All week, news and speculation about the upcoming sanctions had been appearing in the media, and then on Friday both the EU and the US published new sanctions regulations against Russia. ACF continues its series of publications on the sanctions imposed on Russia. As a reminder, we published information about sanctions in March, again in March, in July, a bit more in July, some in August, and a little more in August.
Now over to Nikita, ACF’s investigations department’s regular author on this topic:
So, what’s new in the September sanctions:
The US decision to place Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz under sectoral sanctions can be seen as the next major warning to the Russian authorities. Until today, the sanctions had included only companies and banks controlled by the state or by Putin’s associates, but now the first genuinely private company has appeared on the list.
With the first sanctions, they were essentially telling Putin’s associates: “Guys, tell your patron to stop, otherwise your businesses will suffer.” Judging by the interview Timchenko gave to ITAR-TASS (a Russian state news agency), he does not really consider his business to be his own. It is the business of Putin’s clique, just like the rest of Russia, and if Putin did not stop of his own accord, that means he is willing to risk his own property. Now the Americans are sending a signal to those who understand what it means to have a business of one’s own and private property, and who value that somewhat more than nominal owners like Timchenko. Lukoil’s development was driven by processes somewhat more complex than owning a puppy from the first litter of the president’s Labrador. With these new sanctions, the Americans are urging private business to think seriously: is it worth continuing to silently support Putin’s actions, absorb ever greater losses, and lose prospects for business development? Perhaps those who actually have something to lose should take the risk, begin to unite, and object to the current state policy.
One more conclusion can be drawn from the information about the new sanctions. There is a clear convergence between US and EU sanctions. This may mean that the EU’s restrained position, driven by its unwillingness to bear losses from imposing sanctions, has become less restrained under US pressure. Or it may be that the risk Putin poses to Europe has grown so much that Europeans are now prepared to incur substantial costs in order to reduce that risk.
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