Text version

(intro music) RTVI TV channel and Echo of Moscow radio present the program Full Albac. Good evening! It is twenty o’clock and seven minutes. You’re listening to Echo of Moscow radio station and RTVI TV channel. I’m Yevgenia Albats, and I’m starting our traditional Sunday program devoted to the key events of the week—those events that will affect the politics of the coming weeks and months. This week there were several such events. On Wednesday, an environmental activist, the defender of the Khimki Forest, Konstantin Fetisov, was beaten with a baseball bat. He’s in the hospital, in a coma. From Friday night into Saturday, journalist Oleg Kashin of the Kommersant publishing house was beaten no less brutally. The beating was exemplary. Phalanges—ah, aaaa—his finger phalanges were smashed so he couldn’t write; his legs were broken so he couldn’t walk; his lower and upper jaw were broken so he couldn’t speak. They beat him as an example. They beat the journalist. Over the past ten years in Russia, twenty-one journalists have been killed. Seventy people have been subjected to attacks. These are figures from the Glasnost Defense Foundation, which—constantly tracks the situation with journalists in the country. Only this year already eight people have been killed and forty have been injured in one way or another. And another event, in my view, closely connected to this story of ours—namely, two marches. The Russian March in Lyublino, with the usual slogans such as “Russia for Russians,” and the Russian March organized by the pro-Kremlin movement Nashi with support from the state agency Rosmolodezh. At that march, the enemies were named one by one; banners were carried. On the banners it said, “Shame on the enemies of Russia.” And then the commissars of Nashi trampled those banners. On one of them there was a portrait of the chairman of the Helsinki Group, a truly saintly person, eighty-two-year-old Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva. That’s what we’ll be talking about today. Only I want to show you—right now the camera will zoom in on this picture—so that those of you who are far from the homeland will know that tomorrow we’ll publish it in the magazine. Look—look at this—this very shot, where one of the commissars of Nashi, well, is stomping on Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s portrait. We remember how that happened—in other countries too, for example, in the thirty-third year in Germany, right? But we’ll get to that a bit later. Now let me introduce my guests. Here in the studio of Echo of Moscow is Andrey Borisovich Zubov, historian. Hello, Andrey Borisovich. Thank you for coming. Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov, politician. Hello, Boris Yefimovich. Hello. Kirill Vladimirovich Shchitov, a State Duma deputy, a member of the Young Guard. Hello, Kirill. And by phone, Alexei Navalny, lawyer and public figure. Alyosh, can you hear us? Yes, good evening. Good evening. Thank you, Alyosh, for finding the time to take part in our program. The first question I’ll ask Kirill Shchitov. Shchitov, excuse me, Kirill Shchitov, precisely because you are a member of the Young Guard, the youth wing of the party in power, the party “United Russia.” On the official website of your organization, the following text was posted. Quote. “Take, for example, the same Oleg Kashin, the author of a scandalous interview with one of the Khimki pogromists; moreover, with one of their leaders, who, as stated in the article, leads the column of anarchists and Antifa activists. Who among us can imagine that a normal, decent person would talk to creatures who are smashing everything in their path?” All of this is posted on the official website of your organization. Let me remind you: this is the youth wing of the party in power, the party “United Russia,” under the heading “Journalists—traitors must be punished.” Next to the text there was a photo of journalist Kashin, on whose chest a stamp read, “He will be punished.” This is a screenshot from that website—so that, God forbid, you don’t think I’m making something up. Please, point the camera. Ah, now—on the website—yesterday it was removed from the Young Guard website. But on the internet, as you know, you can’t hide anything if it was there. This is from the Young Guard website, the youth wing of the party in power, the party “United Russia.” And in this connection, Kirill, I have a natural question: are these your guys who beat Kashin? No, of course not. No. And how can you explain then what’s on your website, by the way, even now—“Journalists—traitors must be punished.” What is that? All right, I’ll explain. First of all, on the website there is an official statement by the Young Guard regarding that tragic event that occurred, yes—and the organization’s position on the methods of beating. That’s the first thing. Second, Oleg Kashin—on the one hand, perhaps, he was an opponent of the organization, political, ideological—nevertheless, in 2006 he took part in our congress. So the question of punishment here isn’t about—about physically inflicting some kind of beating, breaking the shin or something like that. There is political struggle, perhaps some ideological clash, or an informational one. And if a statement is made, by the way—this article, this is not an official statement of the Young Guard as an organization; it’s the opinion of one of the authors. There’s a signature at the bottom that says it’s the author’s opinion and the opinion—

—of the author. He’s a member—this author, a member? Yes, he’s a member of the organization. But still—yes? There were no statements that punishment would be physical, or that it should be physical, or any calls for some kind of physical retribution. Aha. And so, it seems to me—Kirill, excuse me, but here it says, “will be punished.” Right, yes. To punish—Before you, I’ll reveal a secret to you, you’re not new, you’re not the first. Before you, they did the same. There was a website called “Russian Will.” Yes, they— they were a bit more witty than what you did. They indicated the date of birth, and then they said: the date of death—here will be the sentence, it will be carried out. Yes. Yevgenia Markovna, I wanted to emphasize that the case of Russian Will and what the Young Guard does are different things. And now I’m stating the official position of the organization as a member of the organization, as a member of the Political Council. It’s not bad, not good. Our position—my version and our position—is like it is. Punishment, once again, is not physical but informational. We can argue, debate. Journalists—traitors, what is that? In what war, on what fronts is all this happening? There are information wars regarding our country. There are journalists who take a pro-Russian position; there are those who disagree with how the country is being run. If they don’t agree, they’re traitors, right? No, well what does “traitors” even mean—traitors or not? It’s written that way on your website. Journalists—look, I’m reading, camera, zoom in, please, so that God forbid you don’t think I’m making something up. “Journalists—traitors must be punished.” I want to know who these journalists—traitors are, and who will be next on your list. Who will be next—I don’t know. It will depend on how journalists interpret the development of Russia. But when some representatives of the journalistic community call our country—excuse me for an unparliamentary expression—“fucking Russkiye,” well, those kinds of journalists. I don’t know such journalists. Fortunately, you don’t know them. Such journalists do exist; such publications come out from time to time. Basically, the Young Guard as an organization that supports the party “United Russia”—and the party, which is pro-government, and therefore supports the current development of the country, the current course of the government—yes, that’s why it’s pro-government. Basically, journalists—traitors are those who speak out against the current path of development, who criticize the actions of the authorities, who call for some actions to change things that are not always legal. Did I understand you correctly—that all of you who criticize you or your party, your power, or your national leader—yes? That all who criticize—are they traitors? Not quite. I think I was misunderstood. Misunderstood, right? No. And criticism can be constructive, and it can be destructive. So—destructive means traitors? Of course. Tell us what you do with traitors. Or how you intend to deal with them? Once again, once again, this is the third time, maybe the fourth—You know, I really want to hear this from you. Informationally, informationally. What is—what is the power of journalism, as it were? The power of the pen, yes? The power of the word. The Young Guard has its own information resources, where with the power of the word, with the power of the printed word, you can provide a rebuttal, argue. That’s what the struggle is. An information struggle. Once again, I’m just asking you now not to drag it in by the ears and not to try to—It’s hard not to drag it in, you’ll agree. You think it’s hard not to drag it in. And I think it’s hard to drag it in. You wrote, “will be punished.” And on Friday, from Friday night into Saturday—And when was this text written, please tell me. Somewhere after—after Kashin’s materials. So in the summer? Yes. Well, you see what a long time has passed. So you let him live a little? No, why would we let him live? I’m just saying that here—Kirill, I’m asking you again. I’m asking you absolutely seriously. Yes, I’m answering you seriously. On your website of the official organization it was written “will be punished.” From Friday night into Saturday we saw how Kashin was punished. On your website the headline “Journalists—traitors” is still up. I want to understand: does that mean that the policy of the youth wing of the party in power is that if an enemy doesn’t surrender, you destroy him? As it is, as you know, the slogan of the wonderful comrade Stalin. Am I right in understanding that the party in power believes that you, the youth wing, have the right to call people—fellow citizens—traitors? Yevgenia Markovna, once again, you’re doing it again. I’m ready to say it a fourth time, I’m ready a fifth time, I’m ready ten times more to repeat it. To punish—to punish, to fight, informationally—yes. With the power of the word—yes. With the power of fists, beatings—no. You don’t think that people who read your website could interpret the statement “Journalists—traitors must be punished” as a call to action? I don’t think so. I think that people who read our website are perfectly reasonable, adequate—intelligent people who correctly understand the message. And there’s no question of any physical retribution here. Alexei, can you hear me? Yes, yes. Alexei, I’d like now to hear comments from one of the most popular people on the internet. I’ll remind you, listeners and especially viewers of RTVI. I need to tell you that Alexei Navalny is one of the most popular people on the Russian internet; he’s read by more than eighteen thousand people. When there was an online poll about who the internet community would choose as mayor of Moscow, forty percent voted for Alexei Navalny. He’s a lawyer, he deals with—his blog is often called an anti-corruption reception desk. He is currently at Yale University, studying law. And precisely for that reason, he’s not in the studio with us, but on the phone. Alexei, your comment. First of all, what happiness that I’m not in the studio. Nobody sees how red I got. Thank you very much, Zhenya. Secondly, of course, what Kirill just said is something astonishing—what they openly admit that everyone who disagrees with a certain path of development of Russia today, and if they categorically disagree with it—then you can say I disagree with it in a destructive form. I can’t offer you any constructive thing, except that you must immediately leave. These people—an information campaign will be unleashed against them. A-a... I want to say that this is not political struggle; it’s called political sanction. They set up such a nice system in which there are a few—uh—what—???—that is, the government, the United Russia party, which creates proxy organizations under its wing—the Young Guard, which issues political sanctions and hands out radical statements—and directly, combat units. Most often these are fan groups that consist in organizations like Nashi and so on. So it’s precisely through this system that the signal is given to beat or harass a specific person. For example, the same Kashin. I just want to remind you that he complained quite a while ago that he was on the so-called FSO stop—stop lists. He couldn’t fly anywhere; they kept taking him off airplanes. Before every trip, when he came to check in, people would approach him, talk to him, and so on. So for quite a long time, in an organizational sense, he had been put into certain lists of suspicious people—some enemies of Russia. And that’s why these kinds of articles send a very clear signal to these militants: “Beat them!” They send a clear signal to the police: “There’s no need to investigate this.” They send a signal to everyone that these people are outside the law. And in Russia we have a huge number of people—political activists, journalists, and so on—on whom such a label is attached, “radical,” and they really are outside the law. Look at the same Natsbols—how they are treated. A-a... And not even Natsbols, but representatives of liberal groupings, various groups. They can’t go anywhere by train. My acquaintance complains to me again and again: “I can’t go to either the March of Discontent or to my grandmother in the village, because they take me off the train; I’m on the list of enemies. They send me straight to the police station, and there they can do whatever they want with me, because I’m an extremist.” And on the United Russia website, these respectable guys, like Kirill, lead an information struggle that clearly tells them: “Beat this person, and nothing will happen to you for it.” Alexei, well, in your blog you wrote yesterday a detailed post in which you, in essence, said that responsibility for what happened, including to Kashin, should be placed on Kremlin PR technologists. A... And the atmosphere that has been created in the country over the last ten years—the atmosphere of constant division into “ours” and “theirs,” into our enemies and not-our enemies—inevitably produces violence, the expression of which was the attack on Kashin. Am I remembering correctly? Absolutely. And I want to say that despite the fact that the opposition is accused of some kind of extremist rhetoric—indeed, an atmosphere has been created. Look at what is being stated officially. Surkov says: “We won’t just hand over power; we’ll fight.” Pavlovsky says: “Power will hit you in the face.” That’s a literal quote. Then, at some lower level, Kirill and his colleagues write that yes, indeed, he will be punished and must get hit in the face. Then, the guys they hired, literally, hand someone a hit in the face. They really created an entire system. And the level of rhetoric—especially from those in power toward the opposition—its aggressiveness increases every day. These are literally statements saying that we’ll beat you, we’ll kill you, we’ll persecute you; you won’t get any protection. People who sit at some lower level—like the police—but they’re not governors, not heads of administrations—they naturally interpret these signals. They naturally perceive it as instructions for action. And—

all these huge number of youth groupings and special groups associated with them—this is an enormous apparatus for precisely the forceful persecution. Alexei, thank you very much. Boris Nemtsov, what would you say in connection with this whole story? I’d like now to return to these Russian marches, and more precisely—you know, there was an interesting thing that our magazine’s Riia Barabanov noticed. The Russian March that went through Lyublino—the Russian March of nationalists—they unfurled a human-rights slogan: “For your freedom and our freedom.” That’s what, as is known, demonstrators did back in 1968 on Red Square, protesting against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops. And this—this is a picture from that wonderful Russian March organized with the support of the state agency Rosmolodezh—that is, with our tax money. We’re paying for it too, apparently. And here, tell me—what is happening here? Why are they doing it? Why are the authorities doing it? Well, first of all, I believe there’s a direct connection between the attempted murder of Oleg Kashin and the marches of hatred that took place on the fourth, on Unity Day. And—well, the atmosphere of hatred, the atmosphere of contempt for human dignity. These self-incriminating speeches by a representative of the Young Guard—these messages on the internet—of course this is a nightmare. And the responsibility for this lies directly with the authorities and directly with the curator of these so-called youth organizations. In fact, these organizations are of extremist orientation; we must say it plainly: these organizations are extremist. They’ve been taken as extremist in many countries around the world. Many people, in particular from Nashi, are already included in a list of extremists and can’t enter the European Union, for example. These organizations all have a curator with the surname Surkov. Vladislav Yuryevich? Yes. Deputy head of the administration. He bears full responsibility for the atmosphere of hatred—for these articles, yes, that all journalists who disagree with the party of thieves and traitors “United Russia” turn out to be (pause) traitors, yes? I can say that I absolutely disagree with this party and its leader. I believe that its leader has plunged our country into a pit of African corruption. I believe he secured a billion-dollar fortune for his buddies from the Chekist gang. I believe his close friends, the oligarchs, got rich at Russia’s expense. I believe the sooner we remove him from office along with this vile party, the better it will be for our entire country. I completely disagree that people who are in opposition are enemies of Russia. I believe that enemies of Russia are in the Kremlin and in the White House right now. Yes, that’s what I think. You started scaring me, Boris—what is it? Don’t be afraid. I think—I think that there is a deputy to this main curator with the surname Surkov. His name is Vasily Yakimenko. By the way, regarding Yakimenko, there’s a very important remark. At one time Oleg Kashin wrote a message about Yakimenko’s tendency toward pedophilia—specifically that Yakimenko had intimate relations with a teenager, Anastasia Korchyevskaya. This is an underage girl who wrote in her blog that they had an intimate relationship. Kashin wrote about it. Now this story has somehow been forgotten. And I think—unfortunately, in vain, that it was forgotten. Actually, it’s clear why pedophiles become heads of the committee for youth affairs. Well, but I can say that these unprecedented—This is a lawsuit, Boris Yuryevich, I understand that—Excellent. I like it; I’m ready. Here’s what I think: as long as these scoundrels are in power, we’ll have these marches continuing. Now, regarding these marches. Before this summer, as you know, they held this Seliger gathering, right? There was an installation where representatives of the opposition, public organizations, and the same Lyudmila Mikhailovna were dressed in Nazi uniforms. And I, by the way, was there too in Nazi form and also with Lyudmila Mikhailovna, and I made these—on these posters—well, you don’t have this photo in the New Times magazine, but it exists on the internet, where they stomp on and on my photo as well. Ah, yes? Yes, yes, yes. Uh-huh. It doesn’t matter. So, I can say: back then, back then, Yevgenia, I want to remind you, they dressed Nikolai Svanidze, a journalist, in Nazi uniform. Attention! You should understand, this is not a typo. And now they’re trying to arrange for us that they have nothing to do with it, that they only participate in verbal debates. We see their verbal debates across the country. They attack me everywhere. These Young Guard guys. Am I being attacked by you? Everywhere, Young Guard—Where was I attacking you? I didn’t say that I’m talking about you. Young Guard. And who are you? Are you a representative of the organization? But I’m not attacking you. Don’t point your finger—at least that’s impolite. This is great. A person’s villains should be known by sight. In short, they’re everywhere, throughout the whole country. I’m physically healthy, I can give someone a beating, as you yourself—You understand. They’re everywhere trying to intimidate, harass, and scare any dissenters. That’s their principle, and their boss, Surkov, is doing this. Therefore, I think that if Mr. Medvedev really wants to restore basic order in the country—wants the opposition, in accordance with the constitution and the laws, to act; so that journalists aren’t killed, so that they’re not maimed—then Surkov and Yakimenko should be dismissed immediately. Immediately! These people— they are dangerous for the country; they must be removed immediately. Next, these organizations of the hunchbacks—these so-called “hunweibins” that act in our country, that attack journalists and the opposition—these organizations must be disbanded immediately. They are dangerous for society. As long as these organizations exist, there will be a constant threat to journalists, to human-rights defenders, to public figures. They—specifically—and then there’s this march, these colorful pictures. I’m specially—I'm a physicist, as you remember—so look, there were twenty thousand of them. They themselves say there were twenty thousand. Uh-huh. So they all came from other cities. I didn’t bother; I counted how much this march—this Russian march, the march of hatred, as you correctly called it—cost us with you. How much does it cost? How much? There were twenty thousand. So to bring guys from Penza, from Vologda, from Vladimir—normal guys, by the way, very decent guys who even don’t know why they’re going—yes, you need to pay for transport, for accommodation, and to feed them properly, right? On average such a business trip costs five thousand. Believe me, we hold congresses. Yes, five thousand. Now twenty thousand times five—that comes to one hundred million rubles. So for the march of hatred we paid from the budget with you—at least one hundred million rubles. I’m saying, at least one hundred million. Well, Rosmolodezh was supported—our people claim it wasn’t Rosmolodezh that financed it, but some private organizations. Isn’t it your friend Prokhorov? No? I don’t think so. Well, you understand, a person of a world name would still care about his reputation and probably wouldn’t agree to finance scoundrels. On this wonderful note, we’re going to go to advertisements and news, and then we’ll return to the studio. (musical interlude) Full Albats. RTVI TV channel and Echo of Moscow radio present the program “Full Alebard.” Good evening once again. It’s twenty o’clock and thirty-three minutes. We continue here in the Echo of Moscow studio our program devoted to the key events of the week. Today we’re talking about marches of hatred. It’s clear that we began our program with an attempted murder of Konstantin Fetisov, an environmentalist, who is now in a coma. He was beaten with a baseball bat. He’s one of the defenders of the Khimki Forest. And there was also an attempt on the life of our colleague Oleg Kashin, which occurred on the night from Friday to Saturday. And now— and all of this took place on the days when two marches of hatred were held in Moscow: one in Lyublino—where young people, again, were raising their hands in a fascist salute, some of them. And there were the slogans “Russia for Russians.” Well, and naturally there was talk about how to deal with Jewish power. Well, as usual, nothing new, right? But what was really new was what happened on the embankment of Taras Shevchenko in Moscow, where a Russian March took place organized with support from the Federal Agency Rosmolodezh. It’s a state organization that exists with taxpayers’ money. Twenty thousand people were brought from all over the country. Boris Nemtsov calculated that it cost—at least one hundred million rubles. Yes. And there, in particular, they trampled banners with photos of well-known people of Russia, in particular Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva, who was labeled an enemy—an enemy. This was done—this—on the photo that we’re publishing in the New Times magazine, this was done by the commissar of ours, Dmitry Chmarov. Yes, that isn’t the only photo of this kind. What we managed to find. And now I want to ask Andrei Borisovich Zubov—excuse me, Andrei Borisovich Zubov—our well-known historian, professor at Moscow State University. Andrey Borisovich, tell me: with which epochs in the history of our Fatherland, in which epochs in the history of our Fatherland did marches of hatred like this take place? Tell me, does this characterize which era in the history of Russia? What does it say about the current state of minds in our Fatherland? This is early Stalinism. The only era is the time between around the twenty-seventh year, when—Stalin’s struggle with Trotsky and the Trotskyist opposition began. And all of this ended, and the marches ended, in fact, by the year thirty-four. Because after that even such a form of pseudo-spontaneity turned out to be dangerous. But then assemblies began at factories and enterprises, with demands for shootings, executions, and destruction. If the enemy doesn’t surrender, he is destroyed—words by Maxim Gorky, which Stalin repeated many times. So all of this continued in exactly these formats, in fact from the very end of the Stalin regime. The time of the Shakhty case. And up until the case of Jewish doctors in fifty-two, fifty-three years. Aha. So, in general, this is precisely the handwriting of Stalinism. In Lenin’s time there was plenty of nastiness, but this wasn’t there. And after Stalin’s death, that same thing—immediately, it stopped being. Even during the period when Beria and Malenkov ruled the country, in the first months of 1953 after Stalin’s death, from March to July—well, by then, this wasn’t happening anymore. So this is a typical pattern of the Stalin era. Similar things, in fact, happened in Nazi Germany. Not by accident Ribbentrop studied with us. Not by accident. And in general, when he signed the famous Molotov–Ribbentrop pact—meaning, in fact, Hitler, Stalin on August twenty-third, thirty-nine—oh, after that there was such a narrow drinking party in which Stalin and Molotov participated—on the Bolshevik side—and Ribbentrop and Schellenberg on the German side. And then Ribbentrop later recalled, saying that he felt there so comfortable, like among old party comrades. Aha. So, of course, it’s not accidental. Similar things were actively criticized by Mussolini from the moment he hadn’t even come to power yet. This march on Rome, and so on. And in the period after he came to power. It’s interesting that people know this worse—that similar things were practiced in Italy by communists after 1944, when they settled accounts with the Nazis—well, with the Fascists, rather. They were beaten without trial, destroyed, killed in exactly the same way. According to some estimates, about one hundred thousand people perished—those close to the Fascist party. So in fact this is the pattern of two totalitarian systems and two totalitarian parties. The same, of course, was in China and in all the Eastern Bloc. That includes Cambodia, and North Korea. It’s all the same. And from your point of view, Andrey Borisovich, but why? What is it about these marches that makes them so attractive to power in authoritarian totalitarian regimes? We observe similar things in Venezuela too. Of course, very simply. The fact is that any crime requires accomplices. It’s always easier when you’re not alone—when others are with you. The important typical principle of criminality is to smear other people too, so that people can never leave you, never rise up against you. You can easily say: you were together with me, together with me we killed; together with me you voted for the shootings. And in the end, in my opinion, this is just such a satanic involvement in crime and sin, which leads a person to the destruction of conscience and the soul and all that. Because those people who, for example, voted at their factories for the execution of some criminals, starting with the Shakhty case—these people then never could be fully healthy. They understood that they were killers at a distance, and it left a terrible mark on them. That’s basically what it was all done for. Andrey Borisovich, agree with me: in Stalin’s time, Stalin understood that people who get saturated with blood become dangerous. And therefore he removed them in layers—layer by layer he sent them to camps, executed them; new murderers came. Yes. In particular, for example, in the NKVD it was always in layers: Yagoda, then they shot him; his people—then Yezhov came, and so on. And the same thing, in fact, happened to those who were participants in these marches at the end of the twenties, the beginning of the thirties. Well yes, the same thing in Nazi Germany as well, of course. Because naturally, people at the top of totalitarian power had fears that these wolves, especially the young ones, could turn around and throw themselves at their throats. But, well, you see, with us—what is interesting to me—is that Stalin and Hitler understood that sooner or later they would destroy them. They destroyed them. And what will our rulers do? They will—it’s like— they brought twenty thousand people who happily, so, chant, so: “Shame, shame!” And as we can see, portraits of well-known people are sticking out. And then what? Then, it would have to be expected that if this is early Stalinism, they will move on to the actions of our authorities, which were characteristic of the thirties in Russia, in the Soviet Union, in Germany. To speak frankly, it’s hard for me to imagine. Power is weak, and it probably couldn’t resort to mass terror. And there aren’t, as it were, basic economic reasons. And there are no economic reasons. And, by the way, there are no purely political resources for that either. And third, power is too dependent on the West, and capital is there, and so on. So such things are simply impossible. Therefore, I think they do things without realizing what they’re doing. It’s like, by the way, much of what is done now. They don’t understand that these guys can turn around and throw themselves at them. I think that is—well, if it’s not so, then I’m a fool and they’re smart. Well, but it seems to me that the current authorities indeed allow these absolutely unacceptable forms, which, of course, in the future never—

Russia, thank you for that. They won’t say thank you for it. And with each day it becomes clearer that, in general, what they—I'm a historian; I’m representing what future historians will say about this, say, in fifty years. Well, with great bitterness. And that won’t give these people any credit. Well. But it seems to me that, like everything now, it’s amateurish. Well, let’s try. What if it works? What if they go quiet? What if they behave? Indeed, our society today is much—well, you understand—it’s crushed by the same communism, Stalinism, Leninism, by these terrible repressions that began from the very seventeenth year and still haven’t gotten up from their knees. All activists, all active people were destroyed or left, expelled, or died in the civil war. Decent people, for the most part. Or they were simply heavily crushed by camps and then preferred to stay silent. And with such a society it’s easy to govern, and easy to weave ropes out of it. But then someone starts speaking up—a new generation, a young generation, to which, by the way, Kirill Vladimirovich belongs. It hasn’t experienced this oppression, and it becomes dangerous. Because the current authorities, in fact, are parasitizing on the crimes of previous generations—on the crimes of Stalinism, on the crimes, in particular, of Khrushchev and Brezhnev with his psychiatric hospitals—Andropov, and so on. Yes. And it uses society’s lack of voice, it uses its fragmentation. Stalin, at the time, deliberately broke all communal forms—that’s why there was collectivization—so that the Russian society would become atomized, so it would be easy to govern. And he’s using that now. Society begins, I think, slowly, very slowly, to consolidate. This is a natural process under at least limited freedom. Andrey Borisovich, well, you can read on the website of various pro-Kremlin political analysts that in fact they are trying to seize the Russian national idea from radical nationalists, from skinheads, from all kinds of Slavic brotherhoods, and so on, which may pose a threat. And they want, as it were, for the state—to settle that national idea—so that it would be such an enlightened nationalism. What would you say to that? Well, you know, it seems to me that the time for such ideologies has, first of all, passed. And secondly, the era of ideologies—that is, the twentieth century—proved that nothing good comes from these ideologies. All these ideologies of nationalism, racism, Mussolini’s corporate state, yes? Class state, yes—ultimately all of this leads to a national fiasco. By the way, in Russia too there was a national fiasco in 1991. That’s obvious. Similarly, the national fiasco of the Salazar regime; a similar fiasco of the fascist regime in Italy. Well, about Germany, it’s clear to everyone. So all these things are painful. Not by accident is the practice of communism condemned in PACE. Not by accident is Nazism condemned in general, and fascism condemned by all of mankind that has a reasonable mind. These things are extremely dangerous for the future of the country. For a real Russian patriot there’s nothing worse than these Russian marches, the Russian idea. The revival of Russia goes through the revival of the person—through his dignity, his personality, his self-reliance, as Pushkin said. That’s how Russia is revived, and, accordingly, Russian society—not through stirring up these painful feelings which, like a boil, fester and can lead to a serious illness, even to the death of the one in whom the boil has matured. Thank you very much, Andrey Borisovich. Now I have a question for you, Kirill. Uh-huh. Tell me—well, I specifically looked. On your blog, you wrote you were congratulating people on Unity and Concord Day—in your blog. I read carefully. It turns out that, in fact, your organization not only called for dealing with journalists who are traitors— but you held some kind of festival? Yes. Tell me: when you look at these pictures—how does this—how does it seem to you—how does this fit with Unity and Concord Day when portraits are being stomped on? Let me explain. Yevgenia Markovna, I’m just—somehow it’s a bit—maybe not even offended, but it’s a bit shameful for the listeners. From the very first minute of the broadcast we mislead them and apply a substitution of theses. By the way, in rhetoric this is a forbidden trick. Here—starting with dragging in by the ears the opinion of one of the authors of the Young Guard website. Is it the official website? I—once again. The official website? Why did you leave it on the website? Well, why are you interrupting me? You invited me as a guest. Let’s finish my thought, and then I’ll answer your question. It’s the opinion of one of the authors on the official website—but of one author, not of the entire organization. Regarding the Russian March of the Nashi movement. Having no direct relation to this organization, I can say that at that march there was a presentation of various projects of the Nashi movement. For some reason, we pulled out from the context only a photo. By the way, from a moral point of view I don’t approve of these—

forms of political struggle, stomping on portraits. But what was there? There were patriotic projects. In the column, veterans walked as part of the Nashi movement project, “Our History.” There were portraits of those—traitors, enemies—variously called, owners of shops that sell expired products. They are enemies. Managers of brothels. Those are enemies. That’s not enemies, those are criminals. Running brothels is a criminal offense. Are you aware of that? Excuse me, let me ask you a question, Kirill. But I haven’t finished. Well, then you can say nothing. You’ll speak when I allow you to. All right. Then tell me, please, Kirill—are you aware that a criminal can only be called that by a court? Are you familiar with the concept of the presumption of innocence? I agree. I agree. Next. So I’m just describing what was at the Nashi movement rally. I’m not giving an assessment of whether it’s good or bad. And were you there? No, I wasn’t there. I read too, just like you, the news materials about this rally—almost everything about it. So, they walked, they carried portraits—again, of some illegals—more precisely, those who sell alcohol and tobacco products, and so on, right? There is an ideological movement there; there’s some political direction; there’s a struggle against things that are understood politically—how they expressed themselves. I’m saying again: from a moral point of view, I don’t approve of such forms of struggle—for example, stomping on portraits—no stomping—but I didn’t see any specific crime, again, any criminal offense in these actions. Yes, from a moral point of view one can relate differently. As for the Young Guard, indeed, we held a festival “Energy of Streets.” We brought together representatives of various youth subcultures that exist in modern Russia, in the modern world. That’s exactly our position, this is a celebration. By the way, I wouldn’t agree with Andrey Borisovich on that either. Again, we’re distorting the situation a bit. The party in power, the United Russia party, is not trying to somehow sit on the topic of nationalism—on the contrary. United Russia was the initiator of the holiday Unity Day. Why? Because four hundred years ago, in 1612, in 1612—just that year—the people of Russia, having united in the militia of Minin and Pozharsky, where there were Russians and Bashkirs and Tatars and Orthodox Christians and Buddhists and Jews—all together—defeated the Polish-Lithuanian intervention. That is the ideology of this holiday: the unification of the people. I absolutely agree that nationalism will be harmful for Russia, because let’s look at the map of our country. If we take the lands where people live—You know the map of our country well? You asked me about the holiday and my organization’s attitude to this holiday. I’m explaining my organization’s attitude personally. You start telling us that the people here have higher education, that you’re well aware. Nice. Tell me, please: do you believe that when people go through the streets of Moscow, the capital of our homeland, people who call other citizens enemies and traitors—after all, you said it not by accident—criminals, right? Do you believe that this contributes to unity and concord? I believe that when owners of brothels—when sellers—Wait. Are they convicted or not? When owners of brothels, sellers of alcohol, tobacco products—that is, people who violate the law, selling to minors—And you have allowed it for a long time? Excuse me, do you—what—do you relate to the law—you’re an employee of law enforcement? No, I don’t— I’m not. And I’m not saying— I’m not condemning them. I’m saying that what was at the Nashi movement rally. I’m just telling you objective reality. Thank you very much. It’s the organization’s right—Alyosh, are you still here? Alexei, are you still with us, or did they turn you off? Alyosh, tell me—what should I do entirely on my own? You heard all this now. And what will we do, Alyosh? Well, first of all—Obviously, you and I are there, in that same list. First of all, I wanted to say, Kirill, don’t consider us all fools. You sit in the Moscow City Duma, where you have—at United Russia you have eighty percent of the votes. In the State Duma for United Russia, uh, two thirds, a majority. Tomorrow, on Monday—come and from three people pass laws that are needed against snot, against alcohol, and against tobacco. The laws have already been adopted. So what is there to march for then? That’s the first thing. Second, I want to say that it wasn’t even a march of hatred. A march of hatred implies some kind of emotion. These guys had no emotion at all. It was naked cynicism. It was a march in defense of the business of the lake dacha cooperative “Ozero.” It was a march in support of the Rotenberg brothers. It was a Russian march in support of Timchenko, who sits there and clings to Rosneft—in support of people who have clung to Gazprom, oil companies, and so on. That is: a march in defense of a huge pump that sucks money out of a multinational people of the Russian Federation and hides it somewhere in Bondonia, in Switzerland, and so on. What do we do with these people? Well, Jen, here we can’t do anything. I mean, we can’t create now mechanisms with which we can protect political activists, journalists, and so on. Now, of course, there’s a new challenge in front of us, because the authorities have, accordingly, obviously radicalized their actions and reached some completely new levels. That is, beating known activists and journalists for several days in a row is already unprecedented. In this regard, I think, civil society, political activists should be radicalized in principle. We should directly name these people indeed—I agree with the “meme”—as enemies of Russia. United Russia, the party of corruption and swindlers. They are enemies of Russia. These guys are—Lzhedmitry and Marina Mnishek. You understand—against them all marches should be carried out. Thank you, Alexei.

I can’t agree with you: with you, and with Nemtsov. I believe that you can’t call citizens—whose opposition we don’t sympathize with—enemies. You can’t. Because this has been in our history. Boris Nemtsov—so what are we going to do? Declare them enemies and march with—well, I’m not inclined, by the way, I’m inclined to agree with you that you shouldn’t act using their vile methods. It’s wrong. Let God judge them. What do I think should be done? What would I do? Well, first of all I would stop financing extremist organizations. Because they—so it all—Wait, wait, wait a second, hold on. Stop giving money—uh—Excuse me, you asked me a question and you’re not letting me answer. Yes. That’s surprising. So, I think we need to stop financing extremist organizations: the Young Guard, Nashi, Steel, who else there? Russia Young and others, yes, our “hunweibins” concocted—whatever. They all live only off either the budget or the Kremlin’s black cash. We know that well. They spend money fighting against us. That’s all fine. That’s the first thing. Second. If Medvedev wants to carry out modernization seriously, then he needs to get rid of these people who discredit the country and shame it. First of all, it’s two people. You have to fire them immediately. Surkov, Yakimenko. Third. This will happen, as you think? Actually— I think, I think that the journalistic community, you’ll be surprised—this is the rare case precisely because of Oleg. If the journalistic community becomes as unified in solidarity as it has now united in relation to Oleg, and if it conveys its point of view to the president of Russia, then there is a chance to fire these two people. It’s different from zero. I understand that Surkov has an image of a great manager, that he manages Russia, and so on. But you have to understand that this is a line that cannot be crossed. Next. I don’t agree with the analogy with Stalin. Putin is not Stalin. Putin is Stalin and Abramovich, and Abramovich much more. And his task, as Alexei Navalny correctly said, is to preserve his capital and that of his group. These people are tasked with intimidating the opposition, journalists, human-rights defenders—so that under no circumstances will they dare to demand their own rights, including the right to elect, the right to freedom of the press, the right to have a different point of view, and so on. These young people are not guilty of anything. I believe that most of them even didn’t know where they were going and what posters they would carry. I’m absolutely sure that with the same success they could have come to Triumfalnaya Square, if they brought there on the thirty-first, they could have come to this march in Lyublino—anywhere. So—listen, the vile thing about these citizens, Surkov and Yakimenko, is that they corrupt the youth. They make it cynical, sellable, completely devoid of ideas, and completely unpatriotic. We know perfectly well how Seliger is financed. We know how many tens of millions of dollars were spent so they would wash their brains. They fear their own people. And these so-called fighters, these hunweibins there—I don’t know, Putin Jugend or Surkov Jugend, I don’t know what they’ll be called. They are needed exactly so that people can’t protect themselves, their rights, and protect our Constitution. That is completely clear. Therefore I believe this: we should now unite together—journalists, human-rights defenders, the opposition—and achieve that this cancerous tumor in the form of Surkov and Yakimenko will fly out of here to hell. To judge them there or not—another matter. History will judge. By the way, I’m absolutely not bloodthirsty. I believe they are bringing an absolutely nightmarish climate to what’s happening now. In addition, I want to say that Surkov is part of a commission. You know McFaul, Surkov. I believe that if we really want to talk seriously about restoring order, then at least the West should behave adequately and not pretend that it doesn’t know that journalists are being killed and maimed. I think it’s a disgrace for the Obama administration to continue working on the McFaul–Surkov commission. A disgrace! McFaul must leave that commission unilaterally, because by being present at meetings with Surkov he thereby makes him legitimate. And he is outside the law—

and now Russia—thanks for that—won’t say anything. And with each day it becomes more and more clear that, in general, what they are doing is—I'm a historian. I represent what future historians will say about it, in fifty years or so, and in general with great bitterness. And that won’t bring credit to these people. Well. But it seems to me that, like everything now, it’s amateurish. Well, let’s try. What if it works? What if they stay quiet? What if they start behaving? Indeed, our society today is—well, you see, it’s crushed by the same communism, Stalinism, Leninism, these terrible repressions that began from the very seventeenth year and still haven’t gotten up off their knees, in fact. All activists, all active people were destroyed or left, expelled, or died in the civil war. Decent people, mostly. Or they were simply heavily crushed by camps and then preferred to stay silent. And with such a society it’s easy to govern, and it’s easy to twist ropes out of it. But when someone starts speaking up—a new generation, the young generation, to which, by the way, Kirill Vladimirovich belongs—it hasn’t experienced this oppression, and it becomes dangerous, because the current authorities, in fact, are parasitizing on the crimes of previous generations, on the crimes of Stalinism, on the crimes, in particular, of Khrushchev and Brezhnev with his psychiatric hospitals, Andropov, and so on. Yes. And it uses society’s lack of voice, it uses its disunity. Stalin, at the time, deliberately broke all communal forms—hence collectivization—to bring about the atomization of Russian society so that it would be easy to govern. And he uses this now. Society begins, I think, gradually, very slowly, to consolidate. This is a natural process under at least limited freedom. Andrey Borisovich, well, you can read on the websites of various of our pro-Kremlin political scientists that in fact they are trying to seize the Russian national idea from radical nationalists, from skinheads, from all kinds of Slavic brotherhoods, and so on, which may pose a threat. And they want, as it were, for the state—to settle that national idea—but it would be such an enlightened nationalism. What would you say to that? Well, you know, it seems to me that, first of all, the time for such ideologies has passed. And secondly, the era of ideologies, that is, the twentieth century, proved that these ideologies don’t bring anything good. All these ideologies of nationalism, racism, Mussolini’s corporate state, yes? A class state, yes—everything ultimately leads to national fiasco. By the way, in Russia there was also a national fiasco in 1991. It’s completely obvious. Similarly the national fiasco of Salazar’s regime, a similar fiasco of the fascist regime in Italy. Well, about Germany, it’s clear to everyone. So these things are painful. Not by accident, the practice of communism has been condemned in PACE. Not by accident, Nazism is condemned in general, and fascism is condemned by all of reasonable mankind. These things are extremely dangerous for the future of the country. For a real Russian patriot there is nothing worse than these Russian marches, the Russian idea. The revival of Russia goes through the revival of the person, his dignity, his personality, his self-reliance, as Pushkin said. This is how Russia is revived, and correspondingly, Russian society—rather than through stirring up these painful feelings which, like a boil, fester and can lead to a serious illness, even to the death of the one in whom that boil has matured. Thank you very much, Andrey Borisovich. Now I have a question for you, Kirill. Uh-huh. Tell me—well, I, mm— I looked on purpose. You wrote on your blog that you were congratulating people on Unity Day—and Concord—in your blog. I looked closely. It turns out that, meaning, your organization not only, meaning, called for dealing with journalists—traitors—but that you held some kind of festival. Yes. Tell me: when you look at these pictures—tell me, how does this seem to you—how does it go along with Unity and Concord Day, when portraits are being trampled? Let me explain. Yevgenia Markovna, I’m just—somehow it’s a bit—maybe not offended, but a bit shameful before the listeners. We somehow from the very first minute of the broadcast put them in the wrong and use a substitution of theses. By the way, in rhetoric this is a forbidden trick. Here, starting with pulling in by the ears the opinion of one of the authors of the Young Guard website. Is it the official website? I’ll say again. The official website? Why did you leave it on the website? Well, why are you interrupting me? You invited me as a guest. Let’s let me finish, and then I’ll answer your question. This is the opinion of one of the authors on the official website, but one author, not of the entire organization. Regarding the Russian March of the Nashi movement. Having no direct relation to this organization, I can say that at that march there was a presentation of various projects of the Nashi movement. For some reason, we pulled out from the context only the photo. By the way, from a moral point of view I don’t approve of these—

He is not legit. Unfortunately, we have to go off the air at this point. I thank everyone who was with us. Alexei Navalny, thank you very much for being with us. Alexei, we’ll always be waiting for you. Thank you to everyone who was in the studio of Echo of Moscow. All the best. Take care, and I hope that I’ll see you again in a week. (music)