Broadcast of “Lost Focus” from October 15, 2014.

A. VENEDIKTOV: It’s 9:05 p.m. in Moscow. Today we recorded this interview; that’s allowed now. The politics of Alexei Navalny. I’m here with Lesya Ryabtseva. Good evening, I suppose. L. RYABTSEVA: Good evening. A. VENEDIKTOV: And Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny, good evening. A. NAVALNY: Good evening. L. RYABTSEVA: Alexei Anatolyevich, we recently visited Anna Veduta in the States. She misses home, she’s feeling down, and she sends her regards to you and to the foundation. Do you miss her? A. NAVALNY: I certainly miss all my colleagues—those in Moscow and those now in America. One of the unpleasant things about house arrest is that these people are so close, they’re working, and you need to be in touch with them every day. But you’re separated from them. So of course I miss everyone. L. RYABTSEVA: But Anna is separated not only because of your house arrest. She left for the States. A. NAVALNY: Anna left for the States, fortunately of her own free will. I hope she’s doing very well... Ashurkov was forced to leave for Britain. Unfortunately, when we looked at how many people in the office are under criminal prosecution or were forced for one reason or another to leave Russia, the number was quite large. I miss all of them, of course. A. VENEDIKTOV: Since we’ve started talking about missing people, Alexei Anatolyevich, the first question comes from our listeners: do you think the protest movement in Russia has fizzled out? A. NAVALNY: What is the protest movement? If we mean simply a large number of people physically out in the streets— A. VENEDIKTOV: We’re not talking about a “protest mood,” we’re talking about a “protest movement.” A. NAVALNY: But the protest movement also exists inside each individual. If you want to do something to secure a better future for your country, then the protest movement hasn’t gone anywhere. For me, it certainly hasn’t gone anywhere. I see our office buzzing with activity; huge numbers of people want to work with us, both as volunteers and as staff. Our campaign for ratification of Article 20 of the UN Convention is going fairly well. On the other hand, of course, we do see a lot of disappointment and demotivation among a significant part of what is commonly called the protest movement. For some reason they’re frightened or confused by the famous 84 percent approval, support, and so on. Personally, that doesn’t bother me at all, because I understand that today it’s 84 percent, and tomorrow it may not even be 4 percent—as we’ve seen in Russia’s recent history as well. L. RYABTSEVA: But compared with 2012, fewer people now seem to be reviving that protest mood within themselves. Why? What changed? A. NAVALNY: Lesya, you’re just very young. You remember 2011–2012, but I, for example, can remember 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, when there was a kind of gloom that’s almost impossible to imagine even now. And the rallies that began in 2012 were simply fantastic. If someone had said in 2009 or 2010 that 100,000 people would come out onto the streets of Moscow tomorrow, people would have just laughed. L. RYABTSEVA: Do you still see yourself as a leader of the protest mood? A. NAVALNY: I want to be, and I try to be, one of the leaders of the opposition movement. And even more broadly, one of the leaders of those who believe Russia should follow a normal European path. Russia should develop. You can call it leader of the opposition, leader of the protest movement—I try to live up to that role. L. RYABTSEVA: You said you try to be one of them—who else are your allies? A. NAVALNY: I have a great many allies. Anyone who declares the right things—and first and foremost that means a European path of development for Russia—is my ally. Even if I criticize them a lot, or may criticize them. That includes Khodorkovsky, Prokhorov, Yabloko, nationalists, leftists, rightists—anyone. For me there are some basic things, a system of values: Russia’s European path of development, the fight against corruption. Those are the things everyone supports. I’d just like to say very briefly that we now have a sociological service working at the Anti-Corruption Foundation. And that, by the way, is one of the reasons why... A. VENEDIKTOV: We’ll come back to that. We have questions. I’d still like to return to the protest movement. When I say “movement,” I mean it in the European sense of the word. A movement is a political movement. Not a movement of the soul, not something internal—it’s some kind of association, maybe a proto-party. There was a huge protest wave that united different people with different views. In that sense, why did the protest deflate? Was there disillusionment? How does it look to you—from your room, where you’re sitting under house arrest, let’s remind listeners? What’s your view from there? A. NAVALNY: From here it seems to me that it’s clearly a combination of reasons. On the one hand, repression. You remember the Coordinating Council was created. Forty-five people, and I think criminal cases were opened against about fifteen of them within a month. Searches and so on. So yes, repression, absolutely. Some people can withstand it, some can’t. On the other hand, of course, a lot of people who support the protest movement want immediate victories. We came out to a rally once, twice, and we don’t want to go a third time because we haven’t achieved anything. We’ve already spent two weekends on this. And Putin—his regime still hasn’t collapsed. So yes, those attitudes exist, and people need to have this explained to them. But it’s a whole complex of reasons. There are ups and downs, and the same goes for Putin’s ratings. The same goes for the protest movement. That’s part of politics. Of course I’d prefer it if hundreds of thousands or half a million people were marching through Moscow. They aren’t. But that doesn’t mean I personally should give up what I’m doing and become disillusioned. L. RYABTSEVA: A significant number of those who came out onto Bolotnaya Square and Pushkin Square are now part of Putin’s electorate; they returned to him after Crimea was annexed. Do you agree? A. NAVALNY: I agree that among those people who are usually considered the protest-minded part of the electorate, attitudes toward events in Ukraine, Crimea, and so on are mixed. But just look inside families—one person is for Crimea, another is against it. Some think there are terrible Banderites (a Russian term for Ukrainian nationalists, often used pejoratively) in Ukraine, others think Ukraine is undergoing a national revolution. That’s normal. I don’t see some enormous problem in that, including in relation to elections... A. VENEDIKTOV: The question was also that when these people came out on Bolotnaya and Sakharov Avenue, they supported the protest, but they were latent Putin voters. In other words, within the protest movement there were people who were politically loyal to Vladimir Vladimirovich. A. NAVALNY: That’s normal. People don’t think as a monolith. Any of us—if we start segmenting our political views, in each of us we’ll find, to use the silly phrase, a “latent Putin voter.” And yet, in some system of views, both you and I will find something where we agree with Putin 146 percent. There’s nothing страшного about that. We’re not trying to divide everything and build some black-and-white world. We’re saying that the shades are quite obvious. The current regime is leading the country in the wrong direction. But to say that only people with not the slightest sympathy for Putin belong to the protest movement—that seems wrong to me. L. RYABTSEVA: We had a question from a listener: what do you think is good about Putin’s system? What would you single out as positive? A. NAVALNY: In Putin’s system? A. VENEDIKTOV: Those 146 percent where you coincide. A. NAVALNY: It’s completely pointless to deny that in the first years of his presidency Putin did some things right. For example, tax reform. Maybe it had been prepared earlier, but Putin implemented it. Administrative reform was launched. From the very beginning, since 1999, I considered myself one of Putin’s opponents, a principled opponent. But it would be foolish to deny that some correct things were done. A. VENEDIKTOV: Wait, I can’t let that pass, sorry. I don’t remember about 1999, but in 1999 you were in Yabloko, or close to Yabloko. And we remember that when Putin was confirmed as prime minister, Yabloko split; Grigory Alexeyevich personally voted “for” as a deputy. So even within Yabloko there was support for Putin—about half. A. NAVALNY: I’d say that was still connected to political practice: if you don’t support him today, you won’t get money tomorrow. A. VENEDIKTOV: That sounds awfully cynical. A. NAVALNY: Let’s put it this way: Yabloko, for example, also kept voting for Luzhkov. In Moscow. Even when Mitrokhin and I were running around various rallies and illegal construction sites denouncing him, Yabloko nevertheless supported Luzhkov in the mayoral election a few years later. I don’t want to rake over old coals now... A. VENEDIKTOV: I’m just trying to understand—Lesya asked what in politics seems... A. NAVALNY: Let’s put it this way: I entered politics and joined Yabloko when it became clear that Putin would become president. That’s when I went into political activity. Because even then it was clear to me what that meant: that the country would head in the wrong direction. A. VENEDIKTOV: So you liked, you agreed with, the first period of reforms. By the way, given the current economic situation, the question has again arisen of replacing the flat income tax with a progressive scale. Which side are you on? A. NAVALNY: No, I’m against introducing a progressive scale now. Because the issue is administration. They’ll simply collect less money. A. VENEDIKTOV: Like Ulyukayev—he could work in Medvedev’s government. Economy Minister Ulyukayev gave us exactly the same answer. A. NAVALNY: Actually, it’s astonishing, because at the level of rhetoric they all say the right things. Take any of them—they say perfectly normal, correct things. Crimea will remain part of Russia and will never again, in the foreseeable future, become part of Ukraine. Because they say one thing and do something entirely different. You see? On the one hand they speak in favor of cutting government spending; on the other hand, the same Ulyukayev says let’s send another brazillion rubles to some innovation projects. We all understand that this money will simply be stolen. Or buried in the ground. But they keep spending it, over and over again. Yet what they say sounds good. A. VENEDIKTOV: Back to the protest movement and its former leaders. Tell me: these events—in the Coordinating Council, these were your friends, your political allies. Who disappointed you? Which of your comrades from 2011–2012 truly disappointed you as people? A. NAVALNY: I can’t say I was disappointed in anyone. Because I never expected everyone to be superhuman. People are people. Human beings are weak. So there’s no need to make superhuman demands of them. I’m somewhat, let’s say, annoyed by the behavior of what’s called the national-democratic wing. Because I spent a lot of time trying to build bridges between nationalists and liberals, and the fact that the emerging national-democratic movement has now, in connection with events in Ukraine, turned into a pro-Soviet movement—and the nationalists have become these ridiculous Soviet patriots, straight out of 1991—that is a source of some frustration. A. VENEDIKTOV: Who, for example? Limonov? A. NAVALNY: Limonov, the National Democratic Party, Krylov, Tor, and so on. They were all on the Coordinating Council. And it’s an astonishing thing, because the state still pressures them, their party was deregistered, just look—they’re nowhere to be seen. There is no real nationalist political agenda in the country. All the talk they used to make about defending the rights of Russians in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Chechnya, the North Caucasus—nobody discusses any of that. They remain completely marginalized. But at the same time they’ve become a kind of support group for Putin over Ukraine. A. VENEDIKTOV: And what about people who also symbolized the Coordinating Council, though on the other side of the spectrum—Kasparov, Larionov, Sobchak, Nemtsov? Have you been disappointed in them? A. NAVALNY: No. That’s each person’s choice. A. VENEDIKTOV: It’s their choice. But what is your attitude toward that choice? A. NAVALNY: I never expected Ksenia Sobchak to keep tearing her shirt off and climbing onto the barricades with the same consistency and for so long. I understood where all these people came from. And I simply don’t make demands of them that would be foolish to make. They’re not professional politicians—if we’re talking specifically about Ksenia. She has a certain, fairly eclectic system of views. But she sticks to it. In some ways she’s consistent, in others not. I don’t demand of them: “You bastards, I’m sitting under house arrest, suffering for all of you, now go out immediately and burn a car.” I don’t demand that and never have, because I understand they’re not going to burn any cars. That’s all. L. RYABTSEVA: Speaking of Ksenia Sobchak’s views—once she called you Putin 2.0. She thinks your methods are similar. Do you agree with that characterization? A. NAVALNY: I don’t agree. It’s actually quite an astonishing thing. Because Ksyusha was a conduit for the ideas of that part of the Coordinating Council that was constantly demanding from me: what is all this chatter, why are you sitting around discussing things? Just bang your fist on the table, declare yourself the main leader here, and say: I’ve decided everything for you, I’m the main opposition figure. My position of building a coalition and having long discussions was seen more as weakness. And at the same time they accuse me of dictatorial tendencies. I don’t quite understand why that happens. A. VENEDIKTOV: We’ll come back to that. For now we’re staying on the topic of the protest movement. In 2011–2012, in my view, the protest movement consisted of three large blocs. Roughly speaking, as you said: national-democratic, communist or leftist, however you want to call it—and we’ve forgotten about them—and liberal. Or bourgeois, as Limonov would say. Each had its own leaders. You named the national-democratic leaders. What would you say about the left, people like Sergei Udaltsov? Did they leave the protest movement? A large contingent of the protest movement was left-wing. A. NAVALNY: It’s hard to say whether it was large or not. I still hold the view that the protest movement was not made up of ideological columns at all. Being inside it, I saw that ideology was almost irrelevant—3 percent, maybe. Among the leaders, perhaps, they were endlessly dividing themselves into left, right, liberals, and so on. But in reality, the people who came to the rallies came for values. Or against phenomena they disliked: against corruption, for fair elections, and so on. These people did not carry any personal ideological identification with them. As for the left who were present in the leadership, in the Coordinating Council, and so on, unfortunately it also has to be admitted that their left-wing sentiment was more like Soviet nostalgia. They wanted to return to the Soviet Union. And Putin has now said to them: guys, let’s go back to the Soviet Union. They liked that very much, and that’s where support for Crimea comes from, and their ridiculous reaction to these Putin triggers. Putin says “fascists,” like Pavlov’s dog, and they immediately have to jump up and shout: no, fascism shall not pass, we are against fascists. And we can see that he is cynically slapping on these labels from the Soviet past—Banderites, punishers, fascists—and unfortunately the left reacts to these labels like Pavlov’s dog. A. VENEDIKTOV: It sounds to me as if you’re a little envious of Vladimir Vladimirovich’s ability to pull people over to his side that way. Something like that came through, Alexei Anatolyevich—he slaps on labels, and they fall for it. A. NAVALNY: Putin is unquestionably an outstanding political figure, and he has achieved great mastery in manipulating public consciousness. It would be foolish to deny that. Putin has now said to them: guys, let’s go back to the Soviet Union. They liked that very much, and that’s where support for Crimea comes from. A. VENEDIKTOV: Every politician tries. A. NAVALNY: Exactly. But I can say that, unfortunately or fortunately, I work with the part of the population that thinks before saying something. Putin can feed people nonsense on television—saying let’s impose food sanctions and tomorrow we’ll all be eating not nasty European produce but delicious apples from Oryol or Voronezh. But anyone who understands the basics of economics knows that sanctions won’t lead to apples from Oryol tomorrow; they’ll lead to imported apples, just more expensive. So I work with the people who understand a little better how the world works. And that’s why even if I wanted to, I couldn’t allow myself to do what Putin does. Just... wait for applause. L. RYABTSEVA: Alexei Anatolyevich, let’s shift to another plane. Let’s move a little toward Khodorkovsky. In your view, are you competitors or allies? A. NAVALNY: Unquestionably allies. L. RYABTSEVA: Against what? A. NAVALNY: In what sense would I be competing with Khodorkovsky right now? Khodorkovsky is sitting abroad and he... A. VENEDIKTOV: The key word there, I think, is “sitting.” A. NAVALNY: Quite right—he’s abroad, and under current legislation he’s barred from running for office. I’m sitting under house arrest; I’m barred from running. In our Progress Party, out of seven members of the political council, I think criminal cases have been opened against five or four. So talking about us somehow competing is frankly laughable to me. L. RYABTSEVA: Allies against what? A. NAVALNY: We are allies for a European path of development. What I really like about Khodorkovsky is that he says directly: I work with those who support a European path for Russia’s development. That’s the basic friend-or-foe system. If someone is for the European path, then Khodorkovsky is my ally, of course. A. VENEDIKTOV: What don’t you like about Mikhail Borisovich? Let me remind listeners that we asked Mikhail Borisovich the same questions in mirror image, so I’d like... A. NAVALNY: You asked him—I’ve only seen him on television. Right now he can’t come here, and I can’t leave here. So I simply don’t know him. A. VENEDIKTOV: What don’t you like in his current statements? Here you coincide—European path—but where do you differ? A. NAVALNY: Let’s say I think his strategy isn’t quite right. Though I understand why he does it. He declares: I will work only with the people who are already with me—liberals, pro-Europeans, and so on. As for everyone else, I’m tired, I can’t anymore, I don’t want to. Let Navalny work with them. It seems to me that this is the wrong division, and it makes his activity less effective. A. VENEDIKTOV: So liberal Khodorkovsky and Navalny, leader of the national democrats, let’s say. Is that how he sees it, or how you see his position? You lead this column, he leads that one. A. NAVALNY: Nobody is leading any columns. A. VENEDIKTOV: Roughly speaking. A. NAVALNY: Khodorkovsky addresses—he has segmented his part of the electorate. And he addresses those people, works with them. My principled position is that you have to address all people. That’s where we differ. He says: I don’t want to work with everyone. In a way, I understand him. He’s tired. He says: I’m fed up, I don’t want to spend my life talking to people I dislike and who will never understand me. But I like all people. And after my mayoral campaign, the main conviction I came away with is that I can talk perfectly well with any pensioners, military men, police officers—anyone at all. L. RYABTSEVA: And ministers. A. NAVALNY: And ministers. Anyone. What’s the problem? L. RYABTSEVA: And you’d talk to Putin too. A. NAVALNY: I’d talk to Putin—why wouldn’t I? He’s a Russian citizen, he votes, maybe one day he’ll vote for me. L. RYABTSEVA: You said you’ve only seen Khodorkovsky on television. So you haven’t kept in touch with him? You didn’t try to contact him? A. NAVALNY: How? He was imprisoned in 2003, as we remember, and in 2003 I wasn’t well-known enough for Khodorkovsky to pay any attention to me, even if I had wanted to communicate with him. While he was in prison, we exchanged several letters. And now we simply can’t meet. L. RYABTSEVA: But contact him through someone else, pass along a few words? A. NAVALNY: Ashurkov met with him, Volkov maintains some regular contacts with him. So as I understand it, Khodorkovsky isn’t trying to act like some kind of star now; he’s fairly open, a lot of people communicate with him. He personally answers emails, so it’s possible to reach him. We’ve exchanged a few messages here through a complicated communication system. A. VENEDIKTOV: But in opposition circles there’s discussion about who would be the presidential candidate: you or Khodorkovsky. That’s where our questions come from. Would you agree, toss a coin, or—as one listener asks, or rather asserts in the form of a question—Navalny as president, Khodorkovsky as prime minister? A. NAVALNY: That format of discussion makes no sense simply because if we assume we live to see 2016 or 2018, then in 2018 neither I nor Khodorkovsky will be running for anything. Because we’re barred by this law, which Putin apparently adopted largely with me in mind—to ban all convicted criminals from running for office. So if the moment comes when either I or Khodorkovsky can genuinely seek elected office, that means some grand changes have taken place and all this legislation that bars us from running has been repealed. You’ll agree that a lot would have to happen for that. A. VENEDIKTOV: Then my question is: what will the protest movement do in the 2016 parliamentary elections and the 2018 presidential election, if everything proceeds on schedule? There are no candidates for president, Khodorkovsky and Navalny are barred... A. NAVALNY: We’ll find a candidate. A. VENEDIKTOV: A common one? A. NAVALNY: Of course. A. VENEDIKTOV: You think you’ll find a single common candidate? A. NAVALNY: At least right now I’m sure of Khodorkovsky—and not only Khodorkovsky, but many other politicians—that everyone will be able to put aside their ambitions, hold normal primaries, and choose a single candidate. Even if I, he, or someone else is not allowed to run. And that is actually a crucial part of the strategy. You’re talking about 2016 now; for us the question isn’t which party to run from, the question is what to do in a situation where they simply don’t allow normal candidates onto the ballot. Despite all their mythical 84 percent, they keep winning only because they allow only weak candidates to run. They sit there themselves, choose those who have no chance of winning, and only let them onto the ballot. So it’s entirely possible—in fact I’m convinced—that the Kremlin will try to implement exactly the same scenario in the 2016 elections. A. VENEDIKTOV: And then? A. NAVALNY: Then we’ll act according to circumstances. Right now we must fight to ensure that everyone has the right to participate in elections. In 2016 we’ll see what the situation is. What Yabloko will do, what the Communists will do. Whether they include anyone in their lists. Whether single-mandate candidates are registered or not. There’s no point making those predictions now. L. RYABTSEVA: Khodorkovsky believes the system can be changed through educating the population. Then there will be no need for a revolution. Do you agree? Will that help? A. NAVALNY: What does “educating the population” mean? Handing out textbooks or giving lectures? I don’t quite understand. L. RYABTSEVA: Khodorkovsky wanted to create some kind of school. A. VENEDIKTOV: Let’s call it, conditionally, Open Russia. L. RYABTSEVA: One that engages in education and finds new young people with clear minds in the provinces, educates them in something, teaches them European values. And then change in the system will go from the bottom up. In other words, not that you choose Putin from above, but that people from below will want change. A. NAVALNY: It seems to me Khodorkovsky is doing this for exactly the same reason as everyone else who does and says such things—people who came into opposition politics from business or from some other kind of politics. Kudrin is doing the same thing, Prokhorov did it, now... They simply came into opposition politics and don’t quite understand what exactly they should do. So they say: let’s create some schools and educate someone. There was already Open Russia. There is the Committee of Civil Initiatives. They run their wonderful schools, lectures, and so on. But at those lectures and schools they sit with people who already know everything perfectly well. They don’t need educating. So it seems to me that continuing to work with this elite segment of the population—the 10 percent—doesn’t make much organizational sense. Because, Lesya, what are they going to teach you, me, or Alexei Alexeyevich? Of course one can always learn something. But it’s unlikely to seriously affect our political views. A. VENEDIKTOV: Let me remind listeners that Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny is on the air at Echo of Moscow. Lesya Ryabtseva, Alexei Venediktov. Right after the news we’ll return to this studio. A. VENEDIKTOV: It’s 9:35 p.m. in Moscow. Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny is giving an interview to Alexei Venediktov and Lesya Ryabtseva. O. RYABTSEVA: Alexei Anatolyevich, there are several questions from listeners that I simply had to ask you. Are you Orthodox? A. NAVALNY: Yes. O. RYABTSEVA: How do you feel about the growing closeness between the Church and the state? A. NAVALNY: That’s quite a question for a quick-fire round! It’s hard to answer briefly. In principle, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the idea itself. We see, for example, that all American presidents go to church, and there has never been a U.S. president without his own spiritual adviser, and so on. But in the form this takes in Russia, it has a strong administrative slant, which I certainly don’t like, even though I am Orthodox. O. RYABTSEVA: Would you have your own spiritual adviser if you were president? A. NAVALNY: I don’t have one now, and probably wouldn’t if I became president or held some other office. But that’s a matter of evolution, of inner evolution. I mean, would I need one in order to hold some office? In the U.S., or in many other countries—in Poland, for example—you have to display a certain demonstrative religiosity. In Russia, by the way, you don’t need to do that; it doesn’t affect your electoral chances at all. It’s a matter of inner evolution. If I feel I need such a person, I’ll look for one. O. RYABTSEVA: One more question: how do you feel about people wearing St. George ribbons, the so-called “Colorado beetles” (a derogatory slang term for pro-Kremlin patriots, based on the ribbon’s black-and-orange stripes)? A. NAVALNY: People wearing St. George ribbons are certainly not “Colorado beetles” to me; they are people wearing St. George ribbons. As someone who also comes from the Soviet Union, who used to go with his grandmother—a war veteran—to Gorky Park, where she looked for her fellow soldiers, I relate to it normally. What I don’t like is that they’ve turned the St. George ribbon into some kind of strange fetish, and now there are these ridiculous bows—whoever can stick on the biggest one—on their lapels. When military personnel wear them, even though in that form it actually formally violates uniform regulations. Unfortunately, I’m unhappy that they’ve vulgarized and distorted this symbol. I don’t have this instinctive revulsion where if you put on a ribbon, that means you’re bad, or if there’s a ribbon hanging from your car, you’re bad. It’s just that people... Victory, the Soviet Union—we all come from the Soviet Union. A. VENEDIKTOV: I’ll add one more quick-fire question. People will probably immediately think of Robespierre, but this isn’t my question. Nisa-2104 asks: “Which foreign politician do you respect most?”—meaning a current politician, not a Russian one. A. NAVALNY: You know, I respect and admire all politicians who... A. VENEDIKTOV: Alexei Anatolyevich! A. NAVALNY: I don’t have one specific politician, current or even not current... A. VENEDIKTOV: Respect. We’re talking about respect. A. NAVALNY: Any politician who comes to power in a European country or in the United States under conditions of monstrous competition, truly monstrous pressure and stress, is someone I respect. And with pleasure—especially now, when I have plenty of time—I read their memoirs and study how everything works there. It’s all interesting. A. VENEDIKTOV: All right. Then let’s return to our topic of power. How do you see the issue of a change of power in Russia? By what means, in your view, is it most likely and most effectively possible now for one team to replace another? A. NAVALNY: People often remind me of a phrase from some interview where I said that power in Russia would not change as a result of elections. A. VENEDIKTOV: I don’t even remember that. Answer as of today. A. NAVALNY: Unfortunately, looking at what’s happening, I still see that under this system it is unlikely that power in Russia can change through elections, simply because real candidates are not allowed onto the ballot. At one time it seemed more plausible that protest actions, some kind of revolution, might be the scenario. Now, perhaps, a late-Soviet scenario is more likely: power simply gradually disintegrates because it is unable to fulfill its social promises, and so on. A. VENEDIKTOV: And then some Politburo member like Gorbachev... yes? A. VENEDIKTOV: They’ll be forced to do it. A. VENEDIKTOV: Am I understanding correctly? I’m just clarifying. A. NAVALNY: Possibly even Putin himself, Medvedev, anyone. Look at what’s happening to the economy. The country’s officials cannot carry out Putin’s famous May decrees on salaries when oil prices are below $88 a barrel. So one way or another, at some stage they will be forced to undertake at least some economic reforms. And economic reforms in these conditions will drag political consequences along with them. So it’s entirely possible they’ll start pretending to carry out reforms, but in the course of staging those economic reforms, they’ll run into political problems too. A. VENEDIKTOV: So, Gorbachev? A. NAVALNY: Quite possibly. I’m not inclined to make forecasts, because all these forecasts... A. VENEDIKTOV: I’ve lost a listener’s question about the street. How effective is taking to the streets—I mean not so much barricades... I’ve just lost the question... Mass rallies of many thousands—how effective are they? A. NAVALNY: They are effective. I believe there is nothing more effective than that. Power will change only if we put pressure on it. There are different ways to apply pressure, from simply sitting at your computer and voting for our bill on ratifying Article 20 of the UN Convention, to holding seminars, to educating people. But the main thing is that in the end you have to be out on the street, because any government anywhere in the world, at any time, starts doing something only if it feels threatened and under pressure. That’s what happened in 2012, when people came out into the streets. Out of fear—the authorities, I mean Medvedev and Putin—announced political reform. We left the streets, and they quickly rolled that political reform back. So I want to say again: this is the main, basic thing. If we don’t come out into the streets, nothing will happen, and no one will make concessions. O. RYABTSEVA: In a previous interview you said that right now Putin has no time for you—he’s focused on Ukraine and Crimea. But what about before Ukraine? Did he have no time for you then either? Why didn’t he touch you? A. NAVALNY: Why didn’t he touch me? Let me remind you that—perhaps for one day, which is a funny thing—I was sentenced to five years, for one day. O. RYABTSEVA: I was at that trial. A. NAVALNY: Four or five criminal cases were opened against me. At this point I can’t even say exactly how many there are or what stage they’re at. I don’t believe all this talk that Putin has stopped thinking about money and is now thinking about something grand. Thirty witnesses have already been questioned, and every one of them said there was no crime. A. VENEDIKTOV: You won’t have to cut that out? You’re allowed to say that? A. NAVALNY: Under the latest terms of my house arrest, I am allowed to say that. You see? And you say they’re not touching me. You yourself are asking me what I’m allowed to say and what I’m not. It’s just that Putin’s system of priorities changes. Right now Putin is obsessed with some kind of international confrontation with the United States. Naturally, issues of domestic opposition have receded somewhat into the background for him. If people come out into the streets again, it will rise back up on his agenda and become question number one, as it was in 2011 and 2012. A. VENEDIKTOV: In that sense Russia is a complicated country, and despite the fact that our federation is underdeveloped—and in my view both Putin and Medvedev are more unitary than federal politicians—Russia nevertheless has a presidential republic. Mikhail Khodorkovsky—I’m forced to return to that name—says that this is wrong for Russia, that what is needed is a parliamentary republic. What instrument do you think should be used to govern the country? A. NAVALNY: I also think a parliamentary republic suits Russia better. In pure form there are very few countries that are either purely parliamentary or purely presidential. Obviously it would be a mixed system. It seems to me that the question of federation versus a unitary state is fundamentally important in practice. You said quite rightly that we can write in the Constitution all we like that we are a federation—but in reality we are a unitary country where everything is run from Moscow, all taxes are pulled out of the regions and brought to Moscow... A. VENEDIKTOV: Maybe that’s the blessing: a good president, a white knight on a white... or black horse—it doesn’t matter—on some horse, we discussed it, I don’t remember—he introduces... an enlightened monarch. Maybe that’s good for Russia? A. NAVALNY: It’s bad for Russia, because right now we have a monarch who declares himself enlightened and endlessly repeats that favorite historical phrase that in Russia the main European is the state. But in reality he is not any kind of state; he is first and foremost a monarch. And what we see now—the war on the economy, all these utterly stupid laws and strange things happening—they are happening because he wants to remain a monarch. Here my conviction is absolute. I do not believe all this talk that Putin has stopped thinking about money and is now thinking about something grand—restoring the Soviet Union, and so on. That’s all nonsense. All of this is happening solely because Putin wants to stay in power and wants to cement his power. He remembers Gorbachev very well, and he understands perfectly that any political concessions or small steps will lead to his power evaporating. So despite the high ratings, they still don’t let real opponents run in elections. So, to answer your question about the form of government: real decentralization is critically important. It is a key point of my program, the Progress Party program—that power must be given back to where people actually live, first and foremost to cities. I believe power should be given not to governors, those crooks, but to city mayors, so that all power... A. VENEDIKTOV: If the governors were not crooks. If the president were good, proper, and leading in the right direction, and the governor were not a crook. A. NAVALNY: In this system they cannot be anything but crooks, because for Putin a good governor cannot fail to be corrupt. A good governor has to get various shady deals done quickly, and to get shady deals done you still have to be corrupt. Take Luzhkov—he was an effective mayor, he built things, got things done, rigged elections, and so on. But what was all that built on? Money. A. VENEDIKTOV: No, but for Navalny, a good governor is...? A. NAVALNY: For Navalny, a good system is one in which power belongs to city mayors elected by direct vote, where people independently decide all local issues, from their local police officer to how their school is run, what textbook will be used, and in what language people will be taught—all that should be chosen by people on the ground. They live there. And in that sense it is absurd that Moscow decides what should be built somewhere in Kazan or what textbooks should be used in Chelyabinsk or Cheboksary, or how the streets should be swept there. That system doesn’t work, and we can see that it doesn’t work. O. RYABTSEVA: Is Nikita Belykh a bad governor? A. NAVALNY: I said that in this system of power any governor is politically bad from my point of view. What is a governor now? It’s basically a fiction. It’s a person who simply takes federal money and distributes it to state employees, and that’s it. And besides that, the governor is given one task: make sure there are no rallies in your territory. That’s all. Some do it, some don’t—and they get fired for it. O. RYABTSEVA: Alexei Anatolyevich, can you imagine yourself becoming president while Putin is still alive? A. NAVALNY: Why not? O. RYABTSEVA: What would have to happen? A. NAVALNY: A lot could happen. A. VENEDIKTOV: What would have to happen? A. NAVALNY: Putin could realize and understand that he is leading the country toward catastrophe, and that by solving the task of strengthening his own power, he is depriving Russia of a future and depriving our children of a future. I fully believe that—though the probability is not very high—some kind of illumination could occur and he could realize this. Or he may be forced to realize it under pressure of circumstances. Gorbachev was General Secretary. Power changed during his lifetime. All those Middle Eastern presidents—slash monarchs—are still alive, well, except Gaddafi. Yanukovych is alive too, yet power changed. So many things could happen—whether I or someone else... Let’s put it this way: power could share its power, and Putin could remain alive. A. VENEDIKTOV: Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny, Lesya Ryabtseva, Alexei Venediktov. After two minutes of advertising we’ll be back. A. VENEDIKTOV: Is Crimea ours? A. NAVALNY: Crimea belongs to the people who live in Crimea. A. VENEDIKTOV: You’re not getting away from the question. Is Crimea ours? Is Crimea Russian? A. NAVALNY: Crimea, of course, de facto belongs to Russia now. A. VENEDIKTOV: You believe that... A. NAVALNY: I believe that, despite the fact that Crimea was seized in flagrant violation of all international norms, the reality is that Crimea is now part of the Russian Federation. And let’s not deceive ourselves. And I strongly advise Ukrainians not to deceive themselves either. It will remain part of Russia and will never again, in the foreseeable future, become part of Ukraine. A. VENEDIKTOV: In that sense, here was a great question: if you become president, would you try to return Crimea to Ukraine? A. NAVALNY: What is Crimea, some kind of ham sandwich to be passed back and forth? I don’t think... A. VENEDIKTOV: It turned out that it is. A. NAVALNY: From the point of view of politics and restoring justice, what needs to be done now in Crimea is to hold a proper referendum. Not the kind that was held, but a real one. And whatever the people decide, that’s how it should be. I think we all roughly understand what the result of such a referendum might be. Whatever they decide, that’s what it will be. I think that in fact, despite the offense and hurt Ukraine feels, this is a plus for Ukraine. It is a great blessing that Crimea—with its absolutely pro-Russian population, its conservative-minded population that does not accept their anti-corruption revolution, does not accept the desire to move toward Europe—left them. They lost 2 million voters who were slowing that movement down. So in that sense it’s a win situation. Politically, it will for a long time create problems for us, for Ukraine, and for Europe. And unfortunately Crimea is doomed to become something like Northern Cyprus—the Turkish part. Right now it’s a territory whose de facto ownership is clear, but which no one recognizes. L. RYABTSEVA: Speaking of the people—are Russians and Ukrainians one people? A. NAVALNY: You’re pushing me toward an international scandal. L. RYABTSEVA: I’m pushing you toward the truth. A. VENEDIKTOV: We’re asking for your opinion. A. NAVALNY: The opinion of someone who has spent a lot of time in Ukraine, who has relatives there, and so on. I simply do not see any difference between Russians and Ukrainians. For me there is absolutely no difference: they are the same people. I think that point of view will provoke tremendous outrage in Ukraine, where it is fundamentally important for many people to prove that we are different peoples. I see no difference between Russians and Ukrainians at all. L. RYABTSEVA: How do we crawl out of this stupid crisis with Ukraine? A. NAVALNY: We need to stop financing the war. We all understand perfectly well that the military actions taking place in southeastern Ukraine had no preconditions. And still have no preconditions. They are happening solely because for Russia’s current leadership it is a matter of principle to torpedo the Ukrainian state, torpedo reforms, and demonstrate to everyone that the anti-criminal revolution that took place in Ukraine will fail, that it will lead to the collapse of the state. This is a crucial task, including a personal one, for Vladimir Putin. By the way, in Georgia we saw that he is prepared to spend years systematically working on this... He worked on overthrowing Saakashvili and bringing to power people who would persecute Saakashvili. I think that unfortunately Russia has spent major resources trying to make Ukraine fail—to make the Ukrainian government and Poroshenko fail in every sense. To set things right, we simply must stop doing that. We need to understand one simple thing: it is in Russia’s economic and political interest for Ukraine to be a normal, prosperous, wealthy state. That’s just Economics 101. If things go well for them, things will be a little better for us too. We need to let them go. Let them do what they want. A. VENEDIKTOV: Then I’ll build on what you said—that you see no difference between Russians and Ukrainians, that they are one people, as Lesya asked. So maybe there should be one state? Maybe historically all this—the annexation of Crimea, the clumsy, awkward move into Donbas—still points in that direction, toward one state. And maybe that’s normal. Germany was once divided into the Federal Republic and the GDR. So perhaps this is now one people in a divided state. I’m trying to construct what might be... A. NAVALNY: Maybe... Depending on how you count, many people in Russia... A. VENEDIKTOV: And you? A. NAVALNY: I think integration is a natural process. A. VENEDIKTOV: What is a “natural process”? A. NAVALNY: Integration is a natural process. But you cannot simply annex Ukraine now—along with Belarus, the Baltics, Kazakhstan. It just won’t work. It’s unrealistic, utopian, absurd. So... A. VENEDIKTOV: A year ago people would have said the same thing about Crimea—that it was absurd. A. NAVALNY: Is the European Union one state? Yes and no. On the one hand, for ordinary people there are essential things: you get in your car, drive, and never even notice a border. On the other hand, everyone has their own language, everyone puts on their national costumes and dances their own folk dance. The same thing should happen with Russia and Ukraine. A. VENEDIKTOV: You were talking about Crimea. I saw a very competent poll conducted by the ACF. I rarely praise the ACF, but the polling there really is, I must admit... If you do it better more often, we’ll praise you more often. There, for example, 56 percent—this is an ACF poll—supported sending troops into Ukraine. Let me remind listeners: those are your numbers, you asked the question. A. NAVALNY: Yes, that was a recent poll. A. VENEDIKTOV: On Ukraine. Eighty-five percent supported Crimea’s incorporation into Russia. The ACF confirmed that 85 percent. A. NAVALNY: We’re seeing even more now. In the latest polls we still see that 88 to 90 percent support it. A. VENEDIKTOV: If people were asked whether they want Russians and Ukrainians to live in a single state—it would be interesting how they’d answer in Ukraine and in Russia. How would you answer? A. NAVALNY: We know how they answer in Ukraine, because we conducted a poll. At least in Kharkiv and Odesa regions. We see that even people who use Russian at home and at work, who are Russian-speaking and presumably ethnically Russian, do not want to live in Russia. That is a fact established by our poll. In Russia, obviously, people want to live in one large united state. And there is both the imperial consciousness of Russians and, in general, the desire for the country to be one and large, and nostalgia for the USSR, and so on. I believe, of course, that we should move toward integration—but integration and absorption are different things. Ukraine is a big country. Russia has a population of 140 million, Ukraine 40 million. Many people here think Russia is gigantic and everyone else is tiny. Maybe you can say Estonia is small. But you definitely cannot say that about Ukraine. It is one of Europe’s largest states. So what would be the point? And above all, why would we send tanks there? We can live perfectly well with Ukrainians if our border exists on paper but not in practice. They will have their own government, we will have ours. We will maintain normal human, cultural, and economic ties. Without barriers. A. VENEDIKTOV: Alexei Anatolyevich, what do you think motivated the president when he launched his Ukrainian campaign? Crimea is one thing, we can separate that out. But what motivated him when he launched and supported the campaign in Donbas? A. NAVALNY: As I said, for him the collapse of Ukrainian statehood is of fundamental importance, because in Ukraine the worst thing happened from Putin’s point of view: an uprising of people overthrew a corrupt regime, and did so mainly under anti-corruption slogans. Yes, there was also what is inflated in Russia—a certain share of national-liberation elements, and so on. But fundamentally it was a pure anti-corruption revolution, because in Kyiv no one speaks Ukrainian in daily life. Yet the people of Kyiv were the driving force of that revolution. For Putin this is horrifying: the masses rose up and drove out the crooks. And he wants to show that after that there will be civil war and everything will collapse. Because that would set a very, very bad example for Russia and for the Russian population. He may at one stage have tolerated Georgia being held up as an example, Saakashvili’s successful anti-corruption reform, but a similar success of Ukrainian statehood—economic growth, effective anti-corruption efforts—that for Putin would be the worst thing that could happen. L. RYABTSEVA: Let’s imagine your current situation continues and nothing changes. You have no opportunity to run in the presidential election, at least not anytime soon. Would you support your wife if she decided to become a leader of the protest movement? A. NAVALNY: First of all, that would mean I’d read a huge number of books and watch a huge number of films. And my wife is the person who supports me, and probably—no, not probably, certainly—without whose support I would hardly be able to do what I do. But the question of her direct participation in politics is a matter of her personal choice and our family’s choice. We have two children who need attention. And we see where, in today’s politics, a person who takes a bold independent step ends up. Not in the Duma at first—they end up under investigation. So it’s a difficult question. One that requires serious discussion, including within the family. But Yulia has exactly the same political views as I do. I’m sure she could be an excellent political leader. A. VENEDIKTOV: Thank you. That was Alexei Navalny visiting Lesya Ryabtseva and Alexei Venediktov. Or rather, the other way around—Lesya Ryabtseva and Alexei Venediktov were visiting Alexei Navalny. A. NAVALNY: Thank you very much for coming. L. RYABTSEVA: Thank you.