Boris Nemtsov is being buried today. I will not be able to say goodbye to him—the Moscow courts have informed me that nothing extraordinary enough to justify suspending my administrative detention for a few hours has occurred.
Well then, I’ll come to see him later at Troyekurovskoye Cemetery—he has enough time for everyone now.
I have spent several days thinking all this over, and now I want to share my thoughts.
Without emotion, as much as that is possible.
1. I believe Nemtsov was killed by members of a government (security service) or pro-government organization on the orders of the country’s political leadership, including Vladimir Putin.
The only question is how exactly that order was phrased:
— you must kill Nemtsov
or
— you must carry out a high-profile, shocking operation
2. Enough already with this nonsense that “Boris was killed by an atmosphere of hatred.” What atmosphere, exactly? We have had an atmosphere of hatred since 2007, but in recent months we have been witnessing the organized creation of pro-government extremist-terrorist groups that openly declare their goal to be fighting the opposition where the police cannot.
The clearest and most obvious examples:
Ask any politician-businessman from the Moscow region about the dealings of the “Gromov Afghans” (veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war associated with former Moscow Region governor Boris Gromov), and you will hear a lot of interesting things.
And to get a clear psychological portrait, watch this video, in which an Anti-Maidan activist—the son-in-law of a former governor—explains where his money comes from.
These are the very organizations being created to carry out acts of terror like the one that took place that night on Moskvoretsky Bridge.
3. The extremist-terrorist organizations I am writing about are not being created in response to some “unspoken demand”; they are being created directly at meetings in the Kremlin.
This is not freelance initiative; it is Putin, Patrushev, Ivanov, Bortnikov, Volodin, and whoever else is there. They listened, resolved: create it, approve it, allocate a budget, provide media coverage. And at just such a meeting, the order was given—to arrange a high-profile operation.
4. Please, let us also stop this hypocritical lie that “this is not in Putin’s interests.”
Apparently it is in the Pope’s interests, then.
Nothing is ever in Putin’s interests.
The attempted murder of Oleg Kashin—not in his interests; stupid and groundless arrests—not in his interests; election fraud despite high approval ratings—not in his interests; any attacks on opposition figures—not in his interests; and so on and so forth.
And yet all of this happens precisely because it is in his interests. Let us not lie to ourselves. It is. Fear must keep growing, and economic problems must be offset by police control. If simply fabricating criminal cases does not produce the required level of fear, then demonstrative violence is needed—otherwise no one will believe in your toughness.
As the classics of theater taught us: if in the first act there are Anti-Maidan thugs or bearded basmachi (a historical Russian term for Muslim insurgents in Central Asia) hanging on the wall, then by the third act they must start shooting.
Those who say “this is not in Putin’s interests” can go stand in the same corner as “the killers were not in Duvalier’s interests,” “the Red Terror was not in Stalin’s interests,” and “Pinochet gathered everyone in stadiums to play football.”
This is in Putin’s interests. Open a history textbook—it says exactly that.
5. In the same category are arguments like: “Nemtsov was unpopular and had no influence, so what would be the point of killing him?”
Well then, run through in your mind the current systemic and non-systemic opposition figures and try to make a list of those who are more influential than Nemtsov—those who are more influential in practical terms and create problems for the authorities that cannot be solved with a phone call from the Kremlin to the “opposition figure” and his superiors.
You will not come up with even five names.
Not as kind words for the dead, but as a sober assessment, I say this: Boris was one of the most troublesome politicians for the Kremlin.
The list could go on for a long time. Nemtsov actually did things, unlike many others who merely waited for the moment of the “regime’s collapse”; that was the source of his influence and his danger.
6. The absurdity of the versions put forward by the phony general from the Investigative Committee points additionally to a “Kremlin trail.”
ISIS, supposedly; a murder carried out as a provocation. What nonsense is this?
Unfortunately, since the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee concerns itself exclusively with fabricating criminal cases and PR garbage such as opening endless cases “against genocide and Right Sector” (a Ukrainian nationalist group), we should expect nothing from them except lies and attempts to conceal those who organized the murder.
Again, there is no need to look far—just remember the case of the attempt on Kashin’s life. Every possible version was pursued except the obvious ones: Turchak and Yakemenko. The investigation protects them.
And it will be the same here. Just imagine the Investigative Committee establishing that Nemtsov was killed by “Anti-Maidan” activists or some new batch of “Heroes of Russia” from Chechnya.
Let us even suppose they establish the motive for the murder as “the defense of V. V. Putin’s falsely understood interests.”
What then? They will announce it?
We understand perfectly well that in such a case they would even more quickly announce that the murder had been planned by Berezovsky shortly before his death.
7. The only version of the murder not involving the federal authorities that can be taken seriously is the regional authorities. Nemtsov was making life seriously difficult for the governors of Yaroslavl Region and the local crooks. At all our last meetings, Borya told me about the schemes he had uncovered and how much the regional leadership hated him.
8. Could I be wrong? I am confident in my version, but of course anyone can be mistaken.
The only thing that could disprove my version would be the swift solving of the murder, with the identification not only of the perpetrators but also of those who ordered it. A public trial for them, with full disclosure of the case materials, including operational files. There can be no state secrecy here. If there are materials sensitive to private life, then the relatives and lawyers must be given access to them and serve as our guarantee that there are no dark spots and no gaps in the investigation into the murder of Boris Nemtsov.