The Savchenko situation is one of those astonishing mysteries that makes you ask, “What on earth is going on in their heads?” No matter how you look at it, this case is bad for Russia. In fact, it directly contradicts not only the country’s long-term interests, but even Putin’s short-term tactical goals.
Even the most unhinged supporters of war with Ukraine can see that the case is fabricated. Olshansky is a good example. Both in the details (she supposedly rode in military uniform by taxi to Voronezh) and in the broader logic (how can an artillery spotter be accused of the deliberate murder of specific individuals?).
From a propaganda standpoint, this is a complete failure. They could have found someone more colorful for the role of the “symbolic Banderite” (a reference to Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera), so that they would only have had to invent 30% of the story instead of 90%. The inconsistencies are far too obvious. On top of that, it became clear early on that Savchenko’s rather courageous personal conduct would blur the intended image, and the Kremlin would not get the effect it wanted.
There is no doubt that Savchenko took part in combat. She is not just a combatant, but a member of a regular army. The army itself recognizes her and does not disown her. There is no need to overcomplicate this: once she is captured, she is a prisoner of war with a special legal status. Putting a prisoner of war on trial as if she were an ordinary civilian criminal is idiotic. I have no doubt that a trial like this also makes a deeply grim impression on Russian military personnel imagining themselves in the same situation.
The trick of transporting Savchenko to Russia with the involvement of a Presidential Administration employee will sooner or later be used as legal evidence of Russia’s involvement in the war. There are already a million and one such pieces of evidence, but this one is weighty and widely known.
Ukraine has gained a new national hero and, once she is eventually returned, a popular politician with sharply anti-Russian rhetoric.
Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s and Ukrainians’ treatment of Savchenko, the complete and demonstrative abandonment of our special forces soldiers, Alexandrov and Yerofeyev, after they were captured, looks especially awful. They are not mentioned, and no public effort is made to bring them back. It looks terrible—shameful—and it is a disgusting practice. Some lousy LifeNews journalists were demonstratively exchanged and supported, but soldiers were not.
For Europe and the United States, Savchenko is an additional lever of influence that costs them nothing. In other words, new sanctions can be justified by citing the “Savchenko case,” but if she is released, there will be no easing of pressure. From the West’s point of view, this is not a bargaining chip. Cynically speaking, their position is: fine, keep her if you’re that foolish—you’re just giving us another reason to kick you.
From the standpoint of prisoner swaps, she is not needed—there are already plenty of people to exchange. I do not believe in the idea of swapping Savchenko for Viktor Bout. Why would the Americans want that (see point 7)?
(armchair pundit mode on) All the fuss around the Minsk agreements now boils down to the West having to decide who has failed to implement them more. And for the Kremlin, the moment is relatively favorable—the parliamentary crisis in Ukraine gives it a chance to say that Kyiv has failed more seriously. But this also gives Kyiv a chance to argue that the demonstrative Savchenko case was one of the reasons why lawmakers are politically unable to do what Germany wants. (armchair pundit mode off)
Most likely, what we are dealing with is a typical case of plain stupidity and stubbornness being passed off as steadfastness. One set of jackasses decided this would make a good propaganda case—putting some Ukrainian servicemember on trial for the murder of a journalist. Another set of jackasses—from the Investigative Committee—cobbled the case together as best they could, leaving the seams glaringly obvious in every direction. A third set of jackasses, even though they understood that times had changed and this kind of case was no longer useful—especially since it had turned out so badly—stubbornly insisted to the highest-ranking jackasses that everything was fine. And then the Chief Jackasses in the Kremlin, as usual, decided that “we must not give in to pressure.”
All the human lives involved—from Savchenko and her relatives to our captured soldiers, who will now also be held “until Savchenko”—have been cast aside. As usual.
I very much hope that Savchenko will be exchanged for Alexandrov and Yerofeyev as soon as possible. They will realize that this has been a complete failure, put out a flood of reports claiming they outplayed everyone, and make the exchange.
People