The question of whether Russians support the criminal war that Putin launched against Ukraine out of nowhere is of enormous political importance. It will largely determine Russia’s place in the history of the 21st century. It is one thing if Putin was killing Ukrainian civilians and destroying infrastructure with the full support and approval of Russian citizens—as both pro-government polling centers and others are trying to persuade us—and quite another if his bloody adventure is not based on public support. The answer to this question also matters in practical terms: is it worth trying to organize protest against the war? Can there be hope that pressure on Putin from within Russia could force him to scale back the aggression?
But how can this be measured? The standard tool used by ACF’s (Anti-Corruption Foundation’s) sociological service is the classic telephone survey based on a representative sample. It is a fairly reliable instrument for studying public opinion (it has never let us down, for example during election campaigns), but it takes time. A survey lasts a week—and in wartime, far too much changes in a week. Besides, people’s willingness in Russia to talk on the phone, let alone speak honestly, has been steadily declining, and all the more so during a war, when the authorities threaten prison terms for the “wrong” opinion.
So we decided to try a new approach for us: we conducted a series of four very short, rapid online surveys. Each survey included 700 internet users from Moscow; the sample was quota-based by gender and age. The data we obtained, in our view, are extremely interesting. See for yourself:
Here we see a rapid shift in how Russia’s role in the war is assessed. The share of those who see Russia as the aggressor has nearly doubled; the share of those who see Russia as a “peacekeeper” has been cut in half.
Although many respondents are still inclined to blame “the West” for the war, the share of those placing the blame on Ukraine has fallen by half, while the share of those who consider Russia responsible has risen from 14% to 36%—that is, by 2.5 times.
During the first week of the war, the number of people who believe the Russian economy is headed for catastrophe also rose significantly. And those who believed it would pass without consequences were few even on the first day of the war—and a week later there were three times fewer of them.
To analyze these data, an important methodological clarification is needed. As we have already explained, this is not a survey of all Russians—it is a survey only of Muscovites, only online, and only of those who voluntarily agreed to take it by clicking on the relevant questionnaire. We do not know, and cannot even reasonably assume, how these figures relate to the general population of all Russians; in peacetime, we would not conduct such a survey, because its results would have little practical meaning. But by repeating the survey four times over a short period using the same method, we gained a unique opportunity to observe the dynamics of public sentiment. In other words: if the first slide shows that the share of our survey participants who (rightly) consider Russia the aggressor doubled from 29% to 53%, that does not in any way entitle us to say that a majority of Russians now think so. However, this is a very noticeable trend, and we are justified in assuming that similar changes are taking place in other parts of society as well. (It is also worth noting that internet penetration in Moscow is well above 80%, so an online survey of Muscovites differs little from a telephone survey of Muscovites; and that in State Duma elections, party ratings in Moscow and nationwide differed much less than in previous years.)
So, having made all the necessary reservations about the limited precision of our research methods, we can still draw important conclusions.
Never in the entire history of ACF’s sociological service have we seen such dynamics in public opinion. Over the course of just a few days of war, Russians’ attitudes underwent radical change.
The direction of these changes is completely unambiguous: people are rapidly beginning to understand who is to blame for unleashing this war, why it is being waged, and how it will end.
The Kremlin, of course, cannot fail to see this trend either; hence the nervousness and the desperate desire to end the war as quickly as possible.
Anti-war sentiment in society will only continue to grow, and anti-war protest must not be scaled back.
People are ready to change their position. But we need to talk to them and get the truth about the war across to them.
And here is the answer to the question posed in the post’s headline: no, they do not. Even among those intoxicated by propaganda, who believe the nonsense about “Nazis and drug addicts”; even among those who support Putin—most people do not have bloodthirsty fangs. Most are in favor of negotiations, peace, and an end to this fratricidal war.
The raw data can be downloaded here.