Last week, the publication of a Levada Center poll caused quite a stir. According to it, resetting Putin’s presidential term limits split society almost exactly in half: 48% supported the reset, while 47% did not. ACF’s sociological service also managed, just before the quarantine was introduced, to complete a nationwide telephone survey on the constitutional amendments and the prospect of Putin ruling for life, and we can see that the situation is more complex and more subtle than simply “half in favor, half against.” What matters is that we conducted this survey twice in a row—in February and in March, that is, before and after the introduction of the “Tereshkova amendments” (named after Valentina Tereshkova, the Soviet cosmonaut-turned-lawmaker who proposed resetting Putin’s term count)—and that gives us a very interesting insight into how Russian society actually reacted to the term-limit reset.
It definitely reacted.
Here, take a look at the most important slide:
The most important thing we see here is this: the poll conducted after the term-limit reset shows a dramatic drop in support for the constitutional amendments compared with the poll conducted immediately after Putin announced those amendments in January. The share of respondents who were rather in favor of the amendments fell from 67% to 56%.
Of course, we know that “after” does not necessarily mean “because of.” Why are we confident that this drop is specifically connected to the fact that in March, the original amendments about hot school meals and other meaningless fluff were supplemented with the term-limit reset? Here’s why:
Yes, we already understood in January what was really going on, and even then we asked respondents whether they believed that all these amendments were really being pushed through for one reason only: so that Putin could rule forever. But in January, the Russians we surveyed were still more inclined to doubt that this was the case: only 43% thought the whole point was to make sure Putin never had to leave. The “term-limit reset” opened people’s eyes: now 60% understand what this is really about. The link between this slide and the previous one is obvious: people realized that the constitutional amendments were about keeping Putin in power forever (with hot meals serving only as a smokescreen), and they immediately stopped supporting them.
That, in fact, is the answer to the question, “Why not hold a referendum?” Putin would lose a referendum, so instead there will be a completely unlawful, uncontrolled procedure with a predetermined outcome.
At the same time, there is enormous potential for support for the amendments to fall even further. As you can see, 40% of voters still have not figured out what the amendments are really about. And that is hardly surprising—not everyone even knows about the amendments themselves yet.
Even more importantly, Putin’s desire to rule forever is directly affecting his personal approval rating—the indicator the Kremlin cares about most. It is slowly but steadily sliding downward:
We are recording a drop of 5 percentage points (the share viewing him “positively or somewhat positively” was 64%, and after the term-limit reset it became 59%)—this decline is already beyond the statistical margin of error. It is not a fluctuation but a real drop in his rating. Of course, 59% would still be the envy of any politician in a democratic, competitive system. But for an authoritarian leader with a total monopoly over the mass media, it is catastrophically low. There is no longer any such thing as “Putin’s 86%,” no overwhelming majority that can simply ignore everyone else’s opinion. And what is more, even among those who still support Putin, far from all of them agree with the prospect of him remaining in power after 2024:
In essence, only 30% remain firm supporters of “Putin forever.” Everyone else has doubts to one degree or another. Even if we combine those who answered “yes” or “probably yes,” that comes to 47% (almost exactly the same as in the Levada Center poll), and that is still less than half of voters. In other words, a significant share of Putin’s own supporters opposes resetting his term limits. This is not just a split—it is practically a mutiny on the ship!
For now, it is a virtual, sociological mutiny—but under certain conditions, it could turn into a very real one:
It seems that sociologists in Russia have never recorded this level of protest sentiment before. One-third of Russians expect mass protests if Putin decides to stay in power for life. And a full 6% say firmly that they are ready to take part in them:
Yes, yes—“a full 6%” is exactly right. We are talking, just for a second, about nearly 10 million people. That is a very serious potential for street protest. (The Kremlin understands this perfectly well, and one can say with confidence: the coronavirus epidemic will end, but they will try not to lift the ban on rallies for as long as possible.)
For now, it is fair to say that Putin’s entire scheme with the amendments has confused and disoriented the electorate. Everyone is bewildered and does not understand what to do with all of this—and the postponement of the timeline and the winding down of the campaign that had only just begun, of course, only deepen the confusion.
Let us return to the very first slide: even after the sharp drop in March, 56% are still “for the amendments,” while 28% are “against the amendments.” How does that fit with the fact that a majority opposes resetting term limits, if this is really the same issue? Obviously, for you and me it is the same issue, but many voters are simply confused. To them, voting “for the amendments” and “for resetting term limits” are two different things. That, of course, is exactly what the presidential administration’s strategy for achieving the desired result in the “nationwide vote” will be built on—just remember all those hellish campaign videos featuring Bezrukov and Mashkov, the “Let’s protect the legacy of our ancestors” billboards, and the rest of the Central Election Commission’s creative output. That, and of course the total falsification of this “vote.”
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