Russia is fighting in Syria, backing the Shiite Bashar al-Assad in the civil war against various Sunni groups (from extreme radicals to moderates), even though the overwhelming majority of Russia’s Muslims are Sunnis. Much has been said about the problems this could create inside Russia, and we tried to examine the issue using sociological methods.
The task turned out to be far from simple. How do you study “Russia’s Muslims”? It is obvious that they are very different—for example, in Dagestan and in Tatarstan. And it is also unclear how to assess the survey results: say we find that 50% of Muslims think Russia is acting wrongly in Syria—but is that a lot or a little? Maybe 50% of Orthodox Christians think so too?
It was from this line of reasoning that one of ACF’s most unusual and interesting surveys was born. We conducted two identical surveys in two different republics—Dagestan and Tatarstan. Since Tatarstan’s population is split roughly in half between the titular nationality and other ethnic groups (mainly Russians), we expected to find enough Orthodox Christians there for comparison. In practice, that expectation proved correct. As a result, within a single survey we were able to cover three large population groups at once—Orthodox Christians from Tatarstan, Muslims from Tatarstan, and Muslims from Dagestan—and compare their views on the questions that interested us.
We began with attitudes toward religious practice. Many people describe themselves as believers, but not all of them strictly observe religious rules:
What is striking is the strong polarization in Dagestan: roughly half of those who consider themselves believers do not actually go to the mosque, while the other half attend regularly. Nothing similar is seen in Tatarstan: in terms of attending places of worship, Tatarstan’s Muslims are much closer to Tatarstan’s Orthodox Christians than to Dagestan’s Muslims.
This becomes even clearer in the following slide:
In Dagestan, people take the most important fast very seriously, whereas Tatarstan behaves in a much more secular way—and it makes little difference whether a resident of Tatarstan identifies as Muslim or Orthodox Christian.
An even more vivid demonstration that Russia’s nominally Muslim regions cannot all be lumped together can be seen in the following question:
So, we have established that we are indeed dealing with three substantially different groups of respondents. All the more interesting, then, is the fact that they view the events in Syria in roughly the same way:
Perhaps the only somewhat noticeable difference appears in the choice of the second answer option: residents of Tatarstan who identify as Orthodox Christians are much more likely than Muslims to agree that Russia should be part of an international coalition (despite all the television propaganda!).
Speaking of propaganda: what about ISIS, the supposedly terrifying group officially designated as extremist?
The responses to this question do not allow for unequivocal conclusions, but it is still noticeable that Muslims tend to be less “afraid” of ISIS, and this is especially characteristic of the more religious Muslims in Dagestan. This is also confirmed by the next question:
Television talks around the clock about ISIS agents recruiting Russian Muslims. Is it true? There is reason for doubt. After all, if such recruitment is happening anywhere, then surely—as we are told—it would be in mountain schools in Dagestan, in local mosques and madrasas. That means respondents there should have been more likely to encounter recruiters’ activities. But the survey shows the opposite: it is Dagestani Muslims who are least inclined to trust television claims about extensive ISIS recruitment efforts in Russia, while Tatarstan’s Orthodox Christians—who are unlikely to have encountered anything of the sort themselves—are the ones who believe it.
Our unusual survey included about a dozen more questions that offer plenty of food for thought. For example, the question of sharia courts throws Russia’s Muslims into deep uncertainty, but if we look only at those who gave a definite answer, we see that one-third of Muslims in Dagestan and one-quarter of Muslims in Tatarstan are somewhat prepared to accept the introduction of sharia courts. At the same time, 17% of Muslims in Tatarstan do not know at all what a “sharia court” is.
And as for the supposedly passionate love of Russia’s Muslims for hijabs, that is dramatically exaggerated. In both Dagestan and Tatarstan, more than 60% of Muslims oppose making headscarves compulsory.