Alexei Navalny’s interview for Deutsche Welle’s program *Nemtsova.Interview* in 2017

[music]

Today our guest is opposition politician

and unregistered candidate for

president of Russia, Alexei Navalny.

Alexei,

thank you very much for this interview. There is no

shortage of newsworthy developments. This

Monday, you were served two summonses

to appear for questioning at the Investigative Committee

in connection with the January 28 rally.

Please tell us what consequences you

personally expect from this. In that sense, I’m not

expecting anything new. This government

acts in a fairly traditional way.

They always need some kind of criminal cases

against opposition figures, and it seems to me that in

our office at the Anti-Corruption Foundation

there are very few people who are not involved

in one criminal case or another.

It simply opens up opportunities

for legal surveillance of people and for various

obstacles, and in general for all sorts of big and

small

dirty tricks that make life miserable. But I

of course expect that a case will be opened. I don’t

know—maybe travel restrictions, or some

such measures, a search, or something like that—but

something that will let them report back and say

that, well, we made his life a little harder again.

That’s to be expected, and there is nothing new in it.

How do you think you will spend March 18,

2018? Will you be free, or will you

be behind bars? Excellent question, Zhanna.

You’ve hit the mark. We are constantly

factoring that in when planning our activities.

We keep estimating it, but judging by everything,

unfortunately, election day—“election day”

in quotation marks—I will spend in a detention center.

At least that seems to be the plan right now.

I was detained on the 28th, after which

I was released, and so far I haven’t been given a single

document. But apparently my 30 days

are waiting for me—they just don’t want them

to start counting, say, from February 17, so that

they would have to release me

and others either on March 18 or March 19

or March 20, something like that.

Because, well, all the others

got locked up under administrative arrest for tweets with

the video I released, and

it would be strange if they didn’t try to arrest

the author of the video as well. How

do you assess the possible consequences for

the other participants in the rallies that

swept across the country on January 28? What

might await them? In that respect, there is also

nothing new. This government is capable of

fighting the protest movement in two, basically

main ways. The first is

to ban all these rallies. The second is

to demonstratively try to punish

certain people—chosen at random or

the organizers of the rally. By now, at least

40 people have been placed under arrest,

short-term arrest. Some of

them have already been released, while others are still

serving administrative detention. But

the main thing I want to say is that it seems to me

this no longer frightens people, at least

within our campaign headquarters.

It is always a rather unpleasant thing,

of course, to end up under arrest, but

people understand what they are getting into, and they understand that

if we are afraid of this, then

the only remaining way

to express our political views

is to go out into the street—the main, basic

method, really.

And they will take that away from us,

because we—because, that is,

we are afraid that we will be arrested. Alexei, on February 1

a guilty verdict was handed down

to Nikita Belykh. Let me remind you that he is the

former governor of the Kirov Region. You

were briefly his aide or

unpaid adviser.

This sentence was described as very harsh

by experts: eight years in a maximum-security penal colony.

Do you consider Belykh’s sentence

fair? You know, I haven’t spoken with

Nikita since 2009. Our paths diverged quite

sharply after I was

his adviser for just under a year. It is hard for me

to comment on this sentence. I do not

know any of the defendants in this case.

Judging by how

everything unfolded procedurally in court,

the trial did not seem at all

convincing to me. Quite obviously, they did not

take Belykh’s state of health into account,

and he is clearly, genuinely very

ill. But I am very sorry that everything turned out this way.

Nikita and I—I would rather not

comment on it in detail. I do not have

any

warm feelings toward him after we

parted ways, but on a human level

I am upset and saddened that all this happened to him.

On January 29,

again, following the news, there was

the publication of the so-called Kremlin

Report. I know you commented on it.

One question: who was left off the list but

should have been included, in your

view?

Pamfilova, Chubais—yes, there are many like that. All of them

should be included, Zhanna. In that

sense, the list should be much longer.

This corrupt core—the people

who are the main

beneficiaries of corruption in Russia—these are

thousands of families, at a minimum. And I would very

much like to see all of them under

individual sanctions, or at least

on a similar list, however

symbolic it may be—a kind of list

of corrupt officials that does not yet lead

to any consequences, but they all should be included.

to be part of it, and I really would not want

them to be able to live freely, among other things,

travel abroad, come to you in Germany, and

you know, walk around the streets somewhere, and

then come back here and talk about

how terrible “Gayropa” (a derogatory Russian slang term for Europe) is there, and how we

here are now supposed to follow that path.

The main topic of our discussion with you is

of course the boycott of the presidential election.

You call it an electoral

strike. I’ll now cite figures from VTsIOM (the Russian Public Opinion Research Center),

and don’t tell me that it’s a Kremlin-controlled

polling service — I know that.

But Levada (the Levada Center, an independent Russian pollster) is prohibited from publishing — yes, all right,

I’m ready, Alexei — Levada is prohibited

from conducting

electoral ratings, or any kind of

polling of that kind; the center has been designated a “foreign agent.”

So, what does VTsIOM tell us about

turnout? Fifty-five percent will definitely take part in

the election, and 14 percent will most likely take

part in the election — 69 percent in total.

Now, who definitely will not take part? Three percent

definitely won’t, and 10 — no, 9 percent definitely won’t

take part, and 3 percent most likely won’t —

13 percent in total. I looked at your

weekly polls published

on the website, and there is no direct question there

about turnout; there is a question about the level

of awareness about the election, which is fairly

high. So let’s imagine that you

persuaded 20 percent not to take part in

the election, and fewer than 50 percent

of registered voters showed up. What would that

give you?

Zhanna, the question of one’s attitude toward this election

is not a mathematical question. It makes little sense

to shift 15 percent

here, 15 percent there. We are expressing a

political attitude toward this procedure.

And I say — and it seems to me that any

normal person understands that

this is not an election, that it is Putin’s re-election

disguised — Putin’s re-election — and the very

procedure is arranged in such a way as

to remove a candidate who was actually running

an election campaign, who has

every right — yes, I am talking about myself now —

who has every right to take part in the election,

who proved in the European Court

that the cases were fabricated,

and instead of him put forward some people

who may be perfectly pleasant, for example Grigory

Alexeychik — I think very highly of him — but

who unfortunately is playing the role

of an extra. And the question we ask

ourselves is not mathematical; it is this:

what will we achieve if 20 percent...

Alexei, may I clarify the question? Perhaps

I didn’t phrase it

quite correctly, I wanted to say — well, not wanted to say, but —

but

let me clarify. Thank you very much. In

the future, what will this give you? Just imagine you

have persuaded them — I mean in the future, not now. I

understand your position perfectly well. What will this give

you in the future as a politician?

For me, both as a politician and as a person, it will mean that I did not

go there and did not agree that these were

real elections. This is my demonstration,

personally as an individual, and I call on everyone not

to participate — and only secondarily

to take part in the organized movement

of the strike — but first and foremost to express

their personal attitude. Can we consider

this an election? The answer is no. Do we want to

continue taking part in elections like this?

The answer is no. Because if we now

go there, sign in, spoil

our ballot, vote — none of that has

any significance. But by signing in, we

will be agreeing that this is an election. We have always

had only elections like this, which means that any

candidate — Navalny, Ivanov, Petrov, or

Semyon Semyonovich Gorbunkov (a comic character from the classic Soviet film *The Diamond Arm*) —

could be a strong candidate, but they still

won’t let you into the election. They will again put

extras in there who do not run

an election campaign and do not even

try to fight for votes, and once again they will

tell us: Alexei, Zhanna, come and

vote. And I want, already now, in 2018,

to say in March that I do not recognize this as an election,

and I do not recognize the authority that emerges

from these elections. That is what

this will give me going forward:

confidence in my moral rightness. I

did not vote for this government, I did not

support it in any way, and I did not recognize its election.

People keep saying now — and you say it too — in the

top ten, a number of political analysts say that for the Kremlin

what matters in this election is specifically turnout. But

how can low turnout — and Kiriyenko spoke about this

at a meeting with representatives

of the regions, with regional governors —

how can low turnout hurt Putin?

Don’t listen to political analysts — it’s

obvious, simply obvious. Yes, yes, I think that even to you

in Germany, and certainly here in Russia, this is obvious.

You go to the supermarket, and there

you see a bag that says, “Go to the

election”; it’s written on milk cartons,

it’s being shouted at you from every iron (a Russian idiom meaning “from everywhere”): “Go to the

election.” Why? Because for them this is

Putin’s reappointment, yes — but they want

to stage-manage this reappointment of Putin

decently, so that people can see: yes, look,

the majority in the country may still be

dissatisfied, they are getting poorer every year,

the prospects —

there are no prospects at all — but they still came

to the polling stations. And what difference does it make

whether they voted for the opposition? Look,

Putin crushed them. Because on March 19

they will show us on television: look,

the opposition candidates were in it — Yavlinsky, Sobchak,

Titov, Grudinin — and look how our

Vladimir Vladimirovich dealt them

a crushing defeat with 60 percent turnout

of voters

that is the scenario that matters to them

for Putin’s reappointment

it envisions making it look like a real

election. To do that, they need turnout. Alexei,

I’m going to ask you some questions now

from users, and perhaps they may sound a little

like my own, but still

here is a question from Natalia: observers

and spoiled ballots made the protest mass-based in the last election

— if there is a boycott now,

then they’ll simply fill out our ballots for us. I

honestly still do not understand how

that is better. Natalia is completely wrong.

Last time, what made the protest mass-based

was the campaign “Vote for any party against

United Russia” (the Kremlin’s ruling party). People went and voted for

any other party.

They lowered the level of support for

United Russia, and then the authorities

falsified the election in favor of United

Russia. This was noticed by numerous

observers; observers were thrown out of

polling stations, and as we remember, this led to

protests. But we need to understand that

parliamentary elections are fundamentally

different from presidential elections, because

in parliamentary elections you can

vote however you like and reduce

United Russia’s rating. In that sense,

in presidential elections, where the winner

takes all, they do not care how you vote;

what matters is registering you as a

voter. Therefore, on the one hand, we

are lowering turnout and calling on everyone

to regard the election and Putin’s reappointment

and his next term as illegitimate

— illegitimate. On the other hand, we

are now actively coordinating

observers, and we will deploy more of them than

have ever been deployed in

the history of our country, in order to

prevent them from faking turnout. Another question

from Roman: why didn’t Alexei Navalny

find some trusted person

or one of his supporters to run

in his place? People cite your

wife, or Navalny’s ally Lyubov Sobol,

as examples. I did find one — I found you — but

unfortunately, first of all, you left us

— [garbled transcript]

— so that option does not count.

This question, in principle, is either

a joke or a strange one, because if

these are serious presidential elections,

you cannot simply swap one person out for another

— as if, well, today they won’t let the wife run,

so maybe let the neighbor run instead, and then say

the neighbor is Navalny’s — you are supposed to

treat him as Navalny. If it is Navalny’s neighbor,

then he is supposedly almost the same candidate. My

wife, for example, is a wonderful person. I do not

doubt that she could engage in

political activity. But swapping people

is a sham. It means that we have already

agreed with Putin: he will pick us off

one by one,

and we will keep looking for Plan B, Plan C,

and so on. It is absurd. It is simply

even disrespectful toward

the voters. And, Alexei, the questions vary.

I did not write them — people are asking them.

[garbled transcript] because I’m upset, Zhanna,

that you were unable to take part in this

campaign. So, without any provocations,

Alexei Anatolyevich, let us then find out

what your presidential rating is.

We would have eagerly found out my presidential rating

on March 18 if I had been allowed to take part in

this election. But since I was not

allowed to, unfortunately, in 2018 it will remain

a mystery for us. Unfortunately, I would have — I

well, one has to understand, jokes aside, that I

and my штаб (campaign headquarters), and a huge number of people,

volunteers — we worked for a year, we worked our guts out

as best we could. We persuaded people, and they

funded this election campaign.

We worked honestly in order to

give it everything we had in the final

two months of the campaign and

do everything possible to force a second

round and win this election, even under

conditions where the authorities completely

control the electoral process

and the mass media. But we

fought and were ready to fight, so

I am sure we would have shown an excellent

result. And we really did — let me repeat once again —

we fought for victory. And my, well,

perhaps partly with this, well,

I don’t know, personal feeling, as a rule,

to explain it.

Well, I am answering so emotionally because

it is very unpleasant for me to watch all the

other candidates, who do not even

pretend to put up a fight, and yet

argue with us and shout at us, saying,

“A boycott means just sitting on the couch,” and they

keep shouting all this couch talk, while they

are doing absolutely nothing, whereas we worked and

were ready

to show a rating such that you, Zhanna,

would say on your program on March 19:

“Wow, everything turned out much better

than we thought.” [garbled transcript]

Alexei, and now I have

this question for you.

Boycotting this election is not a choice, and

do you sincerely believe that

a change of Russia’s authoritarian government

can happen through elections? I do believe it. I am not

sure it is the preferable option

— the preferred option —

option.

I am not sure that

given what Putin is doing, this is the most

realistic option. But of course I believe, I do.

That’s why I decided to run in the election. I traveled across the entire

country, I gave speeches. I know it sounds banal,

but I really did travel across the whole

country.

I spoke in regions including those

that are considered completely

pro-Putin, like Kemerovo Region.

I spoke in Novokuznetsk and in Kemerovo as well.

I spoke there.

I know for certain that Putin can be beaten.

The election can be won, and in fact

he knows that too.

That is precisely why he did not allow me onto the ballot.

As an opposition politician, you call on

your supporters, and Russians in general, to

come out, including to

unauthorized protests. And since

an unauthorized protest here is

treated by the authorities as something on an entirely different scale...

It is Putin who declares our rallies

unauthorized, while I urge people to come out

to normal, lawful demonstrations,

without looking back at what those crooks

choose to call authorized or unauthorized. Well, I...

I agree with your correction, it’s just that from the

authorities’ point of view, these protests are unauthorized.

So from their perspective, that supposedly

gives them a free hand, and they say that

what you want is a Maidan (a mass uprising, referring to Ukraine), that you want

a revolution. And this is said about you not only by

Russian journalists, whether pro-Kremlin

or opposition-minded, but also by Western

journalists, who say that you are the only person

capable of bringing

large numbers of people into the streets. Where does

the line lie

for you when it comes to peaceful protest? First of all, I am not

the only person who is capable of

bringing people into the streets. We see

many remarkable people who

organize various actions in different

regions.

First. Second, it is not I who bring people into the

streets. It is this idea that brings people into the streets—

or rather, Putin and his system bring people into the streets

through their corruption,

through their inept governance of the country. Well,

where the line is drawn is perfectly obvious:

where there is violence, that is already something

closer to an uprising,

to revolutionary events. Of course,

I believe people have the right to

rise up against a tyrannical regime. But

what is happening in Russia at this stage

is simply entirely peaceful protest. We

see that the mood of the demonstrators is always

far more peaceful than

the mood of the authorities, who turn every

rally into practically a military

operation, with troops, police vans,

and the movement of thousands of people, and so on.

Many people are interested in why, at the

protests you call on people to attend,

people come out not exactly for you, but for

an idea—and why so many young people come, including

underage teenagers.

People...

Why should we be surprised by these underage

young people? They are the ones who have to live here.

As for minors, in fact

there may not be as many of them as people tend to

think, but I am proud that they

come. They may be underage, but that does not

mean they do not understand what

is happening. Nor does it mean that they do not

see that their parents are becoming

poorer every year. It does not mean that

they do not see that they have no

prospects in life.

And what is this young person supposed to do? He is

17, and he understands that when he turns 18, he will not be able to get into a

decent university.

Because the best university in Russia is only

somewhere around 150th place in the world university rankings.

He understands that after finishing his studies,

he will not be able, in his own city,

to find a job paying more than 50,000

rubles a month (about $550), and even 50,000 rubles would be

an enormous stroke of luck for him. So what kind of future is that?

That is why he comes out now

and says: the authorities, all of you, are standing

in the way of my normal development.

Therefore every young person,

naturally, if they are thinking about their

future, should take part in

political activity now. Alexei, one

of the political analysts wrote that

your political—wait,

wait, Mr. Kynyev, all right—

wrote that... I knew this would happen.

I specifically wanted

someone to jump on me—sorry for the

expression. May I ask the question?

Your politics today, he says, are

aimed at forming a new

political majority, whereas

the other opposition candidates

work with a minority. Do you consider it

realistic to turn what is called the pro-Putin majority

into a society—or rather a majority—

in favor of change? How is that

possible? Alexander Kynyev wrote

an absolutely correct article about this.

I recommend it to everyone, and he

because he is a genuine, truly

serious political analyst, clearly grasped our

idea, which is that

there is no such thing as a pro-Putin majority. There are only

people who have been given the illusion that

there is simply no one besides Putin.

We conducted dozens of

focus groups across the country, and the main thing people say

when you ask them, “Suppose Putin were gone,” is:

“Well, there’s no one else anyway.”

“We don’t like Putin, but there’s nobody else.”

And that is the main thing on which

the Putin regime rests. There is no

majority, and we will be able to form one.

our majority precisely because

we are genuinely working and pursuing

a real agenda, not some kind of

small, narrow liberal

bubble that exists on Facebook. I

am, in some sense, also part of this

community, and it consists of very nice

and pleasant people, but we are talking

about much broader issues. We are talking

about poverty, about justice, about

fairness

the unjust distribution of wealth.

We are talking about increasing spending on

healthcare and education. That is, we

have gone beyond what people

who call themselves the democratic

opposition have been talking about for the last 20 years. We

really are forming a majority

that already includes, right now, some 30

percent of residents of the largest cities, and

if we keep working, it will be much more.

That is our task. As they quite rightly

wrote, it is entirely possible.

Absolutely. But again, Putin understands

that this is possible. That is exactly why, in the election,

we are not being allowed to participate.

You have already said that you have your own

sociological service, and that you have offices set up

across the country, including

in smaller towns as well. You

surely have information about what

is happening beyond the capitals and what

the demands are of people who live in

the Russian provinces. What do they want?

They want prospects. They want hope that

life can improve. They are tired of

poverty, and they are tired of spending 18

years being promised things, 18 years of being

told stories. Back in 2007,

Putin could still promise something; perhaps he

could promise something in 2012 as well.

But now, in 2018, it has become

completely obvious to everyone that with this regime and

with these people in power, in the government,

in the governors' offices,

nothing good will come of it. There is no

light ahead. There may not be

a catastrophic economic decline

or collapse, but there will be no noticeable improvements

either, and people do not want to live in this

poverty, in this utter destitution,

while being citizens of a very rich oil-producing

country. They do not want that. They want

prospects and, in that sense, positive

change right now. And all of these are

popular reforms. They want a fight against

corruption.

They want money to be redistributed toward

human capital,

education, and healthcare. They want

a redistribution of money from the regions to

the center—not only money, but powers as well. That

is, fundamentally, they want everything that

is already in place right now in any

European country.

I will probably move on to another topic now.

This is Putin's fourth term; it is inevitable

that it will begin. From your point of view, and

many people believe that after the election

repression will intensify,

including against you and

against your supporters. You and your

supporters could

both be declared extremists, and high-profile

trials could begin. Are you ready for such

a turn of events? There is no need to guess about it.

Let us look at

our empirical experience. Putin has

been in power not for one year or two, so we do not need

to speculate. He has been in power since 1999, and we

see that after every

re-election there is a tightening. Overall, this

curve of repression is, of course, moving toward

greater severity. Yesterday there was

a report published by Agora (a Russian human rights group) saying that

right now, every eight days,

a real prison sentence is handed down for pictures on

the internet. That would have been fairly hard

to imagine in 2012, right? Therefore,

we simply know with complete certainty that

this is exactly how the logic

of his regime develops: more repression. In no other

way can he keep power in his hands.

So these repressions will most certainly

continue to intensify.

But we are ready for this, and we are not afraid.

We will not back down. And your main

theme is the anti-corruption

agenda; that is what the FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) works on. The topic

has already been studied quite extensively; an enormous amount

of material has been produced by you and your

colleagues, as well as investigative journalists. So

what issue will your work be focused on

over the next six

years? I am a person who, after all, does have

a profession—a lawyer who

investigates corruption. For that purpose

I created an organization called

the Anti-Corruption Foundation. People

give us money, transfer donations to us,

so that we can fight

corruption. Even during the election

campaign, when I was devoting all my energy to it,

to the election campaign, the foundation

continued doing this work. So we

still—this remains my profession—and I

will keep doing it, but I will also try

to work on

many other things as well. But the main

organizational and political achievement

of our campaign is, after all, the political

network that we created across the country.

For the first time in many, many years, it is a network of

real people, of tens of thousands

of volunteers. One of the most important tasks is to

preserve this network, to finance it if possible,

and to teach it how to work properly, to learn how to

manage it properly. That is the key thing.

The most important political task for us is—do you

think that the anti-corruption agenda

will remain a mobilizing issue over the course of

the next six years? I don’t know how long

it will remain mobilizing. What I do know is that

there will be more corruption, and corruption

will still continue to remain

the backbone of Putin’s system.

There will be more stealing, and people will be even

more upset by corruption because

they will become poorer.

Alexei, in September 2018 there will be

mayoral elections in Moscow. How do you intend to

take part in them? Personally?

Naturally. Maybe we should nominate you?

Forget it. You’ve already started on that topic.

Now you want to draft me for mayor too, Alexei?

Alexei, I withdraw my proposal about the

presidency, but for mayor—that’s an excellent idea.

Actually, Alexei, a female candidate

a woman, a well-known surname,

smart, beautiful—you’ve just given me

a great idea: Zhanna Nemtsova for mayor

of Moscow. Alexei, I can’t really

indulge you there. Even though you’re trying to joke,

I want to continue my journalistic

career, and it seems to me that I’m doing

slightly better at that. But seriously,

are you really planning to? Is it true that you’re

trying to persuade Ilya Yashin to take part in the may-

oral race? Well, I haven’t been persuading

Ilya Yashin, but starting today

I will definitely start persuading you

to take part in the mayoral race. I’m

sure that Ilya Yashin will sup-

port you, by the way. All right, I see.

You’re not going to answer that question seriously?

I’m being completely serious when I say that

we need a candi- I mean, we need

a woman, and you are perfectly suited to that

role. Why not? No joking at all—this is

a wonderful idea. But I would like to—well, I don’t know—

perhaps disappoint you a little

or let you down: we can’t do without primaries.

Of course, you would have to

take part in primaries alongside other

candidates.

I’m sure you’d be able to beat them.

We would all support you with great

pleasure. Basically, you’re doing everything possible

to unleash the full force of

Russian propaganda on me. Once again, I

am declining Alexei Navalny’s proposal live on air

despite his

charming smile. Alexei, the viewers

are listening—can you persuade Zhanna?

Alexei, we have a well-thought-out campaign.

Let’s take another question: when and

under what conditions can Alexei Anatolyevich

discuss coalition options

on the democratic flank?

Or is that topic closed? And look—

Excellent question. I discuss this coalition

all the time. It’s just that I have

a principled position: a coalition

does not mean that, say, I

and Ilya Yashin get together somewhere, I don’t know, in

a cigar room,

drag in Garry Kasparov, and decide what

the democratic coalition should be, what it should look like.

A democratic coalition is always a dispute

among various leaders, and for many years

I have been proposing one way to resolve that dispute:

primaries.

Therefore, any coalitions, any alliances, any

movements must be formed

with the majority’s opinion in mind—or, if not

the voters’, then at least the activists’. There are

a million people who actively

support parties of a democratic

orientation, politicians of a democratic

opposition bent.

So let them decide. You asked me

seriously, and I’m answering seriously

about the Moscow mayoralty: let’s hold

primaries. I will support the candidate

who wins in those proper primaries. That’s

all. It gives the impression—correct me

if I’m wrong—that you don’t say much about

the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Do you

think that Russians—or the

majority you appeal to—don’t care about it?

I agree with that. I think that, in fact,

these issues are on the

political periphery. I believe that we

must fight the propaganda that

constantly forces discussion of

the Ukrainian question on us. Just turn on

the television—before, it was one out of seven

news items: Donbas, Donbas, Donbas, Donbas,

then Syria, Syria, Donbas, Donbas, Donbas.

Of course, this is an extremely important problem, and

of course it needs to be discussed. But to put it

at the very top and discuss it endlessly—

that is exactly what Putin

wants from us. He wants all

Russian politics, all Ukrainian

politics, and indeed all international

politics to be tied to his

various tricks, seizures,

illegal operations, and for everything

we discuss to be treated as some kind of

derivative of what he is doing right

now. Therefore,

despite the enormous importance of these

problems, I believe that for the domestic

political agenda in Russia, for

the presidential election, this topic is peripheral.

Very much so.

Do you agree that in order

to be a popular politician—that is,

to appeal to the majority—you need to be

something of a populist? I don’t understand what

a populist is. When I propose fighting

corruption, is that populism? When I

propose a perfectly normal

reallocation of military and police

spending toward education?

from healthcare to populism. When I

say that we need reform of the

judicial system first and foremost, that is

a perfectly normal proposal. The point is

that what we need right now are

popular reforms. It is clear

how to carry out these reforms, it’s simple. Well, there is this

political tradition in Russia that somehow

the people who see themselves as the only serious political insiders are

those who sit in groups of five

supporters and endlessly complain

that they have no support, while those who do

have support are supposedly some kind of populists. But

of course that’s not true. I am talking about the

issues that concern the majority

of the population. I try to find

real, genuine answers to these questions

after consulting with a large

number of people, including

economists of a fairly liberal

persuasion, but in any case respected

and genuine economists, and I offer

answers to these questions. But yes, of course, when

ranking

the importance of my topics, I rely on the fact that

when I arrive in some city—

whether Vladivostok or Novokuznetsk—what people there

ask me about. That’s what I was talking about, and in

that sense, I, my entire campaign headquarters, and

our whole team rely on the

interests and agenda of the majority. Alexei,

do you consider yourself a tolerant

person?

Of course. You’ve developed an image—she

was supposed to ask some kind of trick question.

After I said “of course,” you were probably supposed

to say something like, “No, from your

point of view.” That’s your dramaturgy, whereas

I have a different dramaturgy, one that does not always

match your expectations.

Many thanks for helping me host

the live broadcast. Many people have formed an image of you—your

image as a nationalist, and I’m not even talking

about Russia right now, probably, but rather the

West.

Does that get in your way? If so, in what

sense? It doesn’t, because no one

has really formed that image of me, and if

they have, then I hope you’ll help us

correct it. With great pleasure,

by the way.

We’re happy to help you host this program. When you

become mayor of Moscow, though, we’ll have to

replace you with someone.

So, nothing gets in my way. But there are

people who run around obsessively

around me shouting,

“He’s a nationalist! He was at the Russian March” (an annual nationalist demonstration in Russia).

I have been patiently explaining to these people

for many years, and I will continue to explain

how important it is for us to engage with all points

of view, and that, among other things,

the nationalist movement, incidentally,

has now been crushed, and its people are

sitting in prisons as well. It too should be

legalized, and they should have the

opportunity to participate in elections. I will

continue to say that we need

to build bridges and contacts between people

with conservative views and liberal

views. I will continue to insist on the

point—

the most important point in my program—

regarding the introduction of visas with the countries of

Central Asia and the South Caucasus, because

it is a normal point. It is not ideological;

if you like, it can be liberal,

it can be conservative, left-wing, or

nationalist, because it is

a normal policy. Germany has

a visa regime with Uzbekistan and

Kazakhstan—with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan

and Kyrgyzstan—and Russia should have a visa

regime too. Your brother Oleg Navalny is being released

from prison this year. Will he work

with you, help you? Let’s

wait until he gets out of prison. For now, it

seems premature to me

to discuss it.

Because he is in a kind of

constant conflict with the heads

of the prison administration,

who have been constantly trying for three years

to somehow

make his life harder. Their latest innovation

is that they have started sealing over

his electrical outlets with cement.

In one place they bolted down the stool in his cell,

in another they screwed down the bedside table, so that

the person simply could not write on a hard

surface. So these petty harassments are constant.

So let’s simply

wait until he gets out, and then

we’ll decide all the other questions. Alexei, one

last question for you: is there any act

in your—well, I got carried away talking. No, you’re conducting yourself

perfectly well. Is there any act in your

life

—meaning in your political life—about which

you have regrets? A million such acts.

But I’m an ordinary person, and in

life I make mistakes. I try to

acknowledge those mistakes. I try to consult with quite a large

number of people constantly,

and they point out these

mistakes to me. For example, I stayed too long

in the Yabloko party (a Russian liberal political party) and tried

to do something there from the inside.

Then I argued too much with the

Yabloko party instead of just leaving

Grigory Yavlinsky alone, who is, generally speaking,

a good person and a good politician. And even

now I sometimes cannot resist

criticizing them,

although, really, there is no need to get involved with them.

So yes, sometimes I can be rather

harsh with people; sometimes I even shout at them.

But, friends, I’m an ordinary person who makes

makes mistakes, but he is trying to improve — Alexei

thank you very much for this conversation, and I

let me remind you that my guest today was

Alexei Navalny, an opposition politician

for president. Thank you, thank you very much. I

hope that you will become mayor of Moscow. You

will clear the snow much better than

Sergei Semyonovich does. Goodbye.

Many thanks to all the viewers

goodbye