Many politicians say that when
they meet with people, it is important to get
feedback—yes, to see whether their eyes are lit up, so to speak.
I’m curious: did the people of Pskov feel like
these were your like-minded supporters, or were they
just onlookers who came
to see some kind of high-profile
new national political figure associated with
certain conflicts,
scandals, and political events?
Absolutely, I did feel that. As I already said,
this was specifically a meeting with volunteers.
These are people whom no one forced to come.
They did it all themselves: they found my website on their own,
registered themselves, received
a text message, filled out a form about themselves, and
said that they were ready to spend several months
working for the election campaign for free
because they believe in the ideas
of the campaign and believe in
the campaign platform. And
today’s meeting had a very good
atmosphere. It was very pleasant for me. These
trips—I won’t lie—are fairly
exhausting. But when you have a mee-
today in Pskov, it really gives you more energy.
Honestly. And as for the age
of the volunteers—I was at your meeting
and noticed that, by and large,
this audience, if not under 16,
then 18-plus, yes—but there were practically no people older than thir-
Still, there were actually
quite a lot of them, but of course it was mostly
young people. But that is simply a feature of the volunteer
movement in general—it has always been that way, and the same thing
was true in 2013, when volunteers
worked on my mayoral campaign, and that is
how it works. So of course, volunteers
are most often young people, but
the main campaigning push, through these
young people, is directed at people who are
older. That’s how it is structured, and that is
naturally how it happens in all countries.
When a person is 20 or 25,
they want to do it, and they have the opportunity. While
they are not yet burdened with all these
problems, they can spend four months
handing out leaflets for free.
Was there any resistance from
the regional authorities? Here is what
they say.
The organizers of your meeting say there was none at all.
That even surprised us. Despite the fact that I have
traditionally not very good relations with
Governor Turchak—well, that is, he and I
have never actually met—but I even
began my meeting by
quoting his Instagram post, where
he was speaking about the rally
on the 26th, saying that young people should choose between
be-
what was it he called me again—
a hopeless future and wonderful prospects.
So despite the fact that
we criticize Turchak—I criticize him, I
believe he was involved in the attack on
Kashin (Oleg Kashin, a Russian journalist). I believe he is implicated in
corruption. I have many questions about
his wife’s business and about the well-known villa on
the French Riviera, but there was no
resistance or anything of the sort that we
noticed, and everything went very well. We are
satisfied. How do you explain that?
It’s hard to say. Most often we see
the following pattern: the more
uneasy a governor feels, the more
weak he feels, the more inclined he is
to stage various antics
around our headquarters. So, for example,
it was difficult in Tambov or Mordovia, whereas
in Kaluga it was complete peace and quiet. As for your region,
I don’t really want to admit it now,
of course—the very thought is not
very appealing to me—that Governor Turchak
feels very confident, but
perhaps that is one
explanation for why there were no
hired people around the headquarters
standing there with placards.
Everything was very good from the standpoint of
the police and everything else.
I think there was only one person standing there, just one
person. We invited him in, but he did not want
to come inside. But I answered all the questions
he voiced. Nare, the thing is that
the official overseeing domestic policy in Pskov Region
was asked by one of the
journalists a question related to
the growing activity of your supporters,
the emergence, generally speaking,
of an initiative group, and the events of March 26.
Well, his position was roughly this:
we do not see any threat to the regional
authorities from the non-systemic opposition
I’m putting it in my own words, but the meaning
was approximately that these are just
some people over there on the liberal
flank; all of this is far removed from ordinary people, all of it
is not very serious. In general, how do you
view this position of the current
authorities—that everything happening
in the camp of the non-systemic opposition, everything
connected with political forces and non-
party politicians whom the authorities
do not accept, is all something that is simply not worth
paying attention to?
Well, that is obvious disingenuousness. If they were not paying
attention, then they would not be sending, including to
Pskov universities, teams of people who tell
and persuade young people that they should not go to
rallies. We can see this absolutely
on a mass scale now—it is happening everywhere. They come
and show videos claiming that I am Hitler or
that I am an extremist—well, all that nonsense
they spread. We see how actively they are
working in order to persuade
people not to speak out against corruption,
to persuade people to stay silent. But it is obvious that they
They’re trying to put on a brave face in a bad situation.
What is the deputy governor going to tell you?
That, oh my God, we were clutching our heads, we...
We want the business here to be discussed.
Turчак’s wife’s business—they’re pretending it makes no difference to them,
because they don’t want to answer
our
questions. But that will probably only last for so long,
until the moment when, on the sixth, there is a rally here.
A rally. Well, you tell me yourselves, how many
people were at the rally, at your...
Around 100 people, roughly. It was...
It was unauthorized—100 to 150 people.
And yet the governor is speaking out
about it and writing some vague phrases,
saying that the youth should not... This worries them very much.
They are used to living in a zone of
comfort, where no one asks about
corruption—neither at the local level nor at
the federal level. We are not going to stay silent now.
You know, historically it just so happened that
the activation of your supporters in the region
coincided with the appearance here of
Open Russia, and many of your
potential supporters are also
potential supporters of Open Russia.
And since there are not that many
active citizens here, as a rule they are the same
people who drift from one
group to another. How do you generally feel about that?
Do you view this
structure as, well, some kind of your own
potential
electoral resource in the regions, or do you
distance yourselves from it? We have
a practical task: we are running
an election campaign. And everyone who helps us
run that election campaign,
is our friend. Everyone who helps us speak
about corruption, about poverty—
a monstrous problem in Pskov Region—
unfortunately one of the poorest
regions. They are all our friends, anyone who speaks
about this. There is no practical cooperation with
Open Russia. No. Today their chairman came to
the meeting and said that they
support, at their highest level, in the person of
Khodorkovsky, and they also declared
their support for me, for my candidacy. But
I repeat: we have an election campaign.
We do not want to organize round tables
and sit there discussing
positions and doing all the things that, unfortunately,
have become a constant practice:
endless meetings and chatter. We
work with people, hand out leaflets,
campaign, train them, distribute
materials. Anyone who wants to do this
is welcome. But round tables—that’s
without us. I see, so the tasks are entirely
technical; they do not relate to
the current political
process. Let me correct you: quite the opposite.
Technically, technically, that would be
to come here, hire people, and have them
stand somewhere handing out leaflets. That is
a political task. Under political
slogans, we invite people, gather
people who are ready to work for an idea. Well,
because we do not have significant money.
The election campaign is financed
by donations. That is the real
political process. But all these
round tables and meetings are more
an imitation, I would say. It’s just that for a long time
here, in the Moscow political
field, on this flank, a well-known
politician, Lev Shlosberg, has dominated. Well, he
has occupied this patch of ground.
And I even know many journalists,
civic activists, and young politicians who
are sort of torn,
between their ties to Lev Shlosberg
and the desire, say, to join your camp.
Yes, and are you ready in some way
to coordinate your actions with him,
to unite, build a dialogue—I don’t
know—against Governor Turchak, or
in the fight against corruption, or against
poverty? Or do you have your own task,
the presidential election, while he has his own
local regional politics here? We are friendly
with everyone. I think very highly of
Shlosberg, and of course at headquarters we will
welcome everyone. Fortunately, we do not have
serfs (peasants bound to a landowner in imperial Russia), and
we do not have serf activists either. A person
chooses for himself where he wants
to work, what interests him more, which
political structure. We are glad
absolutely
to see everyone, and we are also ready to cooperate with
everyone. Believe me, the number of people who come to us—
former and even current
United Russia members—who say, well, we would
actually support you completely,
we’re just a little afraid. When you
really push harder and it becomes less scary, we’ll
come to you. So everyone is coming to us. And
as for Lev Markovich specifically,
unfortunately he disappoints me a little
by how maniacally and
dogmatically he supports the leader
of his party, so zealously supports
Grigory (Yavlinsky). Support you? Well, we
argued about this here. It seems to me this has no
prospects, and that is clear to everyone, including
Lev Markovich himself. But for some reason he has
got stuck on this note and is trying to convince all of us
that he is a politician, a good politician. I
respect Yavlinsky, who
has consistently lowered his percentage in
elections ever since 1996, and
now supposedly has some prospects. But
Yabloko, having hundreds of millions
of rubles in public funding, in the last State Duma
election received less than 3% nationwide.
Well, there has to be some accountability.
That's right. So why are you
trying to convince someone right now
to get involved with Yavlinsky and promote him? That has no
prospects. I'd like to remind you that on the
live broadcast of Echo of Moscow radio in Pskov
Alexei Navalny is on the program *Special
Opinion*. We're talking about how today in
Pskov, the campaign headquarters
of Mr. Navalny was opened, as well as many
other topics. I'd like to return to your
remarks about how the regime reacts to your
activity. Well, I think it's no secret to anyone
— everyone understands that the regime's reaction
to you and your
supporters could, of course, be much
harsher. Yes, today you were asked a question
and you responded by saying
that people often ask you about this: why
haven't you been killed? If you are killed, what should we
do? Well, I don't want to talk about that
topic, and I won't. I'll ask about something
else: do you have an explanation for the fact
that the authorities react rather restrainedly
to your activity? You have
the opportunity to open campaign headquarters
in Russia, you have the opportunity to meet
on the air of mass media, on the
internet, in the Moscow region. Well, let's
make this a bigger, broader question. In fact,
it's about something else: against such a
brazen opposition figure, they could act
by other methods. Well, first of all,
they already are acting against this opposition figure who
is sitting in front of you, who not long ago
was a perfectly ordinary lawyer. Now
I am a three-time convicted man, and every case
was fabricated. Despite the fact that in the
European Court we prove that these cases
were fabricated, they keep handing down the same
sentences again. In principle, the very fact
that we are sitting here at a radio station
— not in a kitchen, but at a radio station — seriously
discussing questions of political
murders in Russia, says that, well,
something is clearly wrong in the Pskov
region. Indeed, we arrived and successfully
opened a headquarters, and today I
spoke in a wonderful venue that
is located in the city center. In
Mordovia, I spoke in the middle of the woods because
not a single venue in the city of Saransk
would rent to us. And those who did rent
to us were forced to return our
money. In
Tambov, a day ago — the day before yesterday — I spoke
in a hangar at a produce — no, not produce — at a
wholesale depot belonging to one of our
supporters, where the city of Tambov even
cut the electricity during my speech
in order to disrupt it.
What is happening here is unusual. In
most headquarters, we are constantly
facing some kind of pressure and
obstruction from the authorities. It's clear why:
they believe that corruption issues in general
— especially these ones — are absolutely taboo;
they must not be discussed, and those who discuss them must be driven out.
So
Pskov is a pleasant, welcome exception. In
most regions, unfortunately, there is
pressure. But this pressure does not
stop us. I spoke in the middle of the woods
— well, fine. If they hadn't let me
hold a meeting anywhere in the city, then
fine, I would have spoken here too, in the middle of the woods,
and if it had started to rain, then in the
rain I would have stood there, and I assure you
quite a lot of people would have come and also
stood there with me in the rain. Your
opponents often accuse you of
lacking any clear
ideological program, of the fact that you
are essentially ready to gather together — Who, for
example? I wouldn't want to name names right here
on air. Well, that you
are ready to bring together all
supporters — you said part of this today
— regardless of their
political views: nationalists,
then
communists, so to speak, former
United Russia members — that is, if these people are ready
to discuss the issues you raise,
for example the fight against corruption, then
you basically don't care where they were yesterday
— from the Black Hundreds (a far-right monarchist movement in the Russian Empire), or, say, from
the LDPR — and this absence of such clear
party-ideological boundaries among
your supporters, on the one hand,
probably attracts some people, but also
repels others. Do you agree with that
statement? I don't agree that it
repels people, but overall I do agree with your
point. It really doesn't matter to us
where a person comes from, what party
they belonged to; what matters to us is what views they
hold now.
And if within Russian politics
there really were these clear boundaries,
then perhaps this conversation would make sense. But
you know perfectly well yourself — you yourself
just said that many people belong
to several organizations at once.
There are cities — and Pskov is probably no
exception — where there is an opposition activist who
is everything at once: simultaneously
with Open Russia, Yabloko, and with Kasparov there was the United Civil
Front, and so on and so
forth, the Civil
Front. So all these distinctions
don't make sense. United Russia members yesterday were
members of Gaidar's Democratic Choice, and before that
they were members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Here, people in our country
run endlessly from one party to another, and
real ideological boundaries do not
exist. We want to unite everyone who is for
simple things, for basic changes
that can be achieved in Russia, at least
tomorrow, if there is the will, the fight against corruption
raising the minimum wage
this is a measure that has been implemented in all
developed countries; only in Russia can we not
do it. Increasing spending on
healthcare and education—these are simple
things. Within our movement, of course,
there may be many different ideological
disagreements, but for the sake of bigger goals we
come together. Again, I’ll continue along the same
line. Mr. Shlosberg—I'll name him directly—
just last week on
his video blog, answering
questions, said that you have no
economic program, that you have no
strategy at all, and that there is only a set of
slogans, catchphrases, and flashy speeches
which, essentially, are
a kind of populist device, yes, that
draws attention through its vividness
and charisma, but that is not enough
to govern a country. And I was
sent a link to that speech several times
I watched it, and I want
to say that, of course, Lev Markovich really
disappointed me. I understand how they
are worried in the Yabloko party (a Russian liberal political party) about
the fact that they got less than 3%. And I
understand how personally Shlosberg is taking it
because he was the main
architect of what he called
a coalition, which people did not believe in. Well,
they did not vote for it, basically, and
therefore the coalition did not happen. And
well, well—he declared that this was
a united list, and, well, everyone, just as
you said, said: there is no coalition here. No, we will not
vote for this. And their attempt, and
Lev Markovich’s attempt, unfortunately,
now, in 2017, to seriously try to prove to us
that Yabloko is the only party
that has
an economic program—well, that only provokes
either a kindly
or compassionate
response. The program is written, well, indeed
In a speech, of course, I speak
mostly in broad points, but our economic
program—and our program overall—is far
better than Yabloko’s; it is much
better aligned with reality, including
because we
keep adjusting it, because I travel and meet
with people. This is the fortieth campaign office, and everywhere I
meet with volunteers, I answer
every question, I answer all the uncomfortable
questions. But Yabloko and Lev Markovich
are a bit too behind the scenes there, and they do not do the same
and that leads to the fact
that they keep bringing up the 500 Days program
from 1989 or 1988
and still try to convince us that
this is the most important economic
program. If I told volunteers today,
“The 500 Days program,” some of them would tell me,
“We don’t know what that is, because
we hadn’t even been born then.” And they are not
fifteen-year-old children either—they are already
even twenty years old
and remember nothing about any
500 Days program. And instead of
boasting about certain achievements that
certainly did exist—well, I myself once
joined the Yabloko party for that reason—well, one has to
live in the real, new world already, to remember
that this is not 1987 and the beginning of
perestroika (the Soviet reform period), but rather
2017, when you can no longer simply
deceive anyone like that. You said that
you answer any questions, even the most uncomfortable
ones. As I understand it, yesterday or
the day before yesterday, during this tour
through the regions, you were asked about sources
of funding during a meeting, yes?
Do these questions get under your skin—who
funds you, what do you live on, and
how do you carry out your activities—and what answer
do you give people? I love these questions because
they are very easy to answer, and
there was a similar situation today. You were
at the meeting—you won’t let me lie
when you ask. Leonid Volkov,
the campaign manager, asked who here
had ever sent money to
the election campaign. Well, about 30 percent
of the people raised their hands, and that is precisely the most
important objective confirmation that
everything really is as we say: our
election campaign is funded
by small donations from ordinary people, and we have
the most transparent, the clearest campaign
in that sense. As for me, actually
people say, “But the expenses are enormous.” What
enormous expenses? Look, here is what our
expenses are here in Pskov Region:
an office and the salaries of two people. For that we
raise money. Our expenses are lower than those of
everyone else’s—many times over—for one
main reason: this is our basic
advantage. We have volunteers.
You saw the volunteers today—there were
150 people standing there, and they will work
for free. More than that, they will even
pay money in order to work for free.
Another party would have had to hire
150 people and pay them salaries. And that is
a huge expense. We can do without
that. So our only costs are
the cost of leaflets and office rent.
Alexei, well, to me as someone who
has been watching Russian politics, you know,
for the past 20 years, it seems that this
American-style fundraising model,
with its organization of private
donations and tours of the regions,
is, of course, very appealing. You watch
it and it feels like some good
American movie about an election, somewhere in
The U.S. Congress—how much do you think
do you think
this is a workable model for Russia?
Don’t you think that, well, Russia
with its traditional
patriarchal approaches to shaping
the sacralization of power, might
not really respond to such elements of
civic
politics? All this talk about some kind of
special patriarchy, first of all—
and even if that patriarchy does exist, well,
fine. Do these patriarchal people
support corruption? Do they
support Prime Minister Medvedev
in his activities involving the theft of 70 billion
rubles and the construction of palaces across the
country? Of course not. That’s exactly the point.
Our program is for everyone, and it
is supported by everyone, regardless of
whatever kind of patriarchy we’re talking about. We’re talking about
simple things. If in the UK,
Germany, and the U.S. there is a minimum
wage set at an acceptable real
level, and I’m proposing that we also set
a minimum wage of 25,000 rubles for
a full working day, that does not
contradict any kind of patriarchy.
It’s a normal economic measure. And as for
this supposedly American style of
our campaign—it’s not because
it’s some kind of movie image, but because we have no other
choice. You know, maybe I would
travel less around the regions if I had
the opportunity to appear on television, but
I don’t have that opportunity. But here
this is one of the few regions where I
can speak on the radio, because the radio
here is independent. In most
regions, everything belongs to the local
governor, and so on and so forth. So
these meetings with people matter, because people are
essentially our only and main
asset. If I don’t come here, don’t meet
with volunteers, and don’t give a speech
that convinces them, they won’t hand out
leaflets during our campaign. So
that’s really how it should be built.
This isn’t American politics or some
American model of politics—it simply
should be done this way. I am absolutely convinced
that if you’re a politician, if you want
to run for office—whether for president or for the
State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s parliament)—then your job during the
election period is to travel around, to come to
people in any city, climb up on a chair,
and answer their questions. There is nothing
American or French about that. It is also
Russian. That’s how it should be; that’s how it should
be organized. Yes, it disgusts me to look
at those people, those State Duma deputies—they
sit there for 20 years and say, ‘We are
seasoned politicians,’ but not once in their lives
have they met with voters, not once
in their lives have they taken part in debates,
not once in their lives have they answered
uncomfortable
questions. Time and again, I would like to ask:
you keep bringing up the 2018
presidential election, and at the same time I think
even a not particularly attentive or sophisticated
radio listener immediately asks themselves:
well, first of all, there is still almost a year left until those
elections. And second, given your
conviction, as we understand it, you most likely
will not get the opportunity to participate in
these elections. So what, then, is the point, the logic,
the purpose of creating campaign headquarters and
carrying out this activity? Well, I—I
mention 2018, naturally,
because I am engaged in running a
presidential campaign. That’s the first thing.
Second, all this legalistic trickery
doesn’t interest me, because the
Constitution states directly that
anyone who has reached the age of 18 and is not
in a place of detention can be elected. Fortunately,
the Pskov branch of Echo of Moscow (a Russian radio station)
is not a place of detention.
So as long as I am here, I have the
right to participate in the elections, and I am sure
that we, our headquarters, and those people who
believe that elec
there should be competition in elections—they
many of them, in fact, you know, some of them
support Putin, but they say: you
need to be registered, because there should
be some kind of competition, there should be
some kind of discussion, debates. Therefore, by
right and by fairness, I have the right
to participate in the elections, and I will
participate in them because I represent
a fairly large group of people.
That’s it.
When I come here, and another, say,
20 candidates come too, and we see that no one
comes to my meeting, while people come to all of
theirs—then maybe someone
can tell me whether I do or do not
have the right to participate in the elections.
But right now I see the opposite picture.
If Zhirinovsky,
Yavlinsky, Zyuganov, Mironov—all those who
have announced their candidacies—come here, I strongly doubt that
a significant number of people will come to see them
for free. I have a question in this connection, about
the other participants, the other parties.
Look, there is still a whole year until next year’s
election, and there will be other elections. Are they of any interest
to you at all? Or are you so
focused only on your own campaign,
on the presidential election, that you are not
interested in elections to regional
parliaments, local self-government
bodies, the State Duma? Well,
all of that, this whole
slow-moving process that, yes, there
the system has created and is sustained by the system.
is controlled. Do you actually want to impose
your own campaign on top of all this? Or are you
using some of its elements, and are you
supporting someone in the regions? Are you
putting forward some kind of proto-party for
a future political party, or not?
Of course that interests us. We
are interested in any elections. We keep track of everything.
I know there will soon be
municipal elections here. Of course, I’m
interested in the elections to the State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s parliament)
and the Kremlin was very concerned that
they interested me. That is exactly why we
were not allowed to take part in the elections; our party
was dissolved, and they allowed only that
part of the opposition that is completely
co-opted—what they call the systemic opposition. And already
voting like United Russia, or else
having no prospects whatsoever, like
Yabloko. But of course our main task is
the presidential campaign. When you
say, “There’s still a whole year,” I say, “Only
a year.” In fact, an election
campaign should really begin two years in advance.
It’s just simple math: in our
country there are 90 cities with populations over
200,000. Our country, in principle, is
enormous, and very often, to
visit some city in the eastern part
of the country, you need one full day per city, just
to travel around all these cities,
I would need many, many months. And ideally
it would be more than that. I would like to come to
Pskov two or three times, and to every
city I would like to come two or three
times. A year would not be enough for that
even if I were doing it every single day,
with no days off at all.
But while actively doing all this,
traveling around and working in the regions, of course
we are focused on the federal campaign, on the presidential
campaign. As for participation in regional
and municipal elections, that is a matter
for the local headquarters. It’s a matter for local people. I’m not
going to—you know—come to Pskov and
say, “Guys, you have a municipal
election. You, you, and you—go run in it.”
I don’t want to engage in nonsense like that,
that kind of political engineering. If
there are people here who want
to take part with our ideas, with our
program, and they need support, I will
give that support—in whatever form
I can. But to force all this on someone or
push our way in deliberately—no, there is no need for that.
Thank you. The work of your campaign
headquarters in Pskov Region will be handled by
and coordinated by Valentin
Boldyshev. The decision to appoint him
as coordinator—who was he chosen from, and why
was this particular choice made? We—and I am also
very proud of this—resolve all personnel matters
according to the principle of meritocracy, that
is, we try to choose the best people. We
have a fairly well-developed structure from the Party
of Progress; we set ourselves the task of appointing our
party leaders everywhere. Everywhere it was said:
send in your résumés. These
résumés are reviewed, and the chief of staff,
Leonid Volkov, conducts the interviews. I
do not deal with personnel decisions. In other words,
we divided responsibilities: I work as the candidate, I
lead the political process; I do not manage
the campaign’s money, and I do not manage
personnel decisions. We specifically do not
want to create
that kind of system here. Leonid chose the head of the
headquarters you mentioned. We are very
pleased with him; he organized everything excellently.
An excellent office in the city center,
volunteers came in great numbers, and they properly
set up the headquarters. We are very pleased, and
once again we were convinced that the principle of this kind of
competitive selection—where you simply send in
your résumé, come for an interview, and we choose
the best candidate—works. There were several résumés here,
several résumés. Leonid would
tell you more about that in detail.
In every city we have several résumés; in
some cities and regions—well, the more
populous ones, simply the cities with over a million residents—
there is an enormous number of people wanting to join,
which, by the way, became for us
a revelation: a very large number
of former law enforcement officers
of all kinds. It is really
an astonishing thing that almost
a quarter of the résumés come from former
siloviki (security-service and law-enforcement personnel), saying: “We can’t look at all this anymore,
it makes us sick. Please,
we want to work on the election
campaign.” That was a revelation for us. And here too
we were choosing from several
people. Maybe this is simply connected with
the fact that, in the view of some people in
the provinces, you are a source
of funding, that people expect
they will get some kind of
opportunities. Very often here people
think that elections are a mechanism for
making money. That is definitely not about us.
Everyone understood that, and everything is fairly
transparent. The people who work with us
understand perfectly well where the
money comes from. They understand that it was brought in by
exactly those volunteers who came. Everyone
can see that our headquarters live a fairly
modest life. All our travel is, well,
a minibus, economy-class flights—
there is no luxurious lifestyle here. Yes, we
try to rent headquarters in the city center
so that it is convenient, but overall we
lead a modest and efficient operation, and we do not
spend money on enormous
salaries. And because people
donate money to us, and for them
to keep donating money,
we have to be very transparent. We have nowhere
So, as they say, it’s clear there’s no room there to make a little extra on the side.
It’s clear at what price we buy leaflets,
it’s clear at what price we rent everything,
all of that can be checked, asked about, and verified here as well.
There’s no room for any shadow income. Well,
by the way, you yourself are always talking in your
excellent films about
how people make money and where they get
their funds from.
Uh, world leaders and all that—regarding the financial
reporting of your campaign, are you planning
to make it just as transparent?
To show what, how, where, and why?
Absolutely. Well, first of all, it’s a legal requirement.
Second, we have exceeded that legal requirement
several times over,
because right now the law doesn’t regulate
anything. Yes, nothing is regulated.
But first of all, in the near future
we will publish the first report, and it will make
everything visible. For us, the model and standard
is what we did after the mayoral campaign:
we published who worked, who received how much,
how much money there was in total, where it
came from, what the average donation was.
All of that was published, and it will be
published again. And that is exactly why money
gets transferred to us. For us, this matters not just
so that I can come on
radio stations and say, ‘We’re the most super-
transparent,’ but simply because it is
beneficial. When we are extremely transparent,
people send us money. We publish
a report and say, ‘Guys, we raised 55
million rubles (about 55 million RUB)—look at how we spent it,’
and people send us money. Let me clarify
that by ‘the ... campaign,’ what is apparently meant
is Alexei Navalny’s participation in the election for mayor
of the capital. Let me remind you that at the time you came
in second; Sobyanin won. Now, if
we imagine that in almost a year you
are allowed to take part in the presidential election
of the Russian Federation, and
that scenario unfolds—would that be
a success, or still a failure?
Success in an election means winning
the election, of course. In the mayoral election
of 2013, it was not
an ordinary campaign; in fact, we ran it
for only two months. Now we have, uh, a whole
year ahead of us. And if not for the falsifications
at the mobile polling stations,
then of course Sobyanin would not have won
in the first round. According to the official result,
he got 51%, and that 1% came to him precisely outside
the regular polling stations.
There would have been a second round. With a split like 49
to 30, I would have beaten him.
But in a fair election, with a fair result,
I will accept whatever that result is.
Anyone can win an election.
Anyone can lose an election. We are
watching absolutely dramatic things right now in world
politics,
when Hillary Clinton was already
president, already preparing for the inauguration,
and then—bang—she wasn’t president. So in
a fair election, I will accept any result.
But in an unfair election, I will not
stay silent; I will say that the election
is unfair. Your forecast: who will be the Kremlin’s candidate
in 2018? Who will it be?
There’s no need for any forecast—it is guaranteed,
absolutely certain, one hundred percent: Vladimir Putin,
who has already been in power
for 18 years. He intends to run for another 12 years
in the coming
cycles, and all his plans are tied to
remaining president until the very end and
in effect even becoming Russia’s emperor. And everything
that is happening in Russia now, to our
great regret, is aimed at
ensuring that one specific
person keeps hold of that power, even at the cost of
the worsening of life across the whole country. Alexei,
look, you are often criticized for the fact that
you seem to be a lone warrior in the field, right?
Basically, there’s no one beside you. They criticize you—
or praise you; some do praise you. Yes, I
mean that they do not see beside you
other politicians who are known to one degree
or another, because you
distance yourself from them. You do not want
to see anyone next to you except, essentially,
your own supporters. There’s you, and there are
your supporters, while, broadly speaking, politicians
who may already belong to the past for you,
from that cohort of the 1990s and 2000s,
including politicians
with democratic views, are of no use to you.
You do not want to take part in all those coalitions,
you do not want to unite with
anyone, you do not want to stand shoulder to
shoulder with them, not go out with them. That’s all I
do—that’s all I do, constantly.
I keep trying to unite people, endlessly. Listen, I get along with everyone.
I’m on friendly terms with everyone.
I’m very pleased that I’m probably
the only politician who can speak normally
and enter into coalitions
both with liberals and with
nationalists. And what are you criticized for—what
am I criticized for? Of course, many liberals
and nationalists criticize me, but nevertheless that
allows me to gather the maximum
number of people. It is always a difficult
process. I’m ready to be on good terms with everyone, and with
everyone I try to build excellent
relationships.
And I generally try not to criticize
anyone too much. But I stand for, I stand for
competitive procedures. If respected and admirable people come to me
and say,
‘Let’s have a substantive conversation—Shlosberg
and Yabloko (a Russian liberal political party).’ So Shlosberg comes and says:
‘I’m the foreign minister of Yabloko, and let’s
create a united list, but this united
list will be headed by Grigory Alexeyevich.’
Yavlinsky. And you, Alexei, sort of, sort of...
this.
Agree with me. Fine, I agreed — and what then?
We got 2% and then once again we go around
clutching our heads and saying, 'My God,
nobody supports the democrats in
Russia, nobody supports the opposition in
Russia.' But that's not true. Nobody
supports those outdated, unnecessary
structures. So I love everyone, but
just pushing these old
veteran democrats everywhere because they are
old and respected — no. I say, guys,
let's hold primaries, let's hold
a vote. Why did volunteers come to me,
for example, today? Because my
position is simple: volunteers should
campaign for [someone]. I'm ready to compete in
a vote with Yavlinsky, with Zyuganov, and with
Zhirinovsky, even in broader
primaries. Fine — whoever people vote for
should go to the election. If I come in second,
I'll accept it. If I lose to Yavlinsky
or to any other old democrat, whoever it may be.
So, purely in theory, are you ready
if the Yabloko party or any other
party were to offer you its place of its own...
on the left-liberal flank? Yes, but in general
nobody in the country is interested in that at all.
I travel around, and all of this is some kind of
Moscow liberal тусовка (insider political crowd), and even within
that Moscow liberal crowd, it's
an absolutely marginal part. If we hold
broad primaries for
an opposition candidate against
the current authorities, then of course I'm ready for
such primaries and I plan to
win them. And will you yourself initiate something
like that? Well, I try. I'm often
asked about it.
In Echo of Moscow, they especially like to ask
these questions, and in various regions too, but this is
not a simple process, you understand. I think
Zyuganov, for the same reasons, is also not
eager to take part in primaries with
me, and it constantly turns into this kind of
struggle between me and these, well, old
democrats, old communists, and everyone
else under the sun, because they aren't really ready
for competition, unfortunately. And since they
aren't ready for competition, they like to
throw accusations at me and say roughly what you
just said: you don't tolerate anyone
beside you, you only want supporters. Well,
I, I absolutely, absolutely understand that you
voiced what they quite often
say. But what am I supposed to say? I
say: guys, it's simple — we all
like each other. But let people vote and
decide whom they most want
to support in the presidential
election. This
happens in all normal developed
countries now where there is, well,
a presidential republic. We saw it recently in
France. Some coalition was chosen there
through primaries too,
Macron's En Marche movement won. Well,
that's normal, that's fine. That's how it should be.
By the way, speaking of a presidential
republic — let's hypothetically
suppose that you became the future
president of Russia. Would you preserve the kind of
mega-presidential republic that we
have today, that republic of...
You put it very correctly, because in
political science and legal studies there is
the term 'super-presidential republic,' but we have
already a mega-presidential republic,
a giga-presidential republic, I would even
say — effectively
a monarchy. And you can see it in everything: all
issues are decided in Moscow. Any issue —
the repair of your Kremlin, questions of
some investigations into the activities of the
Ministry of Culture connected with
the well-known scandals during
reconstruction here — all of that is decided by Putin,
all of that is decided by the Kremlin, and this has led to
those colossal
problems that we have. Powers and money are pulled
out of the regions, and
basically everything has to be decided in Moscow, but
at the same time it goes unresolved for years, and everything simply
decays and rots. And Pskov Region
again is simply
a textbook example of depopulation.
A quarter of the population has left here, right?
Or died out. And most of that
quarter disappeared during Putin's years, in
those supposedly prosperous years, in what are called the 'fat'
2000s, the boom years of the 2000s.
Well, it's a catastrophe. This system
simply does not work. Russia does not need any kind of mega-
presidential republic.
Of course, strong government is needed. In the United States
there is strong government; we see examples
of presidential republics where there is
strong government. But in none of these
developed countries does the president come anywhere close
to having such powers. It is
vitally important for Russia that
powers and money be
in the federal subjects (regions). Where is there population growth?
Moscow and Chechnya. Everything else
is simply dying, and all of Russia will die
if this continues. So not a
parliamentary republic? Do you think that
Russia — a parliamentary one, as is proposed by
a classic parliamentary republic? Well,
I think we are not ready for that. Another
matter is that we simply need to very significantly
reduce the powers of Moscow and
the federal authorities, and then the question of
this will not even arise. It's simply necessary to
expand the powers of parliament.
The government should, of course, be formed
with the participation of parliament, not the way it is now.
The president should not be involved in appointing judges.
The president should not appoint them, so that they can be
independent. Now, as for parliament—let me ask you this:
Was there, in Russia, over the past
10 years, even a single parliamentary
investigation? The answer is no. The Communists
raised the issue many times: let’s have a
parliamentary investigation. There has not been
a single one since 1999.
Exactly.
So we do not need a parliamentary
republic, but parliament must stop
being a place filled with various
oligarchs or just some kind of
regional crooks who bought themselves
seats in parliament and do
nothing—just enjoy immunity. There
should be real representatives
of the people sitting there, and they should, among other things, elect
the government, appoint prosecutors,
impeach the president,
criticize them. During Government Hour,
someone comes in—
Medvedev, the leader of an unpopular
government, and the parliamentary opposition
practically fawned all over him, showered him with praise,
and did not properly say a single word of criticism.
That should not happen.
Thank you. Our broadcast is coming to an end.
We only have a few minutes left.
To wrap up, I’d like to ask a question
about the work of your
campaign headquarters, and also, as far as your
activities in the Pskov Region are concerned, what should we
expect? Well, probably apart from June 12, when across
Russia these rallies will take place—what else
interesting
are you preparing? I urge everyone who is interested
in getting involved to come to our
campaign headquarters, join us,
visit the website Navalny 2018,
register there, and take part in this
election campaign. We will work honestly.
The main thing people should expect from us
is that we will work honestly and
tell the truth. And of course we will call on people
to join the June 12 rally.
It is an anti-corruption rally that will take place
everywhere. And at our headquarters, which is located
on Krasova Street
38/25, and starting Monday it will be open from
11:00 a.m. every day. We will
work with volunteers. This will be
normal, honest political work,
where everyone will be
equal, where people come together in order to
engage not in political manipulation, not in
cheating, but in real work for the
good of Russia. This was Alexei Navalny,
a well-known Russian politician
and opposition figure. Thank you for finding
the time, despite your tight schedule
during your stay in Pskov, to come to us
and answer our questions. Thank you, and until next
time. Thank you.
Thank you very much. *Special Opinion*.
