Everyone is discussing the RBC article, which says exactly what was very accurately predicted by nearly 9,000 participants in a Twitter poll on December 2—the day after our investigation was published.

The article does not name a single important figure—it is clear that, as before, no one more serious than “the head of a pro-Kremlin foundation” is prepared to defend Chaika publicly. This may mean that the Kremlin is, as usual, leaking information to gauge the reaction, but that does not change the substance of the matter.

The “Navalny problem” is not just the Kremlin’s problem—it is mine as well. In practice, an official, even a completely worthless one, gets a guarantee of staying in public service, because he cannot be removed if Navalny is the one exposing him.

Take Yakunin: as nasty and stupid a crook as he was, they still kept him in place for another two years after we exposed his offshore empire. And then, when they finally removed him, television said: “A note from the special services was placed on Putin’s desk about Yakunin’s offshore assets and his son’s British citizenship.” Right, the special services. That “special service” sits by Avtozavodskaya metro station—it is called the ACF (Anti-Corruption Foundation).

This is an unpleasant fact of our work: the Kremlin dislikes us so much that it will support any ghoul, so long as it is against us. They might even bomb Voronezh (a Russian city; a reference to the ironic expression “bomb Voronezh”) if we were to call on them under no circumstances to do that.

From a rational point of view, it is understandable: it is impossible to admit that some lawyer with three criminal convictions—a marginal figure and a non-systemic opposition politician—put together a gang of 30 people, funds himself through online fundraising, depends on no one, and brings down prosecutors general. Otherwise tomorrow everyone would start self-organizing and demanding the resignation of bad officials.

Though if I were Putin, I would do it differently. I would summon the head of the FSB, he would hand me a thick folder of documents, and I would announce: a successful three-year operation to identify traitors in the Prosecutor General’s Office has been completed. For operational purposes, we allowed certain leaks before the investigation was finished.

Chaika, the Lopatins, the Staroverovs, and the whole gang are escorted out. VTsIOM (the state-run Russian polling center) reports a new record approval rating. Newspapers write that Navalny is simply being used by the FSB for leaks. A couple of million people do not believe it, but to hell with them—they do not believe that Captain Voloshin of the Turkish army shot down the Boeing either. And they do not believe that Serdyukov is honest. Nihilists.

All right, I want to say something else. The question of guarantees of immunity for the Chaikas and the Tsapoks should be considered not in legal terms, or still less political-science terms, but in moral ones.

To keep Chaika as prosecutor general is to take responsibility for deliberately covering up for the head of an organized criminal group.

To grant Chaika immunity is to fully repeat what the “prosecutors’ family” once did with the Tsapok gang. Back then, in 2007–2009, they too were given immunity. We remember how that ended.

We will think not about what the Kremlin has or has not decided, but about what people who are confident they are right are supposed to do—people who are convinced that Russia’s prosecutor general cannot be someone who, in response to the gravest accusations, can only babble about spies.

Yesterday, in addition to the letters already sent, we sent an appeal to every State Duma deputy and every member of the Federation Council.

We demand that each of them submit a formal inquiry and sign in favor of creating a parliamentary commission. A deputy or Federation Council member does not have to wish immediate death on Chaika, but at the very least every one of them should send a request along the lines of “please investigate.”

Based on the results, we will compile a register and distribute this information closer to the elections. A candidate talks about fighting corruption—and we check our list and get a leaflet saying either “supported the Chaikas and the Tsapoks” or “fulfilled his duty as a legislator.”

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