Following in His Son’s Footsteps Former presidential special envoy Igor Yusufov wants to become a major businessman like his son Vitaly. The son bought shares in Bank of Moscow, while the father has his eye on Domodedovo Airport. A conflict there has reached just the right stage for him to step in. Igor Yusufov wants to acquire a stake in Domodedovo—buying a blocking stake for about $1 billion—and is currently negotiating this with the airport supervisory board chairman, Valery Kogan, Yusufov acquaintances said. Read the full article Simply magnificent. You absolutely have to read it. A long, detailed piece about former Energy Minister Yusufov and his dear son investing billions of murky origin into various projects under highly questionable circumstances.
The elder Yusufov did not work a single day in his life anywhere other than government service. And yet, as we can see, the family has plenty of money. One wonders where it came from. Vova Milov (v_milov), who served as Yusufov’s deputy when he was minister, has a very definite opinion on that. Vedomosti also cites some interesting facts: As State Duma deputy Boris Reznik recalls—he was then a member of the Duma anti-corruption commission (which inspected Rosrezerv, the state reserves agency, in 2001; Vedomosti has a copy of the findings)—middlemen profited from the goods Rosrezerv sold. For example, in the late 1990s, 100,000 metric tons of petroleum products shipped to Chukotka were resold three times while the tankers were still en route. Sometimes goods were sold too cheaply, then suddenly at inflated prices: the Defense Ministry somehow managed to pay 1.5 to 2 times more for Rosrezerv food supplies than private companies did. “The Defense Ministry delayed payments for months, which is why it cost more,” a former Rosrezerv employee explains. Inspectors found that under Yusufov, Rosrezerv began actively extending interest-free credit to suppliers. In 1999, the total amount of advance payments tripled to 4.4 billion rubles. And suppliers did not always fulfill their contracts. Thus, in September 1999, Rosrezerv transferred 434 million rubles to Sibneft for petroleum products that were supposed to be delivered before the start of 2000, but by March 2000 it had received only 200 million rubles’ worth of goods. “Following the inspection, the Prosecutor General’s Office opened 35 criminal cases,” Reznik says. “But no one was punished: Yusufov refused to provide the necessary supporting documents, claiming the information was a state secret.” As for the origins of young Yusufov’s capital, as commenters on the Vedomosti website rightly note, the article is worth reading for two astonishing quotes alone. On his career: I always wanted to work for a major corporation. Even as a student, I was interested in Gazprom. I got lucky: at 24, I landed a job at Gazexport (now Gazprom Export) as an assistant to the CEO. There was no help from my father whatsoever. On the origins of his capital: *€40 million is a substantial sum for me. Where did the money come from? They were my personal funds. I made them from the rise in Gazprom’s share price, investing back when the market was still segmented and the shares were cheap, and then selling after liberalization. **Even though my father sat on the company’s board of directors, I see no conflict of interest here whatsoever. *Just foresight. Take notes, rookies. That’s how “foresight” turns modest ministers’ children into multimillionaires. By the way, what’s our Fighter_Against_Corruption up to? The situation looks downright scandalous. Isn’t it time to Cast_It_In_Granite and start imposing Multiple_Fines? Because more and more—especially after Medvedev’s attack on Domodedovo’s shareholders—it is starting to look as though Yusufov is a kind of Abramovich for Medvedev.
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