Alexei Navalny on the program *Full Albats* from August 7, 2017

Full Albats.

>> Good evening. 20

3 minutes 32 seconds. On the air is

the radio station Echo of Moscow. I am Yevgenia

Albats, and I am beginning the program

devoted to the key events of the week,

the events that will have

an impact on politics in the coming weeks

and months. Today I have one guest,

the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation,

a man about whom the well-known

Washington political publication recently

wrote: "He will beat Putin." A candidate for

president of the Russian Federation

according to the opposition, Alexei Navalny, with whom

we will today sum up the results

of the political season for the opposition.

Alexei, hello.

>> Good evening.

>> Especially since today marked the opening of

Navalny’s seventieth regional campaign office.

Also today, a court refused to satisfy the lawsuit

of the influential businessman Mikhailov

against Navalny, who had demanded the removal from

the internet of the Anti-Corruption Foundation’s investigation

into the business dealings of the sons

of the prosecutor general, so let me

congratulate you on that. Alexei,

>> Thank you very much. It is a rarity for us

when we win in a Russian court.

>> Yes, which makes it especially noteworthy.

So, when are you going fishing?

>> To chase a pike underwater for two hours?

No, well, I think I’d rather

They turned a fishing trip into, as I understand it,

a forty-six-minute

film, which they posted on the website

of the presidential administration. Longer than

our film about Medvedev or about

Chaika. I think if I make a film,

it will be about something else, not, not, not about my

fishing trip.

>> Uh-huh. And are you ready to strip for the voters?

Zhenya, we’ve started with provocative

questions. I don’t think voters

need me to take my clothes off. It seems to me

they want something else from a candidate for

president of Russia, not striptease. Especially

since with the stripping, I don’t know

why they did it a second time. There were

so many jokes about the bare torso

on horseback, but apparently they

liked it.

It is extremely important for the Kremlin

to prove right now

that Putin is still with it, that he is not senile. Because

judging by the authorities’ actions in recent

years and especially the last few months, even

people quite loyal to Putin, to

the Kremlin, among the electorate, feel that they

have all gone mad there. So it is important for them

to show that they are in good physical

shape, catching pike and climbing some

mountains in Tuva (a Russian republic in Siberia).

>> I see, Navalny won’t be taking his clothes off,

folks. That’s how it always is when

>> I’m not planning to any time soon.

>> All right, now to something serious. In

an interview with the American channel CBSN, as

I understand it, while answering the favorite question

of all Western journalists: Why are you still

alive, and aren’t you afraid that you’ll be killed?

That was probably the gist of it.

>> It’s a lesson for me: don’t joke in a foreign

language. Let me just tell our lis-

teners that you said you had

a fifty percent chance of being killed and

a fifty percent chance

of not being killed. I specifically

listened to the video in the original, thinking

that maybe they had distorted your words a bit

to promote the program, or that you had said it

somewhat differently, but no, you said exactly that. And

the question can’t be heard, but you said exactly

50% that you would be killed. Well, as I already

said, it’s a lesson: don’t joke in

a foreign language. It was a classic

situation with a foreign correspondent.

You’re riding with him, he asks you

just some general chit-chat, and then

suddenly he asks you: "So what do you

think, will you be killed or not?"

>> Did he really ask it just like that:

>> "Well, yes." He asked: "What do you think,

what is the probability that you’ll be killed?" Well,

and I remembered a well-known Russian

joke about how a blonde is

asked: "What is the probability of meeting

a dinosaur outside your apartment building entrance?" She says:

"50%. Either I will or I won’t." So

I decided to make a joke. Along the lines of that

joke, I said: "Well, 50%—either they kill me,

or they don’t." Because in my

answer I meant that it is pointless

to analyze it. I don’t know and I’m not

even going to think about it, and there is no

point in thinking about it. But they

took it with this kind of

seriousness and put it into the headlines,

which look frightening. But, in

fact, that is not at all what I

meant. Well, uh,

>> Well, I believe that any, of course,

politician in Russia, any person

who is engaged in what is called

independent politics, has certain

risks, but to assess them in percentages or

in terms of probabilities is simply absolutely

impossible. And I repeat, it is pointless

even to think about it too much, because

if you think about it too much, you won’t be able

to do anything.

>> But isn’t that, in the Freudian sense, a reflection

of an inner fear?

>> No, I don’t think so. Well, rather, I

know for certain that it is not,

uh, a reflection of inner fear. I am

a rational person, I understand the level

danger, but there is no fear in me at all

neither inward nor outward.

>> All right. Uh, because, you know, I, uh,

many people had, uh, this kind of reaction

to your statement—it made many people,

who think very highly of you

and feel warmly toward you, of course, feel this kind of,

well, shudder. Uh, and, um, right away there began

there began this remarkable discussion on

the internet about why, then,

not just imprison you? Why kill you? Especially

since the criminal corrections

inspectorate in Moscow recently

warned about the possibility of replacing your

suspended sentence with a real prison term. Ah, but the court—

this proposal from the criminal corrections

inspectorate in Moscow—rejected it. By the way, do you

have an explanation for why?

>> You know, it wasn't even like that. What happened there was

a much more absurd situation:

the court's press office said that the inspectorate

was demanding that the suspended sentence be changed to

a real prison term. Some time later, or rather,

the court said—yes, the court said—that

the inspectorate was demanding it; then after some time

the inspectorate denied it. Then the court

said that yes, such a motion had existed,

but it was unsigned, and therefore it was left

without action. And then all of this was

walked back. A very strange situation.

I go to the inspectorate twice a month,

I'm required to check in. And once a month

they come check on me at home together with

the local police officer. I asked them, I

said: "So what exactly did you stir up there

that was so interesting? Tell me—I'm

curious myself—what was it you were demanding there?"

But they blush, turn pale, and still won't

admit what's going on. And here

I can only repeat once again: it is

pointless to analyze this. I don't know

what is going on in their heads. I

believe there is no strategy at all. These are

just some crazy people,

I mean the Kremlin, the government,

the security services, who for some

momentary reasons, under the influence of

various factors, make or do not make

certain decisions. Some of them decide,

"Let's lock him up." Others

say, "No, let's not, let's not

turn him into a hero." Or maybe it happens

some other way. I don't understand

how it happens. To answer

that question in any meaningful way,

you would need some information about

what is actually going on inside Putin's head.

I don't think even one person

has that information.

>> And you have no doubt that the decision

about you is made by Putin alone?

>> I don't have the slightest doubt about that.

>> Okay. And your probation period was extended

by a year, right, until 2020. What

until December 2020? What does that

actually mean? What does it mean?

>> It means nothing. Well, it means

that once again they are sending a kind of

political signal to the whole country,

to me specifically, but mainly to the whole

country, to the opposition in all its forms, that

we will not allow you to take part in elections,

that the political system will function

without you. There will never be real

competition in elections. And anyone

who thinks on their own that they are

so great and can

independently build up political

capital and then come along and get

elected to something here—that will not happen. And once again they

have, um, in line with this

law of theirs that prohibits

people with suspended sentences from running for office, they

extended my probation period. From the point

of view of the current election

campaign, this does not interest me, because

I am entering this election guided by

the Constitution, which states plainly that

everyone has the right to participate in elections

who is not being held in places of

deprivation of liberty. I do not recognize their federal law,

and it does not conform to

the Constitution, therefore

this court ruling did not really impress

me very much. And besides,

it was obvious that they would

do this. They had already extended it for me, I think,

twice by three months each, and now

they've extended it by another year.

>> Well, I think it had been until 2019.

And what difference does it make—

2019 or 2020?

>> Well, again, that means they have pushed back by

another year the possibility of

taking part in elections.

We all understand perfectly well that

this is simply a display of the system in its current

form: they believe they can arrange things

so as not to allow certain

candidates in. Our task, and the task of this

stage of the campaign, is to make them, to force them

to register me as a candidate,

and to do that by, well, shaping

public opinion. They govern by

poll numbers. If they see in the polls that

in fact the people—not necessarily my

supporters, but even their supporters—

believe that political

competition is needed, and that yet another election in the

format of Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky,

Mironov, Zhirinovsky interests no one,

then they will register me. And

if we fail to create

enough pressure, then probably they

will try not to let me into the election.

>> Now that's an interesting question. So, you have

70 campaign offices open, tens of thousands of

volunteers.

So, have you, so to speak,

secured the support of potential, uh,

signatories, or whatever the proper term is, right,

>> the people who will sign

when the moment comes,

>> when the moment comes, and so on, right? So that’s still

hundreds of thousands of people. If you are not

registered, what will you do? And

more generally, what do you think the

reaction will be?

>> Right now we’re not making any specific

predictions, because what we do

will depend heavily on what kind of

work we manage to do. Right now we have

135,000 volunteers. That could become 200,000,

or it could become 300,000. Right now we have

collected more than half a million signatures

and, uh, including those not yet fully confirmed,

it’s around 800,000 just by email,

but we’re not even counting those. Everything depends

on what the specific situation

will be, what public

opinion will be at that moment. Of course, we will never

recognize an election in which

I am not allowed to run. Of course, we will not

stay silent. As for any specific actions,

there’s no point in making these kind of

strategic or tactical plans, because

we don’t know how this will

play out or what exactly will happen,

or who the other candidates will be. We

understand perfectly well that, well, most likely,

the Kremlin, as a kind of consolation prize, if they

decide not to let me run, will bring in

some candidate of their own, nominally

democratic, but under their control.

What kind of candidate that will be, whether he’ll be

relatively respectable or completely

disreputable—many things will be decided

on the fly.

>> Do you think that by autumn we’ll know

whom they might bring in?

Of course,

>> Well, I think—I mean, by autumn, probably,

later in the autumn. But probably that alone won’t

be enough. They will need,

of course, some kind of Prokhorov number two (a reference to Mikhail Prokhorov, the businessman who ran in Russia’s 2012 presidential election as a nominally liberal candidate) in

case they decide not to let me run.

>> Mm-hmm.

>> Because otherwise, well, people simply

won’t come to the election—turnout will collapse. Yes. They,

of course, can falsify the results, and we

understand perfectly well that they know how to

rig elections.

But, you see, if turnout is 15 percent, they’ll

have to inflate the numbers by a factor of three,

especially in large cities,

where simply no one will go vote.

Well, they always have Chechnya,

Tatarstan, Bashkortostan. But they all live

in Moscow. They all live in Moscow, after all.

They vacation in St. Petersburg.

So the views of the biggest cities still

cannot be ignored. These are real

people; they live in Russia. And besides,

we shouldn’t think that, uh, in Chechnya

everyone really goes to the polling stations on command. In

Chechnya, it’s simply fraud.

In fact, it’s not even fraud there—it’s

a complete rewriting of the results, right? Or in

Dagestan, what happens there. But people

will still know perfectly well that

no one actually went to the polls. And that kind of

de facto delegitimization of the authorities

also matters.

>> Well, this is what I don’t quite understand. On the one

hand, you say that they are pursuing

a crazy policy and that

the country has a fairly harsh

authoritarian regime, but on the other hand,

you seem to be relying on the idea that

they care about legitimacy. Well

>> I don’t see a contradiction here. They are not

interested in legitimacy as such; they are

interested in staying in power. They really are

pursuing a crazy policy.

But within that crazy policy

there is one rational point: they want

to hold on to power in order to enrich themselves.

Personal enrichment and personal comfort.

A great many motives and elaborate explanations

are built around this. From

my point of view, it’s all quite simple.

A fairly small group of

people wants to enjoy this

unimaginable wealth and enjoy

the insane power they have seized

in the country. Everything else is

secondary. It’s just that, in order to better

hold on to power, it is preferable, of course,

not to raise the real level of public anger

too high. That’s all. Therefore, if

they see that barring

a candidate from the election will raise the real

level of public anger, then

they may decide to allow that candidate to run.

>> Returning to the original question—oh,

before I ask you about

the results and your position this season,

tell me, how is your eye?

>> Much better. I can see you, Yevgeny,

perfectly well,

>> with both eyes. I mean, it still sees

worse. My right eye still sees

worse than the left. I have to

put drops in it and fuss with it,

which is rather unpleasant because, well,

a normal person in normal life

doesn’t even remember that they have

eyes. Unfortunately, right now I do

remember that I have an eye, uh, and that it

needs various drops. But overall,

everything has become much better. And thanks

to the doctors, both Russian and foreign.

>> Excellent. Uh, in that same NBC interview

you once again repeated that you are absolutely

convinced that the person who splashed

you with that liquid which caused

a chemical burn to the cornea,

and what, this was all ordered

by Putin's administration?

And you have sufficient grounds to

make that claim. What grounds do you

have to say that?

>> There is not the slightest doubt. I can

confirm it. I gave an interview to CNBC,

probably about two months ago. They spent a long time

preparing it, and now even more

specific facts have emerged. The fact is that

this criminal case has been closed. I still

have not even been questioned in it. All

the organizers directly involved, and

the direct attackers, they have been

identified online, and their faces,

last names, passport details, and addresses are there. And

not one of them, none of them, has been

bothered in the slightest. There is evidence online

and footage showing these people being

brought by the police in their own car or

taken away from somewhere. That is, they—and this

man who directly

splashed me with that liquid—he gives

what are essentially fabricated witness

statements in the case of June 12 and March 26

. In other words, these are people

who work directly with

law enforcement agencies.

Information about my whereabouts and my

movements could only have come to them

from the security services. So I have no

doubts. And this body of

evidence, the fact that they have not faced

not only no punishment, but not even

an investigation, despite the fact that

remember how many statements there were

saying that all this would be investigated,

United Russia (the ruling political party) is unhappy. United Russia

was saying at the time: "Any attacks

must be investigated." And what came of it? And I

we received a reply from the police saying the case

had been closed because they were unable to

identify the attackers. Go to my

blog and look at their photos and

addresses.

>> Do you have anything else, or do you have

any other information that you

>> Well, we do not have any special

secret information or anything that we

are holding back. But what we see, what

is happening, of course, clearly

points to the fact that these

people are being protected and supported by

the security services. And of course, this is a political

order that came from the presidential administration

either directly or indirectly

through some political operatives, or—I do not

know exactly how it works. But this is

exactly the same as with our

campaign offices across the country, right? Endless

seizures of leaflets, arrests and detentions of

people, intimidation, beatings, attacks.

This is a systematic nationwide

campaign involving, without

exaggeration, hundreds of thousands—uh, tens of

thousands of police officers.

who are doing practically nothing else

except confiscating our leaflets.

A huge number of employees of the

prosecutor's office, the Investigative Committee,

and the FSB (Federal Security Service), who go around to the landlords of all

our offices. There are 70 regions, and everywhere

FSB officers come and try

to evict our office. That cannot

possibly be a coincidence.

>> Well, they evicted us in Moscow

several times, and we have, well, very

many cases. I find it hard to say right now

exactly, but probably in more than

thirty regions, we repeatedly

had to change locations because

FSB officers would simply come to the landlords

and force them to terminate their leases with us.

>> An expensive undertaking. How much money have you raised

for the campaign so far? Uh,

>> Well, more than 100 million rubles (about 100 million RUB). We, we broke

the fundraising record from my mayoral campaign.

Back then we raised 104 million rubles in 3

months. Now, well, admittedly over a

longer period, we have raised more than 104 million.

>> And what is the average, uh, contribution?

>> Ah, the median. Ah, 500 rubles. Well,

the donations remain fairly small,

but they are made by

about 70,000 people,

>> Right, yes?

>> So that is a huge number of people.

This is a very major achievement for us. And

this is, in fact, the main reason

why the Kremlin cannot paralyze our campaign

despite all these

efforts involving the security apparatus. Well, as long as

these 70,000 people support us

and each of them can send

500 rubles. And that cannot be stopped. I mean,

if there were one sponsor sending

tens of millions, you could

go to him and say: "Do not do this

anymore," or simply arrest him. But when there are

70,000 people, what can you do about that?

>> And what, interestingly, do they say to the tenants—

to the landlords who

rent you office space for your campaign offices?

>> Well, they come and say: "Listen,

tomorrow the tax authorities will come and seize

all your documents." And then the police will come and

say: "We need all the computers here for examination.

" That is what happens to

our offices. Police officers simply walk in

and say: "Hmm, it looks like you are engaged in

extremist activity. We are taking

all the computers for examination." This

can be done under Russia's monstrous laws

without any court order at all. And

this happens constantly. But

just imagine: you have an office, you have some

accounting department, and they have taken two

computer, and hello, you are not allowed to engage in any

activity at all."

So, uh, very often tenants,

landlords—they really are frightened

by these very serious consequences. But,

uh, I am very proud that we are finding

a sufficient number of people, after all,

across all these seventy regions. We have

campaign offices everywhere. And in Moscow, we have now

found one after a long series of ordeals, when

meetings of our Moscow headquarters

were taking place in random archways and almost

in apartment building entrances. Now we have

50 Gilyarovskogo Street. Come by, Muscovites.

It’s a wonderful space, with a huge

number of volunteers. Well, as I already

said, 135,000 volunteers. That is an enormous

number of people. There are volunteers in

every populated locality in Russia. And our

main problem right now is that we

simply cannot raise money quickly enough

to supply these people with

newspapers and leaflets. Especially considering

that 30% of those leaflets are stolen along

the way by the police. But why do you need newspapers

and leaflets if you

are drawing million-strong

audiences online? How many watched *He Is Not Dimon to You*? Twenty

eight million.

>> Yes. But the country has a population of 145 million

people. That is why I am running in the

presidential election. And I really am

running in the presidential election. And I am fighting

for the votes of the majority. And I will get those

majority votes. I just need

a way to communicate our thoughts and our

ideas. We reach a lot of people through the internet for that,

but it is still not enough.

In Russia, the internet is used daily by

some 70 million people, even more.

So when a video gets 24 million views, that is

very good, but still not enough.

There are people who do not use

the internet at all. There are people who

trust newspapers. They think a newspaper would not

lie. If it is printed in a newspaper, then

it must be read. There has to be

variety. If we had access to television, we

would use television too, but we are not

allowed to buy airtime.

If we could buy it, we would also use

outdoor advertising, but they do not allow that either. So

we

>> You cannot buy it there?

>> Yes, no one will sell us anything.

So we use the methods available to us.

We have volunteers. That is our main

strength. A volunteer with a leaflet

is a terrifying weapon. And the Kremlin really

is terribly afraid of them. They are simply

panic-stricken for exactly that reason. Why?

Because

Putin’s approval rating,

whether it is 86 percent or whatever

other figure, can exist

only in conditions of a political vacuum,

when there is no real competition. But when

someone knocks on a person’s apartment door and

says, "Hello, we are volunteers for

candidate Navalny; here is a leaflet."

And he sees with his own eyes that these are

volunteers. He talks to them,

asks, "How much are they paying you, guys?"

They explain to him that actually no one

is paying us. We have never even seen Navalny

in person. We are simply doing this for the cause,

going around handing things out, and we live right here, in

the neighboring building. And then he understands that this

is all real, that there is a candidate who

has fairly broad

support, who talks about what seem like

obvious things, but things that

everyone keeps silent about: corruption, political

competition, poverty, injustice

and inequality. And that immediately shatters the whole

picture. No, that entire 86 percent instantly

thins out and collapses at that moment, because

people see that there is competition. And

the Kremlin is, of course, terribly and

panic-stricken by that. They have somehow—not exactly

made peace with it, but they are prepared to tolerate

the internet, the fact that there are

millions of people there—mostly residents

of the biggest cities—who will

never again believe Kremlin

propaganda. But the fact that

our campaign is moving offline,

going to pensioners and handing them

a newspaper—that is an attack on what they hold most

sacred. They do not want to tolerate it, they

cannot tolerate it. But we do not care that they do not

want to and cannot. We are going to keep

doing it anyway.

>> How much success are they having in intimidating

your volunteers, after all? I mean,

>> well,

>> after all, online you constantly hear not only

that they came to this person, came to that one,

here someone got punched in the face, there

someone was beaten up, and so on. Then people,

>> fortunately, most of these stories about

people being visited, intimidated, or even

hit or something else—the person still

stayed on working at the campaign office. We do not

know how many more there would have been. Well,

that is, rather, we are sure there would have

been many more if we were operating in

a normal political environment without

intimidation. But even as things are now, it is absolutely

remarkable, and I am very proud of

all the volunteers who work

with us. Well, most of those

stories are about people not

being frightened and staying on at the campaign office. In

your view, has the level of fear

increased or decreased compared with,

say, 2012, with the

Bolotnaya case (the prosecution of protesters after the 2012 Bolotnaya Square rally), or has it, on the contrary, increased

it’s impossible to compare it with Russia

in 2012. In other words, we live

simply in a different country, with a different

political system. So, basically,

the events of 2014–2015

— the start of the war — simply

completely changed the system. Back in

2012, even after

the Bolotnaya case (the prosecution following the 2011–2012 Bolotnaya Square protests), after all of that,

stories about someone

being jailed for a repost or a like would have

seemed outrageous, right? Mass arrests of

people, these arrests over leaflets. Still,

after the Bolotnaya case, in 2013,

in Moscow we ran our campaign, well,

relatively freely. Access to

television was closed off. We were constantly

being restricted in one way or another, but there were no detentions of people

simply for walking around in a T-shirt. Today I

read an astonishing excerpt from

a police report. It said that a person was conducting

campaigning while in a public place wearing

a white T-shirt with the words “Navalny

2018.” And therefore he had to be

detained. From the perspective of 2012, this

would have looked insane. And so, well,

of course, the level of fear has risen,

as has the level of anxiety

among all kinds of people — advertisers,

landlords, businesspeople of all kinds. In

essence, it’s a different country — a country where,

an independent political opinion is

not merely not encouraged or seen as some kind of

potential threat; now everyone

understands that the authorities view it

as hostile and act hostilely. You have

your own polling service.

What does it show — what kind of profile do the people

who support you have, at least

among volunteers?

>> Well, volunteers — by

definition, in any election

campaign, whether in Russia or even in

other countries, are most often young

people. So in our case, they are young people with

a high level of education; that has always

been the case — higher education

>> most often, right? So, well, these are young

people, and besides, they have more time.

They are generally more inclined, everywhere,

all over the world, to take an active part in

campaigns. But the main voter we are

counting on is actually

older people. In other words, we

want to use — and we plan to, and we are doing so —

young volunteers

in order to

campaign. What age group is your support base?

What age group is it?

>> Uh,

we’re counting on — listen, 539,000 or so

of those who are ready to sign

for you. That’s a colossal base.

These are people who use the internet.

Right now, this analysis doesn’t have

much meaning, but we already understand

that these people who signed up

did so online. That means

these are people who most likely — well, definitely —

use the internet every day. These are

people with a high level of education. And

of course, they are primarily residents

of the largest cities. But as

the election campaign approaches, we

will of course change this demographic sample

quite significantly, because right now we have

a very strong

skew toward the internet. That is exactly

why we are running our

offline campaign — in order to

correct it. But I just want to remind you once again

that

>> Alexei, sorry, I have to

interrupt you, because we’re exactly at the half-hour mark.

We have to go to news and commercials,

then we’ll come back to the Moscow studio.

>> Complete nonsense.

Very good.

>> But surely there must be some kind of profile.

You must have some kind of

profile.

>> A profile of whom? The current volunteer? Well,

>> of the volunteers. And in general, who

is your main support base? With Putin

we know. It’s, for example, a 64-year-old woman.

That’s the base, the core, right? It’s

small towns and the countryside.

>> We simply know that. Well, you must also have

something similar.

>> Well, in our case, accordingly, right now it’s simply

the opposite. It’s residents of large

cities, more men than women. As for

women, there are fewer of them than men, yes,

because men are more interested in

the news. Accordingly, these are people with higher

education and, well, residents of large

cities.

>> It’s simply that we can get information to them

more effectively.

>> I think that, in any case, you won’t win over the countryside.

It’s impossible.

>> The countryside is anti-modernization.

By

>> Nobody even lives there, Zhenya. Everyone lives

in cities — 80% do.

>> Well, those are small towns.

>> Well, small towns are actually going fairly well

for us, in fact. It’s just that we can’t

open campaign offices there right now at this

stage, yes. But

>> basically, all of Russia lives in

some kind of large cities, well,

more or less large ones — with more than 100,000

people in them. So

we’ll work there actively. Most

importantly, as I already said, in every

locality we have

volunteers. In

>> in every

every locality in the country—135,000

volunteers, of course, in every populated

place in the country, more or less

in any significantly populated places

there are volunteers here.

Former Georgian President and

former governor of Odesa Region, Mikheil

Saakashvili, faces up to 11 years in

prison on criminal charges, according to

the publication Obozrevatel.

Among the charges against Saakashvili are

murder, embezzlement of state funds, and seizure of

companies and media outlets. Earlier, the Ukrainian authorities

revoked Saakashvili's citizenship. According to

the latest reports, he is in Warsaw.

volume of consumption

They stripped him of his citizenship lawlessly, of course,

citizenship. This is simply a shameful

page in Ukraine's history, absolutely.

Just shameful. I don't understand why

Poroshenko did it. A huge mistake.

>> Well, it seems to me that the hypothesis

put forward by Venediktov is very fair. Elections are

ahead.

>> He's high-profile, and a lot of people like him.

>> It's all obvious: they're simply removing

a political rival, removing this kind of

troublemaker. But how can this

be done in a country that

claims to be a democracy?

>> So this is an absolutely Putin-style

approach. Putin doesn't even do this yet. Uh-huh.

without precipitation, 14°C at night, daytime tomorrow. Although

I was just in Odesa, actually, just now

I had gone there.

>> Yes, I saw it on your Facebook.

>> Listen, well, he didn't leave behind any

real mark. There were neither resources nor

opportunity.

>> How can you carry out reforms in just a year today

quickly in an impoverished country that is also

at war?

>> But they say that he had absolutely

no resources there at all, period.

>> What do you mean by resources? Neither political power nor

financial resources—he had nothing.

Well, it's a pity, just a pity. In Georgia he

really, of course, there was Kakha...

>> They've brought it to you. You don't need more? Aren't you

cold, huh?

>> May I? Yes, ask for some more. No, I just

drank it. Please ask for more tea.

>> Tell them to bring Alexei some more tea.

All right.

on the inside spread, called up

car experts, and Igor Vasilyev

throughout... that you're really... because

I'm looking at your eye, and of course I can see

that it, well,

>> it's a different shape too

>> and it's more yellow; if you look at the white of the eye

what is it properly called?

>> it's just not the same—not, not, not, not opaque

well, I mean, I see much better with it

>> but necrosis isn't forming there after all

>> well, no, I mean, something is forming; you need

to keep putting drops in all the time, a lot of hassle with this

eye. I mean, all the time—you know, it's

the sensation of a foreign body, the feeling of sand

in the eye. That's exactly what it is, and what it's supposed to be. It

is there all the time. It's annoying, to be honest.

>> Well, look, you still managed without glasses.

>> Well, I was prescribed glasses, I have them.

I just don't wear them.

>> Right. But they said then that you would

feel dizzy.

>> Yes. Well, everything would have gone according to the good

scenario. Everything has stabilized.

>> Alexei, there's some wood over there. Knock on it,

please.

Uncut. This is the main thing, uncut, on the website

of Echo of Moscow.

>> Echo of Moscow: direct and feedback connection.

>> Attention to the guests in our studio

discussion of the most important topics in the program

Ricochet. Engineering contests and games live on air

in Moscow.

Active, super-active, interactive

radio.

Full...

>> Once again, good evening. It's 20:35 here in the

studio. Today I have one guest,

Alexei Navalny. And I'm asking him all sorts of

questions, including about

his latest interviews, which

stirred up the whole world, where he said

that, uh, he had a fifty-percent chance of

being killed. It turns out that was a

joke. And about many other things, and about his

election campaign. Alexei, now

if we may, let's turn to the results

of the spring-summer political season for

the opposition, yes. In July, everyone is just

sort of summing up what happened

in spring and summer. How do you assess

the situation in the opposition right now?

>> I don't really understand what 'the situation in

the opposition' means. There are various

structures. I

>> and my colleagues, my associates, our штаб (campaign headquarters),

many people with us, volunteers. We

are engaged in an election campaign.

Our election campaign has been going on for 8

months, of which I spent one and a half

under arrest. But nevertheless it is going on, and

we are satisfied, satisfied with how it is progressing.

We are managing both to organize

rallies, and we have many volunteers, and

we are raising money. Despite

the enormous pressure, which is increasing, we

are continuing to grow. Most importantly, we

see people's desire to work. We see

people's desire, uh, to make change or

to achieve change. We see that this

sense of hopelessness that

you encounter in the regions has become, uh,

has turned from depression into a kind of

political driving force. People understand

that there is no future under this regime, and they

want change. They want those in power

to change there at least once over those 18 years,

to have changed at least once. That is why we are very

satisfied, and I am satisfied with

the way our campaign is going. Speaking about

the opposition in general: well, some people think

that, for example, one should boycott

elections. They do not like what I am doing. But

it seemed to me that March 26 became

such a surprise for many people,

a shock, much like December 10, 2011,

at Bolotnaya (the major Moscow protest on Bolotnaya Square), when suddenly such a

large number of young people, and people,

35 and older, and so on, came out in more than

70 cities across Russia. It was unexpected

for everyone.

>> Not for me. Not for me. Not for our

headquarters. No, because we simply

work with the entire country. And so,

since we entered the field a long time ago and

were never part exclusively of

that sort of Facebook-based life, we saw these

groups on VKontakte (a Russian social network), how people

were joining them, we saw

the number of video views, we saw

real requests that people were sending from

the regions, even from small towns,

asking to be referred to our lawyers for

consultation. So we understood perfectly well

that all of this was going to happen.

The scale of it was somewhat larger than

we had expected. And later, on June 12, it was

a pleasant surprise for us that

the geography of the protests had expanded even

a little more than we had anticipated. But

it did not come as a surprise to us.

Of course, we worked toward this, we knew

it would happen, and in that sense we were not acting

at random. We did not just call for it and then

end up being surprised ourselves by how well

it turned out. We are, after all, people from

real life. And my trips to

our headquarters, the opening of headquarters, they

immerse us in what is happening in

the regions. We understand very well what

is going on.

>> Do you maintain any relations with PARNAS and Solidarnost?

>> Well, I do with Solidarnost. Yashin

is running an excellent campaign right now,

for example in the Krasnoselsky District. He

is there, yes, in Moscow, in the

municipal elections. And I really

like the fact that his is specifically a

political campaign. That is, this

campaign is, of course, also about the local

agenda, but it has an entirely political

orientation. He is acting against this

government, against the corrupt authorities

in that particular district. And in conducting his

campaigning, that is exactly what he says. So we

support, well, certain people in

the regions who are running in elections. Well,

our candidates, however, are not being allowed onto the ballot in

Novosibirsk. There was such a case.

>> Are you avoiding mentioning Dmitry Gudkov?

Why? Am I avoiding Dmitry Gudkov?

Because he is engaged in a mayoral

campaign,

which is still quite a long way off. That is

the first point. And second, I really do not

like, and I consider extremely harmful and

wrong, this political

alliance of his with Yabloko (a liberal Russian political party), and this

absolutely rotten political practice whereby

Yabloko nominates

candidates but makes them sign

some paper saying that they will vote and

act in accordance with

the party's decisions. This is a kind of political

enslavement of politics,

>> what happened in the

>> this is what is happening right now in the

municipal elections. Therefore, and besides that,

I categorically dislike,

for example, those same actions, because

since we mentioned Yashin, Yabloko

together with Gudkov is putting forward a slate. Well,

I think that, of course, Gudkov was not

personally involved in this, but against Yashin's

candidates in every district they put up

two people each. Well, this is absolutely

spoiler work for the mayor's office, but this

may be an excess, a one-off. And,

probably, I do not think that

Yavlinsky personally wants to, well,

harm Ilya. Though, who knows. But

the very idea of binding candidates in this way is something I do not

like at all. And I would like

Gudkov, whom I like,

well, not to take part in this. In

municipal elections, people can run as

independent candidates. One absolutely must

protest against the practice whereby

some party sets conditions on

a candidate's future political activity

in exchange for support, as in: 'our party plenum

has decided this, so later you will

vote that way in your municipal

assembly.' That is categorically unacceptable.

>> Listen, well, you were in Yabloko, you now

know what Yavlinsky is like, you know,

and that is exactly why I am now firmly

protesting. I believe this is completely wrong,

entirely wrong, but again this is

a form of bondage. They are being allowed to keep

Yabloko's license, and they are doing this

The Kremlin, for example, does not give us a license,

but gives one to them precisely in exchange for the fact that

>> You mean registration?

>> The registration of the Progress Party, in exchange for

the fact that Yabloko and, unfortunately,

Gudkov, having entered into a coalition with them,

are trying to restrict the freedom of political

activity of future deputies. Dangerous,

an unpleasant, unacceptable thing. Besides,

it will also lead to, well, to

defeat. It will lead to

worse results. That is very

bad.

>> Have you discussed this with Gudkov directly

?

>> I haven't discussed it directly with Gudkov,

but right now I am focused on

the federal campaign.

For understandable reasons, he has to

support Yavlinsky in the presidential

election. He supports him in

the municipal campaign, and Yavlinsky supports

him in the presidential race. And it's a, well,

wonderful tandem, but for obvious

reasons it does not suit me. I would

like Gudkov to support me

directly in the presidential election. I would

like Yabloko to support me directly

in the presidential election. I believe that

I can and will fight for the support of

all representatives of the democratic forces,

the democratic parties. Well, despite

the fact that, naturally, there are some

frictions, disagreements over programs. In

general, I will fight to

be the single candidate for everyone, including

the democrats. Their line is going a little

in a different direction. They want

to support Grigory Alexeyevich (Grigory Yavlinsky). Well,

that means I will appeal

directly to the people, to the party

members. I will argue that this is

wrong. But that is what

political struggle is. I take it

calmly.

>> Well, I remember very well when there was

the famous rally on Sakharov Avenue (in Moscow) in February

2012, and

you were standing behind the stage, and I

watched as Grigory

Alexeyevich Yavlinsky went up there. You shook

hands, and Grigory Alexeyevich

said something harmless. It all

somehow made it clear that you were very

pleased that you had managed

to reconcile with Yavlinsky. And

>> I'll say this: we met

right before the federal

State Duma elections and had a very good

conversation, and apologized to each other

for various things that

we had said about one another. I have

a very good opinion of him. He is a wonderful,

talented politician, but that does not mean

that I will not compete with him for

the leading position. I am competing with him.

I consider his tactics wrong,

mistaken, and I will say so openly

despite the fact that I

think well of him.

>> Okay, that's clear. What about Kasyanov

and PARNAS?

>> Kasyanov and PARNAS exist, and are engaged in

their own kind of political

activity.

>> So you no longer keep in touch

after the coalition fell apart? So,

we kept in touch before as well. I mean,

hello, hello. How are

you? Is everything going well?

>> Well, just a second. Alexei Anatolyevich, don't

be disingenuous,

>> Really? Zhenya, what does it mean to keep

in touch? I am engaged in day-to-day

work. I do not want to be the kind of

candidate we have seen in recent

Russian history, who

constantly hold various roundtables,

meetings, try to organize

some congress of democrats. Do you want

me to go somewhere, to the city of

Perm, and speak there to volunteers

or organize a democratic roundtable in Moscow

? I'd rather travel around

the regions, work with committees and everything else. I am

not interested in that. There are concrete things to do.

Take Roizman: he was running in the election, running from

Yabloko, whose current political approach is not close to me, but

we

were planning to actively support

Roizman in the campaign. He is removed from the ballot, and we

protest against it and call for

a boycott of the elections in Sverdlovsk

Region. That's concrete. There is something

to discuss there, but just sitting with rather

pleasant people, just sitting there and

holding meetings and listening to speeches—well,

that does not interest me at all. It simply does not

interest me.

>> Fair enough. But admit it, Alyosha, you and I both

remember very well how endlessly

Yabloko and SPS (Union of Right Forces) fought, then Yabloko and

Right Cause. And it already seemed, well,

completely absurd. And the youth, so to speak,

wings of these parties were constantly

fighting each other too.

>> That is exactly why I am no longer interested in it.

That is why when you ask me

a question about Yabloko, and you say, you

say, so to speak,

that you are not ready to support Gudkov, and so on.

>> It simply shows that you

are still captive to the old

democratic disputes of ours, like many people. I

also follow this process, I

understand that what is happening, unfortunately,

in the liberal camp, from a

political point of view, has no

significance. Having traveled around the country, opened

70 campaign offices, having coordinators in all

regions and a huge number of

volunteers, I can say firmly that this has no

political significance whatsoever. Nevertheless,

I follow it, I know what is going on

there, but the fact that you even asked me

this question. I needed a couple of

a few seconds to think, because I haven’t even

formed my own view on all

of this. I’m not interested in what

Yabloko or PARNAS are doing. Yabloko got

less than 2% in the election, despite

receiving colossal state budget

funding—hundreds of millions of rubles.

The same thing happened to PARNAS. They’re

nice people. I like them very much. In terms of

my political origins, I

come from that milieu. But I’m running a real

election campaign with a large

number of people. I’m not going to

get involved in some kind of squabbling in the struggle

for this so-called liberal electorate.

How much could I get within it—

3 or 4%? In Russia, unfortunately,

politics works in such a

way that people don’t box themselves into these

ideological frameworks. And in that

sense, we have this kind of

political chaos. I’m simply a normal

candidate for normal people who

are offering a sensible and logical

program. That’s what I’m focused on. And I

absolutely—ask me, and I’ll

answer—but I’m not going to spend energy on

some democrats or liberals, who

among them is more democratic, who is less

democratic, who should be

supported, and who liked what where. Well,

I won’t lie—I do follow it. Sometimes I follow it and

read unpleasant posts, but I understand

that none of it matters

at all. I apologize for

repeating myself all the time—I’ve traveled around

the regions and so on, but in every

campaign office opening, I answer any

questions I’m asked, and no one asks me

about this at all. They don’t ask me

about Yabloko, or PARNAS, or

Khodorkovsky, or any of these people,

who are very dear and close to me. But people

simply don’t have that on their minds.

>> So what do they ask about? They ask,

they ask about corruption, they ask about

the low standard of living, they ask,

naturally, what we should do about

these judges and police officers. Everywhere

they ask about lustration. Everywhere. It’s

about lustration that they ask everywhere. Everywhere

everywhere, they ask. About

>> Do they actually use the word “lustration,” or

how do they put it?

>> They do use the word “lustration,” and they understand quite

well how lustration differs

from simply criminal

prosecution of people. In absolutely every

region now, people ask about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church

and about these, uh, repressive

actions against atheists. Well, obviously,

it’s a younger audience.

>> What do you say in response? You’re a deeply religious

person, aren’t you?

>> I am a believer, but I think that as

a religious person, I absolutely cannot

support what is happening

now, when some part of the Russian Orthodox Church has taken

it upon itself to direct the Investigative

Committee and push for criminal

prosecution of people because

they didn’t like something. Today there was some

monstrous court ruling, I think in

Sochi, about a person who posted

a caricature of Jesus Christ, and for that

posted it,

and for that he was fined or otherwise

held administratively

liable in some other way. It’s

absurd, monstrous, and contrary

to Christianity itself, I’m absolutely sure of that.

That’s exactly what I’m talking about. That’s what

people ask about. They also ask about

the governor, they ask what’s happening with

the Far East, they ask about

demographics. And no one asks about

the unification of the democrats. No one. It

doesn’t interest anyone outside

our little circle.

>> And what about Putin—do they ask about him?

>> Of course they do. They ask. What I’m asked

most often—my, uh, well-known

position is that if he

agrees to a peaceful transition, he should be given

security guarantees. That position of mine

is disliked by many people. By very many,

even by my supporters, yes—they

criticize me very strongly for it. So

I have to answer questions about it. They

think that, well, everyone should

be jailed. I mean, that Putin

is directly responsible

for everything that is happening—which is absolutely true,

that Putin personally bears responsibility for

crime, corruption, and the unjust imprisonment of

people. That is absolutely true. And that

Putin should therefore go to

prison for it, or somehow be shot on

Lobnoye Mesto (the historic execution platform on Red Square). And a large number of

people think that and insist on it. For them,

it’s a key point of the program. Well, I

say that for the sake of a peaceful transfer of

power, and for the country’s interests as a whole,

we need to forget about that kind of sweet

revenge. I have personal reasons too, including

ones connected with my family,

for why I feel, well,

a great deal of personal negative

emotion toward these people. But for the sake of

the country’s interests in general, for the sake of

a peaceful transition, well, we need to

swallow our pride and agree

that he personally and his family should be given

security guarantees. This should not

extend to people like Medvedev and

the Rotenbergs. But Putin—yes, many people

don’t like that. There is a constant

debate about it. Constantly, of course.

There’s a discussion going on, one that’s been, well, somewhat

imposed by the Kremlin, about the idea that, basically,

if not Putin, then who? Without Putin, everything

will fall apart. And what will happen to the North

Caucasus? How can things go on without Ramzan Kadyrov?

Will war break out there too? Well, I’m telling you,

nothing will happen. There was Said Amirov,

the mayor of Makhachkala, and people said the same thing

about him: if anything happened to him,

war would start, Dagestan would rise up, and in

Makhachkala tanks would be rolling through the streets and firing.

But he got a life sentence, and

nothing happened. Nothing will happen

if Ramzan Kadyrov is gone tomorrow.

He can easily be replaced by another

equally authoritative Chechen. These questions

are very interesting to everyone, and people discuss all this

with great enthusiasm. This is the real

agenda of the country, I repeat, but definitely not

the unification of democrats. And I’m not going to

— the moment talk turns to the unification

of democrats, I immediately turn around and

go in some other direction. Because

the unification of democrats can only

happen through elections and through

primaries. I’m ready to take part in

debates, I’m ready to take part in primaries,

I’m ready to win those primaries. That’s how

the unification of democrats can happen,

not through roundtables or endless

discussion. But returning to your

meetings at campaign offices with volunteers, what

interests people more: the local agenda or

the federal agenda?

>> The federal agenda.

>> The federal agenda.

>> To a greater extent, of course, federal issues

are what people care about,

>> even though we know that all

politics is local, that all politics

is always local.

>> Ah, yes, of course. And every time,

of course, people ask: "Will there be

an investigation into our governor?"

"What do you think about the mayor?" I always prepare

and talk about some local

corruption as well. People always respond

very well to that. But everyone also has a very clear

understanding that the cause of poverty,

injustice,

and the inequality we see — and, frankly,

the extremely low

wages, which really are

shockingly low — all of that is, of course,

the Kremlin. It’s a group of people that has

clung to power, stayed there for 18 years, and

bent

the law enforcement system and the judicial

system to its own interests, won’t let anyone make a move, and

won’t let the country develop. In other words,

it’s a direct link: poverty

equals Putin. Many people already understand that. And I’ll just

say one brief thing on this subject. Many people believe,

as you were saying when you mentioned

sociological data, that

our volunteers, our support groups, our supporters

are the most educated

and the most well-off.

But the people who come to us, even if they are

the most well-off in their regions,

with salaries of 20,000, 18,000, and

15,000 rubles a month (about $160, $145, and $120),

I can hardly imagine who all the

others are. So the appalling poverty

of the majority of Russia’s residents is

really now the main

cause of political discontent. That’s what it is.

>> I see. Thank you. But you understand perfectly well

that you need the support

of the elite. There’s no other option. Yes, precisely

for a peaceful transition, because all the research

on authoritarian regimes shows that

you have to enter into some kind of alliance with

part

of the old elite. Has anyone

reached out to you, is anyone trying

to talk to you?

>> How do you imagine this? If someone

has reached out, am I supposed to tell you now that

such-and-such people, you know,

are making contact, and tomorrow we’ll be watching

show trials against them?

And that would mean

>> All right, never mind. I’m not asking you

to name names openly.

>> I would say that a huge number of

people in the elite want change, and they are

looking in our direction, waiting. But

the elites, especially in Russia right now, are

incredibly cowardly. They’re waiting for the moment

to betray Putin, and with great

pleasure — I’d even say

with relish — they will betray him at some

point. But right now they’re simply afraid.

They’re sitting there weighing their options. As soon as they

As soon as they sense that

weakness, that tremor, like there was in

2012, they’ll immediately start defecting in droves

to the other side — to me and to

various other opposition figures. So

when you meet with any

officials — and I’m sure you’ve made the same

observation I have — the

higher-ranking the official,

the more he curses this government, the more

he talks about how monstrous it is,

how ineffective it is, how impossible it is to work,

what a horror, a nightmare, a complete mess.

That’s what they say is happening in the country. Yes, that’s how they

>> And how do you manage to meet with them

if you’re under constant surveillance?

>> I meet them in the corridors of Moscow,

that’s the only place. Well, Zhenya, I understand

that I’m under constant

surveillance. And in order to receive

some opinions or

messages or anything else, I don’t

necessarily have to meet with anyone. Besides

Besides, I'm not alone. Quite a lot of

people support me in various, uh,

areas of activity, how should I put it, in

different social strata, including

those so-called elites you love to talk about. But I

am not seeking out any meetings myself. Why would I

need that? I already know what they think.

And I don't need it. I don't want to sit down with anyone

and haggle there, and some kind of

liberal Kremlin tower, non-liberal Kremlin tower

(a reference to factions within the Kremlin), and negotiate with them about anything.

What's the point of that? There is none.

>> Well, you'll have to anyway, Alyosha. You will have

to somehow do it. I just don't

seek out such meetings. Especially since, well,

I understand perfectly well that, first of all, for them to meet with

me right now is

unsafe. That's the first thing. And second, well, I

have many other things to do. All these

elites will switch sides when the

political situation changes. My task

is to work toward changing the political

situation, to the best of my ability.

>> Okay. And, uh,

FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) is constantly, so to speak, launching some kind of

investigations. As I understand it, they

are not going to stop. What should we

expect in the near future? Well

>> I was expecting that you would say, well, you've been

asked: "Who are you meeting with?

Tell me, then, a few

names." And now I am supposed to

launch investigations against those people, and

I would literally physically

feel them running off

somewhere to shut down their Cypriot

offshores. No, of course I can't

share that kind of information.

>> All right. Well, I agree with you there. That was a

stupid question, I admit it. And what about

the equipment that was taken from you on, uh, March 12, 26

?

>> Well, it's somewhere, somewhere in the

secret basements of the FSB (Russia's Federal Security Service). We know, well, it's not

just that nothing was returned; we knew that

the equipment was seized by the FSB, but all

our complaints to the courts were thrown out on

the grounds that we don't even know

who we are complaining about. So what happened

was that unidentified men in plain clothes

walked in, without the slightest concern about the cameras, and carried out

absolutely all the equipment, while the police,

the courts, and everyone else say: "We don't even

know who they were. Well, if you

want to appeal the actions of these people,

you tell us his surname, his

position, what unit he belongs to."

>> File a theft report.

>> We filed a theft report, and it has gone

nowhere. I mean, this isn't even

theft. Theft is the secret taking of

property. This was robbery,

because it was the open taking of

property. Fortunately, our

supporters, and simply the broader

public, really felt the weight of this

situation. Back then, within two

days, uh, and I may be off here,

we received, I think, about 12 million rubles (roughly US$200,000 at the time)

in donations, and we bought everything again.

>> Wonderful. And what are your plans for the fall? Well,

after all, are we

>> We will be expanding our election

campaign. Will there be some kind of—will you again

hold some kind of nationwide

action like there was on June 12?

>> There is no specific date, but of course we

will be using the rally format

very actively. That is, it's not that we

will do it mechanically, like,

once every two months we hold a big

rally, but of course rallies are an

extremely important thing. People want to hold

these rallies; they may turn out more

successful or less successful, but we will work in

completely different formats.

For example, in Moscow we understand perfectly well

that we will never again be given permits.

And right now, holding rallies in

Moscow automatically, 100 percent,

means an unauthorized rally. Well,

that too is entirely acceptable and right,

and we will do it. But here too

you have to understand how to organize it,

at least from the standpoint of

tactical work.

>> Okay, good luck to you. And unfortunately, we

have to go off the air. Thank you very

much. Here in the Echo of Moscow studio was

Alexei Navalny. And we will see you

again in a week. Bye.

>> Full Albats.

>> I will. It's just that sometimes you start

repeating yourself, and I don't even quite know

how to tell you.

>> Then just literally hold up a sign for me:

You're repeating yourself, saying the same

thing over and over. I know that's a fault of mine. I

start saying the same thing over and over—

children's playground.

>> Is Grisha really going to run again?

Can you imagine?

I mean, what? Did you fall from the moon

or something? I mean, if he wants to, how could he not?

>> That's the life of a politician.

>> He wants to. A politician is always convinced that he is

basically the best. If he wants to, he'll run.

>> Well, I remember that amazing

scene. Remember

the exit.

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