I’ll keep explaining just how easy it is to uncover corruption in Russia. This is my ongoing argument with all the fools who think that for an organization like ours to do its job, it needs “someone leaking things from the FSB” (Russia’s security service).
Unfortunately, corruption in our country makes so little effort to hide itself that all you need to uncover it is some determination and a bit of time.
To illustrate the point, I took a specific case from our own work and made a new video about it.
How much can be stolen from a 1.5 billion ruble contract? If you believe Dmitry Medvedev’s words, no less than 300 million rubles. I think that in the specific case described here, it’s closer to 500 million rubles.
So: the state defense procurement system. The main “black hole” in the entire public procurement system. In 2015, nearly 2 trillion rubles were spent on it.
Here is one specific tender: the Defense Ministry decided to build a modern military base on the border with Ukraine. They allocated 1.3 billion rubles. The tender was announced.
Several companies entered the bidding — the amount was large, and the work was simple, the kind any construction firm could handle, a great chance to make money. But it turned out the tender had been tailored for “Putin’s chef” — lately he has been the Defense Ministry’s favorite contractor. He knows how to “motivate” generals so effectively that he now handles everything from utilities in military towns to food supply. Here is our major investigation into this.
There was just one problem: in its eagerness to work with Prigozhin, the state customer overdid it and tailored the paperwork to him too blatantly. It was easy for the other bidders to prove the violations to the Federal Antimonopoly Service, and the tender was canceled. That happened back in July.
And of course we kept watching the situation. We stocked up on popcorn and waited to see: how were they going to muscle the contract over to the “chef” next?
The kickback had already been promised — or more likely, the first installment had already been delivered. We figured they’d probably come up with some clever scheme, and wondered how we’d track it.
Yeah, a clever scheme, sure. Completely by chance, we found out that Prigozhin had simply been handed the job with no tender and no state contract at all. And all that time, from July to November, the guy was just building, not giving a damn about any of it.
It all came to light by accident. Someone complained about the illegal construction, and a military prosecutor issued an order over work being carried out without permits. An arbitration court even fined this company, “Megaline” (a Prigozhin-linked firm).
Is it possible to carry out major construction work at a military base without everyone knowing about it — from the unit commander and the “special officers” (security personnel) to the district commander? Of course not.
Besides, obviously no one is going to build for free — tens of millions of rubles would have to be invested. That means either money was shifted to Prigozhin from other contracts, or this one was pushed through illegally. In any case, the size of the kickback paid guarantees that, one way or another, the contract will end up with Prigozhin. Maybe the Defense Ministry will simply buy the facility afterward.
One way or another, I guarantee you that despite any complaints, 1.3 billion rubles from the budget will go to “Putin’s chef,” and he’ll kick back 500 million rubles to the generals and officials who made the scheme possible.
Was this case of corruption hard to uncover? No.
All it takes is the will to do it — and that’s where the real problem lies. ACF has that will; those who are paid to do this job, not so much.