Alexei Navalny on the program *Special Opinion* from March 29, 2019

Your source of information, Echo of Moscow.

>> For those who don't...

>> So, our livestream is up and running.

Now we can say hello to everyone.

>> Hello to everyone on YouTube. How are you all doing?

I hope everything is fine and the stream is running

without delays.

>> And we all hope that Irina Vorobyova

will behave herself properly on air and

let me insult the authorities

as much as I want.

>> Done? Have you said everything?

>> No. No, I hope I'll still get a chance

to speak. Well, there's a chance of that,

Lyosha. There's a chance I'll let you

say something.

>> I've already told you, and I'll repeat it in front of everyone:

if anything happens, I'll throw a mug at her and

walk off the air.

>> Is the tea in your mug hot?

>> Well, warm. Warm.

>> Let's do it when it cools down, okay? I mean,

just so that if I dodge it, and then

the tea still splashes onto me,

at least it won't...

>> If I hit you right in the forehead, maybe

the hot tea will somehow disinfect your wound.

>> He won't hit me.

>> I won't hit you. So...

>> Meaning because my aim is bad, or because

you're quick?

>> I'm quick.

>> Okay,

>> you know that.

Call our offices in Moscow and

St. Petersburg at 8-800-550-72-76

free of charge. Why are there so few of you? Come on,

>> we've posted the links everywhere.

>> Right, just remind me — are we using informal "you"

on air, or the formal one? Informal?

>> I say Alexei and I use the informal "you." And you should too.

Irina, use "you." I mean, I'm not pretending

that we're strangers to each other.

>> You're Irina Sergeyevna.

>> I remember.

>> All right then. Anyway,

>> it wasn't for nothing that we wrapped you in a map.

>> Just try saying

anything else now.

The company

presents the program *Special Opinion*.

>> I remember.

>> And *Special Opinion* begins now.

7:07 p.m. My name is Irina Vorobyova, and

today, sharing his special opinion, is politician

Alexei Navalny. Alexei, good

evening.

>> Good evening.

>> First, I want to ask about the arrests. Uh,

Abyzov, Ishayev. This is literally the latest

news. But I've already understood that you

don't feel sorry for any of them and you don't

sympathize with anyone. I got that, I saw it.

Okay, fine. Then tell me about

those statements of yours saying that

you'd been talking about Abyzov for a long time,

and that in fact you'd already told everyone

everything.

>> In 2017, we released

an investigation into Abyzov. It wasn't even so much

an investigation as it was

simply a presentation of his property in

Italy. And, uh, we explained how

he launders money, siphons money out of

the Novosibirsk region. There was a specific

reason for it, because at the time a rally was being planned

in Novosibirsk. That rally was

against a tariff increase, which was

directly linked to Abyzov. The tariff for

all residents was being raised so that

Mikhail Abyzov, a government official and minister,

could become a little richer. By the way, we

won that fight back then, but basically I

described the whole scheme, which was fairly

well known. To be honest, it wasn't

a case of Navalny

exposing some shocking scheme. It was

a well-known scheme showing how Abyzov

was robbing the people of Siberia. But for some reason

the authorities — the FSB (Federal Security Service),

the Investigative Committee — paid

not the slightest attention to it. Abyzov is

a major corrupt figure. His corruption

is directly tied to Chubais, who

is still in charge of

nanotechnology here. Nothing has

happened to him. I'm glad that Abyzov has, at least,

now been brought

to account. What I'm unhappy about is that this

happened late, and Chubais wasn't brought in

along with him.

>> Wait, no one has been brought

to account yet. So far there's only

a criminal case. Knowing how they

devour each other, what we're seeing with

Abyzov is, of course, not punishment for

corruption — it's simply taking away

his ill-gotten money for the benefit of

some other crook just like him.

So I have no doubt that Abyzov

will get something like 12 years in the end, and all his

money and assets will simply be taken away — first

confiscated, and then sold off to someone like

Fridman, for example.

>> Wait. So you mean — okay,

fine. What's actually in the criminal case? At least

for now, in the official statements we see

what your investigation had already

shown — we saw that too. But in

reality, what do you think it's really for?

>> In reality, it's just a reduction of the

feeding trough. In reality, there's simply

a certain amount of real estate,

property, and assets in the country. These

assets very often belong to, well,

basically random people who grabbed them

during the privatization of the 1990s

in the 1990s. And now much angrier and

all sorts of hungry FSB officers and security officials, and

or some more successful oligarchs,

naturally, they look greedily

at it and snatch pieces of it away from one another

of this property. And from Abyzov they simply

took that piece away.

>> Well, does it have anything to do with

justice, fighting corruption,

the law, and so on?

>> It has absolutely nothing to do with

fighting corruption. If

they really wanted to fight

corruption, then Chubais would have been arrested first

— under whom these schemes could have taken place —

and only later, at some point, would it have been

Abyzov’s turn, and we would have

seen some kind of systemic fight against

corruption. If there really were a fight against

corruption, then after our report

a criminal case would have been opened against Abyzov.

But as it is, this is just one group of bad people

taking money away from another group of bad people, and

along the way they throw each other in jail. Look,

Medvedev has now lost his power. So

Medvedev’s people can be — and by their

rules, should be — devoured, stripped of

everything, and if they show off, all of them should be locked up

and, so to speak, dance the tarantella

on their graves. That’s how everything is arranged

in Putin’s system of power now. They

take money from one another.

>> But admit that under President

Medvedev it was a little better.

>> Of course not. I mean, listen, what does

"a little better" even mean? Better for Abyzov, sure.

Well, for Mikhail Abyzov it was probably

much better. He had everything in Italy.

He was a minister riding around in a black Mercedes, and

now he’s being transported in a prison van.

>> Listen, well, before March 25 or 26, 2019, under

every president, things were better for Abyzov than

they are now. I mean for the country. Well,

under President Medvedev things were somewhat easier.

Some better laws came into

force. It was somehow more open, somehow

more good-natured. They weren’t locking everyone up

quite so aggressively; some people were even released, for example.

No.

Under President Medvedev, this regime

was developing in a logical way. It

took shape in 2003, from the way it had begun,

and they decided to build their own corporate

mafia state, which has no

other goals besides enriching

specific individuals, and it was logically

developing. And you say that in

2012 or 2011 under

Medvedev it was better, and under the first

Putin of the 2003 model it was better still.

And under the Putin of 1999

many people think it was downright

good. I personally didn’t think it was

good, but many people thought it was simply

wonderful: here comes this new

president who is now going to

restore order. But, well, they simply

developed in that way. And what

Medvedev did in 2010 and

2011 simply led to

the fact that, well, Medvedev’s people

got devoured. Otherwise, he probably wanted to devour someone himself

— he just couldn’t.

>> All right. And what happened to Ishayev?

>> Ishayev was simply punished because in

Khabarovsk Krai they elected the wrong

person. Khabarovsk Krai was

an absolute disaster for United Russia. And

not just for United Russia. Putin was publicly

slapped in the face by the residents of Khabarovsk

Krai when they did not elect — did not re-elect —

as governor Shport, that United Russia nominee,

and instead elected Furgal, a candidate from the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia),

And Ishayev was secretly helping him, and

really not even all that secretly. Everyone

knew about it. He used

public discontent in order to

specifically slap Putin in the face.

Because, well, nobody cares about

Shport. But when Putin backs

a candidate and says, "Hello, residents

of Khabarovsk Krai, here’s a great

guy for you, go elect him, because I’m so

popular." And in Khabarovsk Krai

they say, "You know, no, you’re not

popular, and we’re not going to elect

your man." And Ishayev was working toward that. He was

simply punished as an example

on the basis of an absolutely laughable, of course,

charge. He is accused of embezzling 5 million

rubles. I mean, what is that to him—

>> even he himself, it seems to me, somehow

>> Well, he himself is probably just in mild

shock. This man has been a governor since

1991; he practically owns

half the region there. He’s like Luzhkov (the longtime former mayor of Moscow),

yes, only in the Russian Far East. And he, he

worked as a vice president of Rosneft. Even

if we look at his official

income, 5 million rubles is some kind of

tiny drop in the bucket. So, in other words, they brought

a ridiculous charge against him and

put him under house arrest as

a punishment and a warning to all

the other regional elites. Basically: don’t

play a double game.

>> So the regional elites — and really the elites in general —

should now, in theory, be

somewhat frightened, all of them. Right?

>> It’s not only after Ishayev that they’re

frightened. They are frightened in general,

because, uh, they operate in a situation

where

they have to tell Putin and Medvedev and

United Russia and everyone else

how wonderfully popular they are in their

region — when in fact they are not popular at all. But in the

Far East... It’s no coincidence, look, that this

happened in Primorye, where, uh,

the United Russia candidate for governor, uh,

got rejected in Khabarovsk Krai. The same

thing happened in Khakassia. Across the entire

Russian Far East, both Putin’s and

United Russia’s ratings are rock bottom, and it is extremely

difficult for them

to rely on this Kremlin

legitimacy, because nobody likes the Kremlin.

And so, of course, the local

authorities are in a mild panic, because

they are supposed to implement certain

decisions made in Moscow. Those Moscow

decisions are unpopular everywhere. And everyone

can see that Moscow’s decisions

bring only new taxes and new

poverty, and make no one richer — neither

local crooks nor ordinary people. So

basically, a unique situation has emerged

in which everyone from doctors and teachers to

local oligarchs is unhappy with

the Kremlin, because the Kremlin behaves

stupidly, incompetently, and senselessly.

>> And what will this lead to? I mean,

look, if everyone is so unhappy, then

could it happen that, so to

speak, it all starts in the regions?

>> Well, in a sense, that is already

happening. These defeats and failures

of United Russia — that is exactly where they began, in

the regions. And that is why we see that

the authorities are responding in two ways available to them.

Well, three ways available to them.

Method number one is

propaganda, but it has largely

run its course. What else can

Vladimir Solovyov or Dmitry Kiselyov still say?

I mean, propaganda has been used almost 100%

up. The second thing they

use is brute force.

Take Ishayev — they jailed him. Well, they

already jail someone regularly anyway, so it

no longer makes much of an impression. And

third, in order, essentially,

to deal with the consequences of

public discontent — namely, poor

election results — they are changing

the electoral legislation in such

a way that it becomes much easier

to rig things, which is exactly what we are

seeing right now in Moscow, where they are pushing it through.

Today, the Moscow City Election Commission said that

people with temporary registration

may now vote, and there will be electronic

voting.

>> They are considering it. No, wait, they

are considering that possibility. That is,

they did not say that everyone definitely would be

allowed to vote. And they certainly did not say

that there definitely would be electronic voting. But

invite me back on air in

September, and we will discuss how

everything turned out exactly as I said it would.

There will be electronic voting, and there will be

voting. They will say it is for

people with temporary registration. In fact,

what it really means is that they will mobilize, uh,

some 400,000 Kyrgyz people living in

Moscow, who have been given Russian

citizenship and who work mainly in

Moscow’s housing and public utilities system

in order to influence the election

results, busing them around. They

will vote at polling stations because they have no other

way of winning elections.

>> We are going to take a break for literally

half a second. Alexei Navalny is on

the program *Special Opinion*, don’t

go anywhere. And if you want to watch

Alexei, you can turn on the livestream on

Echo of Moscow’s YouTube channel.

All right,

>> It’s fine, no problem. I shut up when

you need me to.

>> Good for you. I praise you.

>> Thanks. And you seem to be behaving

decently too. For now, I won’t throw a mug

at you.

>> *Special Opinion* continues.

Politician Alexei Navalny is here, in

the studio of the Echo of Moscow radio station. All right. And

we will come back to voting in Moscow

later. I wanted to ask about Yakutia,

since you brought up Kyrgyz people, and

all those people who come

to work. In Yakutia, the regional leadership acted

quite harshly. And yesterday you

spoke about it on your, well, that

YouTube show — what is it called? Navalny Live.

>> I detect a hint of disdain

for my super-popular — by the way, this is

the program Navalny,

I forgot — the program *Russia of the Future*,

which airs on my YouTube channel

every Thursday.

>> Yes, everyone in this studio feels embarrassed now.

And because I forgot what it was

called. Anyway, I was watching, and, uh, you

simply said that what the regional authorities

of the territory decided — or rather, the region decided —

not to allow everyone to work in

a certain sector was a kind of

populism. In other words, it does not solve

the problem. So how do you solve the problem in that

case?

>> By restricting migration. Well, the problem

is very complicated. It is connected with the fact that, first

of all, of course, Russia is dying out

and the population is shrinking at a rapid

rate everywhere. By now, it is no longer even growing

in the North Caucasus for the most part,

because the ethnic Russian population and

the populations of many other peoples,

for example the Yakuts, have been shrinking, uh,

at enormous rates throughout all these Putin

years. Now, uh, why did the Russian

population shrink while everything else did not

shrink?

>> Well, because the birth rate, well, no,

There is a population, there are people of various

nationalities. For example, ethnic Russians have fewer births per

family than in the North Caucasus. This

is an objective fact. The same is true

for the Yakuts. They have fewer children than the

average family has in the North

Caucasus. That is absolutely normal. In that

respect, that has always been the case here. Certainly,

that has been the case. So, simply put, some

nationalities in Russia are dying out faster than

others. The population is shrinking very

rapidly. And throughout Putin's 20 years in power,

the main strategy has been that this

shrinking population would be gradually replaced

by migrants. And last year

became the first year when even

migrants arriving in huge numbers

from Central Asia could not

make up for the dying-out population. I mean,

they keep coming and coming and coming. By now,

it feels like half of Tajikistan and half of Uzbekistan, mainly

along with Kyrgyzstan, have moved here, but still

the population is still shrinking. And that is

the main problem. But the second problem

is that migration is

completely uncontrolled. We do not even have

a visa regime with the countries of Central

Asia, without which you cannot even begin

to talk about regulating

migration-related problems. And the authorities

wait and wait and do nothing. Then

naturally, some kind of

huge scandal breaks out, on the level of a real

pogrom, very dangerous for everyone. And

that happened in Yakutia (Sakha Republic). And when it

happens, once the thunder has struck, the men in

power start frantically crossing themselves, and in

particular by making some idiotic

statements about having a "year without migrants"

and so on. I mean, it sounds like

complete madness, real extremism.

Instead of regulating

the migration process, they first

do nothing, and then, well, let's not

call it fascism, but it is

absolutely something outside

the bounds of the rule of law in Russia. I mean,

you cannot say that we

first brought all these Kyrgyz here, and

now we are declaring them

second-class people, because then

the reverse will happen. Right now these rebellious

Yakuts, to put it simply,

have intimidated the Kyrgyz. They have scattered

somewhere, they have been frightened. They are afraid

of beatings and pogroms, but there are a great many of them.

If they are kept in the position of

second-class people, then sooner or later

there will be a backlash.

>> Mm-hmm. All right. And how would introducing

a visa regime affect the number of

people coming here? Wouldn't we lose

a large number of people who

are ready to do jobs here or

fill labor shortages or something like that?

>> Well, if we believe there are

jobs here that need to be done,

we should count those jobs and

issue as many visas as we need

for those jobs. That is the logical approach.

After all, you cannot just come

to Germany and say: "Hello, I have

decided to live here with you. I'm Ira

Vorobyova." You cannot live like that, because

at the very least you need to get a

Schengen visa, because Europe says,

"We do not need just any Ira Vorobyova."

If she wants to come here, let her apply,

and we will decide. The same should apply

to these people. We certainly do need

people, uh, decent workers who

will come here from Uzbekistan or

Kyrgyzstan and work honestly. But

we would like to regulate this and decide for ourselves

how many people we let in and

how many we do not. Right now any, uh,

resident of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan may

well be a wonderful person. And more often

than not, in 99% of cases, he is a wonderful

law-abiding person, but he simply

buys a ticket and, without asking you,

or me, or all the other residents of the

country, he buys a ticket, comes here, and

lives here. But that is not the right

situation, in my view.

>> Let me remind our listeners that questions

can be sent to +7985 970

4545. By tradition, in every

broadcast with Alexei Navalny, I have to say that

we address each other informally, using "ty." This

is normal, every time. It is not

going to change. We are not going to pretend

that we use the formal "vy." There are a lot

of messages about this. How can it be that our

Alexei is being addressed so informally? Oh my God.

>> And I get messages too. How can that be?

Address Irina Sergeyevna informally too.

>> That is exactly why we will not; we will both

protest against that approach.

The laws that have now come into force, which

ban insulting the authorities, have led to

Alexei Navalny posting on Twitter today

what was practically

a manifesto of insults—or perhaps not

insults. Were you trying to insult

the authorities with that manifesto? More than that, I

want to do the same thing right now, to be honest,

on your air, because this is a matter of principle.

They passed their absolutely

disgusting law. And despite the fact that

under this absolutely idiotic

law your radio station may be fined

100,000 rubles or 500,000 rubles

all these people

the State Duma is a gang of crooks and thieves, simply stupid

people, absolutely, and scoundrels; the Federation Council

which passed this law on

banning insults is exactly as much

a gathering of Russia’s enemies, as I— not to

insult anyone, but I can’t use obscene language here

of course, although those are the first

phrases that come to mind, but

scoundrels, villains, and thieves—and the person

who directly introduced this law

is a thief, and Putin, in whose interests

this law was passed, is the leader of this

very organized criminal group.

I don’t know, I could insult them until the end

of the broadcast. You’d just complain that I

took over the airtime. Let me clarify. So, you

used all those words and said

that everyone in the State Duma is stupid.

>> In the State Duma there are— in the Federation Council, everyone is

stupid. In the Federation Council there are no

decent people. I mean, it is, in principle,

a body designed so that

the very worst refuse of the vertical of

power, when they are removed from some

positions—from governorships, from

ministries, or from somewhere else—they are

sent to the Federation Council. In other words,

the worst of the worst sit in the Federation

Council, or else there are simply seats there

that regional officials have sold

in order to shove some crook

into the Federation Council so he can sit there with

some kind of mandate. In the Federation Council

they are all outright horrible and monstrous. In the

State Duma, it’s not only United Russia

there; there are Communists too. I can’t call them

all stupid, after all

not every single one of them is,

>> in the State Duma. Not all of them, but

the leadership of the State Duma and

United Russia, which sits there—that is,

of course, a party of crooks and thieves.

>> What? And thieves too, all of them

>> in the State Duma.

>> Well, you said it was a gathering of thieves.

>> United Russia, yes. Every one of them, absolutely all.

>> And is there, I don’t know, a court ruling? Is there?

>> Yes, I don’t need any court ruling. I

go out into the street and see what is happening.

I see that the laws that United

Russia has passed since the moment of its

existence, since 2003, are

laws aimed at

robbing the population, at making you

poorer while making themselves richer. And

for many, many years we have been conducting investigations,

both I and the Anti-Corruption Foundation

have investigated these people’s activities. And not

once have we seen anything to the contrary. All

of them are either thieves or scoundrels. Some of them

do not participate in the stealing in the sense that

they do not pocket all those millions, but

all of them enable this scheme. Well,

roughly speaking, some take money

out of the cash register, while others stand

lookout. But they are still participating in

this robbery.

>> Well, you see, here’s the thing. By the ruling of

two, two Russian courts—say, yes,

I don’t give a damn about those rulings. Fine,

I have two rulings from the European Court

that say these

cases were fabricated. And I, uh, posted the materials

from all these criminal cases on the

internet, where they remain. And any

person can go there, look, and once again

be convinced that these cases were

fabricated. As for a court ruling

from a Russian court, I don’t give a damn.

>> There you have it. So that is contempt for the court

already—because I do not respect the Russian

court in the slightest and also consider them a gathering of absolute

scoundrels and villains, enemies of Russia. In

fact, and this concerns not only my case

anymore. Not a single person can

obtain justice in a Russian court.

You can go there over some

non-political matter, you’ll be suing over

housing and utilities with Moscow City Hall. You may be one hundred percent in the right,

and you will never

win, because Moscow’s courts

are all geared toward making sure that an ordinary person

always loses and an official always

wins. Aren’t you afraid that you

wrote on Twitter, yes, you’re so brave,

so great, but then people will think:

"All right then, Navalny is being

brave and cool, I’ll be brave and

cool too." Nothing will happen to Navalny, but

something will happen to the next person.

>> I’m not afraid. In fact, I’m sure that I

think something like that could happen to me too.

They don’t want anyone

setting an example. But I certainly

believe that the main tool for fighting

this law banning insults against, uh,

officials should be mass

disobedience. That is, everyone—you, me, and

every radio listener—should

speak about this government plainly

and directly, insult it if you like. And

when, of course, everyone does this,

they will make an example of someone with a fine. Well,

let a million people curse them online.

They may fine 10, 20, or 30 people.

We’ll do better to raise money for their

fines, but show mass

disobedience.

>> But why insult them? All right, I

understand that they won’t bother distinguishing

between criticism and insults, and to them it will be one and the

same thing. But still, why

>> why not insult them? That’s exactly the point. We are not insulting them.

This is all the absolute truth.

When I say that United Russia is a party

of crooks and thieves, or that the Federation Council is full

of crooks, that is simply the truth.

Absolute truth. What’s more, you’ll remember when

Valentina Matviyenko was joking there about

memes, as she put it, and about these

laws saying that if you

write the truth, you’ll be fined, and

If you praise the authorities, you'll be prosecuted

for spreading “fake news.” They laugh, after all. Why? Because

they understand all of this. Because

any truth about this government, well, sounds

like an insult. Because any truth

about your city mayor will be that

the mayor is a fraud and a crook. Any

truth about a deputy will sound like

some kind of idler who

gets a salary of 450,000 rubles a month. Any

truth about a member of the Federation Council will be

that he’s a former governor

— a crook who, instead of being

put in prison, gets seated in the Federation Council.

So there are no insults here.

Come on, we’re not making it

personal. I’m not mocking their

appearance or, I don’t know, some

mannerisms or anything else. I’m giving

these people a political assessment, and also a

plain-language, everyday moral assessment.

>> And when you say that all of this is the plain

truth—well, truth is the kind of thing that

is either facts, or something

confirmed by someone. Well, where it’s been confirmed by me,

confirmed by our investigations,

confirmed—sorry, but take this:

the State Duma—I said that its

leadership are frauds and crooks. Well,

we released an investigation showing that

the 80-year-old mother of the chairman

of the State Duma, Volodin, has an apartment—what was it,

500 square meters—and he can’t

explain to us where it came from. Isn’t that

the truth? It’s also true when the leader of United

Russia, Neverov,

tells us that his

enormous estate was bought

with money from selling a two-room

apartment—where, in Mezhdurechensk or something?

So I tell him: “You are a lying,

utter scoundrel and a crook.” And that

is the truth, and those are facts.”

>> And we’ll go over the facts some more after

the break. This is the program *Special Opinion*. Stay with

Alexei Navalny—don’t go anywhere.

>> Whew, we’ve really insulted Volodin.

>> I don’t know, Alexei Anatolyevich, I haven’t insulted

anyone except you.

>> You can tell that to the investigator, Irina,

>> “I didn’t insult anyone, I don’t know anything.”

>> You can praise them on YouTube right now,

say: “I don’t agree with him.” No need.

You can praise Volodin.

>> Why would I praise anyone? I’m not going to

praise anyone. I’m not insulting anyone, and I’m not

praising anyone either.

>> I’m fine as I am. Though apparently I’m supposed

to both insult and praise, by the way.

>> There. And you know what, dear YouTube, do you

know what my problem with Navalny is?

Or rather, not my problem—his problem.

He always comes on my show. I

really love broadcasts with Alexei Navalny,

I truly do, but he always comes in and tells

me what I’m supposed to do.

>> So apparently I’m supposed to support Navalny. I

am supposed

to go out and do something for people in

Russia.

>> Yes. So you think I don’t support

people in Russia?

people... [inaudible] a poster and go with a poster

stickers, promised a poster—I hope that

Alexei Navalny won’t let me down on this and won’t

bring the next sticker... You said that

as if I had deceived you about something

at some point.

>> Oh, something like that.

>> Listen, could you ask them to bring me some more

tea?

>> Yes, of course.

Maxi, could you ask... [inaudible]

who is suspected of spying on behalf of

Moscow. Today, Sweden’s prosecutor’s office

released Dmitrievsky from custody,

saying that he would not be able to obstruct

the investigation.

>> So, what’s it like? How many people are watching us?

>> Fewer than on your channel.

Well, but you at least have a live broadcast

and people are watching us right now, after all,

that the cathedral is not federal

property.

to say hello.

>> Alexei Alexeyevich,

>> I just read your message.

Say that. Alexei will not be

temporarily required to vote in the elections

to the Moscow City Duma.

>> Temporarily occu—

lay across it, because when I received

I can screech at a very high pitch,

you know?

>> Well, that’s interesting. Because they

introduced a bill; I think they

made it

>> a federal bill. The story there is that

a federal bill was introduced there.

They simply started

copying and, well, basically...

>> not for the Moscow City Duma. Further on, not for the Moscow City Duma. No,

just so he knows.

>> All right, all right.

>> Well, we’re not going to do that right now, I

just wanted Lyosha (diminutive of Alexei) to know. I was just driving along,

listening. There’s a certain

gentleman sitting there now,

>> because when I hear “Alexei

Anatolyevich,” I know exactly who comes to mind. Yes,

all right.

>> What kind of strange surprises are these? Who’s

waiting there?

>> I’m on YouTube.

>> Kira, look for an emergency exit. I don’t want

to see any gentlemen. Not here.

Alexei, sorry, there is no exit. Do you like

Splin (a Russian rock band)? “No Exit.”

>> Oh, calm down. No, no, no. I mean, what do I care—

I don't care who it is, bring in whoever you want.

What is 47—is that some kind of secret

phrase?

>> 47 minutes. Yes, we finish at :47.

>> Lyosha, back me up. You're 100% right.

Replace the host.

>> Ira, this is the second time I'm warning you. What's with that

sarcastic tone? You're supposed to say:

"Well, Alexei, I've read all of this and

reconsidered my—thank you very much—my

views. And now I'll fight against

the regime more actively."

>> Will you stop respecting me if I so easily

change my position like this

from throwing a mug at you to getting up and kissing

you on both cheeks? Like that... like at the World

Cup in the stadium?

>> No, thank you very much. I'll pass. I

understand that if you shake someone's hand like that,

people end up having their hand removed along with

it afterward.

>> Oh, come on, don't make things up. That's not true.

>> What do you mean it's not? Well, okay. No, come on?

>> Of course not.

>> I'm about to launch a poll. Wash your hands

after shaking Navalny's hand.

>> You're a troll.

>> No, actually, I'm not a troll. I'm a very

gentle troll. I love everyone.

>> About the launch of a unified funeral information service

Ritual. Consultations

after the death of a loved one, what a

pre-need contract is, and funeral

services

and burial—free of charge.

In a moment you'll be surprised where that came

from.

95 4054

or at ritual.ru.

>> Echo of Moscow Radio and RTVI

present the program *Special Opinion*.

>> *Special Opinion* continues.

Alexei Navalny, Irina Vorobyova, and about

the latest congress of Russia of the Future—that is,

the Russia of the Future party. Once again, you are

trying to register it. Why do you

keep gathering and voting with cards?

The photos look great, but what's the point of

all this?

>> Because we have every right to

register a party. And the country needs a

normal opposition party that

isn't cowardly, that is honest, and that

will consistently defend and

represent citizens' interests. They won't

register us because they're afraid. But this is

also a matter of principle. We said

that we have a party, we have people,

we have regional branches. No one has any

doubt about that. Yes, under the law,

you need 500 supporters to register a party.

Well, we do have 500

supporters—no one doubts that. And we

said we would do it, and we are doing it.

That doesn't mean we've stopped doing anything else.

And of course, most of our activity

—about 80% of it—lies completely outside the

systemic sphere: rallies, investigations, and so

on. But we said we would

register the party, and we are

registering it. We demand, we demand, and

we will keep demanding it.

>> And here's the question. The central council of the Russia of the Future party

was elected with

>> not a single woman on it.

Alexei Anatolyevich, how did that happen?

>> I was outraged. Well, outraged may be too strong, but I

also

didn't like it much either, but it was the decision

of the congress. People gathered, and two

people—Lyubov Sobol, for example—she actually, we

were electing six people there. Six

people make up the central council. And

Sobol made it into the top six. Well, there

procedurally, she simply didn't get

a majority of the assembly members' votes.

That's how the votes were distributed. Quite a lot of

women took part. Uh, but it turned out

that they didn't make it. Of course, that's

not good. But that's democracy. That's how people

voted. In our party, never—and I'm

proud of this—there is no

"Navalny list" or some pre-approved

slate. I saw plenty of that in Yabloko (a Russian liberal political party),

and I decided for myself that I would

never do that.

>> In Yabloko there were Yavlinsky's lists. You're telling me

that? Every time, in all

parties, what happens is that some kind of

list gets handed out showing how the leadership recommends

people should vote. And mostly, the

endorsed candidates win. I

never speak up to recommend

any particular people. However they vote is how they

vote. It's real

competition and democracy. This time

they voted in such a way that there isn't a single

woman. That's rather unfortunate. In fact, in our

organization, women are very well

represented both in our campaign offices and in

the Anti-Corruption Foundation. The majority of

the staff are women, and there are many women in

leadership positions. But that's just how it

turned out. It's unfortunate.

>> Tell us about Lyuba Sobol's nomination—

how you chose where exactly she would run,

how all of this will work, and whether there is

a chance of getting registered?

>> The chance of collecting the signatures—well, that's

100 percent. Sobol is running in the

central district—that's Khamovniki,

Arbat, and Presnya.

That area. Well, she herself, basically,

made all the decisions. She chose this

district,

probably in part because right now

her main activity is focused on

in the fight against this notorious

"Putin's chef," who supplies

substandard food to

Moscow schools and kindergartens, there was a mass

food poisoning incident, and the radio station covered it

many times as well. Hundreds of children were affected,

Sobol represents the parents

of those affected and organized a class-action

lawsuit. These Prigozhin people are following her

around. I mean, well, actually,

she is engaged in fairly dangerous and

brave work. She's doing an excellent job

and works a great deal with schools

specifically in the Central District. That's why she

chose

this particular part of Moscow. I strongly

support her candidacy. I'm sure that

she will be able to collect all the signatures. A lot of them are needed.

Uh, I'm sure she will receive

enough support. And, of course,

our concern is that the mayor's office

will simply be afraid of her and will try to

keep her off the ballot, as it most often

does. And then again, this time are you

somehow coordinating who will run where

with Gudkov, for example?

Is that being handled somehow

>> As for Gudkov, actually, I know that

Sobol held talks with him, and Gudkov

acted very properly and sensibly. He

originally planned, well, as far as I

know—though I don't want to speak for Gudkov—

he planned to run in this district, and

he and Sobol agreed that he would step aside.

So now he is running in the northwest,

where he had run before, while she

remains in the center. And that's the right decision.

It worked out very well to

divide things up that way. We understand very well that

it will be impossible to sort out all the districts

100%, but whatever can be done,

we are doing.

>> Mm-hmm. They're asking about the elections in St. Petersburg

Actually, more broadly,

they're asking about all the elections and about this

"smart voting" that people are talking

about. Won't smart voting turn into a trap

where people end up voting

for some, well, completely

unpleasant candidate? What should one do

in that case?

>> That will happen, 100%. That is not

a setup; it is a deliberate

strategy, because the elections are structured

in what way? Mostly they allow

only the so-called systemic opposition (parties officially allowed within the Kremlin-controlled political system),

in. Most often, representatives

of the non-systemic opposition—well, not most often,

but fairly often—turn out to be quite

odious characters. To put it

plainly. And if we want

to unseat the United Russia candidate sitting in this

district, then we all have to

vote together for one person. That means we

have to vote for whoever came

second last time, for the runner-up

candidate. Almost always that's a Communist.

Sometimes it's someone from A Just Russia, sometimes

it's an LDPR candidate. And of course, when we

have to, if we want to unseat

a United Russia candidate, vote for a Communist

or an LDPR member, well, of course,

there will be people there who praise Stalin

or make some outrageous

statements. You mentioned the elections in

St. Petersburg—for example, there

the absolutely vile Beglov is seeking power, uh, as

he's nicknamed, "Runlov" (a play on Beglov's surname, from the Russian verb "to run away"), because he

runs away from journalists and from any

discussion.

>> Well, what is that, I mean, what

>> "vile"? That's a completely accurate

word. As for twisting his surname—we're

saying that this isn't

really mangling his surname. It's, as

Matvienko says, a meme that stuck to him,

because Beglov literally

constantly runs away from questions, runs away

even from deputies of the Legislative

Assembly. So, naturally,

well, I live in Moscow, but the residents

of St. Petersburg, Petersburgers, do not

want Beglov. But Beglov

controls his competitors. He

will choose, uh, who exactly

he isn't afraid to compete against, and those will be

some fairly odious people. And

for us, in order to follow the principle, the

slogan that is already popular in

St. Petersburg—"Anyone but

Beglov"—we will have to vote for some

fairly unpleasant people. Well, we'll vote

for them, yes, that's true, and they may be

some kind of Stalinists or, well,

just generally some exotic

characters. But we'll vote for them because

we want to inflict the maximum

political damage on United Russia. And in

Moscow it will be the same. There will be districts

where there are quite appealing candidates like

Milov, Sobol, or Gudkov. But

there will also be districts where there are

appealing candidates who do not have the slightest

chance. And there will be unpleasant

candidates who can defeat

the United Russia candidate. And the strategy of smart

voting is that in

that situation we will vote for

the unpleasant ones—but the ones who can

unseat the United Russia candidate.

>> In that connection, then, two short

questions. First, how are the Communist Party and LDPR politically

different now from United

Russia? All these parties, really—

do they actually differ

from one another in any real way? I mean, aren't they all

basically United Russia, or not?

>> No, that's a major oversimplification. They,

of course, are largely under the control

of the presidential administration, but

they still are not part of the government. But

that is precisely why the Kremlin reacts so painfully

to defeats by its gubernatorial candidates

in governor races. Basically, if you

were 100% right, they would not care at all

what difference it made whether a Communist

won in Primorye or a United Russia candidate did. But

nevertheless, they canceled the election in

Primorye, rigged the new election

in order to push through a United Russia candidate.

Still, there are different people there. And yes, we

understand that the systemic opposition is not

what we dreamed of. It would be good

if the Russia of the Future party took

part in the elections, but right now

the tactical objective is to inflict maximum damage

on United Russia. So we will vote

for the Communists, and for

A Just Russia candidates, and for Yabloko candidates, and

so on.

>> And the second question. These runners-up,

the candidates you are urging people

to vote for—what if they get elected and

then switch to United Russia? There is such a

possibility, and they will be lured away, and

they will be bribed, and some will switch,

but most still will not.

>> And how is this different from the strategy

that existed in 2011, against the backdrop of which

there were later so many

protests?

>> It is different in that here

the strategy is about single-member districts, and

it is much more complicated. The strategy in

gubernatorial elections or on party

lists—vote for anyone, for any party

except United Russia, or vote

for anyone but Beglov. It is much

simpler, because there you have

someone like Bortko from the Communists, and I

heard they also nominated Stas Baretsky,

yes, or something like that, some kind of

super-eccentric people. Choose

anyone but Beglov. The strategy for

single-member districts is much

more complicated, because there are

specific names. There will be some

United Russia guy Vasechkin, Communist Ivanov, and

A Just Russia candidate Petrov. And we will have to

choose Ivanov or Petrov. And Ivanov

or Petrov may have said something

awful online. Everyone will google them

and say: "My God, who are you asking us

to vote for?" And nevertheless

you have to bite the bullet,

forget Ivanov's hellish quotes

from

the internet,

and understand that we are voting not for

Ivanov, not for a Communist or for

the LDPR, but for maximum

political damage to the United Russia party.

A couple of minutes left. I cannot help asking

about Ingushetia. Today there were reports

that a police battalion there was disbanded

that, during the rally in

Magas, refused to disperse the protesters.

Will you support them?

>> We will support them, because this is exactly the

police that stands with the people. This

slogan gets repeated a lot, right? Well, it used to

be heard more often; now not so much, right?

"The police are with the people"—well, it is an international slogan,

I would say, yes. And

it is often heard, but rarely happens. In

Ingushetia, some of the police actually

did side with the people.

They were disbanded, but they need

to be supported. And I am sure that they may

no longer be police officers. But,

at the very least, inwardly they

feel that they have remained honest

people, and they have very strong

support from their friends,

their acquaintances. And for any person that

matters. In the Caucasus, it matters much

more, because all those family

and traditional ties are a hundred times more important there. And

by the way, today, out on the street,

I was approached—uh, I was with Ilya,

walking together with Ilya Yashin, and

someone came up to us, said he was from

Ingushetia, and complained that

riot police from other regions were being brought in there, because

the local ones, naturally, refuse to

disperse their own neighbors.

>> So we should forgive all these police officers

everything that came before and support them?

No matter what? What if there was something in their past?

Well, if there was something before, then

that needs to be looked into. Most often

an ordinary police officer has not committed any terrible

crimes. Well, he is just

an ordinary police officer, for God's sake.

The man served in the army, and there is nowhere to work.

In Ingushetia there are basically no jobs at all. So where

was he supposed to go? He took that job because

if you go to work in the police,

you at least get 35,000 rubles a month (about $380). And if you

do not get a state-funded job,

you will not find work paying more than 20,000 or 19,000 rubles

(about $210–$220).

>> And now my final, by-now traditional

question. If, after all, in the Leningrad Region

or in St. Petersburg there ends up running

Sobchak, then yes. After Beglov,

Sobchak,

>> Yes, we really do not care. If

Stas Baretsky is running, then Sobchak is already

less of a freak than Stas Baretsky. Vote for

anyone but Beglov—our task

becomes simpler. If I were taking part there, I

would vote for the Communist candidate Bortko.

>> Here we go,

>> If I were not participating, if I were

just a voter, yes, I would vote for

the Communists.

>> There you go. Our favorite question for Alexei

Navalny, about Ksenia Sobchak. Now

we somehow need to come up with

some new question. Thank you very much, this

was *Special Opinion*. If you haven’t seen it or

heard it, please watch

or listen on the Echo of Moscow website.

>> Echo of yours.

Thank you very much.