The main result of the election held yesterday in Ukraine is, of course, the emergence of legitimate political leadership. Yes, this is hardly a profound observation (after all, that is what elections are for in normal countries), but the task facing the people of Ukraine was anything but simple. They had to hold an election under conditions where a) a revolution had taken place a couple of months earlier; b) the country had lost a major region; c) a civil war was underway in two other major regions (still in its early stages, perhaps, but with real casualties); d) a neighboring country, larger and more developed, was making significant efforts to derail the election; e) the ousted corrupt former leader was financing unrest and violence, together with equally corrupt figures from Russia. and so on. One could add many more points to this list.

And despite all of that, the winning candidate, Poroshenko, received 54%.

His lowest result was 31% in Luhansk Region, where that very civil war is taking place (albeit with understandably low turnout). In major regions that Russian “political analysts” consider anti-Western, his result was above 40%.

Well, it is worth remembering that Putin received 46% in Moscow—a region where 10–15% of Russia’s population lives:

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Believe me, I say this with no pleasure or gloating—more with irritation, really—but it has to be acknowledged that Poroshenko is vastly more legitimate as a president than Putin.

Poroshenko got 54% in: free elections with fair competition; a contest against experienced and charismatic candidates such as Tymoshenko; the absence of media censorship; the absence of fraud; a system where big business (including oligarchic business) could fund whomever it wanted. Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Tihipko, Dobkin, and others clearly received such funding; a process where no one was denied registration, and even fairly outrageous fringe candidates could run; an election in which the entire political spectrum, from liberals to fairly extreme nationalists, was represented.

Putin got 63% under conditions of: allowing only unpopular, controlled candidates onto the ballot—candidates who criticized the authorities only within limits set by the authorities themselves (see the table above); total media censorship and propaganda; full control over all funding; a ban on nationalists participating in the election, supposedly represented by (forgive me) Zhirinovsky; substantial electoral fraud.

Let me repeat: there is no joy here in saying, “Ah, Poroshenko is better than Putin.” We do not know what Poroshenko will be like tomorrow. But the fact that in Ukraine, amid hell and chaos, a political leader is being chosen through a more competitive process and therefore becomes more legitimate—that is a deeply unpleasant and frustrating fact for all citizens of the Russian Federation. What kind of political leader is afraid of competition if even one of the key conditions is present: open access for all candidates, equal access to the media, or the absence of fraud?

It would be hard to accuse me of loving Putin, but even I do not doubt that he would still be a leading contender in a fair election. Which means that he himself has doubts—and so does his whole Churov-Volodin gang (a reference to key Kremlin election and political operatives).

Returning to Ukraine, the legitimacy of its political leadership is also confirmed by the relative uniformity of voting even for candidates at the extremes. Take Yarosh, for example, who, as we were once again reminded yesterday, has become both a bogeyman and an article of faith for Kremlin TV religion:

You can see that he got more votes in Donetsk Region than in Lviv Region? In other words, there are no regions where a candidate who is totally and completely unacceptable to supporters of other candidates enjoys serious backing. Not to the point of people coming to blows over it.

The only fluctuation of this kind that I found was Dobkin’s result in Kharkiv Region:

But first, he is the governor there after all. And second, Dobkin, in my view, is not nearly as much of a symbol of horror for Lviv as Yarosh is for Donetsk.

What does all this mean for Russia? I believe that both a successful election and legitimate political leadership in Ukraine are very good things for Russia. We do not need an unstable country next door. We do not need chaos and hell on our borders. Refugees, soldiers, bearded men with assault rifles—all of that.

Excitable young people can admire photos of men with assault rifles all they like, but a mature and serious public understands that there is nothing good in this for anyone. Who would you rather have living across the landing: a normal family whose children go to school and who spend weekends at the dacha (country house), or hooligans heroically smashing each other’s heads in, bringing the police, and dramatically breaking bottles into jagged weapons—perhaps even to the delight of your teenage son?

Russia’s real strategic interest in Ukraine is for everyone to leave everyone else alone and let people live as they want. Let them calmly buy our gas and other goods. Let them not obstruct our exports. Whoever wants to speak Russian speaks Russian; whoever does not, does not. Some prefer Moscow, others Warsaw. Some eat gefilte fish, others salo (cured pork fat). Whoever wants vacations in Crimea goes to Crimea; whoever does not goes to Odesa. Politicians argue with each other in debates, and when it is time to decide who is stronger and form a government, everyone goes to fair elections.

There will be no idyll, of course. Poroshenko has taken on perhaps the most interesting and the most difficult job one could find. The probability of failure is very high. I think higher than the 54% he received.

However you look at it, there is a civil war. There are also two regions with no lawful authority. There is a very real “fifth column”—crooked officials financed by Yanukovych who will sabotage everything. There is corruption, and by that measure Ukraine is far ahead of even Russia. Probably the number of incorruptible law enforcement and security officials in Ukraine could be counted on the fingers of one hand. And then, finally, there is Putin, who is acting like a maniac and will try to destroy any Ukrainian government without regard for the strategic, rational interests of our own country.

In short, the first step was very difficult, but it was successful—and the next ones will be even harder.

Let everything turn out well. Peace, friendship, gas (instead of chewing gum), mutually beneficial trade, and a calm life.

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