Alexei Navalny on the program "Big Politics" on the Inter TV channel

And now joining us live from

the television studio in Moscow

is one of the most prominent Russian politicians

of today, Alexei Navalny.

Alexei Anatolyevich, welcome.

Good evening.

Today, without exaggeration, you are the idol of hundreds of

thousands

of Russian

visitors to your blog online,

and other internet platforms.

Crowds cheer you at

Moscow opposition

rallies. Tell me, please,

will you ever run for

president of Russia?

Yevgeny Alexeyevich, I think that,

first of all, you are praising me far too highly.

Of course, that level of flattery can be heard

only at a United Russia congress in

reference to Vladimir Putin. Our task

right now is to secure free elections, so that

all those who want to, and all those who have the

opportunity, can compete for the post of

president and compete for seats in the

State Duma.

Once we achieve real elections, I will definitely take part in them

and will fight for the leading

positions.

Uh-huh. Well, I don’t actually want to flatter you.

I was at the rally on

Academician Sakharov Avenue and remember very well

that when you came out on stage, the square

roared in a way it had not roared

in greeting any of the other

speakers.

That is a fact of your popularity.

I think that in my case people were not so much

supporting me as protesting

against some of the figures

whom I have been conducting my

anti-corruption investigations into. Rather,

they were greeting not me, but

expressing their outrage at corruption.

So who do you see yourself as more now,

then,

a politician, or still

an online anti-corruption campaigner?

Well, corruption is the real

vertical of power. It is the mechanism by

which Vladimir Putin and his

inner circle have simply built

the political system in Russia. So,

naturally, there is no point in being coy. And we

all understand that a person who

is fighting corruption

is engaged in political struggle in

Russia. So these concepts are inseparable

now.

And to what extent are you involved in

organizing protest actions now

not on the internet, but in the streets and squares

of Moscow?

Well, the thing is that we really do have

various organizing committees,

working groups, which are supposedly

engaged in organizing the protest

movement. But it seems to me that the truth

is that no one is actually

organizing the protest movement.

The protest movement exists on its own,

and it was organized by Vladimir

Putin. Vladimir Putin, by staging

election fraud, brought hundreds of

thousands of people into the streets of Russian cities.

So this is simply a wave of protest.

Some people have been lucky enough to be

on the crest of that wave, myself included.

But no one is directing this protest,

no one is organizing it, no one is

controlling it.

At times I read online

comments from ordinary participants in

demonstrations and rallies in Moscow and

other Russian cities saying, in effect, that

they do not like politicians, they do not want

to engage in politics at all, they come out

to protest against violations in

the elections, against the ignoring of

their opinion, against being treated

with contempt by those in power. But then there are

people who are trying to use us as a stepping stone

to break into power, fighting for their own

place in the sun. Don’t you think that

they mean you too?

Well, possibly. Unfortunately, in our country

the period of the 1990s and

the politicians of the 1990s, whom

you also had the opportunity to

observe, produced a general

idiosyncratic aversion to politics and to political

figures. People do not trust them. For

many years in Russia, politics

was replaced by political technology. Everything

was built on bribery, deceit,

paid-for news reports,

manipulation, and so on. People are

deeply tired. They are tired of the fact that

the same people are communists and

Komsomol members today, democrats tomorrow,

and Putin loyalists the day after. Today they

embrace the American ambassador, tomorrow

they shout about American conspiracies and

so on. People are genuinely

sick of it. So it is a paradoxical situation:

yes, people here support free

elections and come out to political

rallies, but they do not support any

particular politicians. And right now there are no

such political idols.

That trust can be earned, regained

only in one way: do not lie and do not

steal. You simply have to show people,

to explain that the time of the 1990s

is gone, those people are gone. A new

time has come. A time, if you like—this may

sound naive—of a new sincerity,

but there is no other way, no other...

in fact, we have no proof other than our own

words and our actual deeds to present

.

Look, Alexei Anatolyevich, you

said: "Trust must be earned or

restored."

What do you mean by that? Yes. Uh,

Well, for example, I-I-I'll ask about

democratic politicians,

opposition democratic politicians,

who, uh, were very well known,

famous—whose stars rose precisely

in the 1990s. Today they are standing next to

you on the stage at these

opposition protest rallies.

But many say that these people, such

as Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov,

and Mikhail Kasyanov, have discredited themselves

and will never be able to regain trust.

How do you see that?

Well, I don't think that Boris Nemtsov,

Vladimir Ryzhkov or Mikhail Kasyanov

need any protection from me

or legal defense services. But first of all,

people change, and the mistakes that all

of us have made need to be acknowledged, they

need to be made up for with new, real

deeds. And I am sure that democratic

leaders who did something wrong

or, well, perhaps did not behave quite

properly some years ago, they

can now, uh, quite effectively and

normally, sincerely and honestly participate

in the new political situation. Well, this is

a normal political process. Some people

lose trust, others gain it.

Right now, I enjoy a certain degree of

political trust, and it is entirely possible

that I could lose it if I am not

honest with the people whom, uh, I

address, and if I descend into

mere politicking and do not

do concrete work. That is

perfectly normal. One should

take a philosophical view of it. There are always

politicians who are loved and politicians who are not

loved. Ratings rise, fall,

and change. I am absolutely sure that

any person, even if they have been on the

political stage for quite a long time, and even if

people have grown somewhat tired of them, can

win back sincere trust and

affection.

Well, we know such examples from history.

We remember how Churchill returned to politics,

how de Gaulle returned to politics.

Well, let's talk about Russia after all.

Tell me, how is the situation

that existed in December different from the situation

that is taking shape now? Doesn't it

seem to you that the slogans are changing,

that if

in December people demanded a recount

of the votes, the annulment of the election results,

so that elections would be honest at all, then

today what is really coming to the forefront is

the demand that Putin leave.

Absolutely right. This, it seems to me,

is a fairly natural development of

what is happening. What happened in

December? On December 5, we took to the streets in order

to say the obvious thing: these were

not elections. We do not recognize them as elections.

There was a huge amount of

fraud, plainly obvious fraud.

The internet is full of videos showing how

chairs of election commissions

simply mark the ballots themselves. Neither procedurally

nor in substance was this

an election. And we came out to say that

we demand new elections. This

was not an anti-Putin rally; these were

rallies and protests for fair elections.

There were mass demonstrations,

the largest mass demonstrations

that we had not seen for

many, many years in Russia and in Moscow, in

particular.

20 years.

There was a resolution.

20 years. Exactly. There was

a resolution, it seems to me, quite clear,

quite simple, with specific

demands. That is the first point.

A review of the election results, the resignation of the head of the Central

Election Commission, bringing to justice

those who took part in the fraud, and

holding new elections. Political

reform—fairly clear and straightforward

demands. They were addressed to the authorities.

The authorities are ignoring them. On the one hand,

we see that they are very afraid of the rallies.

They are making various chaotic

moves. Now there are their counter-rallies,

some support groups are appearing,

and they are trying at times to curry favor with

the protesters, and at other times accuse them of being

hirelings of foreign intelligence services, and so

on. In other words, the authorities are very

concerned about this, but they are not

going to fulfill a single

demand. And the authorities are not some abstract

thing.

We understand that the organizer

of the fraud was a specific person,

his name is Vladimir Putin. He is doing this

in order to preserve autocratic power

in the country. And this autocratic power

in the country he uses for one simple

thing: corruption. That is, he

is simply plundering Russia's national wealth.

Russia.

So, the slogan of the moment

becomes the slogan "Down with autocracy,"

as in 1917.

Exactly. The slogan of the moment is

the slogan "Down with autocracy." We want

a lawfully elected president

a president, not an autocrat, not a tsar or

some man who wants to be

a lifelong national leader, and so on.

We want a government that we may not

necessarily like, but that we respect and

recognize as legitimate. Vladimir Putin is not someone

who can be recognized as

the President of the Russian Federation simply

because he makes himself

president through falsification.

All right. Nevertheless, he is running

in this election, and apparently he

is not going to withdraw his candidacy. On March 4, he

will be on the ballot

alongside four other candidates:

Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Mironov, and

billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov. There was

a great deal of debate before

the parliamentary elections on December 4 about how

opposition supporters should vote. You

remember, don’t you? Some suggested spoiling

the ballots, since there was no “against

all” option; some suggested boycotting

the election; some suggested listening to

your point of view and voting for

any candidate against

the United Russia party. Sorry, for any

party, but not for the United

Russia party. So, uh, now, what

advice are you giving your

supporters now? How should they behave on March 4?

Indeed, our official slogan and

the main strategy that ultimately prevailed, it seems to me,

was: "Vote

for any party against the party of crooks and

thieves, United Russia." And I think that this

time the concept will be similar.

Of course, the slogan "Vote for anyone"

against Putin sounds a little more

or rather, less energetic than "vote

for anyone against United Russia," because

here we are dealing with

four specific people, not entire

parties, which are still, in some sense,

conglomerates and communities. Nevertheless,

we need to understand one very simple,

or rather several very simple things. First,

what will happen on March 4 is not

an election. It is a procedure, an event in

which Putin will reappoint

himself president and Russia’s

autocratic ruler. Second. We must

use this event to apply

maximum pressure on the authorities and

create stress for them, because ultimately we

must create such a level of pressure

that the authorities will finally announce

fair, free elections. And third,

the most effective strategy

for putting pressure on the authorities in this election is

to vote for any candidate against

Vladimir Putin, because that will be

a vote specifically against Vladimir

Putin, not for Zhirinovsky, not for

Zyuganov, and not for Prokhorov.

And what about the idea of marking boxes in

all four columns

and thereby making the ballot

invalid? A great many people

are suggesting that approach.

I don’t like that approach.

I strongly dislike it, because it contains no

unifying idea, you see? Whereas

the call to vote for anyone against

Putin quite obviously unites

supporters and activists of Zyuganov,

Prokhorov, Mironov, and Zhirinovsky.

A call to vote by effectively spoiling

the ballot is divisive.

Then we would have to spend a lot of time

debating with Zyuganov’s supporters. I do not

see the point; at the moment I have no

disagreement with Zyuganov. Zyuganov is

a man who is running against

Putin. He should get as many

votes as people cast for him. There is no

problem. I have no dispute with Zyuganov. With

Putin, we have a dispute over the fact that

we want fair elections. Therefore,

we need to vote against Putin in order

to push for fair elections.

Alexei Anatolyevich, here in the studio of

our program Big Politics

are my colleagues, well-known

Ukrainian journalists. I would like

to give them the opportunity, uh, to ask

you the questions that interest them. Please,

first, a question from political

commentator of the popular Ukrainian

weekly Kommersant, Iryna Solomko.

Just a correspondent, not a weekly columnist,

but I actually have two questions

for you. The first one is

tactical, so to speak. Just now you

were talking about the upcoming election. We

all know very well—it has already become clear—

that Mr. Nevlinsky was indeed not

registered. What interests me is why

you are not protesting this now?

Because essentially, well, I heard

what you said—that you hope

that, uh, through pressure you can somehow

force Putin to do something—but I personally

don’t believe that. Putin is definitely

not such a simple man that

some rallies or something else could

make him do anything, right?

So why is it that at this stage you are somehow

losing this tactical battle,

in my opinion? And the second

question is this. Yevgeny Alekseyevich has already

asked you about your

ambitions and plans, but of course I

think that, especially after the Time cover, yes,

well, no, the article in Time—you

have certainly seen it—where you are

called Russia’s hope, that is, very great expectations

are being placed on you, in

in particular, by the international

community. Everyone understands that your ambitions are at least

presidential. And, at least

in the world, you are

seen as someone who could

probably lead Russia in some

different, take it now in a different

direction. With that in mind, I would

still like you to clearly

state your broader plans. And in

that context, I understand, and I

greatly appreciate, and I think you have done

a great deal as a blogger, yes, someone who

fights corruption, but that is not enough. In order

to lead the country further, one needs

to have at least a team, one needs to have

a program. In that context, are you

doing any groundwork, because,

as the Orange Revolution showed,

the main problem with the Orange forces was

that they came to power unprepared

for that power. Are you preparing now

to, uh, take power and

do something for the country? Thank you.

Ah, thank you very much. First of all,

regarding Yavlinsky. You are completely

wrong, because the organizing committee for

the rallies adopted

a special resolution under which we

demanded that Yavlinsky be reinstated in the

election, when the decision was made

that all presidential candidates would be invited

to speak at the rally that

took place, uh, quite recently, on February 4.

We considered Yavlinsky

a candidate and invited him, although at that

point he had already been removed. Moreover, there was

a separate special resolution and

a vote at the rally regarding

Yavlinsky, and everyone gathered there

unanimously declared that they

categorically protested against his

removal and demanded his reinstatement.

So in that sense, our task,

our position, is absolutely consistent.

Second, as for plans, ambitions, and

so on. Well, you understand, it is not

articles in Time magazine that make a person

a more significant or less significant

politician. That is more a matter of PR and

publicity. Today someone has 15

minutes of fame, right? I am probably having mine now,

probably, among other things,

which is why you are asking me these questions.

The situation has developed in such a way that I am

relatively popular among other

Russian opposition politicians. One should

take that philosophically.

I mean, I am being completely sincere. And

when you ask me about our

strategic plans, and specifically my

strategic plans, I say

quite plainly that our main

strategic plan is to achieve

free elections. Because here we can

talk endlessly about

how we need to create a program,

a team, and so on. Well, as you rightly

noted, Putin is not a simple man, and we

are still very far

from even being able

to take part in elections. Right now, uh,

Time magazine may be writing something about me,

but the only chance I have to appear on

television is on

Ukrainian TV. On Russian

television I am still an absolutely

banned person.

Yes, thank you very much. You see,

there are still certain

gains

of the Orange Revolution. And

you can at least show opposition politicians from abroad?

Yes, you know, we can also show

Ukrainian opposition politicians.

Wonderful.

Alexei, my apologies, we are going to

take a break now and continue our conversation in

the next part of our program. In it

we will also touch on another topic.

We continue this edition of the program

Big Politics on the Inter TV channel. Let me

remind you that today our guest is

the well-known Russian opposition

politician Alexei Navalny. Alexei

Anatolyevich is currently in a

television studio in the Russian

capital, live with us. Let me

remind you, uh, that my colleagues,

Ukrainian journalists present in

our studio, are now asking him their questions.

The next question, please. Dmytro

Lytvyn, columnist for the website Revizor.

I would like to clarify the issue of the level of

pressure on the authorities and the Orange

Revolution, which has been mentioned here

in different parts of this conversation with Mr.

Navalny. Will there be in Moscow, as in

proper revolutionary cities,

any tent camps or

anything similar, which I think would do more

to convince Vladimir Putin that he is

wrong than simply Muscovites coming out,

on a day off to the square with slogans.

That is my question.

Ah, well, I cannot speak about any

specific plans, because,

first of all, they are still being worked out

by a group of people, not just by me.

Second, as I have already said, the protest

organizes itself. It is a wave. And

the people on the organizing committee are, in a

certain sense, simply riding the crest

of that wave. But indeed, we see

a situation in which, uh, the protest

is growing. And the confrontation is growing,

though fortunately it is not, not turning into

some coercive methods, but we can see

that the number of people is growing, the rhetoric

is becoming increasingly aggressive and, uh,

the protests are changing in form, becoming

more and more cunning there, taking on various

sophisticated forms. I do not rule out

that a moment will come when

those gathered will take to the streets and refuse

to disperse. At the same time, let me say right away

that, probably, the model of an Orange

Revolution and Maidan (the mass protest movement in Ukraine), in the sense in which

it happened in Kyiv, is of limited applicability in Russia

right now for a number of entirely objective

reasons, but nevertheless some such

incidents, when the people gathered

refuse to disperse, are possible.

And what are those reasons, Alexei

Anatolyevich? You see, because when I was

recently in Moscow, just this past

Wednesday, I was invited

to take part in a discussion on the topic of

the possibility of an Orange Revolution, uh, in

Russia on the popular radio station Echo

of Moscow. And there one of my

opponents, a deputy of the State

Duma, of the new State Duma, uh,

elected as a result of those very

elections whose conduct, because of

such violations, the opposition is protesting

against, Sergei Zheleznyak said:

"We know everything. We know that they are already

buying tents in large quantities

in order to stage a Maidan in Moscow

similar to the one in Kyiv. Why do you think

that a Maidan is impossible? What are these

reasons?"

Well, there are some obvious

political differences here. Maidan happened.

Uh, correct me if I'm wrong, I'm not

the greatest expert and I can't

say that I know Ukrainian

politics in detail, or how it was all organized,

but some differences are obvious

on the surface. First, uh, Maidan and

the Orange Revolution took place after

a presidential election, when there was

after all a leader, an opposition leader.

In the eyes of

the protesters, that opposition leader had won the election. The victory

had been stolen. And it was clear that they

were protesting in order to reclaim

their victory, namely, so that their leader would become

president of Ukraine. Right now

the protesters in Russia have no obvious

leader. There was no presidential election. All

opposition leaders were simply not allowed

to take part in the election. Therefore there is neither

a unifying political force, nor

a unifying leader. And so all

the people, uh, are not fighting for Ivanov,

Petrov, I don't know, Nemtsov or Navalny

to become president. They are fighting for

fair elections. That is the essential

difference. And there are other major differences.

And there, under the political system then current

in Ukraine, there was at least one

independent TV studio. There was a significant

number of opposition deputies

who stood as a human shield around

that Maidan.

There was also, as I understand it, some kind of

fairly loyal attitude from the city administration

of the city of Kirov,

the city administration of Kyiv, which issued

permission there for Maidan, so to speak,

making it easier to build all that

infrastructure. In Moscow we have

a completely different situation. Permission

for even the simplest rally has to be

literally clawed out and obtained

only through threats. We get

permission to hold marches

and rallies only because everyone knows

that people will come out anyway without any

permission, and then it really

could very quickly turn into

violence, violence. So that is

the only reason why we get

these permits. So, it seems to me,

the situation is very different, and

no direct analogies, especially

in terms of protest tactics, between Moscow and

Kyiv can be drawn.

Alexei Anatolyevich, here is the question that

comes to mind for me. All right.

First of all, you said that it may happen

that one day people will come out onto

the square and will not want to disperse. In that

case, is the use of force possible?

Do you expect that if events follow

such a scenario, then against people

who do not want to disperse, force will

be used?

Well, that cannot be ruled out completely. At the same time,

I think the likelihood of that

is not very high, primarily because

as I said at the beginning of our conversation,

the main purpose of existence for these

people in power is that

they are simply enriching themselves. They have

bank accounts in Switzerland, they are

billionaires, living luxurious lives. And

they understand that an escalation of

the political situation in Moscow and in

Russia, and the use of violence against

protesters, would simply greatly

devalue their assets in the West. Uh, when

our homegrown Russian crooks

are lounging around somewhere in Belgravia, in

London, and living there a life of luxury

riding on yachts and entering

high society, that is one

situation. But when those same people have

blood on their hands and everyone knows

that they are involved in suppressing the opposition

and in violence, I think they are unlikely to be

guaranteed such a splendid, luxurious

and carefree life in Britain or on

on the southern coast of France.

And please tell me,

let's imagine that your slogan

"Vote for any candidate except

Putin" is heard, and one of these

candidates gets a very substantial

share of the vote. Say, for example,

the Communist leader Gennady

Zyuganov. And a runoff situation

emerges. And it is quite possible that in the second

round Gennady Zyuganov could count

on victory, because he could

consolidate the entire protest

electorate. What then?

No problem. Zyuganov will become president.

The president should be the person whom

people choose. Nothing terrible will

happen because of that. You saw it in your

own country. Yushchenko was elected. After

some time, voters

grew disappointed and brought back

Yanukovych. Nothing all that terrible

happens. Yes, there are certain

political excesses, but that is a normal

process. They elect one person,

become disappointed in him, then elect

someone else. I believe it is a tragedy

for Russia that in 1996, uh,

Yeltsin was elected through obvious fraud

as president. We should have

gone through what all

Eastern European countries went through, when after

the romantic revolutions, uh, of the late

1980s and early 1990s,

there was a reaction, and

socialists and communists came to power. Then after

some time they were voted out, and then this

political

pendulum began to swing. There is nothing страшного about the fact that

Zyuganov, for example, or anyone else

becomes president. If

that person is truly elected, he

will form a coalition government,

because obviously he will not have

enough support to

control the entire Duma. He will

be working under significant

pressure from the mass

media, from liberal

democratic forces, and so on.

That is normal: a president who

fends off the opposition and carries out

his duties.

Mm-hmm. All right. Please, I would again like

to give the floor to my Ukrainian colleagues.

Vadim Denysenko, editor-in-chief

of the weekly Kommentarii. Your question.

Alexei Anatolyevich, you know, both here in

Ukraine and there in Russia, the same

question comes up, really, before

elections. Uh, no matter what we say, no matter what

we do, nothing will change.

A lot of people say that. I think that both

here about 70 percent and there about 70 percent

say that really, whether you speak or

don't speak, nothing will come of it. Well, I would

like to ask you

to explain why people need to do something

different from what they are being told.

I do not accept that position. And the whole

history of humanity shows that

when people do something, when even 1%

of active people believe in what they

say and act on what they believe in,

those people achieve astonishing

success. I am absolutely certain that in the

next year and a half, Russia will see

significant

changes in the political situation for the

better. And, you see, six months ago we

had just as many skeptics

who said that nothing would happen

and that it was impossible for hundreds of thousands of people

to come out onto the streets of Moscow unless

the economy collapsed. We saw that

the economy did not collapse, and there was no

meaningful deterioration in the

economic situation. Nevertheless,

suddenly we saw on the streets of Moscow

more people than we had seen since

the early 1990s. And it was impossible

to imagine six months ago that

those changes in the political

situation, in the political system,

that have already been announced would happen. For example, two

months ago President Medvedev said

that governors would still be appointed in Russia for another 100 years.

Nevertheless,

amendments have now been introduced, and governors

will once again be elected. Of course, we

understand that the proposed political

reform is largely deceptive and

is aimed simply at easing

political tension. But that is already

a significant success. With one rally

it was possible to achieve what the opposition in the

State Duma had been trying to achieve for 8

years. So simply our own practice, our experience, and

that of neighboring countries, and simply

human stories, all tell us that

it will all work out and evil will be defeated.

Mm-hmm. Please, a question from the editor-in-chief

of Expert Ukraine magazine,

Andrei Blinov.

Good evening, Alexei. You know, it is very

encouraging that in Russia, as in Ukraine,

young politicians are emerging. I always

try to compare young politicians

to certain characters from

classical literature. And in order

to make the comparison, broadly speaking, understandable,

it is probably best to use Russian

literature, which we are very fond of. And you know,

I have been listening to you carefully.

Still, one has to admit that for now, for me,

the main character with whom you

are associated is Bazarov,

right? Do you remember his theory of nihilism? That

there is, after all, the main point, really.

All right, he's not Ivanushka the Fool (a naive fool from Russian fairy tales).

No, absolutely not. And so, in

fact, I simply, as we understand

here, view the political situation from Ukraine,

it is perfectly clear that there is, of course,

a national leader, and he has major

problems, quite obviously, with

corruption. I can tell you that,

despite the Orange Revolution,

and the genuinely broader scope of democracy

in Ukraine, there are crooks here too, the ones

you are talking about. Believe me, the same

yachts too, perhaps, well, there isn't as much

oil, so naturally it is poorer.

Ah, but I still want to tell you that

let's be honest, if we compare it

with the Orange Revolution, candidate number

two in our case, in the third round after, uh, well,

a major political defeat, received

44%. Today Gennady Zyuganov has in

Russia, as the second-highest-rated candidate in

Russia, a rating of 15, at most 20%.

And still,

in this connection I have one question for you on

domestic policy, and a second one, after all,

on foreign policy, because let's

talk about constructive solutions, not just how

we are going to protest. Because in fact,

uh, we can destroy the world, but why? So

then, the first question, and broadly

speaking, if not Putin, then who? I think

this question will be asked by many thoughtful

Russians and thoughtful Ukrainians. We,

of course, are in the Russian

information space and follow events very

closely. And

the second question: how

should relations then be built

with Ukraine?

Thank you very much for your question. Well,

first of all, when we talk about protest,

it is absolutely not destruction, it is

a positive agenda. Protest

happens because we demand

free elections. What could be more

positive and right than fair,

free elections? As for the slogan

"If not Putin," then who? Which has now

effectively become the main slogan

of Putin's election campaign. That

is, they go around saying: "If not

Putin, then who? The whole country will

collapse, Russia will be annexed by

America, and there will be, I don't know,

cars burning in the streets and

zoos destroyed and elephants running through the streets of

Moscow." Well, that's absolute nonsense,

a lie. And besides, it is even

insulting to a gigantic

country where 140 million people live. And I

want to remind you that we have somehow suddenly

forgotten, for example, about the existence of

President Medvedev, who was perfectly

capable as president

and who assumed that he would remain

president. And everyone was talking about that

quite, quite recently. And in our

Putin government, even if we

talk about the current groups

of the establishment, within Putin's

government there are some relatively

decent people, each of whom could

run the country certainly no worse than

Putin. Therefore, uh, so, the firs—the first

point is that even among Putin's

people, the pro-Putin circle, or those in power, there are plenty of

people who could do exactly the same

things Putin does. That is, at

minimum, mostly do nothing, and

just drift along on the waves of history. A lot of

people can do that. And, uh,

there is

an invention of humanity called

representative democracy. And I believe

that representative democracy,

and political competition in general,

bring the best people to the surface.

The worst gradually sink, while the best

rise. Therefore, as a result of

free elections, the person who comes to power will be the one

supported by the people, and without Putin

excellent politicians will emerge. It may

well be quite likely that in fair

elections, if Vladimir Putin takes part in them,

and Vladimir Putin is

the person who wins them,

but that would already be, excuse me, a different

Vladimir Putin, one who wins only with difficulty

in a second round, who would be forced

again to form a coalition

government, who would be forced

to fight corruption, because

members of parliament and the mass

media would be pressing him, who would be

forced not just to talk, but to actually

do something. Therefore

for some reason we always have this kind of

situation. Back in 1996

it was, if not Yeltsin, then who? If not

Yeltsin, everything would collapse. Back then Putin

was not known to anyone at all. Putin appeared like

a jack-in-the-box, was appointed

by Abramovich in 1999. And

now we are already being told that Putin is

something sent to us by the Lord

God. If not Brezhnev, then who? If not

Stalin, then who? If not Lenin, then who?

Every dictator creates a myth about himself that

he is irreplaceable. But in reality that is

absolute nonsense. If tomorrow a

piano fell on Putin, nothing in the country would

change for the worse. Absolutely nothing.

Water would still run from the tap, commuter trains would still run,

and we would elect a new president,

who would certainly be no worse than Putin.

As for your second

As for your second question about

in relations with Ukraine,

I

am deeply and absolutely convinced that Ukraine

and Belarus are Russia’s main

geopolitical—indeed, in every sense—

allies. And our foreign

policy should be directed as much as possible

toward integration with Ukraine and

Belarus. That is because it is happening

in a completely organic way. And these are

the main foreign policy tasks. And, uh,

of course I understand all the difficulties

that exist in Ukraine right now. A huge

number of people who

play some kind of anti-Russian

card. A large number of people, uh, in

Russia play some kind of

anti-Ukrainian card, and so on. But

that is simply how history turned out.

In effect, we are one and the same people, and we

should strengthen this integration. We

need to resolve all these issues with

Gazprom and gas shutoffs and so

on. But all of that is absolutely just

dust on the huge pedestal of

Russian-Ukrainian unity.

Well, you know, Alexei Anatolyevich, I

think that many of our

viewers who were listening to you sympathetically

immediately tensed up when you said that

Russia and Ukraine, Russians and

Ukrainians, are practically one people. And

that is because many people think that

that is not actually the case.

Yevgeny Alekseyevich, for example, I am

what kind of person am I? I’m half Ukrainian,

half Russian. Uh, a large

part of my relatives live in Ukraine. Until

the Chernobyl nuclear power plant

blew up, all my

relatives lived there. I spent every summer

there. I don’t know, absolutely,

I’m probably more Ukrainian in terms of some of my

roots and genetics. I am absolutely not

trying now to enter areas in which

I am not very competent. I am not

going to try to prove that there is no

such thing as a Ukrainian nation. Yes, for

heaven’s sake, let it exist. And that is

wonderful. Ukrainian culture exists,

and there are many

people who want to

say: "We are not Russians at all, we are

Ukrainians, we are our own people." Wonderful

and excellent, but that does not in any way

contradict integration processes, nor

does it contradict the idea that we can live

within some very, very, uh, very

close arrangement. And to me it is

completely obvious that there is no country

more closely related to Russia than

Ukraine.

Mm-hmm. But at the same time,

many people see today’s Russian foreign policy

not simply

as a policy aimed at integrating

Russia and Ukraine in one area or another,

but as an effort to ensure that this integration

takes place in such a way that Ukraine

ends up economically and politically

dependent

on the Russian Federation. And perhaps

in the future would even delegate part of its

state sovereignty to

supranational bodies. And many people

here absolutely do not like that.

Well, listen, this is a natural

political process. We see the same thing

in the European Union, in

any space where integration processes

are underway. There is a large

country, there is a smaller country; somewhere

there is a larger population, somewhere a smaller

population. And naturally, the elites and

establishments of the two countries—one tries

to dominate the other, while the other

tries to push back and, uh, keep a whole lot of

powers for itself. Naturally, exactly the same thing

happens at the everyday level.

Every time I go to Ukraine

to visit my relatives, we argue

about what matters more: Russian gas

or Ukrainian salo (cured pork fat). It is an endless

process, and it is an objective one. Uh, well,

everything can be calculated, and it is possible to devise

an acceptable arrangement that,

of course, will be criticized every time,

but that is political life: everything

flows, everything changes. Ukraine

is becoming an increasingly developed country. And

Ukraine does not face some of the

problems that Russia may be facing,

objective ones—migration and so

on. Therefore every country tries

every day, every second, every hour

to bargain for better terms for itself. But

this applies not only to countries,

but also to regions, capitals, and cities. It is

a normal process. The main thing is that we

understand that it still has to move

forward.

Still, I should note that according to

all sociological surveys, a larger

number of Ukrainian citizens support not

integration with Russia in politics

and economics, but integration with

the European Union. Although

the prospects for that integration are quite

distant and vague. That too must be

acknowledged.

Well, you see, it would be strange if

the opposite were true. It is perfectly obvious

that Ukrainian citizens who have

the opportunity to visit Europe and

the opportunity to visit Russia proceed

from a very simple fact: that the standard

of living in the European Union is better, and integration into

the European Union would give them more of various

benefits, privileges, and so on. But it seems to me

that these things, on the whole, do not

contradict Russia. I believe that

Russia is part of Europe. And in Russia

processes of integration into the

European Union are also underway, naturally at an incomparably

much slower pace than

this is happening in Ukraine. In Ukraine, uh,

this is completely normal. There are

Euroskeptics in Europe, and there are, in a way,

Russia-skeptics in Ukraine; there is nothing

wrong with that.

Mm-hmm. And Iryna Solomko is raising her hand and

very much wants to ask you one more question.

Yes. My colleagues and I were just listening to you,

and, you know, it occurred to me

that in fact Russian

democrats end precisely at the point

where the question of Ukraine begins.

And all of that is wonderful, but in fact we are

a sovereign state,

yes.

And we definitely want to decide for ourselves whom

to be friends with, what kind of relations

to have, economic, political,

and so on. So these kinds of conversations definitely

I understand—and my colleague too, I think,

will now say that in fact

it is clear that your

voters are in Russia, and this

rhetoric resonates with them, but from the point of view of

geopolitics, in Ukraine, certainly,

what Yevgeny

Alekseyevich was saying—half of your

supporters there have definitely already turned away from you

after hearing this. Because in fact

a modern Russian

politician probably ought to understand that he must

be a democrat not only within his own

state, but also in the geopolitical

sense. And that Ukraine, just like

Belarus, has the right

to be a sovereign state. And without

that understanding, it seems to me that we

will not get very far. Or rather, you will not get very

far. Thank you.

Ah,

thank you very much. This is a kind of inherited

trauma of Ukrainian democracy. You always

seem to think, or someone somewhere seems to think,

that there is a conspiracy to seize Ukraine and

annex it to Russia. No one

is disputing Ukraine’s sovereignty or

the need for the Ukrainian

people to determine their own future themselves—whom

they want to align with and whom they do not want

to align with. There is, it seems to me, no need

to look for grand geopolitical

meanings in this, because

geopolitical meanings imply that

there are always four people sitting in the Kremlin

thinking about how to annex

Ukraine. No one thinks that way. No one needs that.

In fact, it is not that you merely

think this is, of course,

of paramount importance, but I can assure you that in

the Russian political agenda

the issues of integration with Ukraine, unfortunately,

rank only about

twenty-fifth. And no Russian

democrats or, I don’t know,

imperialists, communists—they are not

constantly discussing how

to seize Ukraine or anything like that. This is not

a matter of geopolitics, but a matter for people

like me, who, I don’t know, every

May holidays go to

Ukraine and want there to be

completely, uh, unhindered passage there.

A huge number of people travel to

Russia. We want to live in some kind of

shared state-like space. What

You already have that now, don’t you? You can

come to Ukraine absolutely спокойно.

I mean, here—every year I

spend

6 hours sitting in a car to cross the Russian-Ukrainian border,

whereas, for example, when going to Belarus

I simply drive through without even stopping.

You must admit that is a substantial difference.

We are simply a state, yes, a sovereign

state that has its own border

that needs to be protected. That is absolutely

normal. When you enter Europe,

how long do you stand there?

Please explain to me: when I say

that I want

integration processes to take place, that I want to travel to

Ukraine, and for Ukrainian citizens, my

relatives, to come visit me in Moscow

without spending many hours at the border—what

does that mean? That I am now going to climb onto

your Verkhovna Rada and start tearing down the flag

or ripping off the state coat of arms? No.

And no one wants to encroach on

Ukraine’s sovereignty. There is absolutely no

point in that. In fact, we do not want

to solve your problems either,

of which you have a great many.

And we have not the slightest desire to interfere

in your affairs and do any work

for you.

If I understood you correctly,

Alexei Anatolyevich, you simply want

to cross the border between Russia and

Ukraine by car in roughly the same way

that citizens of sovereign Germany

today cross the border with sovereign

France, for example, without even slowing down.

Exactly. That is also

exactly right. In places where there once

really were border posts,

barriers, customs, and so on.

Exactly. And in Spain, for example,

there are a great many people

who are Euroskeptics and

who want, I don’t know, Spain to separate

or go out under the slogan: "Enough

"feeding Greece." It's a normal process. But

even so, you can easily get from Spain

to Greece, bypassing any other

countries entirely, without stopping anywhere.

That's normal. And the existence of

politicians who strive for greater

political, ethnic, or any other kind of

national identity does not mean

that we should put up barriers and

wage trade wars, and so on.

Alexei Anatolyevich, we're running out of

satellite time, as they say. I'll try

to at least manage to ask you

one last question. So what will happen

after the elections are held on March 4?

What's your scenario, your forecast?

To a large extent, this political landscape

will be determined by Vladimir Putin himself, by the degree

of electoral fraud. If they stage something

more respectable and Putin opts for his

self-appointment in the second round, I think

that will not cause a sharp increase in

protest, although most likely it will not

reduce it either. If Vladimir Putin goes for

the same kind of outrageous fraud

that he carried out quite recently, I

think street protest will grow substantially,

his presidency will become

completely illegitimate, and within

a few months we will see, well, a kind of

serious political

confrontation which, I hope,

will nevertheless not spill over into any kind of forceful

scenario.

Thank you, Alexei Anatolyevich, for

your answers. Let me remind viewers that today on our

program, joining us from the TV studio in Moscow

was one of the most prominent

opposition politicians in today's

Russia, Alexei Navalny. And we will continue

our broadcast.