During the broadcast, a prediction was discussed that Alexei Navalny could face criminal prosecution and imprisonment. He responded that he recognizes such a risk as an inherent part of independent political and anti-corruption work, but has no intention of leaving Russia, since doing so would undermine the purpose of his work and the trust of his supporters. Navalny emphasized that modern internet technologies make it possible to reach a mass audience quickly without state involvement and to influence, above all, the active minority that, in his view, drives social change. Speaking about reforms, he said that a real fight against corruption is possible only when there is political will and public support, and that if fair elections existed, he would be ready to take part in them, including running for president.
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On the air at Radio Svoboda (Radio Liberty) is the program Face to Face,
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and our guest is Alexei Navalny, a blogger,
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the creator of the online project RosPil, and an active
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participant in Russian
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public and political life, answering
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questions from Gregory White of The Wall Street
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Journal and Olga Romanova, a Russian
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journalist who writes for several publications at once.
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And as I promised at the beginning
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of the second part, we will hear the forecast of one
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of our colleagues, namely Matvei
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Ganapolsky, which he gave to Radio
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Svoboda (Radio Liberty) sitting right here in this studio, and
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I have to say, when I heard this forecast
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— admittedly, I heard it in a recording — I had a bad
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feeling. So, soon
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Navalny will go to prison. So how will it happen?
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It will be very simple. Everyone will shout that this is
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impossible, that it's political, and so on.
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First there will be an investigation, then he will
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be forced to come to court, and then, exactly as in
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the spirit of
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Khodorkovsky's case, the prosecutor will say that he is
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a bandit, a murderer, with his legs ankle-deep in
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blood, after which he will have
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handcuffs put on him right in the courtroom, because the judge will simply
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read out what the prosecutor said. And
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after that he will be sent away for about five years. Well,
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not five — three years. Why am I saying this?
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Because it's clear who is preparing to
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be president, and he is not going to
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spoil his mood and his years
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in office because of this buzzing mosquito
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who keeps carrying out all sorts of investigations.
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I believe he is doing something very important
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for Russia, and that is precisely why I
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suggest that he leave Russia
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immediately. People need to understand that
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in this country only one person is without sin;
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everyone else is compromised. All the squeals
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and cries — people think, and I among them,
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that he is fighting corruption — the authorities
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have finally taken notice of this, and
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the decision has been made. You understand, they had to
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weigh whether to open a criminal case
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against a man associated with
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the fight against corruption. I understand that this
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decision did not come easily to the authorities. I understand
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that they calculated everything: the reaction of the West,
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so to speak, the cries of human rights activists, and so
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on.
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But someone said: what, do you want
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all this to go on until what year? No,
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guys, that won't happen. The case has been set in motion.
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I repeat: Navalny will be in prison very
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soon. That was Matvei Gonopolsky on
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the program of my colleague Elena Rykovtseva,
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Press Hour.
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So, what is your reaction? Well, if you think
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that I am deeply shocked by these words,
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for the past three years I have been hearing all this
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at weekly intervals. People
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either ask, why haven't you gone to prison yet,
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or they say, well then, you will go to prison
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soon.
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As I said at the beginning of the program, this is
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a certain inherent risk. Well, not even a risk,
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but rather simply a fact of life for anyone
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engaged in independent
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public or political
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activity, especially if they are involved in
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investigations. I understood this risk from the very
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beginning. And you will not leave? Well,
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of course I will not leave, because then
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everything loses its meaning, everything I have done
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loses its meaning. People will believe you
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only if you share with them
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these risks. I will never be able to persuade anyone
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in Uryupinsk or Bryansk
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to do even something similar
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if I myself am sitting somewhere and giving clever advice from
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London. That does not work. Besides, these
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investigations cannot be conducted from there. I
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studied in America for half a year; I understand
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perfectly well that it is technically impossible.
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Every time you file a crime report,
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the police call you in
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to give explanations, and so on. In other words,
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the whole thing would fall apart. And first of all I would
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lose people's trust — my main
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resource, probably my only resource
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that I have.
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And besides, most importantly,
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I believe we must not be afraid of them, we cannot be.
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They should be afraid of us, and they are
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far more afraid of us, because, well,
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they can imprison anyone. So what
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now? And what conclusion follows from that? Shall we
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all live under the bed, or else
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all move to London, and whoever cannot get to
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London will move to Ukraine? Olga Romanova,
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please. Idiots. What idiots? These people
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seriously think that prison is very
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frightening. No, prison is frightening, no question about it,
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but there are things far worse than prison,
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far worse. Yes, prison is
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frightening, but it seems to me much more frightening
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to work, if tomorrow you were appointed
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an official in, say, some department, I don't know,
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the health department responsible for medicines.
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To my mind, that is more frightening, simply
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more frightening on a human level. Yes, in terms of
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your family,
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to society,
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just how could you look people in the eye? Well, I
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do not want to strike a pose here.
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thing. It can be a dangerous thing, it
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can be something deadly dangerous, as
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we saw in the case of Magnitsky (Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian lawyer who died in custody). And
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therefore ending up there is undesirable for
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any person, but I absolutely agree
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that there are things scarier and more important than
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prison. Well, that is true for certain people. Here I
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would also jump in, because if it were
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so obvious, I think the situation in
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Russia would be a little different. That is, if
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priorities were arranged the way you
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set them for yourself. And priorities
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will be set that way if there are people who
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will set those priorities. Well,
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I set them as best I can, and I
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am sure that now there will appear many more
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people who will inspire others with examples like these.
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I do not want to overestimate my own
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importance, but if I manage to inspire
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even just a couple of people, well then it means
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I will not have done it all in vain. Do you suppose
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that in increasing the number of these people
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the technologies that
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exist now, and which you, among other things,
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for example, use in organizing the project
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RosPil (Navalny's anti-corruption project). Well, without any
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doubt. Because right now I do not need
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a single kopeck, and I do not need any help
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or participation from the state in order to
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tell, say, 200,000 people about something
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within 5 minutes. I can do that
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easily. When I published the documents
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from the Transneft investigation, I set
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the goal of reaching an audience of 1 million people, and we
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reached it fairly quickly, in 2
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weeks. Now we can reach, without
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spending a single kopeck, an audience of 5 million
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people. Time is working for us, the audience
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is growing. Modern technical methods
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are, after all, technical, but they are very important.
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Grek, please. Well, also, what we hear
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from the Kremlin is that the blogosphere, well,
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fine, it chats among itself, but it in no way
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has any influence. The people, these people, do not want
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to vote, and it has no effect at all on the broader
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political situation. What you are doing
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and with this audience, do you feel that there is
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broader reach or influence? I believe that
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there is definitely influence, and in the Kremlin
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they understand that there is influence. Otherwise, if
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there were no influence, why would they have
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invented their own Front (the All-Russia People's Front)? They could have just gone ahead with
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United Russia, and the opinion polls
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that say people support
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the slogan 'United Russia is the party of crooks and
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thieves' are also an indirect, but
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confirmation of all this. Besides, it is
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fundamentally wrong to think that in order
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to achieve some kind of change,
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I, or someone else,
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sitting in every village, for that
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needs television reach. No,
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we need to convince 1% of the active population.
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All change is made by that 1%; it is with
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that group that we need to work. Because if there were
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an opportunity to tell every granny
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about corruption, I would tell every granny
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about it. There is no such opportunity. Well,
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then that is that, topic closed, we will keep pushing
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through.
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Suppose unexpectedly your spirit enters, I do not know,
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Medvedev or Putin. Quickly, quickly,
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quickly: what would you start with? What would have to be done quickly
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first, and then what?
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What would you start with, what would you change, right
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tomorrow?
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If in 5 minutes any kind of
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wild spirit enters Medvedev,
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he will do absolutely nothing. He will
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do exactly the same thing, because
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Medvedev is within such
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constraints. If in 5 minutes there is a button and I use
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that button, then the first thing that needs
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to be done is, let us say, to restore meaning
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to words. When Medvedev talks a lot
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about things—let me explain now—when he
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talks about fighting corruption,
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then, if the spirit has returned in 5 minutes, I
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would actually begin fighting corruption.
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That means concrete legal cases. We
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would begin, first of all—if you like, call it
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a warning to others—we would start jailing those people
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who should
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be behind bars. That would be done first
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of all. Well, in a hypothetical situation
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it is strange, yes—a military coup happened,
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a spirit entered someone, and so on. If we
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are talking about some kind of systemic changes,
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about coming to power through elections,
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then of course everything should be built differently.
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But what Medvedev should do now
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if he sincerely wants change, is that he
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must jail those who deserve
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to be in prison. The consciousness
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of people, when they are told
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the same thing, they will want
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Well, it will be a normal, quite normal
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kind of Stalinist thing. It is not about people's consciousness.
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I understand the question; it is a well-known theme:
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'kill the dragon, become the dragon,' and so on.
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It is not about people's consciousness; it is
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exclusively about the awareness and political
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will of the person who comes in. When
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a person comes who will
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will jail them, but then after four or
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eight years will leave without taking anything for himself and
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having refused those enormous resources.
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That kind of power—how could that be? That just doesn't happen.
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Look, you've jailed a lot of people, and a lot of those people have
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acquaintances among deputies,
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members of parliament, deputy ministers,
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who could literally, within some
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period of time, so to speak, organize a conspiracy. And
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it would not necessarily be
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a conspiracy to overthrow you; it would be a conspiracy
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to ensure total paralysis instead.
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And so the circle closes: what you need is not unlimited
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power, but legitimate power. But
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in fact, all of this is possible
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to carry out only if you have
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substantial support in society.
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Putin has de facto
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legitimacy, because after all
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a fairly large number of people
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support him. In practice, he doesn't need
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any elections or anything like that,
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since there is a sizable number of people
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who support him; he has
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legitimacy. Reforms and changes like these
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can be carried out by a person who
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is genuinely supported—whether that's
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a dictator, or simply a junta. But we
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see, both in recent history and in less
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recent history, many examples of times when
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people with political support
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carried out outstanding reforms, including in
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the area of fighting corruption, and everything
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went perfectly well. The classic example is
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Georgia. Yes, another classic example is
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Hong Kong, and so on and so forth. I don't
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see why Russia should be somehow
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fundamentally different. If you
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do what you are supposed to do, according to
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the rules, everyone will support you; you will jail them all,
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no junta will emerge, and
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society will fully support you.
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So, do you want to be president?
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I am involved in politics in order to
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naturally hold political
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offices that make it possible to resolve
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certain issues, carry out reforms, solve
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problems. Naturally, the presidency is one of
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those offices. If there were elections in Russia,
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I would take part
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in them. So yes—that is my answer to the question
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asked by Olya, in the way she phrased it: yes.
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Yes.