Alexei Navalny: “Tatars are proud to be Tatars—let’s shower them with kisses for that!”

“ALL THESE INNOPOLISES OF YOURS — YOU’RE REALLY INTO THAT SORT OF THING...” — Alexei Anatolyevich, over the past 25 years Russia has seen two different models of federal relations. Boris Yeltsin once said in Kazan, “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.” But for the past 15 years or so, we have been watching Vladimir Putin pursue a policy of rigid centralization. So what does federalism mean in Navalny’s view? — I believe the current federalism is completely fake federalism. The word “federalism” exists, the regions exist, there are regional heads of one kind or another. But in reality they have no powers. What is real federalism? It is the ability of people on the ground to shape their own government. Right now nobody can do that. Maybe here in Tatarstan and Kazan there is more federalism than elsewhere. But when we see your governor saying something fairly harmless like, “Guys, leave us what we earned,” that governor is immediately cut down. And it very much looks as though the current attack on the republic [the banking crisis] is happening precisely because he said those things. So to me, federalism is the right to influence the situation, and that is a right I will return to the people. They must elect their own mayors, and they must elect their own governors — that is the key point. No municipal filters, none of this nonsense where not a single major Russian city elects its mayor anymore. Those things have to be brought back. To me, federalism is directly and 100 percent tied to democracy. That means that under President Navalny, elections will not be rigged, and city mayors and governors will not be appointed. And that means people will influence the authorities and shape government themselves. — The Russian government is now actively promoting fiscal equalization in order to ensure equal living standards across different regions. There is an opposing view: prosperity should depend on how well a region performs. Otherwise there is no incentive to develop. Which of these positions is closer to you? — That’s a false choice. You can’t say either I support a system where half the regions are poor and half are rich, or I support the current system where everyone is poor. Of course, regions will never be equal simply because of geography and population size. It is obvious that, in theory, Tatarstan is destined to be rich. What is happening now is absurd: the average salary in Kazan is what, 33,000 rubles? And the average salary in the republic is under 28,000 rubles. This is an oil-producing region, one of the richest regions — everyone says Tatarstan is one of the richest regions in the country. But where does that wealth show up? Wealth should show up in wages. So yes, of course there are oil-producing regions, and we cannot leave the entire mineral extraction tax in the region, because then Tyumen would be the richest of all and everyone else would sink into poverty. There has to be a certain amount of equalization; there should not be extreme distortions. But most importantly, we have to give regions the opportunity to earn. I am not a fan of Minnikhanov for even a second — to me he is a United Russia politician. But he said one thing correctly: if we earn more here, if we make an effort... Well, you have things here that could be called either “Potemkin villages” or real projects — all these Innopolises, you’re really into that sort of thing — but at least they are being built, at least we see some initiative to attract business here, including the kind of knowledge-based business where intellectual resources make up a large share of profit generation. These people are trying, those others are not. Yet both are poor. Is that really the right system? Of course not. So first and foremost, people must be allowed to benefit from the results of their labor. If your governor is good and brings business into the region, the region becomes richer, and you feel it in your paycheck. That is how all this should work. “MOSCOW CAN DO ANYTHING, A GOVERNOR CAN DO VERY LITTLE, AND A MAYOR CAN DO NOTHING” — You are proposing to transfer serious powers from the regional level to municipalities. Aren’t you afraid that, especially in Russian conditions, this could produce administrative chaos? — If we’re talking about administrative chaos, then we just need to step outside and look around. Kazan may not be the best example of administrative chaos. But even so, Kazan’s budget is laughable — 20 billion rubles — completely indecent for a city of this size. And by comparison, as I often point out, Moscow is now allocating 12 billion rubles just to beautify part of the Garden Ring — more than half the budget of your entire city. That is administrative chaos, because nobody knows where the money is. But practice shows — and the experience of developed countries where people live well shows — that democracy works. People live better when city mayors are elected and have real powers. In America, the mayor of any city has 100 times more power than the president. The president does not decide much of anything, and we can see that now with Trump — he can’t even get a law passed. Yes, he decides questions of war and peace, he can attack someone if he wants. But when it comes to any city, large or small, he has a minimal amount of power, absolutely minimal — even the police do not report to him. That may be a radical example, but I believe that if we introduce a democratic system and a city mayor cannot grab power and keep it all to himself, as has always happened in Russia, and if he is constantly under pressure from below — pressure from other candidates, pressure from the media — then a democratically elected mayor with real powers will govern his city far better than what we have now, when neither the governor nor the mayor has any interest whatsoever in residents’ opinions. They don’t care. Who appoints them? Putin appoints them. Who appoints the mayor of Kazan — is it the governor? No, in effect Putin appoints him; they bring him a piece of paper for approval. So he has one voter, and he works for that voter, even though he has a city of a million people. — But under this system, would regional heads be left with only ceremonial functions? — Of course not. Just as in the United States, where a governor does not perform purely ceremonial functions, even though enormous powers are delegated to the local level. Regional authorities should naturally have major powers, because many issues involving transport, basic infrastructure in general, and the financing of healthcare and education at the regional level are, of course, matters for governors. The problem now is that the system works like this: Moscow can do anything, a governor can do very little, and a mayor can do nothing. And has no money. It is a distorted system; it should not work that way. But I am not saying everything should be handed over to the mayor. Our mayors should be able to do a great deal, governors should also be able to do a great deal, and Moscow should deal with federal issues, because those are very important. — However, in that case we could return to the 1990s, when many regions saw real power struggles between the governor and the mayor of the regional capital, which had a very negative effect on the quality of governance. — The same thing is happening now. Look at any region. Maybe it is not happening here. Because everyone knows about the clan-based politics that exist in Tatarstan; as I understand it, the head of the region and the head of the city are from the same clan. Correct me if I’m wrong — I don’t know all your local intricacies that well. But look at any other region. The governor and the mayor sit there, both from United Russia, and they are in conflict. All the biggest cities — Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, take any city you like. Everywhere there is a fierce conflict between the mayor and the governor, between the capital city and the governor, because it is built into the nature of the system. The capital city needs money, it has to maintain all these schools and hospitals. Right? But it has no money. Even corporate profit tax, which is what mainly fills budgets, is constantly taken away by the regional authorities. So these mayors run around with huge eyes shouting: we don’t have money to maintain the schools! And the federal authorities are now giving nothing for school maintenance; we can see those expenditures being cut. So this conflict is built into the nature of the system. What I am saying is that it should be resolved naturally: give them what they ought to be earning. — At one time you supported the slogan “Stop Feeding the Caucasus,” and in response the counter-slogan “Stop Feeding Moscow” appeared. Which of these slogans is more relevant for Russia today? — Well, both as a Muscovite and as a presidential candidate who wants — and plans — to get a lot of votes in the North Caucasus, I can say that I support both slogans, and both should be supported by Muscovites and by people in the Caucasus, because what they really mean is: stop feeding corrupt elites. I already gave the example here that Moscow will spend 12 billion rubles on beautifying the Garden Ring — half of Kazan’s annual budget. And what good does that do me? They’ll simply steal 11.5 billion of those 12 billion — probably even more. The extreme centralization we have now is simply a more convenient way of stealing money. They collect all the money from across the country in one place, in one chest, and then stuff it into their own pockets from there. The same thing happens in the North Caucasus. Huge infusions really do go there, enormous subsidies. And yet the population is poor. The fact that one family, one teip (clan), one clan drives around in Porsche Cayennes has not made everyone else richer. So yes, I believe we need to stop feeding corrupt elites, stop using this centralized system of corruption, stop pouring money out of buckets somewhere, and spend it properly. “THE IMPERIAL IDEA IS ABSOLUTELY RUINOUS FOR ME” — You have repeatedly defended the idea of a “nation-state” in public, yet in political theory that means a type of state based on the self-determination of one nation. At one point you said, “Russians are ready for democracy.” So what role would be assigned in such a state to the nationalities whose representatives have lived for centuries on the territory of present-day Russia? — When I speak of a nation-state, I mean a political nation. All of us together — Russians, Tatars, Bashkirs, it doesn’t matter who — are a political nation. And as a political nation, we defend our interests in the world, we see ourselves as a single whole, and we are not afraid to use the word “nation.” Notice that in Russia it has this negative, almost pejorative shade. People tend to avoid it. Look at other countries, including those that were formed as a “melting pot.” In the United States, “nation” is one of the first words a president uses, and it does not mean specifically white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. It means everyone. And here too we are a political nation living here, competing internationally with other nations in order to live better. — So the idea of Russia as an empire does not appeal to you? — On the contrary, the imperial idea is absolutely ruinous for me. Because in Russia today the imperial idea effectively sounds like this: yes, the road here is bad now, let it get even worse, but we’ll repair a road in Palmyra instead. Let’s finance some incomprehensible Syrian operation while people here continue living in poverty and earning 20,000 rubles a month, which is impossible to live on. That is empire: trying to rule other countries when Russia itself has been abandoned. Abandoned villages, schools closing down. We need to direct our energy inward, into our own country — and it is already large enough if we look at the map. We have plenty to develop inside the country, without an empire. — You once said that we need to put an end to the “chimera of rossiianstvo” (a civic-Russian identity distinct from ethnic Russianness), but this political nation has to be called something, and it is unlikely that the millions of Tatars living in Russia would agree to call themselves Russians. — And they shouldn’t have to. Maybe we will come up with a new word. But the issue is not even the new word — it is the connotation. Rossiianstvo really is a “chimera of rossiianstvo,” because some completely artificial term was invented, and the term is interpreted entirely incorrectly. On top of that, the term rossiyane (“citizens of Russia”) has somehow effectively made the word russky (“ethnic Russian” / “Russian”) taboo or somehow offensive. That is also a negative thing. I believe there is nothing wrong with people being proud of belonging to a nation. Yes, Tatars are proud of being Tatars — let’s kiss them for it! That is a natural feeling for any person, and it is the same for Russians. We simply should not push the national context out altogether, because this “chimera of rossiianstvo” is, in general, trying to take away from Tatars as well any national element in which they quite rightly take pride. We are constantly saying here that the language must be preserved, culture must be funded, and so on. People are proud of being Tatars — excellent, there is no need to forcibly recast them into some kind of rossiyane. But that does not negate the broader idea of a nation for the Russian Federation. — So the term rossiyane, which Russia’s first president used so actively, is categorically unacceptable to you? — It is the connotation, the imposed political connotation, the way it is used. It seems to me that not only I dislike it, but many other people as well. — You say you are seriously counting on support from voters in the national republics. Do you really think people here will vote for a politician who took part in the “Russian Marches” and is generally associated with the Russian nationalist movement? — Absolutely, yes. Because I think my feelings and what I say are becoming understandable to nationalists here as well. I was in Ufa, and three groups of nationalists came there: Tatar, Bashkir, and Russian. And all of them said: we support you, because you are in favor of giving us political representation. I am sure that my position will find support among Tatar nationalists as well, and among everyone concerned with the national question, because I support giving them freedom so they can register their parties and take part in elections. There used to be a specifically Tatar party here, and now it is banned. I see no problem with that at all. In other, non-ethnic regions, in Sverdlovsk Region, there were several regional parties. I see absolutely no problem and no danger in the existence of regional parties. So I would give them freedom, whereas Putin now throws into prison under Article 282 (Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code, “Incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity” — ed. note) anyone who says they are against United Russia and so much as stammers about the national question, regardless of whether they are Russian, Tatar, or anyone else. And I believe there is no problem at all — take part in elections with whatever platform you want! — But we are not talking about Tatar nationalists; they are marginal figures, and in such organizations in the republic there are often more leaders than rank-and-file members. We are talking about law-abiding Russian citizens who are troubled by the fact that you appeared at the same events as figures like Belov or Demushkin, and who fear that if you come to power, conditions here for the development of national language, culture, and identity will not be supported. — They will vote, because I will patiently explain my position. And our campaign headquarters, where there are Russians, Tatars — everyone — will patiently explain my position. And my position is that I believe regional pride and the desire to feel one’s own regional distinctiveness, national distinctiveness if you like, are part of the shared pride of the Russian Federation as a whole. Because the history of successful national development shows that only those countries develop successfully that are not troubled by this. Take any prosperous country: in each of them there are one or two regions like this. Texans consider themselves Texans first and Americans second. The same exists in France and Germany; Belgium is a country divided into two parts altogether. This is normal, it is built into human nature. In Yekaterinburg, there are the Uralians! There is no ethnic specificity there, but there is enormous regional specificity, and people are constantly talking about a Ural Republic. This is part of a person’s pride and part of human nature, part of self-identification — people feel their homeland there. And that is wonderful. I will try to convey this position to everyone here in Tatarstan, and I am sure I will get all those votes, because they will understand what I really mean. “WE CANNOT BUILD MOSQUES IN MOSCOW FOR ALL MIGRANTS, AND WE SHOULD NOT DO SO” — Let me remind you of an old post of yours in which you described watching “chuchmeks” from your office window as they were building something. Your opponents will no doubt remind you of statements like that too. So who are these “chuchmeks”? Could that mean Tatars, Buryats, Chechens? — You are reminding me, and rightly so. That is exactly the job of an independent press — to remind a candidate of everything he has said. And I admit that chuchmeks is a generalized term, apparently a rather unfortunate one, used in Moscow as a slur, including against migrant laborers. Most likely I used it in the context of expressing my attitude toward illegal immigration, and my attitude toward that is entirely negative. But it does not carry any specific ethnic connotation. Still, I acknowledge that the term is unfortunate. — Does Moscow need new mosques? We often hear local residents protesting when the authorities approve the construction of such religious buildings, yet on Muslim holidays we also see scenes in the capital where thousands of worshippers who cannot get inside pray on mats spread out on nearby streets. — This is a question of migration policy. What we are seeing now is a huge influx of migrants from the Central Asian republics. Two million of them have come to Moscow. And it is impossible to provide mosques for all of them, because if we did, there would be more mosques than in Kazan. Moscow has mosques for those Muslims who traditionally lived in Moscow — my office used to be on Tatarskaya Street, and I regularly walked past that mosque. There are mosques in Moscow, and it is a fact that we cannot build mosques for all migrants, and we should not do so. We need to control migration policy.