Alexei Navalny on the program “Special Opinion” from July 14, 2017

Absolute Albats.

>> Good evening. 20

3 minutes 32 seconds. On the air is

the radio station Echo of Moscow. I am Yevgenia

Albats, and I am beginning the program

devoted to the key events of the week,

the events that will have

an impact on politics in the coming weeks

and months. Today I have one guest,

the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation,

a man about whom the well-known

Washington political publication recently

wrote: "He will beat Putin." A candidate for

president of the Russian Federation

according to the opposition, Alexei Navalny, with

whom we will today sum up

the political season for the opposition.

Alexei, hello.

>> Good evening.

>> Especially since today marked the opening of

Navalny's seventieth regional campaign office.

Today as well, a court refused to satisfy the lawsuit

of the influential businessman Mikhailov

against Navalny, who demanded the removal from

the internet of the Anti-Corruption Foundation's investigation

into the business dealings of the sons

of the Prosecutor General, so let me

congratulate you on that. Alexei,

>> Thank you very much. It's a rare thing for us,

when we win in a Russian court.

>> Yes, which makes it especially noteworthy.

When are you going fishing?

>> And spend two hours underwater chasing a pike?

No, well, I think I'd rather

They turned a fishing trip into, as I understand it,

a forty-six-minute

film, which they posted on the website

of the presidential administration. Longer than

our film about Medvedev or about

Chaika. I think I'll make a film

about something else, not, not, not about my own

fishing trip.

>> Uh-huh. And are you ready to strip for the voters?

Zhenya, we've started with provocative

questions. I don't think voters

need me to take my clothes off. It seems to me

they want something else from a candidate for

president of Russia, not undressing. Especially

since with the undressing, I don't know

why they did it a second time. There were

so many jokes about the bare torso

on horseback, but apparently they

liked it.

It is extremely important for the Kremlin

to prove right now

that Putin is still all there, that he is not senile. Because

judging by the authorities' actions in recent

years and in the last few months, even

people who are quite loyal toward Putin, toward

the Kremlin, among the electorate, feel that they

have all gone mad there. So it is important for them

to show that they are in good physical

shape, catching pike and climbing around some

mountains in Tuva (a Russian republic in southern Siberia).

>> I see, Navalny won't be taking his clothes off,

guys. That's how it always is,

>> I'm not planning to anytime soon.

>> All right, now to something serious. In

an interview with the American channel CBSN, as

I understand it, while answering the favorite question

of all Western journalists: Why are you still

alive, and aren't you afraid you'll be killed?

That was probably the gist of it.

>> A lesson for me: don't joke in a foreign

language. Let me just tell our read-

listeners that you said you had

a fifty percent chance of being killed and

a fifty percent chance

of not being killed. I specifically

listened to the original video, thinking

that maybe they had slightly misquoted you

to promote the program, or that you had said it

somewhat differently, but no, you said exactly that. And

the question can't be heard, but you said exactly

50% that you would be killed. Well, as I already

said, it's a lesson: don't joke in

a foreign language. It was a classic

situation with a foreign correspondent.

You're riding along with him, he's asking you

just some general chit-chat, and then

suddenly he asks you: "So what do you

think, will you be killed or not?"

>> Is that really how he asked it?

>> "Well, yes." He asked: "What do you think,

how high is the probability that you'll be killed?" Well,

and I remembered this well-known Russian

joke about a blonde woman

being asked: "What is the probability of meeting

a dinosaur by your apartment entrance?" She says:

"50%. Either I will, or I won't." So

I decided to make a joke. Along the lines of that

joke, I said: "Well, 50%: either they'll kill me,

or they won't." Because in my answer

I meant that it was pointless

to analyze it. I don't know, and I'm not

even going to think about it, and there is no

point in thinking about it. But they

took it with this kind of

seriousness and put it in the headlines,

which look frightening. But, in

fact, that is absolutely not what I

meant. Well, uh,

>> Well, I think that any, of course,

politician in Russia, any person

who is, so to speak, engaged in

independent politics, has certain

risks, but to assess them in percentages or

in terms of probabilities is simply absolutely

impossible. And I repeat, it is pointless

even to think much about it, because

if you think about it too much, you won't be able

to do anything else.

>> But isn't that, in Freudian terms, a reflection

of an inner fear?

>> No, I don't think so. Or rather, I

know with complete certainty that it is not,

uh, a reflection of inner fear. I am

a rational person; I understand the level

danger, but I feel no fear at all

neither inwardly nor outwardly.

>> All right. Uh, because, you know, I, uh,

many people had, uh, this kind of reaction

to that statement of yours—it made many people,

who think very highly of you

and wish you well, of course, feel this kind of,

well, shudder. Uh, and, um, right away there began

this remarkable discussion on

the internet about why, then,

not just imprison you? Why kill you? Especially

since the criminal corrections

inspectorate in Moscow recently

warned about the possibility of replacing your

suspended sentence with a real prison term. Uh, but the court—

this proposal from the criminal corrections

inspectorate of Moscow was rejected. By the way, do you

have an explanation for why?

>> You know, it wasn't even like that. What happened there was

a much more absurd situation:

the court's press service said that the inspectorate

was demanding that the suspended sentence be changed to

a real one. After some time—or rather,

the court said, yes, the court said that

the inspectorate was demanding it; then after a while

the inspectorate denied it. Then later the court

said that yes, there had been such a filing,

but it was unsigned, and therefore it was left

without action. And then all of this was

walked back. A very strange situation.

I go to the inspectorate twice a month,

I'm required to check in. And once a month

they come check on me at home together with

the local police officer. I asked them, I

said: "What exactly did you stir up there

that's so interesting? Tell me—I'm

curious myself—what was it you were demanding there?"

But they blush, turn pale, yet they won't

admit what's going on. And here

I can only repeat once again: it is

pointless to analyze this. I don't know

what is going on in their heads. I

believe there is no strategy at all. These are

just some crazy people,

I mean the Kremlin, the government,

the security services, who for some

short-term reasons, under the influence of

various factors, make or fail to make

certain decisions. Some decided:

"Let's lock him up." Others

say: "No, let's not,

we shouldn't turn him into a hero." Or maybe

something else is happening. I don't understand

how it works. In order to

answer that question in any meaningful way,

you would need some information about

what is going on inside Putin's head.

I don't think even one person

has that information.

>> And you have no doubt that the decision

about you is made by Putin alone?

>> I don't have the slightest doubt about that.

>> Okay. And your probation period was extended

by a year, right, until 2020. What

until December 2020? What does that

actually mean? What does it mean?

>> It means nothing. Well, it means

that once again they are sending a kind of

political signal to the whole country,

to me specifically, but mainly to the whole

country, to the opposition in all its forms, that

we will not allow you to take part in elections,

that the political system will function

without you. There will never be real competition

in elections. And anyone

who, on their own, thinks that they are

so great and can

independently build up political

capital and then come along and get

elected to something here—that will not happen. And once again they

have, uh, in line with this

law of theirs that prohibits

people with suspended sentences from running for office, they

extended my probation period. From the standpoint of

the current election

campaign, this doesn't interest me, because

I am entering this election guided by

the Constitution, which plainly states that

everyone has the right to participate in elections

who is not being held in places of

deprivation of liberty. I do not recognize their federal law,

and it does not comply with

the Constitution, so

this court ruling did not, generally speaking, impress

me very much. And besides,

it was obvious that they would

do this. They had already extended it for me, I think,

twice by three months each, and now they have

gone ahead and extended it by another year.

>> Well, I think it had been until 2019.

And what difference does it make—

2019 or 2020?

>> Well, again, that means they have pushed back by

another year the possibility of

taking part in elections.

We all understand perfectly well that

this is simply a display of the system in its current

form: they believe they can arrange things

so as not to allow certain

candidates in. Our task, and the task of this

stage of the campaign, is to force them,

to compel them to register me as a candidate,

and to do that by, well, shaping

public opinion. They govern by

polls. If they see in the polls that

people—not necessarily my

supporters, but even their supporters—

believe that political

competition is needed, and that yet another election in the

format of Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky,

Mironov, Zhirinovsky interests

no one, then they will register me. And

if we fail to create

enough pressure, then, probably, they

will try to keep me off the ballot.

>> Now that's an interesting question. So, you have

70 campaign offices open, tens of thousands of

volunteers.

So have you, so to speak,

secured the support of potential, uh,

signatories, or whatever the proper term is, right,

>> the people who will sign

when the moment comes,

>> when the moment comes, and so on, right? So that's still

hundreds of thousands of people. If you are not

registered, what will you do? And

more generally, what do you think the

reaction will be?

>> Right now we are not making any specific

predictions, because what we do

will depend heavily on what kind of

work we manage to do. At the moment we have

135,000 volunteers. That could become 200,000,

it could become 300,000. Right now we have

collected more than half a million signatures

uh, and with those not yet fully confirmed,

it's around 800,000 just by email,

but we are not even counting those. Everything depends

on what the specific situation

will be, what public

opinion will be at that moment. Of course, we will not

ever recognize an election in which

I am not allowed to run. Of course, we will not

stay silent. As for any specific actions,

it makes no sense to make these kind of

strategic or tactical plans, because

we do not know how this will

play out or what exactly will happen,

or who the other candidates will be. We

understand perfectly well that, well, most likely,

the Kremlin, as a kind of sugar pill,

if they decide not to let me run, will bring in

some candidate of their own, nominally

democratic, but under their control.

What kind of candidate that will be, whether he will be

relatively respectable or completely

disreputable—many things will be decided

on the fly.

>> Do you think that by autumn we will know

whom they might bring in?

Of course,

>> Well, I think—I mean, by autumn, probably,

later in the autumn. But probably one such candidate will not

be enough. They will need,

of course, some kind of Prokhorov number two (a reference to Mikhail Prokhorov, the businessman who ran in Russia's 2012 presidential election as a nominally liberal candidate) if

they decide not to let me run.

>> Mm-hmm.

>> Because otherwise, well, people simply will not

show up to vote; turnout will be nonexistent. Yes. They,

of course, can falsify the results, and we

understand perfectly well that they know how

to rig elections.

But you see, if turnout is 15%, then they

would have to inflate the vote by a factor of three

especially in the big cities,

where simply no one will go to the polls.

Well, they always have Chechnya,

Tatarstan, Bashkortostan. But they all live

in Moscow. They all live in Moscow, after all.

They vacation in St. Petersburg.

So the views of the biggest cities still

cannot be ignored. These are real

people; they live in Russia. And besides,

you should not think that, uh, in Chechnya

everyone just obediently goes to the polling stations on command. In

Chechnya, the results are simply falsified.

In fact, it's not even falsification there—it's

a complete rewriting of the numbers, right? Or in

Dagestan, what is happening there. But people

will still know perfectly well that

no one actually went to the polls. And that kind of

de facto delegitimization of the authorities

also matters.

>> Well, this is what I do not quite understand. On the one

hand, you say that they are

pursuing insane policies and that

the country has a fairly harsh

authoritarian regime, but on the other hand,

you are pinning your hopes on the idea that

they care about legitimacy. Well

>> I do not see any contradiction here. They are not

interested in legitimacy as such; they are

interested in staying in power. They really are

pursuing insane policies.

But within those insane policies

there is one rational point: they want

to stay in power in order to enrich themselves.

Personal enrichment and personal comfort.

A great many motives and elaborate theories

are built around this. From

my point of view, it is all quite simple.

A fairly small group of

people wants to enjoy this

unimaginable wealth and enjoy the

enormous power they have seized

in the country. Everything else is

secondary. It is just that, in order to better

hold on to power, it is preferable, of course,

not to raise the real level of public anger

too high. That's all. Therefore, if

they see that barring a candidate

from the election will raise the real

level of public anger, then

they may decide to allow him to run.

>> Returning to the original question—oh,

before I ask you about

the results and your position this season,

tell me, how is your eye?

>> Much better. I can see you, Yevgeny,

perfectly well,

>> with both eyes. I mean, it still sees

worse. My right eye still sees

worse than the left one. I have to

put drops in it and fuss with it,

which is rather unpleasant because, well,

a normal person in everyday life

does not even remember that he has

eyes. Unfortunately, right now I am

constantly aware that I have an eye, uh, and that it

needs various drops. But overall,

everything has become much better. And thanks

to the doctors, both Russian and foreign.

>> Excellent. Uh, in that same NBC interview

you once again repeated that you are absolutely

convinced that the person who splashed

you with that liquid which caused

a chemical burn to the cornea,

And what, this was all commissioned

by Putin's administration?

And you have sufficient grounds to

make that claim. What grounds do you

have for saying that?

>> There is not the slightest doubt. I can

confirm it. I gave an interview to CNBC,

probably about two months ago. They spent a long time

preparing it, and now even more

specific facts have emerged. The fact is that

this criminal case has been closed. I still

have not even been questioned in connection with it. All

the organizers directly involved, and

the actual attackers, they have been

identified online, and their faces,

last names, passport details, and addresses are available. And

not one of them, none of them, has been

bothered in the slightest. There is evidence online

and video footage showing these people

being brought by the police in police cars or

taken away from somewhere. That is, they—and this

person who directly

splashed me with that liquid—he is giving

what are essentially fabricated witness

statements in the cases of June 12 and March 26

. In other words, these are people

who work directly with

law enforcement agencies.

Information about my whereabouts and my

movements could only have been obtained

from the security services. So I have no

doubts. And this body of

evidence, the fact that they have not faced

not only no punishment, but not even

an investigation, despite the fact that

remember how many statements there were

saying that all of this would be investigated,

United Russia (the ruling political party) is unhappy. United Russia

was saying at the time: "Any attacks

must be investigated." And what came of it? And I

we received a response from the police saying the case

had been closed because they were unable

to identify the attackers. Go to my

blog and look at their photographs and

addresses.

>> Do you have anything else, or do you have

any other information that you

>> Well, we do not have any special

secret information or anything that we are

holding back. But what we see, what

is happening, of course, clearly

indicates that these

people are being protected and supported by

the security services. And of course, this is a political

order that came from the presidential administration

either directly or indirectly

through some political consultants, or—I do not

know exactly how it works. But it is

exactly the same as with our

campaign offices across the country, right? Endless

seizures of leaflets, arrests and detentions of

people, intimidation, beatings, attacks.

This is a systematic nationwide

campaign involving, without

exaggeration, hundreds of thousands—uh, tens of

thousands of police officers.

who are doing almost nothing else

except seizing our leaflets.

A huge number of employees of the

prosecutor's office, the Investigative Committee,

and the FSB (Federal Security Service), who go around to the landlords of all

our campaign offices. There are 70 regions, and everywhere

FSB officers come and try

to evict our office. This cannot

possibly be a coincidence.

>> Well, they evicted us in Moscow

several times, and we have, well, very

many cases. I find it hard to say right now

exactly, but probably in more than

thirty regions, we repeatedly

had to change locations because

FSB officers would come to the landlords

and force them to terminate their leases with us.

>> An expensive undertaking. How much money have you raised

for the campaign so far? Uh,

>> Well, more than 100 million rubles. We broke

the fundraising record from my mayoral campaign.

Back then, we raised 104 million rubles in 3

months. Now, admittedly, over a

longer period, we have raised more than 104 million.

>> And what is the average, uh, donation?

>> Ah, the median. Ah, 500 rubles. Well,

the donations remain fairly small,

but they are made by

about 70,000 people,

>> Right, yes?

>> So that is a huge number of people.

This is a major achievement for us. And

this is, in fact, the main reason

why the Kremlin cannot paralyze our campaign

despite all these efforts

with all the security and law enforcement agencies. Well, as long as

these 70,000

people support us, and each can send

500 rubles. And that cannot be stopped. I mean,

if there were one sponsor sending

tens of millions, you could

go to him and say, "Do not do this

anymore," or simply arrest him, but when there are

70,000 people, what can you do about it?

>> And what, interestingly, do they say to the tenants—

to the landlords who

rent you office space for your campaign headquarters?

>> Well, they come and say: "Listen,

tomorrow the tax authorities will come and seize

all your documents." And then the police will come and

say: "We need all the computers here for examination.

That is what happens to

our campaign offices. Police officers simply walk in

and say: "Hmm, it looks like you are engaged in

extremist activity. We are taking

all the computers for examination." This

can be done under Russia's outrageous laws

without any court order at all. And

it happens constantly. But

just imagine: you have an office, you have some

accounting department, and they have taken away two

the computer, and hello, you can’t do any

kind of activity at all."

So, uh, very often tenants,

landlords—they really are frightened

by these very serious consequences. But,

uh, I’m very proud that we are finding

a sufficient number of people, after all,

across all seventy of these regions. We

have campaign offices everywhere. And in Moscow, we’ve now

found one after a long series of ups and downs, when

meetings of our Moscow headquarters

were taking place in random archways and practically

in apartment building entrances. Now we have

50 Gilyarovskogo Street. Come by, Muscovites.

It’s a wonderful space, with a huge

number of volunteers. Well, as I already

said, 135,000 volunteers. That’s an enormous

number of people. There are volunteers in

every populated locality in Russia. And our

main problem right now is that we

simply can’t raise money fast enough

to provide these people with

newspapers and leaflets. Especially considering

that 30% of those leaflets are stolen along the way by

the police. But why do you need newspapers

and leaflets if you’re

drawing audiences of millions online?

How many watched *He Is Not Dimon to You*—20

28 million.

>> Yes. But the country has a population of 145 million

people. That’s why I’m running in the

presidential election. And I really am

running in the presidential election. And I’m fighting

for the votes of the majority. And I will get

those majority votes. I just need

a way to get our thoughts and our

ideas across. We reach a lot of people online for that,

but it’s still not enough.

In Russia, about 70 million people use the internet

every day—probably even more.

So when a video gets 24 million views, that’s

very good, but still not enough.

There are people who don’t use

the internet at all. There are people who

trust newspapers. “They wouldn’t lie in a newspaper,”

they think. “If it’s printed in the paper, then

you should read it.” There has to be

variety. If we had access to television, we

would use television too, but we’re not

allowed to buy airtime."

We could buy it; we would also use

outdoor advertising, but they won’t allow that either. So

we

>> You can’t buy it there?

>> Right, no one will sell us anything.

So we use the methods available to us.

We have volunteers. That is our main

strength. A volunteer with a leaflet

is a formidable weapon. And the Kremlin really

is terribly afraid of them. They’re simply

panic-stricken for exactly that reason. Why?

Because

Putin’s approval rating—

86 percent or whatever

it may be—can exist

only in conditions of a political vacuum,

when there is no real competition. But when

someone knocks on a person’s door and

says, “Hello, we’re volunteers for

candidate Navalny; here’s a leaflet.”

And he sees with his own eyes that these are

real volunteers. He talks to them,

asks, “How much are they paying you, guys?”

And they explain that actually no one

is paying us. We’ve never even seen Navalny

in person. We’re just doing this for the cause,

going around handing these out, and we live right here, in

the building next door.” And then he understands that this

is all real—that there is a candidate who

has fairly broad

support, who talks about things that may seem

obvious, but that

everyone stays silent about: corruption, political

competition, poverty, injustice

and inequality. And that immediately shatters the whole

picture. No, that entire 86% instantly

thins out and collapses at that moment, because

people see that there is competition. And

the Kremlin is, of course, terribly and

panic-stricken by that. They have, well, not exactly

accepted it, but they are prepared to tolerate

the internet, the fact that there are these

millions of people—mostly residents

of the biggest cities—who will

never again believe Kremlin

propaganda. But the fact that

our campaign is moving offline,

going to pensioners and handing them

a newspaper—that is an attack on what they hold most

sacred. They do not want to tolerate that; they cannot

tolerate it. But we don’t care that they do not

want to and cannot. We are going to keep

doing it anyway.

>> How much success are they having in intimidating

your volunteers, after all? I mean,

>> Well,

>> After all, online you constantly hear not only

stories that they came for this person, came for that

person, someone got punched in the face here, someone was

beaten there, and so on. Then people,

>> Fortunately, most of these stories about

people being visited, threatened, or even

hit or something like that end with the person still

staying on and working at the campaign office. We don’t

know how many more there would have been. Well,

rather, we are sure there would have been

many more if we were operating in

a normal political environment without

intimidation. But even as things are now, it is an absolutely

remarkable situation, and I am very proud of

all the volunteers who work

with us. Well, most of those

stories are about people not

being afraid and staying on at the campaign office. In

your view, has the level of fear

increased or decreased compared with,

say, 2012, with the

Bolotnaya case (the criminal prosecutions following the 2012 Bolotnaya Square protests), or has it, on the contrary, increased

it’s impossible to compare it with Russia

in 2012. In other words, we live

simply in a different country, with a different

political system. So,

the events of 2014–2015

— the start of the war — simply

completely changed the system. Back in

2012, even after

the Bolotnaya case (the prosecution of protesters after the 2012 Bolotnaya Square demonstrations), after all that,

stories about someone

being jailed for a repost or a like would have

seemed outrageous, yes — mass arrests

of people, these arrests over leaflets. Still,

after the Bolotnaya case, in 2013,

in Moscow we ran a campaign, well,

relatively freely. Access to television

was closed off. Uh, we were constantly being

restricted in various ways, but, uh, people were not being detained

simply for walking around in a T-shirt. Today I

read an astonishing excerpt from

a police report. It said that a person was engaged in

campaigning while being in a public place in

a white T-shirt with the words “Navalny

2018.” And therefore he had to be

detained. From the perspective of 2012, this

would have looked insane. And so, well,

of course, the level of fear has risen,

as has the level of anxiety

among all kinds of people — advertisers,

landlords, any businesspeople. In

essence, it’s a different country, a country where, uh,

an independent political opinion is

not merely not encouraged or seen as some kind of

potential threat — now everyone

understands that the authorities see it

as hostile and act hostilely. You have

your own polling service.

What does it show — what is the profile of the people

who support you, at least

among volunteers?

>> Well, volunteers — by

definition, in any election

campaign, whether in Russia or even in

other countries, are most often young

people. So in our case they are young people with

a high level of education; that has always

been the case — higher education

>> most often, right? In other words, well, these are young

people, and besides, they have more time.

They are generally more inclined, everywhere,

all over the world, to take an active part in

campaigns. But the main voter we are

counting on is precisely

older people. That is, we

want to use — and are planning to use, and are using

— volunteers who are

young in order to

campaign. What age group is your support base?

What age group is it?

>> Uh

we’re counting on — listen, 539,000 or so

of those who are ready to sign

for you. That’s a colossal base.

These are people who use the internet.

Right now, this analysis doesn’t have

much meaning, but we already understand

that these people who signed up

did so through the internet. That means

these are people who most likely — well, definitely —

use the internet every day. These are

people with a high level of education. And

of course, they are primarily residents

of the biggest cities. But as

the election campaign approaches, we

will of course change this demographic sample

very significantly, because right now we have

a very strong

skew toward the internet. That is exactly

why we are running our

offline campaign — in order to

correct it. But I just want to remind you once again

that

>> Alexei, sorry, I have to

interrupt you, because we’re exactly at the half-hour mark.

We have to go to news and commercials,

then we’ll come back to the Moscow studio.

>> Full... [inaudible].

Very good.

>> Well, there must be some kind of profile.

Surely you must have some kind of

profile.

>> A profile of whom? The current volunteer? Well

>> of the volunteers. But in general, who

is your main support base? As for Putin,

we know. It’s, for example, a 64-year-old woman.

That’s the base, the core, right? It’s

small towns and the countryside.

>> We simply know that. But you must also have

something like that.

>> Well, in our case, accordingly, right now it’s simply

the opposite. It’s residents of large

cities, more men than women. So

with women there’s a gap — more men, yes,

because they are more interested in

the news. Accordingly, these are people with higher

education and, well, residents of large

cities.

>> It’s simply that we can get information to them

more effectively.

>> I think that, in any case, you won’t win over the countryside.

It’s impossible.

>> The countryside is anti-modernization.

By

>> Nobody really lives there anymore, Zhenya. Everyone lives

— 80% live in cities.

>> Well, those are small towns.

>> Well, small towns are actually going

quite well, actually. It’s just that we can’t

open campaign offices there right now at this

stage, yes. But

>> basically, all of Russia lives in

some kind of large cities, well,

more or less large ones — with more than 100,000

people in them. So

we will work there actively. Most

importantly, as I already said, in every

locality we have

volunteers. In

>> in every

every locality in the country—135,000

volunteers, of course, in every populated

place in the country, more or less

some significantly populated localities

there are volunteers here.

Former Georgian president and

former governor of Odesa Region, Mikheil

Saakashvili, faces up to 11 years in

prison on criminal charges, reported

the publication Obozrevatel.

Among the charges against Saakashvili are

murder, embezzlement of state funds, and seizure of

companies and media outlets. Earlier, the Ukrainian authorities

revoked Saakashvili’s citizenship. According to

the latest reports, he is in Warsaw.

consumption volume

Listen, of course they stripped him of it completely lawlessly.

His citizenship. It’s simply a shameful

absolutely shameful page in Ukraine’s history.

Just shameful. I don’t understand why

Poroshenko did it. A very bad mistake.

>> Well, it seems to me that Venediktov’s hypothesis

is very fair. Elections are ahead.

Elections.

>> He’s high-profile, a lot of people like him.

>> It’s all clear: they’re simply removing

a political rival, removing this kind of

troublemaker. But how can this

be done in a country that

claims to be a democracy?

>> In other words, this is a completely Putin-style

approach. Putin doesn’t even do this yet. Uh-huh.

no precipitation, 14°C at night tomorrow. Although

I was just in Odesa, actually, just now

I had gone there.

>> Yes, I saw it on your Facebook.

>> Listen, well, he didn’t leave behind any

real mark. There were neither the resources nor

the opportunity.

>> How can anyone carry out reforms in just a year today

quickly in a poor country that is also

at war?

>> But they say he had absolutely

no resources there at all.

>> What do you mean by resources? Neither political power nor

financial means—he had nothing.

Well, it’s a pity, just a pity. In Georgia

he really was, of course, there was Kakha...

>> They brought it to you. Don’t you need more, aren’t you

cold?

>> May I? Yes, ask for some more. No, I just

drank it. Please ask for more tea.

>> Tell them to bring Alexei some more tea.

All right.

on the inside spread, called up

automotive experts, and Igor Vasilyev

throughout... you’re really quite... because

I’m looking at your eye, and of course I can see

that it’s, well,

>> it’s a different shape too

>> and it’s more yellow; if you look, this white part

what is it properly called?

>> it’s just not the same—not, not, not, not opaque

well, I mean, I can see much better with it

>> but necrosis isn’t forming there after all

>> well, no, I mean, something is forming; you have to

keep putting drops in all the time, a lot of hassle with this

eye. I mean, all the time—you know, it’s this

foreign-body sensation, a feeling of sand

in the eye. That’s what it is, and that’s how it’s supposed to be. It

is there all the time. It’s annoying, honestly.

>> Well, look, you still managed without glasses.

You got by without them.

>> Well, I was prescribed glasses, I have them.

I just don’t wear them.

>> Right. But back then they said that you would

feel dizzy.

>> Yes. Well, everything would have gone according to the good

scenario. Then everything stopped.

>> Alexei, there’s some wood over there. Knock on it,

please.

Without Cuts. Most importantly, uncut on the website

of Echo of Moscow.

>> Echo of Moscow: direct and feedback connection.

>> Attention to the guests in our studio

discussion of the most important topics in the program

Ricochet. Engineering contests and games live on

the air in Moscow.

Active, super-active, interactive

radio.

Full...

>> Once again, good evening. It’s 20:35 here in

the studio. Today I have one guest,

Alexei Navalny. And I’m asking him all sorts of

questions, including about

his recent interviews, which

stirred up the whole world, where he said

that, uh, he had a fifty-percent chance

of being killed. It turns out that was

a joke. And about many other things, and about his

election campaign. Alexei, now

if we may, let’s turn to the results of

the spring-summer political season for

the opposition, yes. In July, everyone is just

summing up, so to speak, what happened in

the spring and summer. How do you assess

the situation in the opposition right now?

>> I don’t really understand what “the situation in

the opposition” means. There are various

structures. I

>> and my colleagues, my associates, our штаб (campaign headquarters),

many people with us, volunteers. We

are engaged in an election campaign.

Our election campaign has been going on for 8

months, of which I spent one and a half

under arrest. But nevertheless, it is continuing, and

we are satisfied, satisfied with how it is going.

We are managing both to organize

rallies, and we have many volunteers, and

we are raising money. Despite the

enormous pressure, which is increasing, we

are continuing to develop. Most importantly, we

see people’s desire to work. We see

people’s desire, uh, to make change or

to achieve change. We see that this

kind of hopelessness that

you encounter in the regions has become, uh,

has turned from depression into a kind of

political driving force. People understand

that there is no future with this regime, and they

want change. They want those in power

to be replaced there—over 18 years, at least

once. So we are very

satisfied, and I am satisfied with

how our campaign is going. Speaking about

the opposition in general—well, some people think

that, for example, one should boycott

elections. They do not like what I am doing. But

all the same, it seemed to me that March 26

came as such a surprise to many people,

a shock, much like December 10, 2011, was in its time

at Bolotnaya (the major Moscow protest rally at Bolotnaya Square), when suddenly such a

large number of young people, and people,

35 and older, and so on, came out in more than

70 cities across Russia. It was unexpected

for everyone.

>> Not for me. Not for me. Not for our

headquarters. No, because we simply

work with the whole country. And so,

since we entered the field a long time ago and

were never exclusively part of

that kind of Facebook-based life, we saw these

groups on VKontakte (a Russian social network), how people

were joining them, we saw

the number of video views, we saw

actual requests that people were sending from

the regions, even from small towns,

asking to be referred to our lawyers for

consultations. So we understood perfectly well

that all of this was going to happen.

The scale of it was somewhat larger than

we had expected. And later, on June 12, it was

a pleasant surprise for us that

the geography of the protests expanded even

a little more than we had anticipated. But

it was not unexpected for us.

Of course, we worked toward this, we knew

it would happen, and in that sense we were not acting

at random—calling people out and then

being surprised ourselves by how well

it turned out. We are, after all, people from

real life. And my trips to

the regional headquarters, the opening of headquarters—they

immerse us in what is happening in

the regions. We understand very well what

is going on.

>> Do you maintain any kind of relationship with PARNAS and Solidarnost?

>> Well, with Solidarnost, yes. Yashin

is running an excellent campaign right now,

for example in the Krasnoselsky District. He

is there, yes, in Moscow, in the

municipal elections. And I really

like the fact that his is specifically a

political campaign. That is, this

campaign is, of course, also about the local

agenda, but it has an absolutely political

orientation. He is acting against this

government, against the corrupt authorities

in that particular district. And in conducting his

campaigning, he says so directly. Therefore we

support, well, certain people in

the regions who are running in elections. Well,

our candidates, however, are not being allowed onto the ballot in

Novosibirsk. There was such a case.

>> Are you avoiding mentioning Dmitry Gudkov?

Why? Am I avoiding Dmitry Gudkov?

Because he is engaged in a mayoral

campaign,

which is still quite a long way off. That is

the first point. And second, I really do not

like, and I consider extremely harmful and

wrong, this political

alliance of his with Yabloko (a Russian liberal party), and this

absolutely rotten political practice

where Yabloko nominates

candidates but makes them sign

some paper saying that they will vote and

act in accordance with

the party’s decisions. It is a kind of political bondage,

a shackling of politics,

>> the thing that was at

>> this is what is happening now in

the municipal elections. Therefore, and besides that,

I categorically dislike,

for example, those same actions, because

since we mentioned Yashin, Yabloko

together with Gudkov is putting forward a slate. Well,

I think that, of course, Gudkov was not

personally involved in this, but against Yashin’s

candidates they put forward, in every district,

two people each. Well, this is absolutely

spoiler work in the mayor’s office’s interests, but this

may be some kind of excess. And,

probably, I do not think that

Yavlinsky personally wants to, well,

harm Yashin. Though, who knows. But

the very idea of binding candidates in this way

is something I categorically dislike. And I would like

Gudkov, whom I like,

well, not to take part in this. In

municipal elections, people can run as

independent candidates. One absolutely must

protest against the practice whereby

some party sets conditions on

future political activity

in exchange for some support of its own—like, ‘the plenum

of our party has decided, so that is how you will

vote later in your municipal

assembly.’ That is categorically unacceptable.

>> Listen, well, you used to be in Yabloko, and now you

know what Yavlinsky is like, you know,

and that is precisely why I am now firmly

protesting. I think this is completely wrong

entirely, but again, it is

a form of bondage. They are being allowed to keep

Yabloko’s license, and they are doing this

The Kremlin, for example, does not give us a license,

but it gives one to them precisely in exchange for the fact that

>> You mean registration

>> the registration of the Progress Party, in exchange for

the fact that Yabloko and, unfortunately,

Gudkov, who entered into a coalition with them,

are trying to limit the freedom of political

activity of future deputies. Dangerous,

an unpleasant, unacceptable thing. Besides,

it will lead to, well, to

defeat. It will lead to

worse results. That is very

bad.

>> Have you discussed this with Gudkov directly

?

>> I haven’t discussed it directly with Gudkov,

but right now I’m focused on

the federal campaign.

For understandable reasons, he has to

support Yavlinsky in the presidential

election. He supports him in the

municipal campaign, and Yavlinsky supports

him in the presidential race. And that’s a, well,

wonderful tandem, but for obvious

reasons it doesn’t suit me. I would

like Gudkov to support me

directly in the presidential election. I would

like Yabloko to support me directly

in the presidential election. I believe that

I can and will fight for the support

of all representatives of the democratic forces,

the democratic parties. Well, despite

the fact that, naturally, there are some

frictions and disagreements over platforms. In

general, I will fight to

be the single candidate for everyone, including

the democrats. Their line is going

a bit in a different direction. They want

to support Grigory Alexeyevich (Grigory Yavlinsky). Well,

that means I will appeal there

directly to the people, to the party

members. I will argue that this

is wrong. But that is what

political struggle is. I take it

calmly.

>> Well, I remember very well how, uh, when there was

the famous rally on Sakharov Avenue in February

2012, and

you were standing behind the stage, and I

watched as Grigory

Alexeyevich Yavlinsky came up there. You shook

hands, and Grigory Alexeyevich

said something harmless. It was all

somehow clear that you were very

pleased that you had managed

to reconcile with Yavlinsky. And

>> I’ll say this: we met with him

right before the federal

State Duma elections and had a very good

conversation, and apologized to each other

for various things that we had

said about one another. I have

a very good opinion of him. He is a wonderful,

talented politician, but that does not mean

that I won’t compete with him for

the leading position. I am competing with him.

I consider his tactics wrong,

mistaken, and I will say so openly

despite the fact that I

think well of him.

>> Okay, that’s clear. What about Kasyanov

and PARNAS?

>> Kasyanov and PARNAS exist; they are engaged in

their own kind of political

activity.

>> So you no longer keep in touch

after the coalition fell apart? So,

we kept in touch before as well. Well, I mean,

hello, hello. How are

you? Is everything going well?

>> Well, just a second. Alexei Anatolyevich, don’t

be disingenuous,

>> Really? Zhenya, what does it mean to keep

in touch? I’m engaged in day-to-day

work. I don’t want to be the kind of

candidate we’ve seen in recent

Russian history, who

constantly hold roundtables,

meetings, try to organize

some kind of congress of democrats. Would you rather

I went somewhere, to the city of

Perm, and spoke there to volunteers,

or organized a roundtable of democrats in Moscow?

I’d rather travel around

the regions, build committees, and all the rest. I’m

not interested in that. There are concrete matters.

Take Roizman: he was running in the election, he was running from

Yabloko, whose current political approach is not close

to me, but we

planned to actively support

Roizman in the campaign. He is removed from the ballot, and we

protest against it and call for

a boycott of the elections in Sverdlovsk

Region. That is concrete. There is something

to discuss there, but just sitting with fairly

pleasant people, just sitting there

in meetings and listening to speeches—well,

that does not interest me at all. It simply does not

interest me.

>> Fair enough. But admit it, Alyosha, you and I

both remember well how endlessly

Yabloko and SPS (Union of Right Forces) fought, then Yabloko and

Right Cause. And it already seemed, well,

completely absurd. And the youth,

wings of these parties were constantly

fighting with each other too.

>> That is exactly why I’m no longer interested in it.

That’s why you’re asking me

a question about Yabloko. You say, you

say that, so to speak,

you are not ready to support Gudkov, and so on.

>> It simply shows that you

are still captive to the old

democratic quarrels of ours, like many people. I

follow this process too, and I

understand that what is happening, unfortunately,

in the liberal camp, from a

political point of view, has no

significance. Having traveled around the country, opened

70 campaign offices, having coordinators in all

regions and a huge number of

volunteers, I can say firmly that this has no

political significance at all. Nevertheless,

I follow it, I know what is happening

there, but you even asked me

this question. I only needed a couple

a few seconds to think, because I haven’t even

formed my own attitude toward all

of this. I’m not interested in what

Yabloko or PARNAS are doing. Yabloko got

less than 2% in the election, despite having

received colossal budget

funding—hundreds of millions of rubles.

The same thing happened with PARNAS. They’re

nice people. I’m very fond of them. In terms of

my political origins, I

come from that milieu. But I’m running a real

election campaign with a large

number of people. I’m not going to

get involved in some petty squabbling in the struggle

for this liberal electorate.

How much could I even get within it—

3 or 4%? In Russia, unfortunately,

politics is structured in such

a way that people don’t force themselves into these

ideological frameworks. And in that respect, we have

this kind of

political chaos. I’m simply a normal

candidate for ordinary people who

are offering a sensible and logical

program. That’s what I’m focused on. And I

absolutely—ask me, and I’ll

answer—but I’m not going to spend my energy on

which democrats, liberals, who

among them is more democratic, who is less

democratic, who should be

supported, and who liked what online. Well,

I won’t lie—I do keep track. Sometimes I follow it and

read unpleasant posts, but I understand

just how completely irrelevant it is.

It doesn’t matter at all. I apologize for

repeating myself all the time—I’ve traveled around the

regions and so on, but in every

campaign office opening, I answer any

questions I’m asked, and nobody asks

about this at all. Nobody asks me about

Yabloko, or PARNAS, or

Khodorkovsky, or any of these people,

who are very dear and close to me. But people

simply don’t care about that at all.

>> So what do they ask about? They ask,

they ask about corruption, they ask about

the low standard of living, they ask,

naturally, what we should do about

these judges and police officers. Everywhere

they ask about lustration. Everywhere. It’s

about lustration that they ask everywhere. Everywhere

everywhere they ask. About

>> Do they actually use the word “lustration,” or

how do they put it?

>> They do use the word “lustration,” and they understand quite

well how lustration differs

from simply criminal

prosecution of people. In absolutely every

region now, people ask about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and

about these, uh, repressive

actions against atheists. Well, obviously,

it’s a young audience.

>> And what do you say? You’re a deeply religious

person, aren’t you?

>> I am a believer, but I think that as

a religious person, I absolutely cannot

support what is happening

now, when some part of the ROC has taken

it upon itself to direct the Investigative

Committee and bring criminal

charges against people because

they didn’t like something. Today there was some

monstrous court ruling, I think in

Sochi, about a person who posted

a caricature of Jesus Christ, and for that

posted it,

and for that he was fined or

otherwise subjected to administrative

liability. This is

absurd, monstrous, and completely contrary

to Christianity—I’m sure of that.

That’s exactly what I’m talking about. That’s what

people ask about. They also ask about

the governor, they ask what’s going on with

the Far East, they ask about

demographics. And nobody asks about

the unification of the democrats. Nobody. That

doesn’t interest anyone outside

our little circle.

>> What about Putin—do they ask about him?

>> Of course they do. They do. What I’m asked

most often about is my well-known, uh,

position that if he

agrees to a peaceful transition, he should be given

security guarantees. This position of mine

is disliked by many people. Very many,

even my supporters, yes—I’m very

heavily criticized for it. So

I have to answer questions on that subject. They

think that, well, everyone should

be jailed. Or rather, that Putin

is directly responsible

for everything that is happening—which is absolutely true,

that Putin personally bears responsibility for

crime, corruption, and the unjust imprisonment of

people. Absolutely true. And that

Putin should therefore go to

prison for it, or somehow be shot on

Red Square’s execution ground (Lobnoye Mesto). And a large number of

people think that and insist on it. For them, this

is a key point of the program. Well, I

say that for the sake of a peaceful transition

of power, and in the broader interests of the country,

we need to give up that kind of sweet

revenge. I have personal reasons too,

including ones connected with my family,

for why I feel, well,

a great deal of personal negative

emotion toward these people. But for the sake of

the country’s interests in general, for the sake of

a peaceful transition, well, we need to

swallow our pride and agree

that he specifically, and his family, should be given

security guarantees. This should not

extend to people like Medvedev or

the Rotenbergs. But Putin—yes, many people

don’t like that. There is a constant

debate about it. Constantly, of course.

There’s a discussion going on, sort of, somewhat

imposed by the Kremlin, about how, basically,

if not Putin, then who? Without Putin, everything

will fall apart. And what will happen to the North

Caucasus? How can it function without Ramzan Kadyrov?

Will war break out there too? Well, I can tell you

that nothing will happen. There was Said Amirov,

the mayor of Makhachkala, and people said the same thing

about him too: if anything happened to him,

war would start, Dagestan would rise up, and in

Makhachkala tanks would be rolling through the streets and firing.

But he got a life sentence, and

nothing happened. Nothing will happen

if Ramzan Kadyrov is gone tomorrow.

He could easily be replaced by an equally

authoritative Chechen. These questions

are very interesting to everyone, and people discuss them

with great enthusiasm. This is the real

agenda of the country, I repeat, but the unification of democrats

is not. And I’m not going to

stick around wherever talk of democratic

unity begins — I immediately turn around and

go in some other direction. Because

the unification of democrats can only

happen through elections and through

primaries. I’m ready to take part in

debates, I’m ready to take part in primaries,

I’m ready to win those primaries. That’s how

democratic unity can happen,

not through roundtables or endless

discussion. But returning to your

meetings at campaign offices with volunteers — what

interests them more: the local agenda or

the federal agenda?

>> The federal agenda.

>> The federal one.

>> To a greater extent, of course, federal issues

interest people,

>> even though we know that all

politics is local, that all politics

is always local.

>> Ah, yes, of course. And every time,

of course, people ask: "Will there be

an investigation into our governor?"

"What do you think about the mayor?" I always prepare

and say something about local

corruption too. People always respond

very well to that. But everyone has a very clear

understanding that the cause of poverty,

injustice,

and the inequality we see — well,

put bluntly, these very low

wages, which really are

appallingly low — that is, of course,

the Kremlin: a group of people that has

clung to power, sat there for 18 years, and has

reshaped

the law enforcement system, the judicial

system, won’t let anyone make a move, and

won’t let the country develop. In other words,

it’s a direct link: poverty

and Putin. Many people already understand that. And I’ll just

say briefly on this point. Many people believe

— you were talking about

sociological data — that

our volunteers, our supporter groups,

our supporters are the most educated

and the most well-off.

But those who come to us, even if they are

the most well-off in their regions,

yes, with salaries of 20,000, 18,000, and

15,000 rubles a month,

it’s hard for me even to imagine who all the

others are. So the appalling poverty

of the majority of Russia’s residents is

still, at this point, the main

cause of political discontent. That’s exactly it.

>> I see. Thank you. But you understand perfectly well

that you need the support

of the elite. There’s no other option. Yes, precisely

for a peaceful transition, because all research

on authoritarian regimes shows that

you have to enter into some kind of alliance with

part

of the old elite. Has anyone

reached out to you, has anyone tried

to talk to you?

>> Just imagine: if someone has

reached out, and I now tell you that

right now, you know, such-and-such people

are making contact, then tomorrow we’ll be watching

show trials against those people.

Which means that

>> All right, never mind. I’m not asking you

to name names openly.

>> I would say that a huge number of

people in the elite want change, and they are

looking in our direction and waiting. But

the elites, especially in Russia right now, are

incredibly cowardly. They are waiting for the moment

to betray Putin, and with great

pleasure — I would even say,

with relish — they will betray him at some

point. But right now they are simply afraid.

They are sitting there and weighing their options. As soon as they

as soon as they feel that

weakness, that tremor, like there was in

2012, they’ll immediately start running in droves

in the other direction — to me and to

various other opposition figures. So

when you meet with any

officials — and I’m sure you’ve made the same

observation as I have — the

higher-ranking the official,

the more he curses this government, the more

he talks about how monstrous it is,

how ineffective it is, how they won’t let anyone work,

what a horror, a nightmare, and a complete train wreck it all is.

That’s what’s going on in the country. Yes, that’s how they

>> And how do you manage to meet with them

if you’re under constant surveillance?

>> I meet them in the corridors of Moscow,

that’s the only place. Well, Zhenya, I understand

that I am under constant

surveillance. And in order to receive

some opinions or

messages or anything else, I don’t

necessarily have to meet with anyone. Besides

Besides, I'm not alone. Quite a lot of

people support me in various, uh,

areas of activity, how should I put it, in

different social strata, including

those so-called elites you love to talk about. But I

am not seeking out any meetings myself. Why would I

need that? I already know what they think.

And I don't need it. I don't want to sit down with anyone

and negotiate there, with some kind of

liberal Kremlin tower faction, non-liberal

tower faction, and negotiate with them about anything.

What's the point of that? There is none.

>> Well, you'll have to anyway, Alyosha. You will have to

let someone do that. I just don't

seek out such meetings. Especially since, well,

I understand perfectly well that, first of all, for them to meet with

me right now is

unsafe. That's the first thing. And second, well, I

have many other things to do. All these

elites will switch sides when the

political situation changes. My task

is to work on changing the political

situation, to the best of my ability.

>> Okay. And, uh,

the FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) is constantly, so to speak,

launching investigations. As I understand it, they

won't stop—should we be expecting something

in the near future? Well

>> I was expecting that after you were, well, asked,

"Who are you meeting with?

Tell me, well, a few

names." And now I'm supposed to give you

investigations into those people, and

I would literally physically

feel them running off

somewhere to shut down their Cypriot

offshores. No, of course I can't

share that kind of information.

>> All right. Well, I agree with you. That was

a stupid question, I admit it. And what about

the equipment that was taken from you on, uh, March 12 and 26?

March?

>> Well, it's somewhere, somewhere in the

secret basements of the FSB (Russia's security service). We know—well, not

only has nothing been returned, we knew that

the equipment was seized by the FSB, but all

our court complaints were thrown out on

the grounds that we don't even know

who we're complaining about. So what happened was

that unidentified men in plain clothes

walked in, unconcerned about the cameras, and carried out

absolutely all the equipment, and the police,

the courts, everyone else says: "We don't even

know who that was. Well, if you

want to appeal the actions of these people,

you tell us his surname, what

his position was, what department he belonged to."

>> File a theft report.

>> We did file a theft report, and it went

nowhere. I mean, this wasn't even

theft. Theft is the secret taking of

property. This was robbery,

because it was the open taking of

property. Fortunately, our

supporters, and simply the broader

public, really felt the

situation. Back then, within two

days, uh—I don't want to get this wrong now—

I think we received about 12 million rubles (roughly US$200,000 at the time)

in donations, and we bought everything again.

>> Wonderful. And what are your plans for the fall? Well,

after all, we

>> will be expanding our election

campaign. Will there be some kind of—will you again

hold some kind of nationwide

action like the one on June 12?

>> There is no specific date, but of course we

will be using the rally format

very actively. That doesn't mean we

will do it mechanically, like,

once every two months we hold a big

rally, but of course rallies are

extremely important. People want to hold

these rallies; they may be more

successful or less successful, but we will work in

completely different formats.

For example, in Moscow we understand perfectly well

that we will never be given permits again.

And right now, holding rallies in

Moscow automatically, 100 percent,

means an unauthorized rally. Well,

that too is entirely acceptable and right,

and we will do it. But here too

you have to understand how to organize it,

at least from the standpoint of

tactical work.

>> Okay, good luck to you. Unfortunately, we

have to go off the air. Thank you very much.

This was Alexei Navalny in the studio of Echo of Moscow (a Russian radio station).

And we will see you again

in a week. Bye.

>> Absolute Albats.

>> I will. It's just that sometimes you start

repeating yourself, and I don't really even know

how to tell you.

>> Just hold up a sign for me, literally,

a placard: "You're repeating yourself, saying the same

thing over and over." I know I have that flaw. I

start saying the same thing over and over—

children's playground.

>> Is Grisha really going to run again?

Can you imagine?

I mean, what are you talking about? Did you fall from the moon or something?

I mean, if he wants to, then how could he not?

>> That's a politician's life.

>> He wants to. A politician is always convinced that he is

basically the best. If he wants to, he'll run.

>> Well, I remember this amazing

scene. Remember

the exit.

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