will threaten Russians.
>> He’s just like that. Ah, I mean, he’s
short. Yes, that’s true.
State Duma deputies as early as next week
on wheels is better,
>> that I’ll be able to leave on wheels. We’re already on
YouTube.
>> I believe we’re already on YouTube. Yes. Hello
everyone in the first reading. We believe
it is right to discuss this issue. And our
>> the voice of the person who said that
Putin is our only national treasure.
>> Did you hear that? Volodya, well of course, lis-
in the SVO program (the Russian government’s term for the war in Ukraine), if suddenly someone
gets hurt
liability has been increased to up to 7 years
Kiselyov too—the main thing is Putin’s...
Putin’s loss because of a person’s negligence
because they violate an order.
It’s not that everything is fine, it’s just that I had
a low... intent.
>> Right, like during an interrogation. Only
you need a lamp, need a lamp. A lower chair, lamp in the
face. We’re already going. That’s it. And the lamp in the face
for him too? Lamp in the face—there are three of me here.
>> Well, of course the questions won’t be easy,
but how else could it be?
>> Very good. I just love all difficult
questions. I’ll remember—you’re on YouTube without
a break. I understand, yes. And I even know a question for the
break. Yes
>> not only simple snacks, but even
signature dishes. According to statistics from
the Yandex.Eda service, the number of establishments
that joined over the past month
has tripled. This trend is especially
clear in the capitals. Moscow and
the surrounding region accounted for 30% growth,
St. Petersburg for 15%, and Yekaterinburg added 8%.
The total number now
of restaurants offering dishes with
delivery is 16,000. About the same number
of partners is also listed in the Delivery
Club network. Among the newcomers there is also a prestigious
fine-dining establishment with an international
reputation.
>> What do you think he’ll announce?
I’m sure he’ll announce the postponement of the
vote. Ninety percent of it will be about the need
to unite.
>> Well, yes,
>> that hard times are coming. Take our situation into account
Well, and they’ll say that we must
all together take, undertake safety
measures, quarantine, our older
generation. But I don’t think he’ll announce
anything extraordinary.
Rather, right now the task is simply
to make up for what they failed to do,
because they really did fairly
little, especially since something was happening in Moscow,
while the entire rest of the
country...
and doused [him] with something resembling sour
milk. He himself wrote about it on
Twitter.
>> Yes, we can see it with our own eyes
>> a person, and the studio in the next
room says that he himself wrote about it on
Twitter, although now your entire corridor is covered in flour
.
>> That’s true.
>> The euro is 84 rubles 15 kopecks. In Moscow now
tomorrow you’ll bring me tea, asked
the Echo of Moscow news service.
>> Watch the live broadcast of this program on
>> our YouTube channel and on Yandex.Efir.
>> Thank you very much.
>> Yegor Zhukov.
Conditionally Yours is on the air.
>> Good afternoon. This is the program Conditionally Yours.
My name is Yegor Zhukov, and today my
guest, also, I suppose, conditionally yours,
Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny.
Hello, Alexei.
>> Good afternoon.
>> Tell us, for quite a while now, conditionally with
you happened. Ah, yes, well, actually
nothing all that terrible, fairly
standard. Lately, for some time now,
regularly near the entrance, near my home, when
I’m going to work, there are constantly some
groups of crazy people lying in wait for me,
a couple of whom shout something in
my face and walk with me like that to work,
while one films it on camera. And today they
were there too, but today they decided to douse
me with milk and cover me
in flour. And now this flour is simply
covering the corridor of Echo of Moscow, because
I was shaking it off here for a very long time.
>> Well yes, basically, there’s nothing, nothing except
condemnation for such people that we, of course,
can say. Though, probably,
they probably have no other methods of struggle.
>> These are, essentially, the very same
people who splashed
brilliant green antiseptic on me, and against whom they tried
to open a criminal case. And the Moscow police
told us it was impossible to find them.
And yet here they are, though they are always, as it
usually happens, yes. Ah, Alexei, before
I start asking you questions,
I would actually first like to
sincerely thank you, really,
because it was precisely the release of the film *He Is Not Dimon to You*
that personally became the Rubicon for me,
after which I definitively decided that I would
go into politics in Russia. I’m sure I’m
not the only one like that. So without exaggeration
one can say that you laid the foundation
single-handedly for a kind of new protest era
in Russia. So for that, my sincere
thanks to you.
>> Thank you very much. I just want to
correct you, of course—not single-handedly. It was
after all the Anti-Corruption Foundation and
the film *He Is Not Dimon to You* is the product of the work
a large group of amazing people, uh,
people who work with me.
And in fact, they often make
a bigger contribution than I do, while I just sit
in front of the camera and wave my hands around. So
thank you very much. Basically, I
take your compliment and
gratitude as a compliment and
thanks to our entire team.
Thank you.
>> Yes, yes. Still, I’d like today’s broadcast
to be framed somewhat in
a critical tone, because it seems to me
that,
>> I figured as much when you started,
but may I ask you something first?
>> Ah, that’s the Pozner technique, because
Pozner (a well-known Russian TV interviewer) has already been here. I had only just
started asking him something during
the break when he said, "How did you
get here?" That’s learning from the masters. I’m
just incredibly glad that I happened to be on air
today in particular, despite the fact that I got
covered in flour here. And that’s because yesterday
Zharov from Roskomnadzor (Russia’s federal media and communications regulator) became
the head of Gazprom-Media, that is, the
organization that owns Echo of Moscow.
I really want to be the first person
on the air at Echo of Moscow to call
Zharov a crook—which I certainly do consider him to be.
I’m just interested in
your opinion. So what do you think
about that? Alexei, how about I become
the second person on the air at Echo of Moscow
to call Zharov a crook.
>> I’ll close the door now so Venediktov
can’t burst in here.
>> Well, that’s our shared opinion. We should
make clear that it is our opinion. But I more or less
agree with you. Very nice. So, the first
question I want to ask is about rallies. And,
if you don’t mind, I’ll read out a short
list.
>> Go ahead.
>> The rallies on March 26 and June 12. Goal:
to force the authorities to launch an investigation
against Medvedev. The goal was not achieved.
The rally on October 7. Goal: to force the authorities
to release you from
administrative detention. The goal was not
achieved. The rally on January 28. Goal:
to popularize the election boycott. The goal was not
achieved. Turnout was quite normal.
The rally on May 5. Goal: Putin’s resignation. The goal
was not achieved. The rally on September 9. Goal:
the cancellation of the pension reform. Goal: not
achieved. The rally on July 27. Goal:
the registration of independent candidates in
the Moscow City Duma elections. The goal was not achieved. All
these rallies are essentially what are called
"shout a bit and
go home" rallies, where you, Alexei, give
people a place where they are supposed to
gather, but do not give them a clear
strategy for action. And as a result, not a single
goal that you yourself set for these
rallies is achieved—which, basically,
could have been assumed from the start,
because without a strategy for action, people
can’t do anything. There is a
quote that is, admittedly, mistakenly
attributed to Einstein, and it goes
like this: "Insanity is doing the same thing
over and over again and expecting change."
So why hold rallies again and again
without giving people any
strategy, if it is obvious that in the end
the goals of the rally will not be achieved without
a strategy?" And I would perhaps even
expand the list you just
read out and say that for 20 years we have been trying
to build democracy in Russia, and the goal has not
been achieved. For 20 years, everyone—now,
just a second—but still, the goal of
the Echo of Moscow radio station to achieve freedom
of speech in Russia has not been achieved. The goal of any
opposition movement—to achieve
a rotation of power—has not been achieved. And,
of course, over the last
20 years we have seen the failure of everyone’s attempts
including mine, and perhaps I bear
more responsibility for that
than anyone else. And yet
positive change, positive
change in Russia is not happening. And
all of these goals have not been achieved. Here I can
say that my attitude toward all this is not
that of a political technologist, but rather
a political one. I simply believe in certain
things. If I believe something is right, and
after our investigation "He Is Not Dimon to You"
we publish it and there is no
reaction at all, I tell everyone: "Guys,
let’s go out into the streets, and if no one
comes, I’ll go out alone, because I simply
believe in it, because I think it is
the right thing to do. I’m not a naive person,
I understand that if this government has
everything—from judges to prisons and police—
then Medvedev is probably not going to come running
because of me or because of our rally of even
50,000 people or 100,000 people,
in a panic. But I believe in it—let me finish.
And that is why I do it. And
rallies are part of the work. I
head an organization called
the Anti-Corruption Foundation.
The goal of defeating corruption in Russia
has not been achieved. Does that mean that I
should—I'm speaking specifically about rallies. And
note that I never told you that
you shouldn’t organize rallies. I myself attended
almost all of your rallies. And I’m
very glad they happened at all.
The issue is that rallies without strategies,
without some kind of
>> rally strategy.
>> You simply tell people:
"Just go out to the square, and that's it."
>> Well, you could at least offer them
some kind of list of actions, some kind of plan,
Yegor,
>> but just holding a rally, it seems to me, is
the second one after *Don't Call Him Dimon* (Navalny's anti-corruption investigation), or maybe
after *He Is Not Dimon to You* / *He Is Not Our Tsar* (major protest slogans/campaigns), I don't remember, one of those rallies already
was held after the investigations came out. And I
talk about it, and then
several people show up and start writing to me
in the comments: "Campaign: Flowers for
the Police." And they add hashtags: January 28
They keep posting hashtags. I don't
understand what this is. Let me finish
properly. Great. So right now
I'm telling radio listeners about this. And I find out
that there's this young man named
Yegor Zhukov, who said that we should
organize a "Flowers for the Police" campaign and give
flowers to police officers. And maybe that's
a good action, in your view. But
I do what I believe in. If I know for sure
that if I tell everyone, "Guys,
there's this great idea. It's described in
Gene Sharp's book, which of course I have
read."
>> I wanted to give it to you today,
Alexei. But if you've already read it, then
great.
>> Listen, do you know who gave it to me?
>> Yashin,
>> of course. Oh, he was here in the studio. He
published it in 2005. Back then he was fascinated by
that book. Everyone was fascinated by it, and
I was too, to some extent. So anyway,
if I say, January 28—what year was it? 2018
Yes, 2018.
>> January 28, 2018—guys, let's
collect a million scarlet roses for
the police and give them out. Well, I
just don't believe in that myself. First of all,
I don't think people would
support it. But that's not the point. The point
is that in that same excellent
Gene Sharp book, there are 198 methods
involving state infrastructure, where,
for example, 1,000 people come to city hall
and simply all sit down there, and so on.
Without a plan of action, rallies of this kind
do not achieve their goals. And we've already seen this
from empirical experience. Not a single one of
the goals was achieved. Alexei, so
what was the net result? In the end,
what we got, first of all, was total demoralization
because, well, morale just drops.
If we had given flowers
to the police,
>> given flowers to the police.
Blocking highways. Blocking highways. You
could have—take the blogger Kamikadze D, for example,
he talks about this all the time, right? You
tell people where to gather, but you don't give them
a strategy, and in the end some people end up in
prison. By the way, I don't blame you for that in
the slightest. The repressive regime is to blame.
I'm just saying that what remains in
the end is only declining morale and people in
prison, while the goals are not achieved because
there is no strategy of action.
>> Well, that has nothing to do with
strategy. I do not have the
moral right, uh, to openly call for things
like that. "Let's block
the highway." What I do say, of course, is that
we have—because we do have—a
basic constitutional right to assemble
peacefully and without weapons. I tell everyone that
we don't care what Moscow City Hall
says. And I always go out myself. I never
file applications for Sakharov Avenue or anywhere
else. I say, "We'll go out on
Tverskaya." And I go out on Tverskaya myself. But
to tell people, "Come on, let's
gather and block the roads," I simply
know that the next day everyone in
all our campaign offices would be arrested
immediately. I simply do not have the
moral right. That's exactly what this is
about. Look, Alexei, it's foolish to deny
that you are one of the very few people in Russia
who truly takes on
political responsibility. Yes, and for
that you deserve the deepest
gratitude. And that is also why you are
called the leader of the opposition in
Russia. It's absolutely obvious. It
would be silly to deny it. At the same time, of course,
you're not some kind of superhuman; you also
have a family, and I wouldn't demand from you
things that, yes, I couldn't
demand from myself. But the point is
that a rally is not the kind of form of protest
that you can simply
use up. Because if you don't, well,
carry it through to the end, then in the final analysis,
as I said, what we're left with is declining
morale and people in prison.
I'm not calling for anything here, let me
make that clear now.
>> See, that's what's interesting. I don't, I
don't—but politically, you are the leader
of the opposition, Alexei. I don't even organize rallies,
but you do. You tell people, you name
the place where they need to
gather, you don't give them a strategy, and
in the end nothing comes of it, because
look at how it appears. You
are ready to do 30 days in jail, yes, but to bear
greater responsibility—not so much. And this
is not a reproach. Again, it is not.
Strategy. Look, let me
try to explain it differently. I understand what
you mean—please understand me too.
A rally is not a strategy, and a rally
is not an end in itself. Of course, I
believe that in the current situation, power
will not change hands as a result of elections. And
the most important part of the strategy is
holding rallies. And the key thing in them
is the number of people. Not some
political-technique or political-strategy
trick. Like, let's block a road here or
give flowers to the police. It's simply
about the number of people. So what is it that we
should be fighting for? For the number of people and
their willingness to stay out on the streets for as
long as possible. But rallies are only part
of the strategy. Overall, the strategy is
to create a crisis for this
government. And my strategy, in 2011,
was that I called on
everyone to vote for any party against
United Russia. In the end, that
led to rallies, because they
falsified the election, and the response was
mass protests. But after that, the task was simply
to gather these large rallies. A rally is
not some special thing that, well,
you see, it's like LEGO. You can build one thing out of
it, or you can build
something else. It's simply a political
response from society. We need to, we must
create the pressure of society. Right now
my strategy is that we
use legal mechanisms. One of the
strategies is Smart Voting, in order
to create a crisis both in the elections in
Moscow and in regional elections.
>> Alexei, we'll come back to that in a moment.
You talk about numbers, but if
simply, I don't know, even 60,000 people
come out, but they don't know what
to do. They'll come out and face police batons, they'll be
detained, and
>> they don't need to do anything there, they need
to stay on the street. So,
>> so it's an open-ended protest, right?
>> Well, of course. All right, but that's also
a certain form of rally, isn't it? You're not
telling people, for example, from the very
beginning: "Go out there and stay
there."
>> Just listen to me again. I am
a responsible person, a person from
real life. And I understand very
well that as soon as I, basically,
call people to a rally, I get arrested
and released a month later. And if I
come out and say: "Guys, we're going to a
rally, and it's going to be open-ended." That
will lead to what I already said:
my entire
infrastructure will be arrested, and other political
parties will do—will end up doing
absolutely nothing. And, unfortunately,
the wonderful people at Moscow radio stations,
they can't directly call for it either.
They say: "Well, Navalny has been locked up,
his headquarters have all been shut down too. No one
can say it out loud, so let's
not do anything." But there is no,
you see, some kind of
special word or special format
or anything else that will turn
a rally of 20,000 people or 60,000
people, in the current situation in Moscow, into
a giant rally of 200,000 people. We
all have to work together, all politicians,
to gather rallies of
200,000 people. Because Moscow is a city
where 15 million people live. And my failure,
if you want to talk about my failure,
then it is not that I
somehow conduct rallies incorrectly, but that
so far I have not been able to gather
a rally of 200,000 people.
>> Well, 200,000 will come, and then they'll go home
afterward, and that's it.
>> So 200,000 come out. I understand you. All right.
Okay. Then just to wrap up this topic,
for yourself overall, have you ever
considered those very forms
of protest, thought them through? Have you thought
about whether they can be applied—namely,
blocking highways altogether? I mean,
>> Since 2005, when Yashin published the book
by your beloved Gene Sharp, throughout 2005
he kept coming around me saying, kept saying,
"Let's do some of these things."
But again, real life is real; in that book
there's a great idea written there,
for example: let's hold strikes,
sure, let's do it. And our Anti-Corruption Foundation
and, more broadly, our network of headquarters
actively help trade unions—for example,
helping the doctors' union organize strikes.
Do you know what the most common request from
the doctors' union is for me right now? "Get us a
lawyer." Yesterday the criminal investigation unit came to
the union leader. Here our people were jailed,
there they were jailed. So, yes, it sounds
very good, and we do it. And,
probably the first such political,
you could say, strike in recent
years was in Nizhny Novgorod,
organized by a union with our
informational support. But one thing is written in a book,
and another happens in practice: when this
strike begins, they immediately send in
the National Guard (Rosgvardiya),
>> meaning the conditions just don't exist yet for
that to happen. Well, overall that's what
>> I'm simply saying that the book,
it's a good book, but it was written in 1993,
and it's a set of great recommendations. Not all
of them, unfortunately, are applicable in
Russia. Like giving flowers to the police.
Then let me ask you about this
—I'll switch into Pozner mode again. Sorry, what will
you say when you stand before God? And
look here: Zharov has taken over
Gazprom-Media, which owns Echo of
Moscow, and we know that he's a crook.
>> 100% of the radio station's staff disagree with that.
And we know there is enormous
support. Well, everyone in Moscow
>> to call a strike,
>> but simply suggest, from this great
book, what methods could now be used
by Moscow radio stations in order
to, well, somehow make things happen.
>> Good idea. Interesting idea.
>> Good idea. No, come on, we remember all
that. Let Plyushchev, then,
stage an act of self-immolation, Ultman can stage
a hunger strike, and there’s another method from
*Lysistrata* we could use: refuse
to perform marital duties. And
let Venediktov declare that, as a sign
of protest, he will not have sex for
three months. There’s also the option of
refusing to go to segregated
beaches. That one is especially relevant in Russia.
Yes.
>> Well, that’s why it really is a great book from the
point of view of, let’s say, out of
everything you said, what was closest to my
heart personally was: no, thank you.
What resonated with me most was when you said,
>> I wasn’t offering that to you, just so you know,
sorry.
>> What I liked most, somehow,
was this part, when you said: "So,
when will 200,000 people come out?" I think that
>> we live in a police authoritarian
state. This police
authoritarian state is not at all
as stupid as people tend to think. They
are, first of all, very effectively reading this
book cover to cover.
>> Have you studied Armenia’s experience? Just
curious.
>> Well, of course, of course. I’ve read it
carefully.
>> Small groups don’t confront the police,
they run away from them. There are people there, sort of like
scouts, right, who watch, and if
the police are heading toward a crosswalk, then
the small group runs to another one, and in the
end the whole city comes to a standstill. You described
some small part of the movement and
simply a kind of, well, tactic they
came up with. But the bigger picture
is that there was
an opposition group in parliament,
a fairly large one. There was Pashinyan,
a charismatic leader who mobilized
the whole country. There was, in the end, this
Sargsyan, who wanted to change
the country’s constitution, and successfully did so. And
then, when he decided to engineer a transition and
become prime minister himself,
the whole country rose up against him. The country
rose up, and after that all sorts of things happened,
small groups were running around and so on. But
the small groups by themselves didn’t
resolve the issue, right?
>> No, overall I agree with you. Basically,
the point that methods really
aren’t everything, and that certain conditions must first
come together. That is, in
general, a good argument, yes, and again
from a political science point of view—you
don’t like political scientists very much, as far as I
know—but from a political science
perspective this is just, this is just the perfect
argument. I’m still a student, so that’s why I
love you. No, I, like James Madison,
one of the Founding Fathers of the United
States, want to be both a strong political scientist
and a strong politician.
>> That’s a serious bid for victory.
>> We have about
six minutes until the break, so I want to take up the next big
topic after the break. But
before the break I want to ask you a few
somewhat personal questions. They are,
nevertheless, all connected to politics,
so I think it will simply be
interesting. Under what circumstances would you take
your whole family abroad?
>> Well, for now I don’t see any such circumstances and I can’t
even imagine them. My family supports
me. Uh, it’s not always easy to be
a relative of an opposition figure,
someone in the opposition. And, by the way,
the relatives of an ordinary
opposition activist often have it harder than
the relatives of one of the leaders of the
opposition. But my family supports
me. We’ve never even
discussed anything like that.
>> You haven’t even, well, thought about it, imagined
what events might unfold?
>> At what point in your political
career were you genuinely afraid?
Really. Can you remember the moment
when you were most afraid?
Well, what do you mean? Afraid in what sense?
Afraid in terms of
>> I mean. Afraid
>> afraid enough to give up
your political career. Well, say right now
I’m walking to a Moscow radio station. And then
two people run up, one of them has
a camera, and I see some little bottles in
their hands. I think: "Damn, they’re about to splash me again
in the face with brilliant green (a bright antiseptic dye often used in Russia in attacks on activists). I’ll be all
green, and I’ll have to run off to some
hospital, and the hospitals are all closed right now
and get my eye treated." So, I mean,
is it unpleasant for me? Yes, it is. Am I afraid
enough to give up
what I do? No. So I’m a normal
person, and there are moments when
you feel a sense of danger
or a sense of risk, but it’s not something that
would make me give up my
beliefs or my actions.
>> Obviously, it’s unlikely that anything could
make Alexei Navalny give up
politics, but was there ever a time when you were
really afraid—more afraid, anyway,
than at other moments?
Well, those first arrests, when you don't
really understand any of it. It's not that
it's scary, exactly — I mean, you're ready for anything,
but it still brings you
to some clanging metal door.
And your ideas about prison and a cell,
you've probably had this too, are
some kind of movie-based image, right,
that now you're going to have to fight for your life,
to the death. But it all turns out to be
complete nonsense, and in fact
there's nothing frightening about it. And here is Kira laughing —
the press secretary of the Anti-Corruption Foundation
(FBK, Alexei Navalny's organization), who in total
has probably spent about 3
months there already, right? And most
of the FBK staff have gone through it.
So there are just certain things
that happen again and again, and at first you
are afraid of them, and then you realize
there isn't really much to fear. And the police
grab you, drag you away, and they have these brutal
faces, but then on the bus they start
telling you about their hard
lives.
>> Oh, that's easy. I had exactly the same thing.
How many days did you actually spend in prison?
Well, I wouldn't call it prison. Detention.
>> No, in prison. In prison. In prison proper.
In an actual prison.
>> In a pre-trial detention center (SIZO). One day in SIZO, when I was
arrested in the Kirovles case.
>> For you, are other opposition figures primarily
potential allies or
competitors?
>> Well, that's politics. Sometimes they're allies.
Sometimes they're allies, sometimes competitors. That is,
when you're calling on people to go to a
rally, you're directly my ally.
When you say in your video that
Smart Voting is nonsense, then you are
my competitor. I compete with
you for the audience's trust. I
am, of course, trying to persuade them. Uh, today
Khodorkovsky is my ally, and tomorrow if he
supports Sobchak, he's my competitor,
because I'm calling for a boycott. And so
on. That's a normal thing. Look,
there were elections to the Moscow City Duma,
you took part in them too. And there were 35
districts. 35 — 45 districts, I mean. And
then there will be State Duma elections, and there there are only 15
districts. And those 45 people will come to compete in
15 districts, and it'll be a total free-for-all,
and all of them will
hate each other, but at the same time they will still
remain, broadly speaking,
allies.
>> You're often asked about your so-called rigidity.
>> Uh-huh. Let's just say that after spending
some time in this whole crowd,
and sort of being part of it, I can
tell you that a lot of people among
the opposition leaders themselves
say that you still
only ever agree to cooperate
on your own terms.
Is that true?
>> That's because when I offer someone
cooperation, I offer it on the basis of a
well-thought-out strategy: Smart Voting
or something like vote for anyone against
United Russia. And we conduct
sociological surveys, so we have a
polling service. And I'm confident in
this strategy. I'm confident that in
discussion, in debate, I can prove
that it's right. Remember back in
2011, it was the same: uh, there was
Kasparov, he was for debates, for—
for a boycott, sorry; Nemtsov was for
the so-called 'Nakh-Nakh' strategy, and I
was for voting for anyone against United Russia. In
the end, I can't say that everyone
joined me, but there were many open
debates, most people supported
my strategy, and there was Smart Voting.
So many people criticized it and still
continue to criticize it. I mean,
if I believe in something, I
propose it, and I have absolutely no problem
fighting for my position, fighting to win
the support of everyone else.
>> There's also this kind of question that comes up:
if we're talking about specific
examples, I completely share your attitude toward Ksenia
Anatolyevna Sobchak.
The thing is, as I recall,
she offered you the role of her authorized representative
and to go on federal TV channels for debates.
You're taking a long time to say this. You're smiling
yourself as you say it. How exactly
do you imagine it — that I walk out and
say, 'Hello, I'm her authorized—' Come on.
I don't think she would have asked you
to phrase it like that. But that's exactly
the point, isn't it? You simply don't
want to be associated in any way with
that person, and yet you still would
get a few minutes on a
federal TV channel. You'd be able to
make a statement. In your very first sentence you'd
say, 'I'm not really any kind of authorized
representative here.' I began this conversation
with you by saying that there are things
I believe in, and I do them. For me, that's what
politics is, because I
am not some systemic opposition figure or
some vague character who can't run
for anything. I only do
the things I believe in. And I know
Sobchak. I know that she came to me and
told me she was running because she was being
paid. And even if she hadn't told me that,
I would still know perfectly well
what this was about. And, well, I don't know. And the fact that
she wasn't a real candidate, and the fact that these
the elections are not real; they should be
boycotted. That is part of my convictions.
>> Well, there were minutes on the federal TV channels,
that would have been real
the number of minutes on the federal TV channels,
where they talk about how I stole all the timber
or about how I am a Freedom agent,
who came from America. I am not read
to sacrifice my main strategy, my
attitude toward these elections. These elections are
a sham. And I, you understand, am supposed to
do this sort of thing. Think: "Yes, these are
sham elections." But then I would go and tell everyone,
you should still come anyway,
because I want my minutes on federal
>> channels. Gori, you did not need to
say that people should vote for Sobchak.
You could simply have come and spoken on
federal TV as Sobchak's authorized representative. I
would have come as Sobchak's authorized representative, and
her portrait would have been hanging behind me. And everyone
would have looked at me and said: "His anti-corruption investigations are
worth next to nothing,
because he is Sobchak's authorized representative."
>> All right, friends, we will continue after the break.
This is the program *Conditionally Yours*. My name is
Yegor Zhukov. We will continue with Alexei
Navalny.
>> *Conditionally Yours*. Could I have some more tea? They can
hear us, guys. They can hear everything
>> postponement.
>> Ah, they have already announced it,
>> right? Right now there is a postponement being announced as important news.
A postponement. No, an emergency situation.
>> Uh-huh.
>> Next week is simply a non-working week.
>> Until next March for now.
>> And now he is saying they will defer loan payments.
>> You will have time, like a vacation.
>> You will have time
>> For everyone or for those infected?
>> Well, no, it will appear. Well, if it is a
non-working week, then
>> Oh. No, no. Well, about, about
>> Ruslan. Got it. Thank you very much for
telling me.
>> Yes, yes, yes.
>> Let's sign off once more. Yes, all right.
>> And I will talk to Yulia about sex.
>> No need, no need, please.
>> There you go. Just like that.
>> You are a notorious sex terrorist.
I am protecting my family.
And
>> we continue on YouTube. And I,
>> of course, Vladimir is speaking very loudly
Putin, but all right. I also wanted to ask
this question, just as a continuation of this
topic.
If we are talking about opposition leaders,
without naming them, because
>> Let's name them; only YouTube is watching us
closely, so in principle we can
name them, in principle. Well, all these people
who spoke at the rally on July 20,
they told me that the decision
to announce the rally on July 27 was made by Alexei
Navalny on his own.
>> Which people exactly?
>> Galyamina, Gudkov, and all the
others who spoke then at
Sakharov Avenue. He noted that now
>> that is what I was told. I was not there myself then.
I am telling you. I made that decision with Yashin
We discussed it together and
said: "But this is exactly what you want from me.
It is the strategy." So I went out and announced it.
>> No, no, no, that is not the point. The point is that
I am not even accusing you of anything right now. I am
just interested to ask. Yes. With the other
candidates, you did not discuss this at all. So
you discussed it only with Yashin?
>> Well, no, I did discuss it.
>> Do you understand why people might develop
not the most
pleasant attitude toward you because
you did not discuss such an important thing with them?
I do understand.
>> I will explain. Because I discussed it with everyone
who, with all due respect to Galyamina
and Gudkov, can actually bring people out,
who matter from the standpoint of
a rally. And the main candidates who knew about my plans were
Yashin, Sobol, Zhdanov,
Yankauskas. In other words, all the real
candidates, the actual candidates. And as for
the rest,
>> not a real candidate.
>> Gudkov is a real candidate. But I, honestly,
to be honest, Gudkov will probably
be offended by this. I have doubts
because, well, I do not want information
to leak. There are some things you simply cannot
blab to everyone in the world ahead of time,
right?
>> Well, I mean, there is information that
you are not going to say now about his
insincerity, right, about how he does not
It is a feeling. There are people about whom I know for sure
If I told them something, they told no one
else. I discussed it with them. And
besides, these people matter the most
when it comes to bringing people out. I am
telling you exactly as it is. I am telling you
absolutely frankly, just as it is. I mean,
I am simply interested in the sense that
I myself work with
Dima, yes, and I am just interested in your
position on this. Do you think that
>> Well, he supported Sobchak in the election.
>> That is disgraceful.
>> Well, that is it then.
>> Well, he himself thinks it was disgraceful. So,
>> if he himself thinks it was disgraceful, why the hell did he
speak at her rally before election
day? After Dima, for some
I do not know what reasons he
had, pulled that stunt and played on
on the drums and supported her, also throwing in
support for the Yabloko party, which is quite a party (a Russian liberal political party).
I can’t entrust him with any
sensitive information
>> because of that.
>> Because of that too, among other things. Well, that’s the main
reason. Any other reasons
just get drowned out by it, because even now
we still don’t understand his motives. Do you
understand his motives? I do. There’s, well,
there is a reason there, so tell us
>> I haven’t spoken with him, I haven’t spoken with him about
whether it can be disclosed. Some kind of
secrets,
>> And you want me to tell you my secrets?
>> No, it’s not my secret, it’s a secret. Well,
I don’t know whether it’s a secret or not.
>> Look, that’s why for me it’s simple.
That’s it.
There is some information that I can
tell people I trust. Dima,
I think well of him, but after
the Sobchak story, I can’t trust them.
>> I understand you. Well, okay, that’s your position. Yes,
that’s a position. All right, Mikhail...
>> all right, one minute, next, now
>> let’s start—who else are you interested in, what else were you
told
>> now
>> now, now there will be a question about
meanings—now the questions will be about ideas
>> on our YouTube channel and on Yandex.Efir (a Russian streaming platform)
Egor Zhukov
“Conditionally Yours” is on the air
>> Good afternoon, this is the program *Conditionally Yours*
my name is Egor Zhukov, and today my guest is
Alexei Navalny, and we continue
to discuss all the topics that interest me and,
I hope, Alexei Navalny as well
too. Alexei, in my view,
what distinguishes a great political leader from
an ordinary one is the ability
to paint such a picture of the future, to give
people ideas, meanings, that
will inspire them to accomplish, well,
truly great deeds, great
acts. A person who wants
to change the government in Russia, a person
who wants for the first time in its long
history to lead our long-suffering
country to prosperity, must be
a great political leader. Well, at
least, that’s how I see it. The thing is,
that in my view, the fight against
corruption is not something capable of
inspiring people to great deeds. What do you
think, then—what can you
offer Russia? Because we
are talking about big things, and the question should
be a big one. What can you offer
Russia that would make you worthy specifically of the
office of President of the Russian
Federation, and not just of being the head
of an Interior Ministry anti-corruption department?
>> I disagree with you, because it seems to me
that you are romanticizing all this. Well
I mean, of course it all sounds
great. A great person must
offer great ideas. But as I see it,
for Russia to become a normal European
country for the first time in its thousand-year
history—as Putin is probably saying right now
at the same time as us on
air—that is quite a great idea.
What’s more, defeating corruption in Russia
is, of course, a great idea and a great
undertaking, because I have believed and still believe
that corruption is the foundation of this regime,
and it is one of the main reasons why we
live so poorly, so badly, and why there is so little
freedom in Russia. So, uh,
what we all don’t need right now is
grandiose pathos; we need normalization. We
must become a normal European
country. We are ready to become one tomorrow
without some kind of grand overarching idea. That itself is
the grand idea, if one is needed.
>> Alexei, but everyone has their own understanding
of what is normal. I mean now, not even
in the sense that each individual does, but that each
political ideology, each
spectrum of ideas has its own understanding
of normality. And when you say that
we need to return to normality,
or rather, arrive at something normal, you
mean your own version of normal.
>> I mean the European Union, which
is located right next to us. I
mean a system in which there is
separation of powers, the rule of law, and
free mass media.
>> That’s being for everything good and against everything bad
and
>> No, no, these are absolutely concrete things.
This is an absolutely concrete matter that
has to do with the procedure for appointing judges, with
the role of parliament. Everyone argues about this.
Look, Putin governs people precisely
by means of what he calls a
great idea. For him, the great idea is
empire. We must dominate
our neighbors. When I talk about
normalization, I mean that we should not
be bossing our neighbors around; we should
be paying our own people here and now
a decent salary. Does it seem to you that
this idea is, well, not impressive enough? Well,
somehow not enough...
>> well, it’s obvious to people who are
opponents of Putin. That’s the point.
>> It’s obvious, but we have never managed
to make it happen. Like the idea of fighting
corruption, it is obvious, but Russia
has existed for many hundreds of years, and never
have we—not even under the Soviet Union—
done anything to
defeat corruption. Uh, so I would like
normalization, and that is where greatness will lie
Russia. It is a huge, magnificent
country that will simply live
amazingly well if we get
>> if Alexei Navalny becomes
head of the Interior Ministry’s anti-
corruption department.
>> But the head of the Interior Ministry’s anti-
corruption department cannot fight
corruption. Corruption can only be fought
by political power. That is
the first point. Second, corruption will disappear in
a system where there is, as I have already
said, an independent judiciary,
political competition, namely
a proper parliament and free
media.
>> It’s just that corruption will not be the only thing you’ll have to deal with
if you become president.
>> I have a main job. You have a main job too.
You are a journalist in
Moscow, right?
>> And I have, unfortunately for you—fortunately for me—
a main job. I
am not a politician, as very often happens
in Russia. “What do you do?” “Well, I’m
kind of an opposition politician.” All right,
good for you. But I have a job, and that job
is that I head the Anti-Corruption
Foundation. Well, I founded it,
and we fight corruption, and
we publish information about that
corruption. I do this work because
I consider corruption the root of everything
bad that happens in Russia.
>> It’s just that more and more often you hear
this phrase: “The opposition
doesn’t work with meaning, the opposition doesn’t
work with ideas, the opposition doesn’t
offer that very image
of the future.” Because, look,
every time we watch your
latest investigation,
it’s absolutely first-rate, everything is great from the standpoint of
documentation, the evidentiary
base—really excellent, no complaints at all.
But in the end, it is still just
yet another proof that
our government is corrupt. Damn, well,
we already know that.
>> But that is my job. That is what I do as part of my work.
Look, when I am doing my job, I
talk about corruption and about our fight
against corruption. And people support us with
donations for that. We live on those donations.
When I have a
campaign, that is exactly it. They
support you for bigger things than just
fighting corruption. We know what
people are supporting us for. They are probably supporting
us for more than that as well, because we
have also built a network of headquarters across
the whole country. And during the election
campaign I presented a program in which
my vision was laid out. And my entire, essentially,
election campaign was conducted under
the slogan about the Beautiful Russia
of the Future, which, well, is probably
known to quite a large number of people.
And I have there a set of
specific, as you put it, meanings.
It seems to me that this is a rather unclear and
suspicious expression that
political analysts love to use. It’s just that
the word has been worn out so much
that it is no longer even clear what it means.
But still, I do have a
political program. Do you
>> think that this, just this alone, inspires people?
>> I hope it does. I would like
to inspire them more.
>> It’s just that in your interview with Sobchak (Ksenia Sobchak, Russian journalist and politician), you said
that you are a centrist. In the interview with Sobchak,
Ksenia Anatolyevna, you said that you are
a centrist.
>> Probably in response to some strange
question that was asked. You see, it’s just that
centrists do not make
revolutions, Alexei, that is the whole point.
Revolutions are made by people who paint
a concrete image of the future, one that
sets itself apart from all other images
of the future, and creates a movement toward it, you understand. That
is the essence of it. In order to present us with that
image of the future, you will
inevitably have to position yourself
on the political spectrum. And you know,
like in that old meme.
Like, “Would you like the right or the left?” Right? Well,
there you have your program. I ran in
the 2013 election with a specific
program that was written in black and
white. It can be read. I have
a presidential program. It is a real
program that I wrote together with
very smart people. I believe that—with
the smartest people in Russia, in fact. And in that
sense, it is not a matter of right or left. I
have a very clear set of views.
Perhaps to you, as a
libertarian, it does not seem very inspiring.
To some, this program is more left-wing;
to others, it is more right-wing. On
migration,
it is more conservative than,
well, than many listeners of Echo of Moscow (a Russian radio station) would find pleasing.
My position on the minimum
wage is not so pleasing
to libertarians. And yet, I do have
a set of things I believe in. They
are laid out very clearly, and I have been talking about these
things for many years. And I believe that
it would actually be quite hard
to accuse me of changing my
views. On what, exactly?
Well, I mean, all of this whole
story there—it is clear that I
did not even want to go in that direction, but you
You said that yourself. That whole story with, well,
Georgians, "rodents," and so on and so
forth—things like that. You're not saying that now.
This is one of the questions
that, let's say, I was asked
to pass on to you from what they call the lower
internet. How did that happen?
>> Not from the darknet, where you buy meth and all that, but from the
lower internet. That's a different expression.
>> And you're in the upper internet.
>> I don't know. Right now I'm in an interview with
Alexei Navalny. I was asked
to pass this on. How does that happen—a person
who was, say, a right-wing conservative nationalist
turning into someone who
supports, Lord forgive me, Bernie
Sanders.
>> I like Bernie Sanders's campaign. It's not that
I support him exactly; I just really
like Bernie Sanders's campaign
because in terms of
its technical organization, it's very similar to
what we do. It runs on small
donations and this kind of grassroots
organization. It's very easy for me to answer
the question you're asking
because, whether it's the
upper or lower internet, I don't know, but on
some part of the internet I've spent my entire
public life, and everything I've said
has been recorded, everything I've written
has been preserved. And in that sense, yes, I
did write a post during the war in
Georgia, when it was just beginning. I had
an acquaintance who was stuck somewhere in
Tskhinvali under shelling. I wrote a post
in which I called Georgians "rodents," for which
I apologized. I can apologize again,
but fundamentally I haven't changed my view.
>> So are you still ready to go to the Russian March
going forward?
>> I still believe that, absolutely,
the Russian March should be allowed. All
those people who go to the Russian March
have every right
In the form in which I went to the Russian
March, called for these Russian Marches, and
declared my support for the
national-democratic movement.
Of course I am. As soon as the Beautiful Russia of the Future
arrives, we'll have
a huge, wonderful, magnificent,
friendly, most peaceful-in-the-world
Russian March, where
all of Moscow will be marching, and everyone will just
be happy. As you know, the Irish
hold something like that. We'll have a very good Russian March,
and then everyone else
will hold their own marches too.
>> Alexei, why are you involved in
politics?
>> Because my encounter with the judicial
system many years ago
>> Deeper, deeper, deeper. Can you explain it
on a deeper level—why?
I'll tell you at the deepest level. Yes, we keep talking about
some upper internet,
lower internet. The fact that this even
makes sense shows the primitiveness of my own
makeup. On both the deep and the
basic level, as a lawyer,
>> I ended up in Russian court several times and
realized that this Russian court does not deliver—it
does not judge. It is fundamentally structured in such
a way that no fair
decision can be obtained there. I realized
that being a lawyer was pointless. I really
wanted to be one. I studied, I consider myself
a good lawyer. And I simply understood
the uselessness of my profession, and indeed
the uselessness of the legal system. I
realized the corruption and viciousness of this state and
understood that—well, what could I do? Retreat
into internal exile? No, better that I
try to change something. That's how I became
a politician.
>> Fair enough. Alexei, I'm continuing the line of thought
I started here. With some, I don't know,
Mr. Udaltsov or
some left-wing
bloggers, I'd probably also
feel—we more or less equally feel
the country's rot, yes, but
we want to fix it in different ways, and we're
moving toward different goals. And that's what
this is about. So when I just asked
why you are involved in
politics, what I really wanted was
an answer specifically in terms of the
values that matter to you, because
if I ask someone on the left, he will most likely
tell me, "I strive for
equality." That's what matters to me—that he
won't talk to me about Putin, he won't
talk to me about United Russia,
or the courts; he'll say, "What I want is
for people to be damn equal." That's
the main thing for me, right? Some
libertarian will say, "Hell, for me
the most important thing is freedom." Well,
for example, yes—I'm striving for a world
where people's
freedom isn't restricted. Well, basically,
>> In those terms, what matters to me is
justice. I want there to be a
system.
>> "Justice" is the most ambiguous concept
in politics.
>> I want disputes between people to be resolved
fairly. I want everyone to be
equal before the law. I want everyone to be
equal before the law, and I don't want
the strong to be able to humiliate the weak,
whether by taking advantage of the state's inaction
or the state's support. I want to live
in a country where everyone has absolutely equal
rights: the rich, the poor, anyone
at all.
>> The point is that the very same law
will spell out exactly which rights
people have and which they do not. Do you understand?
in, I don’t know, Sweden, although in Sweden it’s already
a bit less so. In the United Kingdom, people
may have the right to, say, free
healthcare, yes, while in another country
that right may not exist. And so on.
So it still depends,
you see, the answer that everyone is equal
before the law is, of course, correct,
but it is meaningless, because there are
laws under which, you know, well, Jesus
was crucified according to the law. Alexei, well, that’s
exactly the point. That is what it was; it was according to
the law, according to the letter of the law. Right now
Putin says that he is, by law,
changing the Constitution. This is absolutely
illegal. Literally every
word, uh, of these amendments that they
introduced contains a violation of the law. And
for me, as a lawyer and as a human being, I
want what is written in
the laws to correspond to the essence of justice. And
when you ask me this question, because
we are, of course, people with somewhat different
political views, like absolutely everyone
else.
>> What are your views?
Do you want me to rate them for you on a European scale?
On the American one, I’ve already
heard you say that
it supposedly makes no sense. Is Zyuganov (Gennady Zyuganov, longtime leader of Russia’s Communist Party)
left-wing or right-wing?
>> Well, we can take—if we take, I
just—Alexei, I’ll calmly respond to
this attack.
Three—we take three different dimensions:
cultural, economic, and one’s attitude toward
the state. And on each of them we can
place a person. On the
cultural level, Zyuganov is right-wing; on the
economic level, Zyuganov is left-wing. That is
normal, and we can say that. That
doesn’t mean it makes no sense.
It simply has several different
>> levels. It makes sense. But right now in
modern Russia, it does not make sense.
And for us it most certainly
does not, from the standpoint of politics or your
favorite political strategizing, it definitely does not
make sense. Because instead of
talking about the main things,
for example, right now the Constitution
of our country is going to be changed illegally
through an illegal vote, in such a way
that from a super-presidential
republic, as it was before, we will turn
simply into an outright authoritarian
state. And right now absolutely all of us
must oppose this. And among
ourselves, sorting out such important
questions as attitudes toward
guns, attitudes toward your beloved feminism
or my beloved migration,
and so on—these are all important things; we
can debate them on Twitter, but
overall, right now this cannot be
the basis of political
self-identification. We should not split
into right and left, because, you know,
I think we should sell
handguns, while you think
we should also sell assault rifles. That is
a major difference in American
politics—a fundamental difference
for American politics. In Russia
right now, it makes not the slightest sense.
Well, I understand your position. Although it still
seems to me that there are some
issues on which it is very
hard for people to unite. And if
if, well, speaking of that—
>> for example
>> people still have different understandings of the
country we should be aiming for. And
some people may think that if I
support Navalny now, then anyway,
even though he is now speaking in favor of, well,
some universal human values, still
he will go on to build that kind of country, and I
don’t even understand what kind. That is, I see
some of his specific points, but I
also generally support those points. But
>> This is very easy to explain. Navalny
wants to build a country in which
there will be parliamentary elections. And Yegor Zhukov
will go into those elections with one party, while
Navalny, apparently, will run with another. That’s
all. And then we will appeal to
the citizens, and you will propose something
of your own, and I will propose something of my own. Based on
the results, a parliament will be formed,
a coalition or non-coalition
government, and this whole system
will start working. That is what is called
political competition.
All right. Alexei, you belong to
Generation X. It’s an interesting
generation in the sense that you are, of course,
not a boomer, but at the same time not a millennial and
far from a zoomer.
>> Yes, it’s that—76–82—it’s that cursed
Soviet generation, right?
>> Well, the question is this. More and more often, you
keep posting on your own
social media all sorts of memes, and
videos from TikTok. You like using
your favorite word—guys
or dudes—you really like
using it. Do these things come naturally to you?
>> Margarita Simonyan (Russian state media editor) scolds me for
using the word “chuchundriki.”
>> “Chuchundriki.” So do things like that come naturally to you?
Do you check meme channels,
Telegram or Instagram accounts before bed? Or
do you do it simply to
attract a younger audience?
>> When you say, "Do you check meme
channels on Telegram and Instagram," you
sound like a boomer, to be honest.
>> Me? I mean, damn it, that's how I actually
talk in real life. That's exactly how I
say it.
>> Strange. Well, I mean, I...
>> It's just that I say this on
Moscow radio stations, so you see,
context matters, context matters. Alexei,
is definitely someone who tries
to stay in step with the latest
developments, including all kinds of tech
trends, partly because we constantly
have to adapt in order to survive. I never
could have imagined that I would one day
be recording videos for YouTube. I
can't stand watching videos. Even
all those interviews on Echo of Moscow (a Russian radio station), I
only read as transcripts, because
video is far too slow for me. I like
reading, but, well, I'm forced to do
this, and I keep an eye on all sorts of
other technologies and possibilities.
If I see, or read in an article, that
the biggest share of traffic now goes
to TikTok, I go and see what
TikTok is. I go there, I'm horrified, but I still regularly
look at what technological possibilities
TikTok offers, because what if we get kicked off
YouTube and have to move to TikTok?
I hope that never happens.
>> So you use TikTok yourself, then.
>> What do you mean, "use it"? I drop in a few times,
look at these strange
dancing people. I understand all those memes
from TikTok because, I mean, I'm trying
to understand what it is, just so I can
understand how the modern
internet works.
>> Well, friends, I can say that Alexei
Navalny is more progressive than I am,
because I'm not on TikTok, although I do
watch compilations of funny memes from
TikTok on YouTube. Though,
>> Isn't that really the most boomer thing you can do?
>> Yeah, probably. Alexei, we have
about a minute and a half left, and I
wanted to ask a question. I think it's
an important one. I hope you can answer it
in a minute. In your interview
with Yuri Dud (a well-known Russian interviewer), you said that people who
engage in corruption at the lower levels
would not be subjected to lustration
and so on. Basically because they were
forced into it, whereas people at the top who
engage in corruption should be
subjected to lustration and so on.
Here's the question: couldn't the people who
are at the top also tell you, "I would have been
the odd one out if I hadn't taken part in
corruption, and I would have been jailed too"?
>> They won't be saying that to me. They'll be
saying it to a fair court, because
that's where they belong.
>> What's the criterion for this so-called coercion? Well,
it's holding political office. And
when a police officer takes, say,
500 rubles (about $5-6) from you for something, he is unquestionably
a corrupt police officer, and under
current law, he should be imprisoned.
But, you see, lustrating all
traffic cops makes no sense. Another matter is that maybe half of
the Interior Ministry needs to be disbanded, but that isn't
lustration, that's simply dismantling
an ineffective structure. It shouldn't be
lustrated. A significant
portion of them should be jailed because
they are criminals, and all the rest
should be dismissed. But lustration should apply to those who
hold political office, because
it is precisely people in political
positions—not necessarily bureaucrats,
but also people who head
state television and so on—
who are not just corrupt, they
encourage corruption, because
corruption is a way of governing
the country. And here we need to clearly
distinguish between a traffic cop and an employee
of the presidential administration—those are completely
different things. Speaking of officials and
the heads of various media outlets, we recommend everyone
watch the recently released films on
Alexei Navalny's channel about Margarita
Simonyan and Mr. Keosayan. And my name is
Yegor Zhukov. This was the program
"Conditionally Yours." My guest was Alexei
Navalny. Thank you, Alexei.
>> Thank you.
>> You've been listening to the program.
>> Why didn't we discuss the constitution at all?
They're going to keep roasting us for that forever.
The most important thing...
>> I've already spoken about it a thousand times everywhere.
