Debate: Alexei Navalny and Igor Strelkov

[music]

Good evening. In Moscow, it seems to be 8:00 p.m.

This is Debates Live, a live on-air conversation between

Alexei Navalny and Igor Strelkov.

My name is Mikhail Zygar, and today I will

moderate this conversation, apparently as

someone who has no connection whatsoever

to what is happening or to

contemporary Russian politics. I

study the history of the Russian Revolution and

run the project

1917, but today we have a different story.

A brief recap of previous episodes.

Why, exactly, did this

meeting take place? I am addressing Alexei

Anatolyevich

Navalny with a challenge to hold public

debates. I accepted this challenge because,

first, I am a supporter of open

political discussion and I am not afraid of debates,

and second, in these debates I will prove that

my—our—position is

truly patriotic. Igor

Strelkov outlined three debate topics: how

to defeat corruption, how he plans

to build relations with the West, and what should

be done about

[music]

Donbas. So now I will briefly explain

the rules under which Alexei Navalny and Igor

Anatolyevich Navalny and Igor

Ivanovich Strelkov will debate. Three rounds, as we have already

said, and they begin with questions

that the participants ask each other—

two questions each, in fact. One of them—that is,

the three main questions of the rounds—have already been

announced in the videos. Then there will be

an additional question from each

participant. Then our viewers will have

the opportunity to ask their own questions

to the participants. To do that, write on Twitter

or to me—my handle on Twitter is

Garoov. In any case, be sure

not to forget #DebatyLive. We will

be tracking it, and the most important questions on

the three topics—namely, the fight against corruption,

relations with the West, and

the situation in Donbas—on these three topics

we will put the most important questions to both

participants. And then, at the end

of each round, I will ask one question

of my own. To begin the first

round, we need to determine which of the

participants will answer our question first.

Since all of this is happening in the interests

of the viewers and not in our own interests, we should

try to make everything as

clear as possible.

For transparency, we can do it with rock-paper-

scissors. You'll throw, and—or perhaps

we should toss a coin instead? Though that is also somewhat

the viewers won't see the coin toss. Well, that's

a little

you...

It's up to you. I believe that on such

serious matters, given that these debates

are effectively taking place with a person who

is putting himself forward for the presidency,

we should still be a little more serious.

As a presidential candidate—well, I am running for

the presidency—rock-paper-scissors

is a familiar game to me. I'm ready, but I'm also ready for

a draw. I would like everything to be

fair. Which of you has a

coin?

I'm sure there won't be any problem finding

someone with a coin in this

studio. It's just that our viewers

won't see it. I hope it's obvious—not a Russian one?

No.

A Russian one. Well then, I'll toss it in front of me onto

the table so that at least you

can see it. Which of you calls it? Agreed, Igor

Ivanovich?

Please.

All right then. So, the first question will be answered by

Navalny, and we are beginning the first

[music]

round. So, the first round is devoted to

corruption. Let me briefly remind you what

the question from Igor Ivanovich

Strelkov was, exactly.

The question was: in what way

do you intend to fight

corruption once you come to power, and how will you

eliminate the financial

oligarchy? And, essentially, as a follow-up

to the question, there was an attempt to ask

what will prevent this financial

oligarchy from re-emerging. Your time starts now. Thank you very much.

Mikhail, thank you very much for the opportunity

to once again talk about these

points of my program. And

indeed, the fight against corruption is

the key plank of my program. Once again,

I can confirm that yes, I believe

the fight against corruption is the most important thing,

without which there will be absolutely nothing. And

it was very important to me that in

your address, in your challenge, I sensed

a certain skepticism—as it seemed to me—about

whether corruption can supposedly not be defeated

in Russia at all, that you simply can't

break through all of this. Alexei, I want

to say that I know how to defeat

corruption in Russia, I will be able to defeat it, and

I will prevail over it when I become

president of Russia. And my confidence

is based on the work of this fund, this

foundation, this organization, which is a

non-profit organization. Nevertheless,

it is an opposition organization, but nevertheless

for many years it has successfully

fought corruption. It has exposed

and gotten canceled corrupt tenders worth

tens of billions of rubles, and we have exposed

many officials, and we have published many

We know how to conduct investigations. I

know, and I know what I will do from

day one. Moving on to

complete, absolute specifics. Igor

Ivanovich, to fight corruption, one

main thing is needed, three political things

and several specific measures. Measure

number one, the main one, is the will to act. I

and my team have that will

to fight corruption, so we will

fight both corruption as a phenomenon and

specific corrupt officials. And the three

political things are, first,

political competition and fair elections.

I will allow everyone to run in elections, including you,

including nationalists, everyone who is not

allowed now. Second: independent

courts. Without them, there can be no fight against

corruption. I will make the courts independent,

including from the President of Russia. And

third: free mass media.

I guarantee that the media in Russia

will be free. Those are the three political factors, and

then several specific ones. Number one: I

will pass a law against illicit

enrichment. Right now, everyone online is

discussing the judge who, as you know,

held a $2 million wedding and

people are wondering what should be done about her. Well, I

know what to do with her: under my law,

she would already be under investigation, and then

in the dock. Second, I will introduce the

institution of independent prosecutors. Third, I

will abolish the insane state regulation in

Russia. There are 5 million businesses and millions of

inspections every year. I will reduce

the number of inspections by 200 times when I become

president. And perhaps the most important

of the specific measures: I will reform the

public procurement system. It is 32 trillion rubles every year,

of which six are stolen. We will make sure

that

the beneficiaries of every contract, of every

contractor, are disclosed, disclosed in

all registries, so that it will be impossible

to hide subcontractors the way it is done

now, and so that civil society organizations,

including ones like ours, have the

right to file complaints and gain access

to all documents. These are the measures

that, very soon after

I implement them, will bring Russia

and the citizens of Russia trillions of rubles in benefits

and make it possible to carry out all the other

reforms.

So, thank you to Alexei Navalny.

I think I stayed within the time limit. To Alexei Anatolyevich

Navalny, I think I stayed within

the allotted time. I tried. Now I am moving on to

the question that Alexei asked

Igor

Ivanovich: you seem to condemn corruption,

Alexei Anatolyevich said. So why did you

recently sit under those

portraits? There was a photograph where Igor

Ivanovich is sitting under a portrait of Putin.

Was it really unclear to you before who

all these people were? Have you really only now

seen the light? Was it really not clear to you that

these people have no goals other

than power and enrichment?

Your time has started, your time has started. Well then,

naturally, Alexei Anatolyevich, this

question from you is rhetorical.

Naturally, having spent a long time serving

in the Federal Security Service

in the central office divisions, I

knew perfectly well what

these people were, who they were, and how they

govern the country, and how they handle

the money they supposedly

earn.

In this connection,

I can only say

the following: in 2014, I supported Putin

because I genuinely believed—or rather,

came to believe—that he was carrying out

a revolution from above, because his actions

in foreign policy, which we will

return to later, I think

demonstrated that he had crossed the

Rubicon and had in fact entered into an irreconcilable

conflict with his Western

friends and patrons.

Consequently, I was sure that the next

step—the logical step, the only one that

would allow further progress

toward restoring

Russia’s sovereignty, including

economic sovereignty—would be the cleansing of his

own inner circle. What year was it when we

did not...

interrupt—we will still have time, I think, to discuss that. Yes,

in what year, after what was done with

Crimea, could one

go back? I believed that our

president was a sufficiently intelligent man,

sufficiently aware of his own actions,

to move logically to the next step.

Therefore, for a little more than

a year and a half—specifically until the autumn of 2015—

despite the many contradictions

that

arose from my views of

reality and, apparently, his views

of reality, I reluctantly believed

that in conditions of confrontation with the West,

the president, as supreme

commander-in-chief, had to be

supported. When those illusions

disappeared, the portrait

disappeared as well, just as it had appeared.

The only thing I can say is that when I

was still

serving in the central office of the

Federal Security Service, there was never

one hanging in my office, unlike in other offices,

although I was, in one way or another, a superior there.

a portrait of Vladimir Vladimirovich and

never, starting from

the campaign of the early 2000s, from the Second

Chechen campaign (the Second Chechen War), I did not regard him

with much trust, since, to preface

your—one of your questions—I can

say that I categorically did not

like what he did in Chechnya. From this

I conclude that the presence of certain artifacts on

the walls is not in any way

a compromising factor for me. As for

the rest, we will discuss your remarks a little

later. It seems to me I got carried away

indeed. So now we have

Alexei Anatolyevich asking

a follow-up question to Igor Ivanovich on

the grounds that you still—Igor

Ivanovich, I am not satisfied with your

explanation, and I wanted—I think you, I

apologize, are being evasive. Especially since

you worked in the central apparatus of the FSB (Federal Security Service), as

you

emphasized; you are a Russian nationalist and

a patriot in every interview. By

that year, I had already

been many times at trials where Russian

nationalists were sitting in cages for nothing

on

fabricated charges. By 2011, by

2012, in 2010, we knew that

these people did nothing but steal. But how could you

only in 2014 have

suddenly seen the light when your ideological

friends, colleagues, comrades-in-arms, nationalists

were already being imprisoned across the country? Alexei

Anatolyevich, do not forget that I

starting from 196

served in the military, and even now I

am considered an officer and serviceman, although

I am in

the reserve. Therefore, certain claims

relating to the fact that I toward someone

felt some particular way—those will not be

commented on by me. I knew

quite a lot, I think no less than

you. Moreover, I know many, including those

nationalists who were imprisoned; far from

all of them are angels with wings, far from

it, although many

let us say, were not approved of by me in terms of their convictions

—they were not guilty of what they were accused of

I apologize again. Therefore, in this

respect, I will not comment on how I

felt about it, I will not

do so. I can tell you quite

openly and honestly that starting from

1991, I never supported the

government that was established. Although

it must be said, I did not support the

government that existed before that year either. I never

hid, and do not intend to hide in

the future, that in my personal convictions I

am a monarchist, and for

me, Russia’s ideal is an autocratic

monarchy. Of course, one may smile and

shake one’s head, but nevertheless that is so

therefore I viewed these events, this

regime that arose and was built in 1991

and continued under Vladimir

Vladimirovich Putin, as a temporary

phenomenon, as a transitional stage

toward the restoration of Russia—Russia itself

Russia that will rely on all

of its history, and not only on the Soviet

or only the pre-Soviet period

accordingly, since at that time I

intended to serve, and did serve, and served

Russia as

best I could, without participating in political

activity, I considered myself entitled not to

not

comment on it. Hence all claims against

me about what I saw and what I did not see are point

less. I was not running for president, after all, I did not

announce that I

was going to lead the Russian

state. There are many

different thoughts on this matter; there may be many such thoughts

many. Incidentally, Igor Ivanovich has answered

one of the questions coming in

on Twitter about whether he intends

to run for president. Now you

have the opportunity to ask Alexei

Anatolyevich about his answer to your

question—what you are satisfied or dissatisfied with. I

listened carefully to your answer to my

basic question and understood only one thing:

you are not going to

change anything. You are going to act within

the framework of the system that has existed since

1991, with minor changes, and since

the 2000s under Vladimir

Vladimirovich, who became the successor

to Boris Nikolayevich, you are going to introduce

some very minor

cosmetic changes into this system

which, in my view, in and of itself

produces corruption. I heard nothing

about that. Courts—that is wonderful

A free press is excellent

free elections are great, but I did not

hear how you intend to destroy

the system that breeds corruption. How are you

going to destroy the oligarchic

regime which in itself is the

guarantee of this

corruption? Igor

Ivanovich, perhaps I was not sufficiently clear

in explaining, but to me this sounds like

a prepared question, and you were expecting from me

a prepared answer

to a different thesis. What I described is

not cosmetic change. A free and

fair court system in Russia is by no means

a cosmetic change. Right now you cannot

participate in elections, your

associates cannot participate in elections

I am forbidden from participating in elections, and

to let in anyone who wants to participate, from liberals to

nationalists—these are not cosmetic

changes. Finally introducing laws to combat

illicit enrichment is a tremendous

breakthrough for Russia, because this is precisely

that very oligarchic elite. But

look at all these officials

who earn 3–5 million rubles a year, but

live like Arab sheikhs—they will be

held criminally liable

solely on the basis of a mismatch between income

and expenses. Well, I already cited that judge

from Krasnodar as an example—this is

undoubtedly a revolutionary change in

the good sense of the word. If you expect me

to restore the monarchy, and if only

the restoration of the monarchy is, for you,

something essential—no, I will not

restore it. But under Yeltsin, too, there was

an unjust oligarchic regime, and there were no

real attempts to build

a normal state for Russia’s citizens.

Under Putin, exactly the opposite

process is underway. This very

comprador elite you are talking about

—I completely agree—has

usurped power. They have created a new

aristocracy. They are recreating a feudal

regime. What I am proposing will destr

oy this feudal regime, while at the same time

freeing up enormous sums of money,

enormous resources, and creating new

opportunities for reform in Russia. What

I am proposing is a concrete plan to fight

corruption, and specific measures that

have been used successfully

in many other countries. We are drawing on

that experience.

I know how to make a brief remark, but

this is all political economy and everything else

besides. I think you know that Marxism

was not, in fact, built out of thin air;

Marx did not invent it from nothing, and the theory

of the base and superstructure, I think, is also

well known to you. Everything you said concerns

the superstructure. I heard nothing about

changes to the

base itself. Wait.

As for influence from the superstructure, from the side of

the courts and so on, I do not hear how you

intend to reform the economic

system, the economy, because as long as

the economy remains in the hands of the oligarchy, in

the hands of the oligarchy, you can

shuffle officials around as much as you like, introduce whatever

kind of press you want—the result will still

be the same: one set of crooked

officials will be replaced by others

just as crooked. Whatever you introduce will not

be enforced. Therefore, as a

presidential candidate, I want to hear specifically

how you are going to change the economy,

what you are going to do in this sphere. In

your program, nor in

your answer, do I hear that. So

then, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism,

the base and

the superstructure

political economy—social being determines consciousness.

The base determines the superstructure. So, Igor

Ivanovich, it’s just that you probably do not

have some of the figures at hand.

I will tell them to you now, and it will become

clear where our base really is. You have confused

the base and the superstructure. And those procurements I

was talking about—I am saying that this system

needs to be reformed, and you tell me

that it is some minor trifle. It is 32

trillion rubles a year—37% of Russia’s GDP.

Thirty-seven percent! That is not nothing—that is the country’s entire economy,

which is precisely what belongs

to the oligarchs. And when someone tells me that

corruption is just some minor issue, and

that we should reform something else instead, that means

there is nothing else in Russia, no

other sector of the economy, no other

economic base, besides this one. We need

to get in there; we need to free up

the colossal sums of money that are being stolen

every day. We need to drive out those very

oligarchs. That is exactly what I am talking about. And who

are the oligarchs now? These friends

of Putin—they are the oligarchs. I will free

the country from them. That is the main goal, the main task

of the fight against corruption. Nature abhors a vacuum,

Alexei Anatolyevich, but I did not hear

how you are going to eliminate the very conditions

that produce oligarchs, do you understand? Yes, you may

disperse the oligarchs, let us say—but you do not want to hear

Igor Ivanovich. I repeat once again: that is why

I said there are three political factors:

political competition; I will shorten

the presidential term to four years. I am not

talking about politics—I am talking, in this case,

about the economy, because the fight against

corruption is not only a political

but also an economic issue. All right, I understand

that perhaps you are not hearing me. I

maybe—let us

then give the floor to our viewers and

listen. Or rather, I will now tell you

what they are writing. Many of them do not

specify whom exactly the question is for, and here

the most frequent question concerning

the fight against corruption—I will phrase it. Here it is:

it is formulated as follows: how exactly will you

fight corruption if all

the supposed fighters against it—for example, the FSB, the Interior Ministry, judges, and the prosecutor’s office—

are themselves corrupt? And another version of the same

question: what will happen to the FSB afterward? I think

this question can be put to both

participants, because it is not specified

who exactly it is for. Alexei Anatolyevich answered last,

so now Ivano—well,

since I am not seeking the post of

chief anti-corruption fighter and do not

intend to,

that is, I am not one, I can say what it looks like

My view of this situation

So then, if we are talking about the fight against

corruption in general, then first and foremost

it is necessary to cut the ties that

have been imposed by the oligarchic class itself, that is,

If it comes to that, let us return to

the issue of the West. I think this is connected to

freeing Russia’s economy from the status of

a raw-material pipeline, a raw-material appendage of the West

without this, no one will ever

defeat corruption. I am not speaking rhetorically, I

am speaking to you frankly. The State Duma, of course,

if you do not do this, you will do

nothing. Briefly, on the question of what should be done and how

to deal with the FSB (Federal Security Service), I will say this, as

a state official who has been

here, indeed, Alexei

Anatolyevich is absolutely right: a fish rots from

the head. If honest and capable people are put at the head of the security services,

the security services

will begin functioning normally, and

a process of self-cleansing will begin. But

this is only on the condition that the heads of the security services and

other law-enforcement agencies are not part of

that bureaucratic-oligarchic system, as

they are now. Alexei Anatolyevich, of course, we cannot

leave in their posts those people, those

generals who, first of all,

themselves

are corrupt and observe this

corruption, which in itself is

an official crime. They should not

remain in their positions. But why were you

a general and watching all of this?

But I want to say that, of course, there are enough

people whom we can appoint to leadership

positions—normal, honest people.

There is enough money in the budget to pay

them decent salaries, and the system

will work. If only there were the will to do it. Igor Ivanovich,

regarding your remark—well, as

Dmitry

Anatolyevich Medvedev says in such cases, commenting on our

investigation: “This is some kind of compote” (a muddled mix). You

have mixed in the raw-material economy. Of course, it is

a crucial task to fight against Russia’s position

as a raw-material appendage, but with

corruption this is not directly connected. If

in Russia, those sectors of the Russian economy

that are not connected with raw materials are just as

equally

corrupt. Clear political

measures and specific anti-corruption measures

will make it possible to carry out any

reforms, including getting rid of

the status of a raw-material appendage. It is just, well,

there has to be some logic in

one’s actions, that is all. Alexei Anatolyevich,

the only thing I will say in response is that within

three minutes it is extremely difficult to present one’s view

logically and coherently

on this issue. And to do it in one minute

is even harder. Therefore, in this

case, compote is compote, but nevertheless

it is quite difficult to put it differently.

I think we need to move on to the questions.

Viewers, I think that since our conversation

is going quite lively, we will now

ask—I will now ask one final

question to each of the participants. Especially since

there have not been many questions about corruption. I

think everyone knows Alexei’s attitude toward corruption,

everyone is familiar with his position.

[music]

It is also more or less clear from his answer. So,

here is a question that comes up, and I have somewhat

combined several different questions being asked on

Twitter. They are connected both with your

biography and, in part, with corruption.

Partly so: with whose money did you

organize the incursion into eastern Ukraine,

the seizure of Sloviansk? Where did you get the weapons? Who

financed your operation, if not

representatives of the oligarchs?

Uh, I can say that I got the weapons in

Crimea. There I also got a very small amount of

money, which I had in a very

limited amount. As for the other questions, as an

officer on whom people still continue to

depend, people who are still continuing

to serve and fight, I simply cannot and will not

answer, because an answer

to

that would deprive me of my officer’s honor.

But again, look—I am not the source of these questions.

These questions are not coming from me. This is not

an interview; this is a conversation, a conversation with

the audience. They voiced them, and I am answering. So I ask you to understand

me in advance, those viewers who

say: if you do not want to answer, then you do not want to. All right, then

a question for Alexei Anatolyevich, precisely

about the raw-material appendage. Alexei, what

reform awaits Russia’s oil and gas

resources?

First and foremost, we must stop

exporting raw materials. We still earn

quite substantial

money from them, but we could

earn much, much more. We have

not properly built a single new

oil refinery. Well,

you would think: Putin has been in power for 18 years, 18 years

of huge oil prices—well then, build

plants, process it. Let us sell

petroleum products abroad, some kind of

materials—we would earn more.

But absolutely nothing has

happened here. So of course diversification

of the economy, even in terms of raw-material

exports, is needed, because what does Russia live on?

Oil, gas, mineral fertilizers—that is,

the most primitive forms of exports.

I am ending the first round here. To be honest,

I do not know about our viewers, but I am not

impressed by our participants’ answers.

I hope that in the second

round the answers will be much sharper. Especially since

it is a much more populist topic.

[music]

Topic. So, the second topic is relations with

the West. So, who is starting?

Who started before? So now Igor Ivanovich

will begin answering.

And why do you keep repeating this nonsense that

the West is the enemy? You should understand that

we have completely different problems, for example

Islamism, the North Caucasus, and so on.

Then Alexei listed the problems

that seem to him more important than

the West’s machinations. Your time. Well then,

I believe that we need to look at

the root of the problem, once again go back to the

2000s and ask:

who helped build the system

that you criticize so desperately, though I

criticize it quite harshly myself? Who

covered for it? Who allowed our oligarchy

to take trillions of dollars out of Russia?

Who helped privatize the Soviet

economy—perhaps not very efficient in the

consumer goods sector, but effective in other

areas—and in this way

ended up being swallowed up precisely by Western

companies and destroyed? Who, so to speak,

helped turn it into a raw-materials pipeline, and

who is interested in it remaining

that raw-materials pipeline? I answer

this question quite logically: in this

the countries most interested are, first and foremost, the

Western countries. One could broaden that, of course,

and add Japan and so

on. That is not important. It is they

who are interested in nothing being produced here

except raw materials or products of

primary processing.

They were interested in this for all 27

years, they are interested in it now, and

they will remain interested in it.

Next, that concerns the economy. Now as for

politics: no one has ever needed a strong Russia

throughout its history, starting from

times probably even before Peter the Great

(the Russian tsar who westernized the country). It has always been the aim, one way

or another, to break it into smaller pieces and subjugate it.

That has not changed, so speaking at all about

any change in the West’s position on

this, I consider meaningless.

Further, the West is categorically opposed to

the reunification of the Russian people, who

were split apart by the borders drawn by the Bolsheviks

and then torn apart again in 1991

while still alive, so to speak.

And how strongly it opposes this we can see after

the events of that year. And I really do not

understand how we are supposedly together with the West

when Western countries, the United

States, and NATO deploy troop contingents to

the Baltics and place missile defense systems in Poland,

and in every possible way strengthen the once again greatly

weakened grouping around Russia after 1991.

I am not even

speaking of the restoration of an absolutely

Russophobic regime and its direct support by every available means.

Therefore, in my view,

the West was and remains our economic and

political enemy. Moreover, the West

is interested in preserving the comprador

elite that currently governs

Russia, or at best replacing it with

something even more

to its liking. Thank you, Igor Ivanovich.

Alexei Anatolyevich, Igor Ivanovich

asked you a question: how do you plan

to build relations with the West? Will you

support the WTO, and will you

oppose attempts to fragment Russia

which, as is well known, were being made even

before the collapse of the Soviet Union and

are being made by the West now? Relations

with the West, with the East, with China, with Africa

and Southeast Asia—I will build them

in such a way that it is beneficial to us.

That is the prism through which I see it: is it beneficial

for Russia? And forgive me for such a perhaps

primitive approach: do the citizens

of the Russian Federation earn more

from it? That is the basic thing. I just wanted

to return to your answer,

because, well, it is, you know, a somewhat

childish position: in 1991

all our troubles came from the West. You

have surely seen those remarkable

documents from St. Petersburg City Hall from the time of Sobchak

and Putin, which described how

Vladimir Putin, together with his

associates, who are now

federal ministers, carried out schemes

with precious metals, selling them

abroad. Was that the West? I do not know—

did Chamberlain come there and teach Putin

to fiddle with precious metals? Was it the West

that conducted the loans-for-shares auctions here? Of course not.

Of course.

Of course there is an international division

Every country acts fairly

selfishly. And this is not just some abstract

West in relation to Russia—does Germany

not compete with France? And does

France not jealously try to defeat

the United Kingdom and Germany economically in

Europe? Of course it does. Every normal

government defends its own interests.

And of course, well, European countries,

European politicians—is it really in their interest

for us to sell to Europe—when 42% of our

trade is still with Western countries—

not raw materials, but at least

petroleum products? Of course not. They

want the oil refineries

to be on their territory. But these are simply

rational actions in pursuit of their own interests.

Trump acts in the interests of the United States, Mexicans

in the interests of Mexico, Canadians in the interests of Canada,

Germans in the interests of Germany first, and then

in the interests of the European Union, and only in

Russia, truly, does the elite act in

for their own personal corrupt

interests. These people are, well, rootless

cosmopolitans, excuse me — they have no roots, no

tribe; it makes no difference to them whether it is the West or not the West.

If tomorrow it becomes выгодно for them to keep

their capital in Hong Kong or Singapore

or in Zimbabwe or somewhere else, they will just as surely

also

reorient everything toward the West.

And all those troubles that arose because of

our own officials, because of our

government. And as for the WTO, I

cannot help but note here, unfortunately,

that many people are simply saying things

that are evidence that, well, it is unclear whether you

understand what is happening. You, Igor

Ivanovich, unfortunately keep repeating that

it was not the West that forced Russia to join the WTO.

It was Russia that spent many years trying to

join it, because it was in our interest

to do so. Russian

metallurgical companies carried out a massive lobbying

campaign in order to get into the WTO.

They spent 15 years on this so that

trade wars would not be waged against them, and

who negotiated the terms of accession to the WTO?

Putin. I would have conducted those negotiations differently.

So, Anatolyevich, your attitude toward

the WTO — what would you do in the post of

president? The WTO is a trade

organization; the whole world is in it. For

most sectors of Russia’s economy right now,

the conditions

and the current situation make WTO membership beneficial. If we

leave the WTO tomorrow, that very West of yours

— the West that you consider an enemy —

will applaud, because

a huge number of Western companies

will be able to squeeze our exporters whenever they want.

Trade agreements are complicated. At

the present moment, we simply must

negotiate.

The WTO is an organization about a country’s efforts

to defend its interests.

Russia

the government our interests just

does not defend them. Now an additional question regarding

what we heard from

Alexei. Igor Ivanovich, still, I

do not really understand what it means to sever

some kind of ties between someone and someone else.

Look, you say that we must sever

ties with the West, that the West is our enemy. Vladimir

Vladimirovich Putin and his entourage

are the main exponents of Russian non-citizen

Finland, state contractors — the Rotenberg brothers

their nephews, they are there too, in Finland, and so

on. I still have time. They are the West.

Timchenko and Rotenberg — that is the West. They are

the occupation colonial administration

of the West in Russia, precisely the same one that

the West installed here in 1991

and continues to support vigorously.

A brief clarification: the Rotenbergs and Timchenko

and all the rest — it was the West that brought them here.

That is, they did not emerge from Putin’s childhood circle;

the West brought them here. When

the British came to India, they did not bring

all the officials there, nor did they place them everywhere.

Most of the so-called

Indian Empire was governed by the same

nabobs, shahs, and sultans — that is,

local feudal lords who became

performers of the functions of British officials.

So there is nothing surprising about this.

The same situation has simply repeated itself here.

Having conquered and subordinated the country,

mostly, by the way, not directly by force of arms, and in

our case specifically not by military force,

they found the people who run

the economy and politics in the interests of

Western partners. In fact, the whole

policy of Boris Nikolayevich (Boris Yeltsin), and after

him, to a significant extent until

2014, and now that of Vladimir

Vladimirovich, has followed this, this

corridor. May I make a brief clarification, if

I may? I still do not really understand.

Let us imagine that you can do such

things. Please explain to me whom in

the West we are supposed to defeat so that in Russia

there would be no Rotenberg, Timchenko, and all the rest of

that crowd. We do not have to defeat anyone

in the West. But if you

had listened carefully to my question — by the way,

I did listen. Yes, in your main allotted time

you still did not answer; you did not touch at all on

the most important question: that Russia

is a divided country. Germany was allowed

to reunify, but Russia is not allowed

to reunify. Again, you are ignoring that

question, but I think we will return to it

in the third part, about borders drawn

arbitrarily across the living body of the Russian

people

by the Bolsheviks, which are not

ethnic boundaries. The West is using all

its strength not only to preserve these

borders, but also to adjust them

in favor of the country’s further disintegration. What, then,

is the West to us in this case, as

a state? You spoke a great deal

about citizens of the Russian Federation, whereas I am

speaking first and foremost about the Russian people, and

secondly — which is also important —

about the citizens of Russia. So,

for me, any Russian living outside

the borders of Russia, the Russian Federation,

has exactly the same rights as any

Russian citizen. Well, sorry, that is how it is. If you

want to make a brief remark, you may. I

will simply turn to you. A brief remark: it seems to me

that you have not followed closely enough

my political biography. In those

years when you were still serving — not that I am trying

to needle you — in the central apparatus of the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service),

and not speaking on political matters, I was with

a person with whom I now strongly

I parted ways with Zakhar Prilepin on this.

In a sense, your colleague.

I signed the manifesto of the Narod movement, which stated

that this was Russia’s most important problem and

task: that the Russian people have

a truly enormous

wound, a tremendous problem — Russians

are the largest divided people in

Europe. That is why I have spoken openly on these issues

for many years, and I continue to do so.

But excuse me, if you are saying

that the Bolsheviks carved up the borders while the country was still alive,

but it was the Bolsheviks who

drew them. So what are you proposing I do now?

For the sake of some vague idea of fighting

the West, are we supposed to

So, do you recognize these? — I recognize

the current borders of the Russian Federation.

Of course. — The ones drawn precisely

by the Bolsheviks, correct? I am in 2017,

and in 2017 the Russian Federation

has borders. But actually, right now we are just

I am, in fact,

anticipating your remark and want to

ask you a general question from

the viewers. I’ll phrase it roughly like this:

is it possible

to restore — how is it possible to resist

the West and restore Russia to its former

borders, and is it possible to restore in

Russia a monarchical system? I think

that is roughly what you were just

about to comment on.

A brief remark: once again, I want to emphasize, as I have

always stressed — do not confuse

this with some kind of programmatic position.

As for a monarchical system,

at the present moment, restoring

autocracy in the form it existed

in 1917

is impossible, if only because

at that time

the overwhelming majority of the population of the Russian

Empire was Orthodox Christian, or otherwise

professed another religion.

And so restoring it within those borders is also

impossible — within the borders of the Russian Empire,

naturally, if we are talking about Finland

and Poland, and the rest as well, it is impossible.

However, I believe it is necessary

to restore the natural boundaries

of settlement of the great Russian people,

which, in my view, consists of three

main parts: Great Russians, Little Russians,

that is, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.

The question is: should we start a military

operation against Kazakhstan tomorrow in order

to seize northern Kazakhstan, where

Russians live? The answer is no. What you are saying

is demagoguery. So we are supposed to restore everything —

but how?

What, launch a military operation tomorrow

against Belarus? No need. — Well, that is

what I’m asking you. You are planning to be

president, after all. I stand for

my position is this: I stand for

giving Russian citizens the chance

to live normally, to become more prosperous, to

develop, so that Russia no longer has this

horror and nightmare where you go to a hospital

in the Moscow region

and the ceilings are collapsing. I believe that

for the sake of these chimera-like ideas — let’s

restore all of this — we cannot. Do you

really believe this can be done?

If we do not restore, including the economic

integrity of the former country, then do not

forget: it is possible to do something right now,

right now, immediately — simply take action and

do it. In three years, Russia could be living

significantly better; Russian citizens could

be earning — excuse me again for the

simplistic approach — salaries twice

as high, through normal methods of

reform. We are drifting a little — we are drifting

very far

off topic. I would say this strongly

reminds me of something, and I would even say

it reminds me of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (Russia’s first president), who also

promised the same thing in 1990 and 1991.

Not in exactly the same words,

but it was the same promise. Just wait,

the 500 Days program, and then we would

all start living well. The 500 Days program was not

adopted. Boris Nikolayevich promised a lot,

but unfortunately he surrounded himself

with people like Vladimir Vladimirovich

Putin and Anatoly Borisovich Chubais,

who, incidentally, still to this day

sits very comfortably on enormous amounts of budget

money. And Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin

carried out no democratic reforms at all.

He did not fight corruption; he rode a

trolleybus a couple of times and declared

that he would fight the nomenklatura (the Soviet-era ruling elite), after

which he began rebuilding that very nomenklatura

and turned his inner circle into

billionaires. I have an absolutely clear

program, completely the opposite of that,

and it is aimed at the interests of citizens. No, unfortunately,

there is no particularly strong, clearly expressed

interest among our audience in the subject of the West.

It seems to me that this topic does not really

concern our viewers very much, so I will ask

perhaps one more question. Alexei

Anatolyevich Navalny is being asked how, at

the present moment, relations with

the United States and the European Union can be improved, and how

relations with Trump should be built. This

probably concerns our third

question. First of all, in order

to resolve a significant part of the issues concerning Donbas,

Ukraine, and everything else, it is necessary

to implement the Minsk agreements so that

most of the sanctions can be lifted, while some

of those sanctions will never be lifted. Overall,

once again, this whole topic

of normalizing relations is also

Much of what Igor Ivanovich says is demagoguery.

These countries will always act in

their own interests. Trump will act

in the interests of the United States, and Europe will be very

far from pleased if we really

start getting rid of our status as a

raw-material appendage, because, well, they do not

want that. They want crude oil

to keep flowing to their oil refineries.

Therefore, we should not be thinking about

how to normalize relations with

the West; we need to think about how to

normalize our own country, and that is our

main

task. Mr. Ivanovich, since you

talk a lot about the West, users

are asking—Twitter users: who

exactly is “the West”? Could you explain

specifically, more specifically than in a single

word, what the object of your indignation is?

It is a group of the most economically developed

countries, mostly united in the

North Atlantic bloc, led by

the United States. That, for me, is

the conventional “West,” if you can put it that way. Well,

there are, of course, certain people, certain

organizations. Yes, naturally, there are

people, there are organizations.

These are the heads of oligarchic corporations

that significantly influence

politics both in the United States and in

Europe.

It is an established state apparatus.

It is political

systems. I do not remember all of them politically—why should I

name them one by one? An intelligent person understands

what I am talking about: the United

States.

And when you speak of the West and the Euro-Atlantic

bloc, the Atlantic countries, we can see

right now that a huge

conflict is taking place: Trump wants European

countries to pay more into NATO, and they do not

want to pay. The contradictions between

countries, even within the EU, are enormous. Yet you

describe the West to us as essentially

a monolith. They can quarrel among themselves as much as they like,

but they have common interests

that they will defend, and

always do defend, with a very hard, unified

force, as one

front. These interests consist in the fact that

the biological and

mineral resources still remaining on Earth must first and

foremost serve their prosperity.

So how much has the policy

of the United States and of that same

North Atlantic bloc changed after

1991, after the disappearance of

their global rival, the socialist

system?

Before 1991, the United

States and the conventional West

did, yes, turn into showcases those countries to which

they gave help in the

struggle against socialism

and, earlier, against feudalism.

They rebuilt Japan,

which had been devastated almost to rubble, and

even allowed it to compete within

their own sphere; West Germany as well, and so on and

so forth. Name me even one

country that America and its allies entered

after 1991, after

the global adversary disappeared, and which they

did not destroy but instead

rebuilt. What did they do? They smashed

Yugoslavia. Name me even one

prosperous country from among the former parts of

Yugoslavia. Look at Iraq, Libya, and now Syria.

Igor Ivanovich, everything you are

saying leads to one conclusion: it means that no

“West” is to blame at all, but rather the people sitting in

the Kremlin and the Government House are

the real villains who are preventing us from

developing and are keeping us as a raw-material

appendage. It was not the West, not Trump, who made it so

that 70% of our exports are made up of oil.

Excellent. Then I will now wrap up

our second round. But this time, unlike

the first time, I will not ask a question of my

own. Now, from me, a short rapid-fire

question—literally one for 10 seconds, a yes

or

no. In the history of the Russian opposition, there have been

different

attitudes toward the West and toward how the West

should impose sanctions on Russia.

For example, an opposition figure who lived

100 years ago, Maxim Gorky,

wrote articles saying that the West should not

lend money to the Russian government

and should impose sanctions on the government.

Academician Sakharov supported

economic sanctions against the Soviet

Union. Alexei Anatolyevich, do you

support maximum sanctions

against the Russian

Federation—against people, and

against...? Like Gorky, I wrote an article for the newspaper

*The New York Times* saying that yes, I believe

sanctions against oligarchs and Putin’s

friends—I, of course, as a citizen of Russia,

am against sectoral

sanctions. I consider sanctions against

Putin’s

inner circle effective; even against Russian citizens, sanctions

must be imposed, of course, if it is in the interests

of Russian citizens. And, Ivanovich, you talk a lot

about the West. Have you been to any Western

countries? Tell us where you have been, and in

which foreign languages do you read

and speak? Good question. No, I have not been to

Western countries; I have not been to

Europe at all, except for Yugoslavia during

the Bosnian war, and passing through Hungary

and Romania as well, on duty during

the Kosovo war in 1999, literally.

Only for a very short time, and not in any other countries.

I have never been to Western countries, although they are mentioned quite often.

It comes up quite often. My older sister, because of her work,

in business... We are speeding everything up, and

we are starting the third

round. So, the third round is about the situation in

Donbas and in Cr

Crimea, which, which was surrendered, and Ivano...

Accordingly, what will you do with

Donbas or Crimea? Are you going to

hand them back to Ukraine? And further on,

there is the characterization of Ukraine as a place where

there is, in Igor's view, a fascist

leadership. Thank you very much.

This is an important question. Igor Ivanovich, I want

to begin answering it—not from afar, but simply by saying this:

I would like you, from my answer to

this question, from the way I approach it,

to understand the essence of my

presidential program as well. So,

first: last night there was news that

Russia had entered the top five countries

worst for pensioners to live in.

The day before yesterday there was news that

Russia's natural population decline

had tripled. The country is dying out, and

third: every single day I see

notices from Russian hospitals saying that

Russian citizens must come—and

must come, you'll understand in a moment—

must come to hospitals with their own

bandages and iodine. And this has a direct connection to Donbas,

because the war

that you started is an expensive thing,

one that is destroying Russia's economy,

that is taking from citizens of the Russian Federation,

from my fellow citizens, whom I am running

for office to protect, their last money—

their last money. Twenty million people are below the poverty line, and

you are de facto telling me: Alexei,

you must finance wars—huge,

costly wars. So, Igor

Ivanovich, my answer is no: Russia cannot

sustain this and cannot afford

to wage war. Of course, the tragic

events in Donbas are tragic for everyone; they are

tragic events, terrible deaths.

Ten thousand people have died, and even now

far fewer people are dying, but they continue

to die. But forgive me for

this phrase: a bad peace is better than a good war.

There are the Minsk II agreements. I know that you

do not agree with them. Well, I do not know whether to call

them your colleagues or now

your opponents—the leaders of these

republics—they were part of this process.

The Kremlin, unloved by both me and you, was part

of this process. Europe, the United States, and Ukraine were

part of this process. In the Minsk

agreements I see provisions that are, well, extremely

important for you and for us—for everyone. These are

the special status of Donbas, enshrined in

the Constitution, language, elections, and so on and

so forth. It will be difficult—monstrously difficult—

to implement all of this. But it is still better,

forgive me, to implement it than to fight,

because Russia has no money for this war

and cannot wage it. In your

most recent interview, well, you said

something monstrous: literally the day before yesterday, 'We

will still fight Ukraine over

Donbas.' No, we will not. We want to, and are

categorically opposed. Already now we have

3 million refugees—1.5 million from one side

and 1.5 million from the other side. As president

of Russia, what am I supposed to do with these

refugees? They are living in Rostov Region,

they have neither salaries nor jobs. Therefore,

I would like to stop all of this. I would like

a peaceful settlement in Donbas and

would like to end the war. In this,

the country is interested.

The country has a stake in this. So now a question for Igor Ivanovich:

Why were you silent for three years about who shot down

the Boeing, and who shot down

the Boeing? I will answer the same way I answered before:

the militia did not shoot down the Boeing, because it lacked

the means with which it could have

shot it down. All the air defense assets

that were at my

disposal included five Igla MANPADS

and one Strela-10, which at the time of the Boeing's سقوط

was in Zugres and was covering

Zugres accordingly.

The militia under my command could not have shot down the Boeing,

simply no way. I cannot and will not give any other comments

on this matter for

one simple reason: I did not participate in

the investigation and am not even interested in it

on principle. That is all I wanted

to say on this subject. And now I

will use the remaining time to

criticize you a little.

You said a great deal here about

the fact that while I was serving in the FSB (Russia's Federal Security Service),

you were already a Russian nationalist, you were already

speaking up for the Russian people. Well then, where are

the Russian people in your view, Alexei Anatolyevich? Are they

only in the Russian Federation for you? And

those people who, after 1991,

millions of Russian people, remained outside

Russia's borders—are they not Russian? Do they

have fewer rights to our common

destiny and to what is ours in common? They want

to stay alive, they want to remain

alive; they do not need war, Alexei

Anatolyevich. Excuse me, their

rights are being brutally trampled, first and foremost

their cultural rights. Excuse me, no one would have

risen up either in Crimea or in Donbas if

—forgive me—you had been there. Here I was

asked whether I had been to Europe. No, I had not.

But I was in Crimea and I was in Donbas, and

if the situation had developed differently, I could have

been in Odesa or I could have been in

Melitopol. We were expected

everywhere. For 25 years, over the years since

1991, Russians...

The people of Ukraine grew tired of the moral and

cultural genocide—quiet, of course—

that was being carried out against them.

They were tired of being treated as second-class people. And

has it become easier for them now? No, it has not.

It has not become easier, and that is my main, fundamental

complaint against Vladimir Vladimirovich

Putin. You say that you would easily

end the war in one stroke—you would hand over

Donbas. You say that you would unilaterally

transfer the border to Ukraine and

fulfill your... I have your...

literally, this is what you just said.

In previous interviews, you said you intended

to hand over the Donbas border to Ukraine. I

looked carefully—I can quote it.

One of the points was that you said you would

transfer the Donbas border separately from

the issue of Crimea. Well, immediately after that

the question of Crimea would arise. Alexei Anatolyevich,

we have—I have very little time, 3

seconds—but I conclude that you have never

been a nationalist, and certainly are not

one now, judging by what you

have said. And it is highly doubtful that you are

a patriot. Well, as for Crimea, I think we should discuss it separately.

Ask an additional question.

Go ahead, Igor Ivanovich. First of all,

this juggling of yours—nationalists, non-

nationalists—none of that matters.

Do you understand? And how can one regard as

a true nationalist—using your own

terminology—a person who

keeps emphasizing that he is an officer everywhere, yet

sat in the state authorities, sat in the FSB (Russia’s security service),

watched all this injustice and did not

say a single word? Is that how Russian nationalists behave?

Apparently not. As for

the issue of Russian nationalists: half a year

ago I appeared as a witness at the trial of

Alexander Belov—a perfectly genuine

nationalist. They threw him in prison on

what was basically a fabricated sentence, just like

dozens of other nationalists. So please do not

make some kind of

claims against me about whether I am a patriot or not.

Because my position is patriotic;

it is real. And yours, excuse me,

for the perhaps lengthy comment,

is hypocritical.

Russians were sold out in Turkmenistan for a gas

contract. Russians were driven out of Uzbekistan.

Six hundred thousand Russians were driven out of Chechnya, but you

you understand everything—you only started being so

appropriative.

But only at the point where it is advantageous to Putin

do you speak out, and where it is not advantageous to Putin...

Let me ask a question: in what year did you graduate from university?

Graduate? I graduated from university in ninety-

five, if I’m not... Do you know where I was in

ninety-... year? You should carefully

study this. In that year, having a higher

education and fully having the

opportunity to receive an officer’s rank,

nevertheless I did not wait for that and went

as a volunteer to fight in Chechnya. I fought there

...

In the year when I graduated from the Moscow

State Institute of History and Archives,

having no military

specialization and not yet having completed military

service, the very next day after defending my

thesis I took my Mosin rifle (the classic Russian three-line rifle) and with my

friend, who was later killed, went to Transnistria

to defend the Russian people. What does that mean...

For the second Chechen war, I wrote a pile of reports, and in

the end, from that year until 2005,

I was in Chechnya. I was there—allow me, not in

words alone.

You may believe me. So when you

start making some kind of

claims against me about who defended what and

telling stories about some Belov

Potkin who, excuse me, never defended Russians

in any way other than with his tongue—well, excuse me,

after that it simply looks ridiculous.

Alexei Anatolyevich, simply ridiculous. Unlike you, I

defended Russians not only

in Donbas, and I came to Donbas not

to unleash a war, as you accused me of doing,

but to defend the right of the Russian people to

self-determination, to reunification with the main

part, to reunification into a single

state. And why is it, Igor

Ivanovich, that since 2014 you have not been there?

I will answer for you myself: because

those people who are now in Donbas might kill you.

You say this is not

a reproach; I am simply saying that.

Please listen to me. I will formulate

my question. So, you believe that in

Donbas something is happening, or

something good was happening, but in the words of

Igor Ivanovich—whose interviews I read regularly—we know that in Donbas

we know that in Donbas

there is a corrupt regime of murderers; your

former comrades, militia commanders,

are being killed by various Wagner private military companies

protected by Putin’s cook (a reference to Yevgeny Prigozhin), as we are investigating.

So forgive me, but the fact that you

have such a heroic biography, that you went

to fight here and went to fight there, does not

change the whole system, in which as a result

of what you did, there is now sitting there

a gang of corrupt officials and those people who

would kill you if you went there. Igor

Ivanovich, right now you are answering Alexei

Anatolyevich’s question and then immediately

asking your own question. And that is precisely

my main complaint against

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin: that in

2014, when it was possible to annex to Russia—or at least give

to Russia, or at least give the opportunity

for all the Russian regions

of Ukraine to determine their own future, at a time when both the financial and

economic situation of Russia was

fairly solid—he did not

do it. And since you reproached me for that...

Why I ended up here rather than in

Donbas, I can say the following: I was not

afraid that I would be killed. If I had been afraid

of being killed, I would not have gone either to Crimea

or, all the more so, to Donbas. Believe me, there

were plenty of situations when I could have been

killed — you may not believe it, but in any case, if

I

had had a choice, had had the opportunity to choose

for myself and remain in Donbas, I

would have stayed in Donbas. Unfortunately, I

was given such conditions that

I could not remain in Donbas. What exactly those were,

forgive me, but as a military man I cannot answer you

for now. This is already the third time you have said that

there is military secrecy and you cannot

answer the question now. Yes, Igor Ivanovich is answering,

and then the question is asked precisely — and

I emphasize this — this is where my

main complaint regarding Ukraine lies: toward

this government, toward Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin)

personally, and toward his entourage. But Alexei

Anatolyevich, listening to you, I understand that in

fact, if you differ from

Vladimir Vladimirovich on this issue,

it is only for the worse. Because he,

however clumsily and imperfectly,

having created these criminal regimes,

which, by the way, are not much worse than the one in Kyiv, but

for a number of reasons

poorer — at least he leaves open the possibility

for future reunification, which is what

my comrades in Donbas fought and died for.

In my militia there, 95% were

locals, not Russians who had come there; only 5% of my

men were volunteers. That is what they

died for. And you are going to hand them

back to Ukraine. In that respect, you

are, forgive me, much worse than Putin in my eyes.

Do you have a question for Alexei Antonovich? I

don’t even know; I think maybe

there are too many questions. May I

just comment on the answer then?

Then let us give the floor — of course

we will give the floor to our viewers. Most of the

questions are for Igor Ivanovich, and one

of them is this: Why did you first begin

posting on Twitter the joyful news about

an An-26 being shot down — “a birdie fell” — and then

frantically delete it when it turned out

to be about the Boeing?

I answer: I wrote nothing on Twitter,

because I was not on it. Nor was I

present on any of the social

networks. The only place where, as of July 2014,

I posted my reports

was the FT section of the

Antiques Forum. All my reports from that time

are preserved there in a separate section. If

anyone is interested in what I wrote on

that day, they can look it up and verify it.

I did not write that message, that is all.

Excuse me, there is on the internet, on the internet

there is an anonymous

video recording — anonymous, I do not know who

the author is — where it is stated that this

message was not taken from my page

on the Antiques Forum. I can give my word of

honor, I can swear on the

Bible that I did not write that

message. But on the other hand, it makes no

difference whether people believe me or not. The most

common question users ask

Alexei Navalny is this:

Do you consider

Strelkov a war criminal, and how

do you envision a trial of Igor Ivanovich

Strelkov? Well, for me, a war

criminal — I do not like throwing around

phrases and such, you know,

labels. Igor Ivanovich likes to

say, “We are nationalists, patriots, and you are not,”

and it turned out from the debate that

after all he likes Putin more, and

more than that, Igor Ivanovich, you still believe

that he will restore something there, just as

you believed back in 2014, and

still do now,

while understanding that you are deceiving yourself.

As for war criminals,

that is a precise term. If he killed

non-combatants, if he committed certain

acts that are directly listed in

legal documents, then any

person, including Igor Ivanovich, would be

subject to legal proceedings. If

it is established that non-combatants were killed, or

that he enslaved someone, or

engaged in looting, then whether he is recognized as

a war criminal is a matter for the court, not for

Alexei Navalny. I can say

politically that I do not like his

position on Donbas; it is harmful,

absolutely. He is in fact saying, well, I

cannot debate Putin, Putin is afraid to

debate, but Strelkov here — in effect, Igor

Ivanovich — is now voicing Putin’s

position, and I am arguing with him politically. And

matters concerning war criminals will be

dealt with by the courts.

And Igor Ivanovich, a question for you:

Has anyone at all among the people

living in Ukraine been better off after what you

did there in 2014? I mean both

eastern Ukraine and Ukraine as a

whole. I believe that whether things became

better for them or not can only be

judged by the outcome of this war, which

is still ongoing. We already have results now.

What results?

Wait, that is just as

rhetorical a question as asking whether

life became better for the people of Ukraine in 1943,

when Stalin decided to liberate it from

the Germans. In my view, without the reunification of

Russia, without the full reunification of

the Russian people and the revival of our country

in whatever form, there will be

impossible—completely impossible for us.

We were torn to pieces, and until those pieces

are put back together, all the fine words about how

we can now, within one separate

territory of the Russian Federation, manage

to rebuild—

they have absolutely no chance of

being realized. How can one even talk about

how, without the reunification of the Russian

people, after leaving nearly a third

of Russian people outside the country's borders, we have the right

to build a new Russia? How can we

do that? To me, that is absurd. To me, it is

impossible. Go on, ask the next question.

Well, you've combined several questions into one, and

what should be done with the current

leaders of the DPR and LPR (self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics), and also what

should be done with—what would you do with

Ramzan Kadyrov, who heads

Chechnya? That's quite a leap from Donbas to Chechnya, but

basically that's what you're asking. So, what

should be done with the leaders of the DPR and LPR?

That is a matter of the same Minsk II agreement, where,

as I recall, an amnesty is spelled out.

Igor Ivanovich speaks about these leaders

probably even more harshly than

many Ukrainian internet users do,

because he knows these people

personally, and his comments are

certainly not complimentary. I know one thing:

I would like this war

to end as soon as possible, so that

refugees could, if possible, return to their homes, and

so that there would be no more problems. We should not

be spending money on this. Sorry again for

that approach. I still have

time, as I can see from the clock. And

therefore

Russian-Ukrainian and European

negotiations, and all the sponsors of the second

Minsk agreement, must resolve this

complex and difficult issue, which

affects different parties. As for

Ramzan Kadyrov, with regard to him, first of all there should be

an investigation conducted

into his possible

involvement in the murder of Boris

Nemtsov. May I make a brief remark?

Go ahead.

Alexei Anatolyevich, unfortunately, your plan

to hand over the border—or perhaps fortunately, I don't even

know how to put it—will lead to an even greater

number of refugees. That's not my plan, that's

not my plan. And what you're trying to do—

to stop the war—it will not stop because of that.

As soon as you surrender

Donbas—let's speak plainly—

as soon as you hand Donbas over to Ukraine, the question

of Crimea will immediately arise. And as long as in Kyiv

the current authorities remain in power,

openly Russophobic, genuinely

Nazi—though in a mode, as they say,

so to speak—

there will be no reconciliation with Ukraine,

and war, in one form or another,

is inevitable, you understand. May I ask a question?

Please tell me, Igor Ivanovich,

how did it happen that you alone are standing there

looking so spotless in your white coat, while I

see the Kremlin, which I do not

like, as a sponsor of the Minsk

agreement; Ukraine, Europe, the DPR and LPR,

various people within the governments of these

republics—they signed the Minsk

agreement. And now, first of all, you are

more or less the only one saying it is bad, and

on top of that, for some reason, reproaching me as if

these were my agreements and my plan. I'm not accusing you—

you are saying that I would surrender Donbas,

whereas I am saying that I simply want

to implement the agreements that

the DPR and LPR signed, right? I'm not saying—

I'm not saying that you—I'm saying that

what I mean is that

you intend to carry through to the end that same

treacherous policy of our

president, who, yes, first of all gave up all of

Novorossiya (a political term used by Russian nationalists for parts of southeastern Ukraine), in effect, although he could have

liberated it; who gave up all of Ukraine, as a result of which

it ended up in the camp

of our enemies and effectively became

a weapon of the West, in the West's hands, turning

it into a second Poland. Could I at least make

a brief clarification on that point?

It's just very

important. No, Igor Ivanovich, explain to me:

why do you consider this

a betrayal, while Plotnitsky and Zakharchenko,

the ministers, and everyone else—the entire

establishment, as I understand it, of these

republics—do not consider it betrayal?

Anatolyevich, well, what can I say? But

you do consider Timchenko and Rotenberg

not to be such worthy

citizens, shining examples, right? Well then, think

about whom our rulers could possibly have installed

whom they could have put in place after

they refused the possibility of carrying out

a revolution from above in Russia—whom could they

have put there? People just like themselves.

Absolutely. If you believe that the creatures

of the Kremlin are traitors, then all those people—

including Plotnitsky and Zakharchenko—

are traitors too, if only because

if Igor Ivanovich Strelkov, also known as Igor

Vsevolodovich Girkin, came to Donbas purely

as a volunteer and became the de facto commander

of the militia—well, that is what happened in reality, though later

the Supreme Council formally approved it—nevertheless,

and he was neither a citizen nor a resident of Donbas,

whereas they are native residents of Donbas whom

the people, for better or worse, elected as the heads—note this—

of the republics, the people's republics. After that, they

signed the Minsk agreements, in which

they recognized themselves as the heads of certain

districts within Ukraine. If they are

local residents, then—

after all, they swore allegiance to the people's...

I’m not sympathetic to the republics at all, but I don’t

understand why you think that

it’s your— I don’t think that my

or my opinion

is shared by people; it’s just that they don’t know

the tactic that they

have been sticking to for the last hour and 12

minutes: they’ve been calling each other Putin and

saying, “No, you’re the one acting like Putin.” “No, it’s

you who are acting like Putin.”

Then let me ask one final question

that will allow you to draw some, uh,

some general conclusion. It’s a question about ordinary

people, and it also comes up on Twitter

and it’s probably the most common accusation

made against each of you: that in fact

you don’t care about ordinary people who

were once your supporters. This is what

people write about you—that you, I’ll quote, that you

ran away from Donbas and abandoned those

who stayed there.

And in general, how do you sleep at

night after that, and what do you dream about? Well, yes, and in general

you too, Alexei Anatolyevich, are accused of something similar:

that you don’t care about those

people who were your supporters.

You don’t write on

your Twitter or in your blog about those

supporters who suffered because of you.

You write about corruption, you write

some positive news, but about those people

who are being sentenced in the March 26 case

you stay silent. All right.

Unfortunately—if I may, I’ll begin—unfortunately,

unfortunately. I wish it weren’t so,

but it is, and my

Twitter and my blog are simply packed

with news about daily arrests,

detentions, about the everyday forms

of pressure my

supporters are subjected to—the people around me,

and simply random people who

join in, and then the regime picks them as

targets. I write about this every

day. It is pain—my pain—and a great

suffering for our entire organization. Unfortunately,

yes, but we are fighting a leviathan

that wants to devour everyone, anyone who

is dissatisfied—from nationalists and patriots

of every kind to liberals

of every kind, democrats, the left and the right. And unfortunately,

yes, we are not in a position—I’ll say this plainly—

and I say it with pain—we

cannot even list all the names

of those who are under

pressure—thousands, tens of thousands of people; this is not

an exaggeration—who still join

our movement, join our

campaign, because they see the bigger

picture: that if we do not fight this

now, if we think only about ourselves—like, “how awful,

I was detained for 10 days” (10 days)—that is

fundamentally

insignificant compared with what

needs to be done. We are doing everything possible, we

... Well then, the only way I can

justify myself before my

comrades who accuse me of

having

abandoned them—they are not, let’s say, making the same

kind of accusations as the scum do.

I think it’s not hard to figure that out.

And those who served with me in

the same units, who served on my

staff, already know that perfectly well. But

the only thing I can say in my defense

is that I have received nothing either for my

so-called flight or for my

service. I live on the same basis

as I did here before—indeed, you could even say

worse, because

before Donbas, before Crimea, I had a very well-

paid

job, strong social guarantees, and I could

look to the future with confidence. Now I am

a salaried employee, living on my wages and

military pension. I have nothing extra.

Therefore I can honestly and openly

say: in every case I acted as

my conscience told me to, and as I understood

my duty. Perhaps I was mistaken; I am not

a saint and I could have been wrong. Nevertheless, the fact

that I am here now and not there

means that I cannot be there

physically. I cannot even enlist as a private soldier

in that army, because I would not

be allowed to cross the border, and if I were,

I would simply be deported from there. I am not

going to be a clown and put on a show

for the sake of my own publicity. I think this is

an excellent ending for our debate

because a show really, a show really

did not

happen. You gave us the chance to say a couple of

minutes more as a closing statement. I

apologize for stepping onto the host’s

territory. I believe that, of course, we did not

end up with a show, but of course you still have

the opportunity to fix that. Perhaps

you could explain why you came to

these debates at all. Let’s give each of you one minute.

However you like—let’s once again

And I came to these debates precisely in order

to look Alexei

Anatolyevich in the eye and understand whether he really

thinks what he says and says what he

thinks. Unfortunately, yes: he really

does say what he thinks. Unfortunately, he

really is not a nationalist.

For him, nationalism is in the

past. Unfortunately, he— We did not have time

to discuss the Crimea question, but he is a questionable

patriot in the sense that he is still ready

to cast doubt on

Crimea’s status, simply on the grounds

that there was some referendum there, and so on.

And unfortunately, I did not understand how he

plans to defeat corruption, because

fighting corruption, even with the

harshest judicial measures, would not

eliminate its

root cause, in my view, it would not work

It would be the same thing, only, so to speak,

all over again

there is a very high probability, Alexei

Anatolyevich, that if you come

to power, you will continue the same

exact line that before you was pursued by

Boris Nikolayevich (Boris Yeltsin), and then Vladimir

Vladimirovich (Vladimir Putin); you will

follow in the wake of the Western system,

in which Russia has no place except as a raw-materials

appendage, simply none

the main misconception in which, as

we saw today, Igor

Ivanovich remains, is that patriotism for

modern Russia is, well, some kind of

romantic mood. As you said, I

picked up my three-line rifle (the Mosin rifle) and went off somewhere

to fight. That may be good, it may

be that at that moment you did something

right in accordance with your

convictions, but I

there are cities with no roads, there are

hospitals with no bandages, there are schools

that are falling apart, and we have thousands of

schools being shut down every year, we have 20 million

poor people in the country, and we are in total hopelessness

our life expectancy in the country is

laughably low. You say people are dying

in Donbas, but people are dying in

hospitals every day because they cannot

get proper medical care in Russia in 2017

therefore

for me, patriotism in Russia right now is

action aimed at ensuring that

the citizens of Russia, Russian people, live better

and more prosperously right now. Right now I

am living in

the year 2017, and I am a real person from the

real world, so in the real world I

intend to solve those problems that

exist. I do not want to live in this chimera

that we must

immediately unite with Belarus

seize something, annex something, and all

the rest of it. Of course, we should

help Russians, and we must understand and

always remember that Russians are the largest

divided people in Europe, but helping people

right now means not war, but a fight against

corruption and improving the economy. I

hope I have finished my thought. I

thank our audience for having

stayed with us through it

one moment. Well then, let us hope

that the culture of political dialogue from

today onward will only

develop rather than degrade. That is all

all the best