Alexei Navalny on the program “A-Team” from December 28, 2016

This is Echo of Moscow on the air. The ATAM program.

The toughest program for Russian

politicians. It is hosted by four Alexeis.

Today: Alexei Solomin, Durnovo, Golubev, and

Naryshkin. And with us is a fifth Alexei. And

that happens rather rarely. Ah, but

sometimes it does. Alexei Navalny is on

Echo of Moscow. Hello.

>> Good evening. I'm already feeling the strain.

>> Ah, well, not tough in the sense of, you know,

some oppressive feeling, but in the

sense that it shouldn't be easy for you. Well,

uh, it's a difficult program, so to speak.

Alexei Anatolyevich, when you

appeared in the political life of our

country, many people compared you to, well,

they outright, basically, called you a leader,

saying that your group, your political

group, was the kind of group or party or

informal party built around a single leader,

a Führer-type structure. So this image of a leader—was it

an image your entourage, your

advisers, recommended to you, or are you

personally comfortable in that role?

>> Oh, I certainly didn't think I'd be starting

the program with something like: you

guys are still young and don't know much yet.

Back in the room next door, which you have

there as the reporters' room, in 2005 I was recording

a program called Urban Development Chronicle.

Even then, it seemed to me, I had already emerged

in politics, because I joined the Yabloko party

as far back as 2000. And there was no

party of any kind, and

certainly no leader-centered one, and in fact no

party of my own at all. And for many years I

worked in Yabloko, which, if there was

a leader-centered party there, I was clearly not

the leader of it. So

my development as a politician, generally speaking,

took quite a long time. And

>> Well, Alexei Anatolyevich grew up and became

the leader. Got it. First he came to

Yabloko, where there were other leaders, then

Alexei Navalny matured and became

the leader himself. Seems perfectly logical to me. I

am trying to be the leader of my party. I

am trying to be the leader of what I

represent in politics. And I fight for

those leadership positions. Note

that I am one of those

politicians who always advocate

competition. For many years I have

consistently defended,

for example, primaries, elections, and so on.

That is, I want to—I certainly

lay claim to a leadership position, but I

always invite everyone else

to compete with me and am always glad

to compete. The criticism from some of your, perhaps former,

or perhaps not former, colleagues is that

Navalny does not tolerate competition in

any form. He pushes away everyone talented

casts them off, and that is precisely why

you are compared to Putin. Our

question is this: namely, that

Navalny, yes, is another Putin. No matter which

political analyst you ask, they will say:

"Navalny is just another Putin."

>> Well, political analysts should absolutely not be

consulted. And as I have said many times

already—which is why political analysts in particular

take offense at me—most Russian

political analysts should be thrown into the cages

at the Moscow Zoo so that the animals

can eat them, because Sobchak is not a political analyst,

she is a journalist, and she compares you

to him directly. Let's not throw anyone into a cage,

all right, but I want to tell you

that this is all some kind of abstract

conversation: he doesn't tolerate anyone, and so on.

Whenever I obtained a leadership

position, it was through elections. I won

the election to the Opposition Coordination Council

and effectively headed it, even though the party

—we're talking about the Coordination Council here, not the party—

the Progress Party, but nevertheless it existed, and I don't

know what anyone is laughing at. When

the Coordination Council existed, we

now know from leaked correspondence

from the Presidential Administration and from polling

that they themselves conducted, that

24% of voters were ready to vote for it. Nevertheless,

let me finish my thought. And

>> Even in the Progress Party, when we

elect the party chairman, it is

a vote not of the political council, not of the congress, but

of all party members. Therefore

I am always in favor of competition, but I do claim

a leadership position, unquestionably.

The Coordination Council—sorry, what exactly did it

do? Why was all that

voting on Tsvetnoy Boulevard necessary? I still

remember it as if it were yesterday; I even went there as a reporter

to cover it.

>> A waste of time. It really was a waste

of time. Back then there was a different reality,

a different political situation, and a different

Russia. And in that Russia

of 2011–2012, when

there were rallies of 100,000 people

taking to the streets, the people who went

to those rallies demanded a new

way of structuring the opposition. I was one

of those who proposed it, saying: let's

elect it. There will be no self-appointment, which

many people dislike, and I think you

don't like it either. So let's

vote. We elected the Opposition

Coordination Council, and like the entire protest movement of that time,

it was crushed.

Let me remind you that

45 people were elected to it, and in one way or another,

more than 30 of them were

subjected to criminal prosecution. One

So you are saying that the authorities sensed

the danger of the Coordination Council and

therefore decided to jail everyone. That is

...on the Echo of Moscow website (a former major Russian radio station/news outlet). I’m referring you there. And

there are quite a lot of reports about

that same hacked correspondence

from the presidential administration, which

discusses with horror the question of how

popular the Coordination Council is.

>> When people say that Navalny is

the same kind of politician as Putin, do you

find that flattering?

>> Who says that, exactly? That’s just you

saying it. It’s not true. Go read up on it.

Type it into Yandex and search for it.

“Navalny, a Putin-style politician.”

I’m perfectly fine with people

criticizing me or criticizing my

actions, the kind of work I do.

>> So for you, it’s criticism when people say

“Navalny is like Putin” — that’s criticism? Yes,

>> Well, of course it’s criticism. Because what

is Putin? Putin is a man

who used illegal methods

to seize power over an entire country. Putin is

a man who lies and is hypocritical.

So, uh, are there any traits of his that you

would borrow

>> from Putin?

>> I don’t know what his traits are. That’s

exactly the point. That’s one of the problems with him. No one

knows what his traits are, because

he lies endlessly and endlessly

deceives people. What would you like to know

about Putin? What is it you feel is missing? If

we set aside all those various

corruption cases and your suspicions, then

what is it, in your investigations, that

you find lacking in Putin in terms of

that kind of transparency from him?

>> What I find lacking in Putin is respect for

the law and respect for the people of the Russian

Federation. He insults those people with his

lies; his corruption insults them. He

humiliates and robs these people together with

his friends. So of course, what I’m missing is

simply the rule of law. I

want him to obey the law, just as

everyone else should, just as I am prepared to obey the law,

and do obey it.

>> Maybe you just don’t know him

well enough. You yourself said

that you don’t know his traits.

>> And I, like 140 million citizens of Russia,

have studied him well enough over

the past several years, it seems to me.

>> Ah, well, let’s leave Putin aside for

a second. I don’t know whether we’ll manage that for the rest

of the program. I wanted to return

to you. After all, Navalny in 2011–2012

really was, uh, probably,

the most vivid leader of the protest

movement, a kind of revolutionary,

a Robespierre-like figure who came out to rallies,

shouted louder than anyone else, and with genuine

fury at that, and many people were even a little afraid of you

back then. But that’s not happening now.

Now it feels as if you’ve, well,

run out of steam, or your manner

has changed. How do you explain that?

>> You’re looking at a person in the context

of the times. Everything you said

is tied to rallies. If there are rallies,

if there is a protest movement, then people

look at the person standing at the podium,

speaking before a crowd of 100,000

and saying something, and you perceive it as a fierce

speech. But if there is no crowd of 100,000, and

no demonstration, then it seems as though I’ve already

run out of steam. That’s the context of the times. I, as

it seems to me, as I hope, uh, I

try to think of myself as being

the same person I was in 2000, when I entered

politics, and exactly that same person I remain

now. It’s just that the times are different,

the circumstances are different, and some things look

more exciting, more interesting,

more appealing, while other things look less

interesting. But in reality, 90% of my

work consisted then, just as it

consists now,

of sitting in an office at a computer.

That’s all. Have you become disillusioned with

revolution, with mass demonstrations?

>> Well, of course not. I believe that mass

demonstrations are the most effective

form of political struggle. It’s just

that—

>> Then why aren’t there any?

>> Because Russia is different now. If in

2011 or 2012 you could

boldly go out to a rally and not be afraid of

anyone, now the likelihood of facing

criminal prosecution is very

high. In 2011 and 2012

you didn’t even know a single

person who had been jailed for 15

days for taking part in a rally. But now you

know dozens of people who have been sent to

prison, and you know a person who has

been repeatedly jailed for solo picketing

... and held in a special detention center

together with Yashin

once. That was back in

2011. I’m simply telling you

that now, in 2016, you know dozens

of people who are in prison.

Naturally, that frightens people. And if

in 2011–2012, with some difficulty,

you could still get

permission for a rally, or you could

go to an unauthorized one, then now

the only people willing to go to an unauthorized rally

are the most desperate, because

it has genuinely become dangerous.

>> So it turns out that you work

when you’re allowed to work, and

your audience, your followers,

come out when they’re allowed to. They

allow this... If you follow

my work, you’ve seen that I also

I go out to unauthorized rallies (protests held without official approval).

I do it fairly often, and at the very least I go out

every single time that I call for it myself.

I have—and this is neither

any kind of achievement, nor is it

something to be proud of—but I’ve had administrative

arrests for these rallies, five of them.

So, uh, I haven’t changed. And I

continue my work. I’m a normal

person, I do have certain fears,

but I try not to be afraid of anyone and

to write and say what I believe

is right and necessary. And I conduct investigations

into those whom I believe

need to be pursued right now.

So I’m not afraid, but I don’t want

to demand that all 100,000 people do the same. What are you talking about?

And shout at them: “What, are you cowards? Immediately

go out into the street and let yourselves be beaten.”

You used to say that before, that’s exactly what you used to say.

That was precisely, exactly

your rhetoric before. “Journalists, sit down,” you

remember that?

>> Threatening journalists? Yes, that’s right.

And here we really should have inserted the tape

of the clip from when there was

a sit-in protest and you were shouting,

“Journalists, sit down.” I said yes,

absolutely, I shouted, “Sit down,” I did say that.

Because at that moment I wanted, and everyone wanted,

us to sit down in order to show

everyone gathered there that they shouldn’t

move. If journalists are getting in the way, then in

some cases I give them instructions.

Of course.

>> And what gives you the right to tell

journalists what to do? Because

at this demonstration everyone has to do

the same thing for the common good. For example,

there’s no need to go barging ahead somewhere. I also

have to care about people’s safety.

If some are sitting while others are moving toward them,

someone could get trampled. And for the sake, for the sake

of ensuring safety,

>> you wanted to enforce a sit-in protest,

everyone had to sit down. And you were telling

journalists what to do. I was surprised

that the journalists didn’t do anything about it.

If I had been there, I would have filed

a complaint against you saying that you threatened me, that you

threatened journalists. Frankly,

dear Alexei, I don’t care about your

complaint. You can file it with

whoever you like. If right now, if right

now there were a fire in this studio, I would

be shouting at you. And possibly even using

rather harsh

language. “Journalists, get up and leave

this studio immediately.” If you

resisted, I’d keep pushing you as well,

so that journalists would take part

in the protest action.

>> You wanted journalists to take part

in the protest action.

>> Important point: let’s address the format

of the program. There are five of us here. We need

to speak either all at once or one

at a time. Tell me, do you feel your

responsibility for the participants in the May 6 protest

who ended up in prison?

>> I do feel, of course, that

responsibility, and responsibility for

a huge number of other people

who are in prison simply because

they are connected to me,

for example my brother, or in the

Anti-Corruption Foundation there are lots of

people who have either been jailed or

been forced to leave the country simply

because they know me. And,

of course, I understand that those people,

ordinary people who were imprisoned in the case and

are still imprisoned in the May 6 case, are there because

I was, among other things, one of the

initiators of that political

movement. So my responsibility for

everyone who is in prison is one of the

things I always keep in mind.

>> Alexei Navalny was not imprisoned in the Bolotnaya case (the criminal case over the May 6, 2012 Bolotnaya Square protest in Moscow).

.

>> As you may remember, I had my first search

in connection with the Bolotnaya case when nothing had even

really happened yet. A case had been opened. And, well,

as I understand it, this is only

my own guesswork and speculation. The Kremlin

decided that they couldn’t imprison me on

an overtly political charge, and instead needed

to prosecute me specifically on economic

charges, which is what they later did.

So it’s a remarkable thing. I’m

probably the only one in the Bolotnaya case who

was questioned a couple of times,

after which, uh, I was basically

only very reluctantly summoned to

court as a witness, even though it was

perfectly obvious to everyone that I was

the main organizer of all those demonstrations.

>> The Kremlin—sorry, sorry, perhaps—

>> The Kremlin, the Kremlin—was it afraid of you back in

2011–2012?

>> I don’t know. I think the Kremlin was afraid,

of course, not of me. The Kremlin was certainly

afraid of the people who took to the streets, but I was not

the reason why people went out into

the streets. The Kremlin itself was the reason.

People went out into the streets because

the elections were rigged, because of

corruption, because of injustice.

I was simply one of the people who

called on others to take to the streets. So

the Kremlin was afraid of the people. But not

>> Is the Kremlin afraid of you now?

>> Same answer. The Kremlin is afraid of the fact that

some people, myself included,

can mobilize people. Why would they be afraid of me personally? I mean,

they have a large enough security apparatus

to walk in here and arrest

me right here in this studio. And there are no

problems. The Kremlin is afraid of people who

can voice them. Today, would you be able to

mobilize people, in your view,

judging by your sense of things?

>> Mobilize them for what?

>> Well, if I understood that

it was possible to hold a demonstration of one hundred thousand people tomorrow,

I would hold it tomorrow.

Of course, I fully understand that right now,

at this stage in the development of the authoritarian

state in Russia, organizing

a large demonstration is quite difficult. I

am fully aware of that. And that is why I

understand that I cannot organize one tomorrow.

If I could, of course I would.

>> Turnout.

Tell me, did you vote in the

most recent election?

>> No, and I said so on Moscow TV programs.

I cannot take part in elections in which

I have been stripped of my voting rights.

That would simply mean acknowledging

that I agree with it. If

you gave away your ballot

to a vote-rigger. That is what it amounts to.

>> No, that is not how it works. We have a statement on this from

the Progress Party. We

do not recognize these elections. And, broadly speaking,

the result of these elections was absolutely

preordained. We wrote about this. And

it was clear that the status quo would remain. We

said so before the election. So everyone

gave away their ballots, but not even

to the vote-rigger — they gave them to Ella

Pamfilova, who knew what

result she would ultimately enter into the final

protocol copy. That is all.

>> Are you glad that Yabloko and PARNAS failed?

Why would I be glad about Yabloko's

or PARNAS's failure, especially

PARNAS, the party from whose democratic coalition I left,

but even so I

sympathize with Yabloko and PARNAS. These people

are my political allies,

and I treat them all accordingly. There is absolutely

nothing here to be happy about.

>> You did not use your authority to help. You

did not call on people to vote for either side, nor did you

urge them to stay home.

>> Because it would have been pointless. And I

said so directly before the election,

despite my personal sympathy for all

these people. But both Yabloko and PARNAS,

which are essentially the former SPS (Union of Right Forces), cannot

clear the five-percent threshold.

That has been obvious, excuse me, since 2003.

So then people should have stayed home and not gone?

>> That depends, depends on whether,

for example, you had a decent

single-mandate candidate. If you did, then you should go,

and if there was no single-mandate candidate,

then you could also stay home, because

the result was preordained and

obvious. Since 2000

>> Since 2003. Then why, knowing full well

that the result

was preordained? Since 2003 you have

held talks with participants in

the electoral process, while you yourself, well,

do not have the ability to run for office.

Why? As far as I know,

>> What talks do you mean?

>> You had a meeting with Yavlinsky.

>> Well, that was not since 2003, that was

this year.

>> Yes? Well, if everything has been

preordained since 2003, then what is the point at all?

And at that meeting, I just

want to ask you whether this is true or not. Did

Yavlinsky or Yabloko offer you two

places in the federal part of the party list

and up to three nominations for your people in

single-mandate districts in the election, out of nine

in Moscow? As far as I know, you turned

that offer down. Even though your own

associates, your people, would have supported it.

Why?

>> That is not true. Invite Grigory

Alexeyevich (Grigory Yavlinsky), and he will gladly

tell you about it. In that respect he is

a decent man. Uh,

Grigory Alexeyevich offered us two

single-mandate districts, apart from

the central one. There was no talk whatsoever of places on the party list.

And not because he was

especially greedy. I was not asking him

for that; I was not saying to him, "Grigory

Alexeyevich, give me half the places on

the list." It was simply because, broadly speaking,

everyone understood perfectly well

that there would be no result, that all of this

was doomed and nothing would come of it. I was not

going to join any party list.

Even if I had wanted to take part in

party lists, I would have done so together with

PARNAS, not by going onto Yabloko's list.

Sorry, but I am still

not prepared to do those kinds of somersaults. Yesterday in

PARNAS, today in Yabloko — that would have been

improper, foolish, and inconsistent with

our principles.

>> All right, then why are you making such

a somersault yourself? You go to negotiate, then

say you will not take part in the election. That

is also a sharp change of position.

It is done in the interests of the voters, when

we are disqualified or not

qualified, when everything is preprogrammed.

You asked, and now I will answer you, and everything

will become clear. I really

thought, and still think, that there should be

a fundamentally new entity created,

a democratic coalition, a party with

new approaches. That is, not the same thing that

has existed since 2003, but a new

democratic movement, the most important part of which

is precisely competition for

places on the list, first and foremost for

first place. At one point I

really did make a mistake, and we all

agreed that Mikhail Mikhailovich

Khasenov would take that top spot. I

said we were ready for that. It was

a mistake, of course. Later, when we

conducted repeated polling and

saw that such a list would simply

collapse, both I and

other members of the coalition told Mikhail Mikhailovich that no,

we had to return to the question of primaries

for first place. He refused. After that

I left the coalition, because

I said that this list could not possibly

win anything. We—I conducted polling, and we

published the polling, and our

Anti-Corruption Foundation polling

once again proved to be the most accurate. And just as we

predicted, neither one nor the other would

reach 3%. And that is exactly what happened. And, by the way,

despite the fact that

our wonderful Alexei Alexeyevich

Venediktov, sitting in the next room,

was telling all of us that Yabloko

was polling in the double digits, in

Moscow none of that was true. And

the polling showed this clearly: that

everyone would get 2%, because Yabloko’s electora-

te in Moscow was 12.9. Specifically in Moscow

12.

>> While you still have time, if

you have an internet connection, go online

and you’ll see how mistaken you are. That’s

not true. Yabloko simply got around

9% in Moscow.

>> Uh, but nationwide it did not even reach 2%.

And that was obvious, because

parties that for 15 years have failed to

clear the threshold cannot suddenly clear

the threshold, because people with democratic

views want to be connected with

a party, they want to choose the list themselves,

including through primaries, and they are not

prepared simply to trust party congresses.

Golubev.

>> Yes, I’ll change the subject a bit and move away from

the elections now. There’s this, you know,

little play on words: “Navalny the

nationalist.” So what is this story with

your nationalism, which

>> Why do you call it a play on words?

Well, I don’t know, because in fact

nationalists

well, whichever nationalists, let’s say,

I’ve happened to speak with, they

do not consider Navalny a nationalist in the

sense in which they understand

Russian nationalism.

>> Ah, well, you see, that is an important

clarification. I’m glad you asked me about the

wordplay, because it turns out some people

consider me a nationalist, while others do not

consider me a nationalist. This is an important

point: in left-liberal circles

many people really do say that I am a

nationalist. In right-conservative circles,

many say that I am not a nationalist.

This

>> Are you a nationalist or not?

>> And this is important, because

>> this label is simply connected with some

points in my platform. Yes,

absolutely. I’ve discussed this a million times in this very

studio. I support,

for example, a visa regime with the countries of

Central

>> Asia—is that nationalism?

>> Any name for an ideological current is

a label. And in the Russian political

tradition, unfortunately, it is customary to stick the label

“nationalist,” or even “fascist,” as

some people call me. Simply

because I support a visa

regime with the countries of Central Asia. I

really do support such a visa

regime. I criticize the authorities in Chechnya. I

believe that Russians, as Europe’s largest

divided people, have

specific problems. And these things do exist.

These problems are, for the most part,

taboo in the liberal, in the liberal

Russian political tradition. But I

talk about them, and that makes many people uncomfortable,

so they call me a nationalist.

>> For you, well, since Russians in Russia

are after all the numerical majority, should

nations that have such a

majority have greater rights

than others?

>> Well no, of course not, all people are equal. And

no additio—no additional

rights are needed. Russians need

additional efforts to address

problems: social decline, alcoholism, the same

divided condition. There are, for example,

Russians in Turkmenistan—they have been abandoned, in

fact, they were sold out by Putin for gas.

There is, well, right now there is

a case involving a Russian person who is sitting in

pretrial detention in Russia, because Uzbekistan

considers him a military deserter,

and this is now a huge problem. And all

those same nationalists are debating whether

Russia should extradite to Uzbekistan our

Russian compatriot who

violated Uzbek laws. These

problems exist. And additional

efforts are needed to solve them. But that does not

mean that Russians should

have an advantage over Tatars. But

that is absurd even. How can a Russian, how can a

Russian nationalist be

effectively on the side of Ukrainians in this

conflict between Russia and Ukraine?

>> A Russian nationalist.

>> We only have 40 seconds. We’ll come back to this later.

>> First of all, “for Ukrainians” is a stupid

phrase. Russian,

A nationalist, a person who wishes

good and happiness for his country and for his

people, must certainly be against

the war with Ukraine, because it is

a crime against the Russian people. And

if you recall, I can see that you

are interested in nationalist

issues—the last Russian March was there

there were two columns. And the column that

was somehow labeled as being for

Ukraine was larger than the other one.

Well, in Russia right now, the ones supporting Ukraine are the fascists.

In Russia.

>> We’ll continue.

Well, I don’t even know. Let’s sort that out

afterward. All right,

agreed. Five minutes of news and commercials.

Then we’ll continue the program. Today with

Alexei Navalny

>> 20:35. We continue the program ATAM,

the toughest program on Echo of Moscow (a Russian radio station).

For politicians, I’m hosting with four Alexeis

today. There’s me, Alexei Solomin, Alexei

Naryshkin to my left, and to my right

Durnovo and Golubev. And sitting directly opposite

is Alexei Navalny, who today is

the guest of this program, despite the fact that

he’s also an Alexei. And we still haven’t

quite sorted out

the issue of nationalism.

Yes.

>> We seem to have moved on to fascism already. That’s

right. No, if we’re going to, yes,

sort out the Russian nationalists, then

the part that supports Ukraine in

this conflict consists of fascist-leaning

nationalists. And they go there to fight

for Ukraine and, well, behave very actively there in every way.

There are also nationalists

who support, naturally,

the Russian side. So one way or another,

Navalny is someone who supports

Ukraine. And

>> I am by no means accusing you of fascism.

Just to be clear.

>> There are two things I wanted to say. First,

it was said that this is the hardest program for

politicians; those are my favorite kinds of

programs. I really like it, truly,

it’s genuinely very, very interesting with you. And

that’s the first thing. Second, here is where you are deeply

mistaken, in my deeply held view,

there is no such thing as a

Russian side and a Ukrainian side in this conflict.

That is an entirely primitive way of understanding it.

This is a war unleashed by Putin,

Vladimir Vladimirovich, to solve

his domestic political problems. He

wants to enslave that very Russian people

even further, and that is why he started a war in

Ukraine—a war that nobody needs, and

least of all the Russian people.

The Russian people are now paying more for

food because of these stupid sanctions.

The Russian people are paying even more because of

these stupid counter-sanctions. And Russian soldiers

are dying there for reasons no one can explain. They are being buried

in some secret cemeteries. There is no

war of Russians against Ukrainians. This is

Putin’s war to keep

the population of our country in bondage.

>> When you use the phrase

“the Russian people,” it gives the impression that, I don’t

know, the Yakut people aren’t suffering.

>> That’s only because your colleague

Alexei framed it that way. A Russian

country—not Russian. So even if

we—well, he, he’s the one there

who knows about nationalists—says

that some nationalists are one way, others

another. So using that same

terminology, yes, if we are talking

about Russians, although as we have seen

Buryat tank crews were also dying there somewhere and

being wounded. So, what Russians definitely do not

need right now is

the conquest of Ukraine and raising

some flags over Kyiv. To hell with that,

let them live as they want. The problem Russians have

is that, excuse me, in

the Smolensk region, nobody lives anymore. Just

look around, drive through it. All the fields are overgrown,

people are completely deteriorating. So why are you

telling us about Turkmenistan, about Uzbekistan,

where Russians are suffering there—and they are suffering?

And what are we talking about? Well, here, yes, here

in the Russian Far East there are hardly any Russians at all.

So why then are you talking about those people? Well,

how does that make sense?

>> I’m saying—I’m saying that Russians have many

problems, specifically Russians. And

the fact that this is the largest, as I repeat,

divided nation in Europe—that is also

a major problem. Ah, well, not in the world—in

Europe. I just want to tell you

that the degree of humiliation and persecution

to which

Russians were subjected, for example, in

Uzbekistan or Tajikistan,

>> yes,

>> it is not even remotely comparable to what

is happening, or was happening, in Ukraine.

>> Listen, there were tortures, torture pits, all of that.

>> You’re probably talking about Chechnya now,

I suppose. Wonderful. But what I want to

ask you is this—please remind me, Alexei, as a well-known

nationalist, how many

Russians lived in Chechnya, for example, in 1988?

In that year?

And now not a single one. So there you have it—they were

driven out, they were tormented, they were genuinely

tortured, tortured

by Islamist fascists.

We somehow skipped over Ukraine.

>> I’m simply saying that this is an important

point. In Ukraine, of course, there is

a problem—there was a problem with the Russian

language, but to say that Russians

were subjected to the same persecution, it

was honestly almost absurd. So once again,

there is the problem of a divided Russian

nation, that problem does exist, but what

Putin is doing now is not a solution

to Russians' problems; it is a solution

to his own personal problem. The war is meant to

strengthen his power. But what, what are you

doing so that the problems

of the Russian people—or not Russian,

Yakut, any people at all in Russia—

actually get solved? You talk about Putin's cronies,

you make videos, they are very

appealing. By the way, probably you can be

congratulated on this: you have become

a real video blogger. There are many like that. And

millio—millions of views. That is, that is

top bloggers, I mean, those who have

more of them—that's good. But how does that help

those people who, as you yourself said,

go to the store and spend more money?

>> I'll explain now. I'm forced to do this,

because, apart from my favorite

radio station, Echo of Moscow,

which broadcasts to an audience of millions in Russia, there are no longer

any media outlets left where I can speak to

even hundreds of thousands of people. Right now

I'm reaching them this way. And this is, among other things, my

way of helping those same Russian people, because

if you think that I ever

wanted to be some kind of video blogger and

record videos, then absolutely not. I

am now essentially creating my own kind of

quasi-television channel. Maybe a rather

pitiful one. You have a platform. How does it work?

What's the payoff?

>> I spread the truth. I

talk about corruption. I am engaged in

political activity. And I

>> You've been doing this for a long time, but where are the results?

>> You didn't win the elections. No one holds rallies anymore

either. That's true. In the

elections, I did not win. That's true. Right now

I am, in fact, barred from these elections. In

part because—and first and foremost because—

I did not win the elections, but

I got a fairly decent result. And

I

>> What prospects are there for Alexei Navalny?

You're a video blogger now. It's not about

prospects; it's about what I

am supposed to do. I decided for myself

that as a person, as a citizen, as

Alexei Navalny, as a father, husband, and

brother, there are certain things I am meant to do in this life,

and I do them, even if,

you know, tomorrow no one supports me

and not a single person comes out

to demonstrate with me. I will still

do them. It's not about, uh, me

thinking that everything is measured by success. It is entirely

possible—and this is the story of 99% of politicians—

that in my life there will be no more

political achievements at all

that I could boast about

on air here. But that does not

matter, because I am supposed to do

certain things in this life; I decided that

for myself, and I do them.

>> So you'll go down in history as a man

who made videos about Putin,

Sechin, corruption, and so on. Do you

agree? It's quite possible that if that's how

my life turns out, and I cannot do anything

more substantial, then I may

go down in history as a man

who appeared on the Aty program. Well, well,

that's not bad either. Appeared, at least,

at least,

>> Forgive me, please, but for all of us, for all of us here,

including the hosts of the ITM program,

what do we get from your investigations, again

what is the payoff in the field? Well, listen, you,

as I understand it, after all, sitting here

are four Russian citizens. Of you,

three are wearing glasses. That suggests that you are

smart people and are interested in what

is happening in the country.

>> I ruined my eyesight. Probably from

reading books with a flashlight under, under

the blanket. I hope that those— As for me, I

just had surgery to correct my

vision; otherwise I'd be sitting here in glasses too.

I hope that the things I

talk about, particularly corruption,

make you, as citizens of Russia,

stop and think, make you not vote

for United Russia and for Putin. And at

some point, when we achieve a situation where

elections are free, perhaps

some of you will come and vote for

me, for my party, or for people

like me.

>> The Russian public watched Navalny's videos,

watched them, say, for example,

since, I don't know, 2012, and read your

investigations. What result did we get

in parliament? Today is

the first day of the State Duma's work.

United Russia has a constitutional

majority, so it doesn't work.

>> Well no, of course not. No, that's not wrong, yes.

No, not everything is in vain. Nothing is in vain.

The regime is such now that power has been completely

usurped. This is not

a parliament. This is Putin

writing down 450 names and saying: "They

must sit in parliament now, at

this stage in the development of the authoritarian regime

in Russia, you really are right." And you

can—well, just don't say it in such a

tone as if I should be

offended by it or something. That's not the case at all.

I understand perfectly well that right now there is no

simple way in which

I could just do something and Alexei

Naryshkin would say, "There it is, the huge

benefit." I am trying to bring that benefit,

As best I could, using whatever means I had, I created it.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation, which

is the largest independent

nonprofit organization in Russia. We

fund it through thousands of people

who make donations to us.

We conduct these investigations when no one

in Russia can carry them out—either they do not dare

or are simply unable to. This is

our contribution, a modest contribution.

Unfortu-

nately, what we do—uh—we try

to do it well.

>> You yourself brought up history, Russia’s history.

Whose heir are you? Of those who held power

in our history, who is closest

to you?

>> That’s a common question: who is closest

to you among political figures, among

historical figures? No one is, because

we live in a completely different

society. It’s impossible even to compare

them at all, absolutely, or to draw any

parallels between myself and them, or even between

Putin and someone else—well, that’s just

a pointless exercise. It makes

no sense. In Russia’s thousand-year history,

you haven’t found anyone you might be

even roughly similar to?

There are many remarkable people in Russian history.

There are many one can

admire, but to draw parallels between myself

and them would, well, simply

be ridiculous, because it is

a different time, with different historical

circumstances, and besides, well, in many ways

any historical narratives are simply my-

>> Forgive me, but this just sounds like,

you know, a failing student

making excuses in an exam when he never

knows the answer. Oh no, I can tell you

when I was making excuses: it was when

Venediktov (Alexei Venediktov, Russian journalist) was sitting where you are and started

peppering me with Prospero and other

historical questions. That was when I

was dodging; now I’m simply saying

what I think.

>> Pigeons.

>> Ah, yes. Returning to your

investigations, Alexei Anatolyevich,

today Putin said that the most

important things—for lawmakers—are

education, healthcare, children, all

that sort of thing. As for you—well, I

completely agree with him. For me too, that is

the most important thing. But for you, it seems

to me, the most important thing is

corruption. You see, you play on these

base feelings of our people so that

they think, "Ah, look how awful they all are

in power—we must overthrow them

immediately." You do not deal with

social issues, healthcare, education. You’re

not interested in that. What matters to you is telling

people how bad the people at the top all are.

>> Now, Alexei, let me help you connect

the dots, and you’ll understand how all of this

is directly connected. Russia’s largest

charitable foundation,

"Podari Zhizn" (Gift of Life) raises 1.5

billion rubles a year.

>> Mm-hmm.

>> And yet in

any of our anti-corruption

investigations, we show and prove

how tens of billions of rubles

were stolen. So when you see

discussions about how money is raised

for children, about charitable foundations, and how much

time is spent on that, I assure you

that corruption steals enormous sums from these children,

from people with disabilities, from pensioners.

And this is directly connected. These are simply

directly linked things. In order

to achieve better healthcare

for people, we must fight

corruption. In order

to secure higher pensions, we

must fight corruption. These things

are directly connected. So when Putin

says that the most important things are

healthcare, the social sphere, and so

on, I completely agree with him. But

the thing is, I agree with the words

he says, but he does not

follow them. Because if he wants

healthcare to improve, then let him

make sure people stop stealing in

healthcare. That is exactly what we

are working on. When you defeat corruption, you

make room for those people who

are more competent when it comes to building

healthcare and education. Or do you

believe you have that expertise yourself?

>> I cannot defeat corruption.

Only a legal system can defeat corruption.

In fact, to fight

corruption, you do not need either Alexei

Navalny or some especially

good or honest or knowledgeable person—

of whatever kind. To fight corruption,

you need competitive politics, free

mass media. That is what

is needed to fight corruption. When

Russia has the rule of law and

a normal judicial system, and media

that are not afraid—Echo of Moscow (independent Russian radio station), for example, is not

afraid to publish my posts—but,

as I have already said, it is the only

major media outlet. When there is free media,

then corruption will decline. It is

a natural process of putting life

in the country in order.

>> Naryshkin,

>> On financing, since we have already

been talking about it—the Anti-Corruption Foundation,

its annual budget,

>> According to our latest report, I think,

38 million rubles. I hope that this year

it will be more.

>> All of it, all of it is donations.

>> All donations. Our average donation

is, I think, 1,200 rubles.

>> What does Alexei Navalny and his

family live on?

>> Well, I was a lawyer. After I was

convicted for the first time, I was stripped of

my law license. I

registered as a sole proprietor.

That is, broadly speaking,

a similar arrangement. I actually pay even less

in taxes. And the portion of my clients

whom I can still serve as a

sole proprietor—though this

is no longer related to criminal cases; for those

you have to be a licensed attorney—that work continues, so

there are perfectly proper contracts in place.

>> So aside from your work

at the FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation), you also provide legal

services? Very little. And, well, right now I

can honestly say that I have

about one and a half clients left, effectively.

>> And what field is that? I don't know,

family law, some business matters?

Well, it's civil law first and

foremost. It's primarily connected with

my main specialization. That is the protection of

shareholders' rights, corporate law,

that sort of thing. Well,

>> How much does a legal consultation with

Alexei Navalny cost? Well, this isn't any kind of

showing off, don't take it that way.

But no lawyer will ever

tell you how much a legal

consultation costs. Well, it depends on

the issue. If you ask me right now,

and I hope you won't, how

to divorce my wife, that would be one

fee. But if you ask me

how to sue Gazprom

or whether I would represent your

interests, then that would be a completely different

amount.

>> At least give us the ballpark—what currency, rubles,

dollars,

>> Of course rubles; settlements between

residents in foreign currency are not permitted.

So, of course, rubles.

>> Alexei Anatolyevich, since last time we've had

this little segment, based,

by the way, on a column by Oleg

Kashin—you've probably read it—where

he asked about Volodin, whom he would hug, Surkov

or Volodin. We decided to continue

that tradition. I'm going to name five

pairs now. I have one big request.

>> Ah, five pairs. You need to choose whom you would

rather hug. You can't refuse,

you can't say no. We want to understand whom

you feel more drawn to, so to speak:

Vladimir Lenin or Nicholas II (the last Russian tsar),

>> Whom would I hug out of those two? Yes,

>> Listen, come on. I understand perfectly well

that if I say, "No, you

aren't going to arrest me or shoot me,"

So here's my answer. I will

practically go out of this

studio and hug Alexei Alexeyevich

Venediktov, who's sitting there, and he'll

hug me back, there.

>> Which one is closer to you?

>> Well, neither of them is closer to me. This is

again, guys, a strange question.

>> Which one is the lesser evil?

>> Oh God, really,

one devoured 100 people, the other devoured

a million people. This is like

forcing someone at gunpoint

to answer that old question about two chairs. Next

question. It's honestly a little

ridiculous. Both of them were

the cause of terrible upheavals in our

country. Lenin emerged because there

was Nicholas II and there was the tsarist regime,

which in the 19th and 20th centuries tried

to preserve absolute power. I won't hug

either one of them, but I would speak

with interest to both.

>> Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump?

>> Oh, I'd hug both of them, one and the other. And

>> No, you can't do that, come on. Well, you can

hug one first, then the other.

Which one first? They're interesting people. I

would hug both, guys. Well,

>> You can't do that. Come on now. We told you

the rules during the break.

>> Your rules are wrong.

Like Putin, you don't want to—look, now they'll

start telling us again that

you're telling journalists how they should

do their job.

>> Alexei. Look, they won't be

hugging you simultaneously, so

you'll have to hug someone first. Whom

will you hug first? Come on, who

first?

>> They'll be at a debate. You know, I'd do it with both

hands. The listeners can't see right now. I

would embrace them both, that's obvious.

>> Vladimir Putin or Dmitry Medvedev?

>> Dmitry Medvedev is not really

>> politically—well, he is a politician nonetheless.

Still.

>> Well, if by "hug" we mean in the sense of

talking and interacting, then

of course it would be more interesting for me to talk

with Putin.

>> Yevgeny Prigozhin or Igor Shuvalov?

Don't mix them up.

>> It would of course be more interesting for me

to talk with Shuvalov, because Yevgeny

Prigozhin is a major, but still

lower-level

corrupt figure. And Shuvalov is a corrupt figure

on a much larger scale, of course.

Yury Lushko,

>> They say he goes to Echo's parties.

of Moscow (Echo of Moscow, the radio station), so maybe I'll even

see him there.

>> Yury Luzhkov or Sergei Sobyanin.

>> Well, I'd gladly

talk with Sobyanin, have a conversation. He, I

ran for mayor of Moscow, and his, uh,

line of work is, of course, very

close to me, and I'd have quite a

lot to discuss with him.

>> Is it true that you met with him on

election night? At Moscow City Hall?

>> Sob... No, I've never seen him except

on television. As for Putin, listen,

what question would you ask Putin? Just

seriously: imagine you're now

walking out of the building on New Arbat, from

the Echo of Moscow newsroom, and Putin is walking down the street.

>> Well,

>> I've been asked that before, I'll explain. Good question.

Thank you. A few years ago I was

asked that question, and, uh, my answer

was the standard one: that I would ask him

in detail why there is so much

corruption and everything else, ask a specific

question. Now I would ask him

what on earth is going on, what is this

madness with this plutonium, with the war in

Syria? What kind of nonsense is this? What's your

plan, dear comrade? That's what I'd be more

inclined to ask about, because what

is happening now, and what happened before, was

wrong and disgusting, but in

some sense even rational for

holding on to power. What is happening

now, well, it's just complete insanity. Wha...

>> What's your plan for Syria? Do you have a

plan for Syria?

>> The plan for Syria is that

we need to take part, together with the international

community, within the framework of the international

coalition, in the fight against ISIS. And the plan for

Syria is to acknowledge that

Assad is one of the causes

of ISIS's emergence. And Assad is no

friend of ours.

>> And bomb him? Why bomb him? He

right now

remains in power solely

because Russia supports him.

Russia should not support him,

because, by the way, judging

by the way you were talking about Ukraine, you

seem to like all that stuff about juntas and so

on. Well, the regime that is

in power in Syria is a genuine

military junta, the real thing. Because Assad's father

seized power as a result of a

military cou... coup, and his

dear son is holding on to that power

illegally. So that's bad. Tell me,

please, tell me this. So,

there will be a presidential election, suppose

you win it. Would you cancel the FIFA World Cup?

>> Of course not. Why would anyone cancel the

World Cup? The goal isn't to cancel

the World Cup, just as when

we criticized Olympic construction,

the point was,

>> first, by the time of the election, most

of that money will already have been spent, and

almost all of it will be gone. The goal

is to make sure there is no corruption. Russia should not be

deprived of the Olympics, or the World Cup,

or Eurovision, or, I don't know, the

World Folk Ditty Contest, or an

interplanetary chess congress. We just

shouldn't steal money allocated for

building these facilities. Time is short.

Tell us, what should be done about abortion?

Ban it, allow it?

>> Well, nothing needs to be done. The

current regulations in Russia

should remain as they are. And, by the way,

this regulation is

supported by the majority of Russian citizens.

It should be covered by insurance. That is, just as

it is now, through public healthcare funded by taxpayers.

>> Well, otherwise you will get

infant mortality and the deaths of women

who will be having abortions in

underground clinics. And this isn't some

personal theory of mine; it's simply what experience shows. Look

at what happened in the years

1936 to 1938, when

abortions were banned. Just look at

the horrific graphs of female and

infant mortality. Then you yourself

will argue that nothing should

be changed in this area. Now,

>> Earlier, in the first part of the program, you spoke about Chechnya.

Is Kadyrov a problem

for present-day Russia?

>> Well, what do you think: a governor, the head

of a region's executive branch, who

is, in my deep conviction,

the organizer of contract killings—is that

a problem or not? Of course it's

a problem. A man who, in effect—I am

sure of it—was behind, for example,

Nemtsov's murder: that was Kadyrov. And that's not even mentioning

the countless murders of Chechens themselves

that have been carried out in Moscow, which

Yulia Latynina talks about so well on your air

all the time. When I see a

governor who, incidentally, by virtue of his office

cannot command any

police, FSB officers, or any

security agencies, yet somewhere in a

stadium they assemble some hellish wild division

of bearded men armed with, I don't know,

machine guns. And it's completely unclear what kind of

force this even is, or whom they

obey. I understand that this can

never be acceptable.

>> After the broadcast, Putin will call you and

ask: "Alexei, my dear,

>> I liked the program, I’ll say that much, very much.

I really liked it. Come by,

>> That’s clear. Alexei, what should be done about

Kadyrov?" I don’t know. Help me. Here’s

the recipe.

>> I would say: "Act according to the law."

Vladimir Vladimirovich, well,

>> you yourself spoke about this army there at the

stadium, where bearded men gather. Are you

suggesting starting a war there? Because

Putin allows it to assemble. All

these people have ID cards.

should do to make sure Kadyrov is gone.

So,

>> are you afraid of Kadyrov?

>> Are you afraid of Kadyrov? I’m not afraid

of Kadyrov. I understand that this is a man

who effectively has a license to

kill. And I understand that if he

sets his sights on some

person, very little will stop him.

For example, what should be done about Kadyrov?

Right now, if Kadyrov is

the problem. You say that, by law,

the Nemtsov case should be investigated, if all

the facts

>> simply sign a decree dismissing

Kadyrov, just sign a dismissal decree. If

he organized the murder, then he should be

arrested. And I assure you that in

modern Chechnya, where a

vertical power structure has been established, Kadyrov could be

replaced tomorrow with some other similar

figure, only a better one.

>> What do you mean, he won’t give up power? But that

Alexei. It’s convenient for everyone to

say that, Alexei. But now everything is arranged

differently. Kadyrov—even when he

sensed a moment of falling from favor, as you

remember, he even said he was ready

to leave. He can be replaced by another

person within this system as early as

tomorrow.

>> Alexei Navalny on the program AT Steam

today. Alexei Solomin, Naryshkin,

Durnovo and Golube hosted this broadcast. Thank you

all. Happi—very

the others didn’t like it, or what?

>> That means we’re going to get chewed out. Venediktov,

you’re not saying it, right? We have,

>> Yes. Say it was awful.

>> No, I mean, it was kind of, well, somewhat

interesting questions, some tough ones. That’s

always interesting.

A lot.

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