Alexei Navalny’s Interview with Yevgeny Kiselyov

Hello everyone, my name is Yevgeny Kiselyov, and

you are watching my YouTube channel. And now I

want to show you a video recorded back in

the now distant year 2012, which, in my view,

is still very interesting today, and not

only because it includes my

interview—a long interview—with Alexei

Navalny, I think one of the very few, if not

the only such extensive interview

that ever appeared in

the Ukrainian media, and which I do not think was

republished in the Russian mass media.

Well, the thing is that 12

years ago—slightly more than that—in February

2012, a significant part of the Ukrainian

public was, in fact, not very

interested in Russia, and even many

Ukrainian politicians, deeply immersed in

their own country’s domestic problems,

would sometimes, with a certain

irritation—or let us say with

irritated incomprehension—say to me:

“Why is it, Yevgeny, that you keep talking about

Russia?”

is nostalgic

for life outside Russia.

And then, in late 2011 and early 2012,

when mass protests suddenly flared up in Moscow

against

election rigging, which soon

grew into rallies and demonstrations

against Putin’s regime, against

the then already announced return

of Putin to the post of President

of Russia—and it must be said that the Putin

regime at that time was still very different; by

today’s standards, it was almost mild.

What really worried me then, in fact,

was something else: what would happen to Russia if

the opposition forces suffered

defeat. It was clear to me, and I considered it

my duty to convey to the Ukrainian

audience as well that if the protests fizzled out

and a period of reaction set in, this would

inevitably lead, in both Putin’s domestic and

foreign policy, to repression

against the opposition in Russia and to aggression

against Ukraine—an even worse aggression than what had already

happened in 2008 with regard to

Georgia, Russia’s neighboring country. And it was

obvious to me that Putin viewed Ukraine

as a threat, as a source of democratic and pro-Western

sentiments that were dangerous to him,

as a dangerous example of how

a country can live under conditions of

political competition, rotation of power,

genuine electoral struggle,

a strong opposition represented in

parliament, relative freedom of the press,

and an active civil

society. Alas, my fears and concerns at the time

came true: in Russia, the opposition was

crushed, Navalny

ended up

in 2022 turned into a bloody

full-scale war. But back then, in 2012,

political life in Russia seemed

bright and full of hope, and this

is, by the way, very clearly felt in

the detailed report from Moscow that

appeared then in an episode of my program,

which I hosted on the Ukrainian TV channel

Inter, called Big Politics. And in

this report, which precedes the

interview with Navalny, then a bright

rising star of the Russian opposition,

those moods, it seems to me, are very

clearly conveyed. By the way, I am deliberately

not translating the voice-over text

of the correspondent from Ukrainian into Russian

in order to preserve that sense

of a journalist’s outside perspective on

the events in Moscow at the time. I am sure that

my audie

will understand everything even without

translation. Before showing you this

video, which includes, I repeat, a long

interview with the late Alexei Navalny, I

would ask you, please, to give this

video a like so that as many people as possible

can see all of this.

Ask questions, leave

comments, and of course

subscribe to my channel and keep watching.

It all happened, seemingly, only quite

[music]

recently. We are back on the air, live

on the Inter TV channel. This is

the program Big Politics, and I am its

host, Yevgeny Kiselyov. Now let us talk,

as promised, about events in neighboring

Russia, where the day of the

presidential election on March 4 is drawing ever closer. Last

Saturday, everyone was waiting for an answer to the question

of whether the opposition would once again manage to hold

a mass rally of its supporters

despite the bitter cold. We now

know the answer: it did. And not only

the opposition—this time, a mass rally

was also held by supporters of Prime Minister Putin,

the leading favorite in the upcoming election.

All the details are in the report by our

special

[music]

correspondent.

A clip on this subject is now being actively

discussed online: a video from a Krasnoyarsk

TV channel in which, in a single slip of the tongue,

the presenter, speaking about Vladimir

Putin, apparently meant Vladimir

Lenin. The mistake was not cut out, and the video of the blunder

became a hit across the global web. Users

began seriously joking about the prime minister’s funeral.

The political season had only just recently begun with an appeal.

With “Putin, go away” on a banner, Russians came out of

the internet and into the streets. They climbed onto a roof and hung up

such a banner, decorating a building opposite

the Kremlin. The less time remained until the presidential

election, the stronger the protests became. Russians began

to speak not only about fair upcoming elections

but also about a radical change to Russia’s

political system. “I’m sick of it, honestly. I

used to support this, this government, but now

I’m against it. I’ve had enough.” Russians began protesting

first on the internet, on social media

at first simply sharing their thoughts.

Then they started discussing things and organizing themselves.

Until recently, politically active Russians

included many ярких personalities, some of whom

became leaders of the new movement. For example,

Tikhon Dzyadko, a young and popular TV

and radio host, is also a moderator

of one of the protest groups. “I am one

of the moderators of a Facebook group called

‘We Were at Bolotnaya, We Will Come Again’

and another group that was created to inform people

through which

people about

where rallies would take place, how these rallies would

be held, whether they were authorized or not authorized.

That is very important. It seems to me

that in this whole current Russian story

this movement is absolutely

independent and non-political, but at

the same time, despite those first

two points, it is also

political in the sense that the demands

these people are making and what they

want are absolutely concrete things.”

The main demand remains fair elections.

Political analysts, however, are skeptical about the chances of preventing

Vladimir Putin’s victory on March 4. There is no

real alternative to him, which will help him in particular.

There is no alternative on the ballot. People are used to going

to elections and choosing someone, and therefore

we need to explain that this is a puppet and this is

a puppet theater, and in order to be

confident about the future, we need to say clearly

to ourselves, to the electorate, to the people at polling stations: this is all

nonsense.” The main political sparring

partner for now

is Mikhail Prokhorov, though not everyone takes him seriously enough.

Be that as it may, political analysts do not

rule out that Prokhorov could

end up facing Putin in a second round.

Although his rating in current polls

is not always higher than Zyuganov’s or

Zhirinovsky’s, later the businessman

may still find himself in the second

round.

“By means of falsification on any scale,

to secure a mandate for Putin,

a presidential mandate in the very first round,

the greater these falsifications are, the

greater the political damage that will be done

to Putin. In this case, he is working directly

against himself and directly against his own

political future.” The League of Voters, which includes

Parkhomenko along with

other well-known figures such as Parfyonov

and Akunin, decided to push for the upcoming

elections to be fair. The League appealed to all

candidates with a request to grant permission for

monitoring the voting. Under Russian

law, an observer at a polling station may be

a media representative or a citizen who

has received such a right, that is, a mandate from

a candidate or the party that nominated him. Putin’s campaign headquarters

have not yet given such consent. “These are

not elections on March 4, especially if they are held in

just one round. They will only further intensify

citizens’ protest activity, and that is very

important. This means that

the regime will, so to speak, lose not so much

its legitimacy—it will lose that already on March 4—but rather

the speed at which this model’s degradation

of the Putin system, as I call it,

‘capitalism for friends,’ the speed

of that degradation will increase with every

day.” The first action organized through

social networks this year, the White Circle, also

became a preview of the future

protest at Bolotnaya Square. It was a spontaneous

car flash mob, when cars with white

ribbons or simply

white symbols of the Russian protest movement completely

formed a white circle around the Garden Ring (a major circular avenue in Moscow).

Law enforcement reported hundreds of cars, although it was not

hard to calculate that in fact there were

more. To fill the Garden Ring in

two lanes, taking into account the average length

of a car and the distance between them, about 4,000

cars would be needed. “When I was standing on the Garden

Ring, my car was all dressed up

with white ribbons, and all around there were also

many, many decorated cars with white

symbols, and from someone’s window there was playing

a remix of a speech by Alexei Navalny

from a rally, and then I remembered Kyiv, and there was

the same feeling of joy and euphoria as

during the Orange Revolution,” said journalist

Anastasia Karimova, who not only took part

in

the car rally. “To throw yourself at the embrasure there

or stand for several hours

out in the freezing cold—of course people are unhappy

with the situation in the country, but they are still

hesitating. Still, it is worth showing that it is not

too cold, that it is not scary, that one needs

to endure a little and stand up for one’s rights.”

And as it turned out, there was a rally in freezing Moscow.

At the same time, a rally for

fair elections was planned for tomorrow on

Sakharov Avenue. Those calling people to Sakharov Avenue were the so-called

"real democrats," as they call themselves.

Supporters of Valeria Novodvorskaya and

Konstantin Borovoy were marching separately because

they explained that they did not want to protest alongside

nationalists and representatives of left-wing forces.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky also decided to hold his own protest rally.

Zhirinovsky's supporters began gathering there.

The only thing that could have affected turnout, the authorities said, was

the weather. So on Saturday morning,

as they prepared for the February 4 protests, Muscovites

were figuring out as best they could

how to dress. The rally on Poklonnaya Hill (a memorial park in Moscow) resembled

a public festival. The main thought seemed to be:

if not Putin—"If there is no Putin, there is no Russia."

"Putin is a strong leader." Those who came said

they were not so much for him as against the "orange plague" (a reference to pro-Western "color revolutions").

It seemed strange that among the rally's speakers

there were no leaders of the right-wing parties. From the stage they spoke about

a secret

conspiracy, moving on

to those who want to say yes to fair elections.

Nera

On the eve of the event, unpleasant details surfaced.

Reports said that some of the people at Poklonnaya were being

bused in. The editorial offices of several

newspapers and TV channels received phone calls from employees of state

institutions saying they were being forced to protest in support of the authorities

so as not to lose their jobs. And on the main

website where extras were being recruited, one could even

find ads offering payment to those who came.

People I cannot help but trust have already told me about it.

These were private conversations—about how

they were forced to go there, what

they were threatened with if they refused, as at

Rosneft and elsewhere, from various

sources. I already know this. And later

messages started pouring in about dissatisfied participants

from Poklonnaya who had not been paid for taking part in

the rally. The ruling party believes that after Poklonnaya

the protest movement will fade away, especially since its

organizers are also facing a fine because

they filed an application for 15,000 participants, but

nearly ten times as many showed up.

According to Interior Ministry data, that many people came. I think

no one expected it. It is absolutely obvious

that people simply came to express their

position. For me, it is very important. As for

the matter of

fines, let the organizers not worry.

I am ready

to do my part and partially

share responsibility with them before

the law. When the rally on Poklonnaya was already

drawing to a close, Bolotnaya 2 was gathering

momentum. They had been at Chistye Prudy, Bolotnaya

Square, and Sakharov Avenue, and promised

to return a month before the presidential

election. Despite the frost, Russia was once again

protesting.

We're not sitting at home. — And how will you keep warm

today for several

hours?

[music]

And the hearts are demanding the same as before: fair

presidential elections and a rerun of the State Duma elections,

the dismissal and prosecution of Central Election Commission head

Vladimir Churov. One hundred people is one thing; when 200,000 come out,

it becomes rather difficult not to

hear them. We cannot say that we are complaining about

anything in particular. Overall, we live fairly well,

but we are angered by the fact that no one listens to us, that we

vote and yet no one takes it into account. So, basically,

we are going to express our

dissatisfaction. The only presidential candidate

who took part in the march was Mikhail

Prokhorov. He marched in a separate column with his

supporters. I will make sure that the authorities

finally turn to our citizens

with their face, not some other part of the body. I will make sure that

our country becomes the best place

to live, a place where people want to tie the future

of their children. At Bolotnaya, they

would come for a while and then leave

the square, saying: but people are not going around in circles for nothing.

No ideology can draw people out for several hours in

subzero temperatures, when for the third time, even in

the frost, when steam is coming from their mouths, people

come, gather, and are ready to defend

their rights, and above all the right to

free elections. I think the authorities

must hear this, otherwise such a government

will simply be overthrown. Unfortunately, there is no other

option. In terms of reason and

justice, of course, it would have been necessary

to postpone the March 4 election.

Right now, I am not sure that

it will be possible to do that, because the momentum

was lost after December, unfortunately.

So the election will most likely go ahead. But

even if Putin wins, it will

be what is called a Pyrrhic victory.

Another feature of the Russian elections was the split

among public figures into two camps: supporters

of Vladimir Putin and his opponents. Among the latter

were even

I will vote for the person who

specifically helped not only me, but

many people, helped culture, to which

I myself belong. And it is easy for me to do this.

I have seen for myself that this is

a person who keeps

his word.

Our task is to break this system,

to dismantle the system that does not allow

people to exercise their

constitutional rights. The system,

political analysts continue, was created

for one specific person. That was the case in the days of

Peter, Alexander, Alexander I, therefore one of the

possible paths for the Russian opposition

is to demand changes to the constitution, for example such as

depriving the president of the right to partisan

political play, limiting him exclusively to the role of guarantor of state law

to form the government, with the right to send the Cabinet into resignation in

the event of a vote of no confidence from parliament. Vladimir Pun-

feels what is being demanded of him and sees what

is happening in the streets.

Political analyst Andrei Okara shared his impressions in

a meeting with the mayor, to which he and his

colleagues were invited. It personally seems to me that he is precisely

lately in a very serious search

and, well, I have a feeling that he

really wants what is best for Russia and very

sincerely

wants it. Well, maybe not in the same way as the people

who come out to Bolotnaya Square (a major protest site in Moscow) or

to Akademik Sakharov Avenue, what Putin himself

has become accustomed to.

But it seems to me this is a very

small, domesticated bird in the hand, and probably this is

still better than if it did not exist at all.

And so, for now, in the near-term prospects

in the immediate future, the positions are as follows:

citizens can try to influence

the fairness of the elections, though, political analysts remind us, it is worth remembering

that the authorities' trump card is

the administrative resource. A signal of that

was the rally on Poklonnaya Hill (a large memorial park in Moscow), though not fully. How this

will affect those who were against it—and it cannot be ruled out

that they will not want to

vote. One of the strategies identified is

not to give a single vote to Putin and to sign up as

an observer. Besides signing up as an observer, I

am calling on people at 8 p.m. on March 4

to come to every territorial polling station in their

district, to come there and organize themselves

through the internet, through social networks, and

wait until they bring out to you, for observers,

a copy of the protocol so that it is possible

to record and conduct a parallel vote count.

The strength of ordinary citizens is simply very

important, very important.

They stress the need to be ready for popular

[music]

mobilization. I was there on December 10, I was there on the 24th of

December. Here I am today, and I will go on until

the very end. Come out.

threat

Well, in principle, Khimki Forest (a forest near Moscow that became a symbol of civic protest) was

also a reason to talk about

freedom, about

the rule of law, about some kind of equality for everyone

before the law, both ordinary citizens and not-so-ordinary ones.

Right now, 100,000 have already come.

Tomorrow—we'll live and see. But the main thing is that

people have started thinking about their sense of

dignity.

This is

[music]

As for the 'orange plague,' as they called the possible

revolution, on Poklonnaya most likely

it will not happen, because, as political analysts say, today

psychologically people are not ready to live in the streets.

At the same time, they remind us: even 100,000

people at a rally in freezing weather is no small thing.

Kira Tolstyakova, Andrei Onoprienko

Big Politics, Russia

[music]

Moscow. And now joining us live as our guest

from a television studio in Moscow is one of

the most prominent Russian politicians

of today, Alexei Navalny

Alexei Anatolyevich, I

greet you.

Good

evening. Today, without exaggeration, you are the idol of

hundreds of

thousands

Russian visitors to your blog on

the internet and other

online platforms; crowds greet you

at Moscow opposition rallies.

Tell me,

please, will you ever

run for president

of Russia? Alexei: I think that, first of all, I am

being praised far too much. Of course, that kind of

level of flattery can only be heard at

a United Russia congress in relation to

Vladimir Putin. Our task now

is to achieve free elections so that all those

who want to, and those who have the

opportunity, can compete for the post of president,

can compete for seats in the State Duma (the lower house of Russia's parliament).

Once we achieve real elections, I will definitely take

part in those elections and will fight

for a leading position. Well, I don't want to flatter you

either, but in fact I was at

Akademik Sakharov Avenue and I remember very

well that when you came out on stage,

the square roared in a way it had not roared

in greeting for any of the other

speakers. That is a fact of your popularity.

I think that in my person they were not so much

supporting me as protesting

against some of those figures

whom I investigate in my

anti-corruption investigations. Rather,

they were greeting not me, but expressing their

outrage at corruption. Still, who do you

consider yourself more now:

a politician, or still, well,

an internet anti-corruption fighter?

Well, corruption is the real

power vertical; it is the mechanism by

which Vladimir Putin and his

inner circle have simply built

the political system in Russia. Therefore,

naturally, there is no need to be coy, and we

all understand that a person who

is engaged in fighting corruption is engaged in

political struggle in Russia. Therefore

these concepts are inseparable now. And to what

extent are you involved in organizing

protest actions no longer on

the internet, but in the streets and squares?

Moscow. Well, the thing is that

we really do have various

organizing committees and working groups that are supposedly

engaged in organizing

the protest movement, but it seems to me

the truth is that

no one is organizing the protest movement

at all — it exists on its own

prote

It was organized by Vladimir Putin. Vladimir

Putin, by rigging

the elections, brought hundreds of thousands of people into the streets

of Russian cities. So this is simply

a wave of protest. Some people have

been lucky enough to find themselves on the crest of this

wave, myself included, but this protest

is controlled by no one, no one

is organizing it, no one

is directing it. Sometimes I have to read online

comments from ordinary

participants

in rallies in Moscow and other cities

across Russia saying, essentially, that they do not like politicians

and do not want to deal with politics at all

they are coming out to protest violations

in the elections, against

the ignoring of their opinion, against the fact

that the people in power take us for fools. And

then there are people trying to use our

shoulders to break into power, fighting for

their own place in the sun. Don’t you think

they mean you as well?

Well, perhaps. To our great

regret, the period of the 1990s and

the politicians of the 1990s, whom you also

had the chance to observe,

produced a general kind of idiosyncratic aversion to

politics, to political figures

— people do not trust them. And for many years in

Russia, politics was replaced by

political technology (media and campaign manipulation). Everything was built on

bribery, deception, paid-for

news reports, and so on. People are deeply

tired. They are tired of seeing the same

people be communists and Komsomol members (Soviet Communist youth league) today,

democrats tomorrow, and Putin loyalists the day after

today they are embracing the American

ambassador, tomorrow they are shouting about

an American conspiracy, and so on. People

are genuinely sick of it. So

it is a paradoxical situation. Yes, people here

support free elections and come out

to political rallies, but they do not

support any particular

politicians. Right now there are no such

political idols. That trust can

be earned, regained, only in one

way: do not lie and do not steal. You need

simply to prove to people, to explain that

that time, the 1990s, is gone. Those people are gone.

A new time has come — a time, if you like,

perhaps this sounds naive, of a new

sincerity. But there is nothing else, no

other real proof besides

our words and our actual deeds that we

can offer. Now look, Alee

Anatolyevich, you

said, or

rather, what do you mean? For example,

let me ask about democratic

politicians, opposition democratic

politicians

who were very well known, famous

whose stars rose precisely in

the 1990s. Today they are standing beside you

on the stage at these opposition

rallies

of protest. But many say that these people

such as Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Mikhail

Kasyanov

have been compromised forever. So

how do you view that?

Well, I do not think that Boris Nemtsov,

Vladimir Ryzhkov, or Mikhail Kasyanov

need any protection from me

or any legal-defense

services. First of all, people change, and

the mistakes that all of us have made need to be

acknowledged, they need to be

and I am sure that democratic leaders

who did something wrong or, well,

perhaps did not behave entirely properly

some years ago, can now

quite effectively and normally

participate sincerely and honestly in the new

political situation. This is a normal

political process: some people lose

trust, some gain it. Right now I

enjoy a certain degree of political

trust. It is entirely possible that I may

lose it if I am not honest with the

people I am addressing, and

if I descend into some kind of petty politicking

instead of doing concrete work

That is normal. One should

take it philosophically. There are always

politicians who are loved and politicians who are not

ratings rise, fall, and change. I

am absolutely certain that any person,

even if they have been on the

political stage for quite a long time, and even if people

have grown somewhat tired of them, can

win back sincere trust and affection

We know such examples from history. We

remember how Churchill returned to politics,

how de Gaulle returned to politics. Well,

let us talk, after all, about

Russia. Tell me, how does the situation

that existed in December differ from the situation

that is taking shape now? Do you not

feel that the slogans are changing, that

if in December people were demanding a recount

of the votes in Reutov (a town near Moscow)

and fair elections, then today, after all, what

is coming to the forefront is the demand that

Putin

step down. Absolutely right, that seems to me

a fairly natural development of

what is happening, of what came out of

December. On December 5, we took to the streets

in order to say the obvious: these were not

elections, and we do not recognize them as elections.

There was an enormous amount of

fraud; it is simply obvious. The internet

is full of videos showing how

chairs of election commissions

simply put check marks down themselves. Neither

procedurally nor in substance was this

an election, and we came out to say that we

demand new elections. These were not

anti-Putin rallies; they were rallies and

protests for fair elections. There were

mass demonstrations, the largest

mass demonstrations that we had not

seen for many, many years in

Russia; in Moscow in particular there was

a resolution—the biggest in 20 years. Absolutely right, there was

a resolution. It seems to me it was quite clear,

quite simple, with specific

demands. They were:

first, a review of the election results; the resignation of the head

of the Central Election Commission; bringing to

justice those who took part in

the falsification; and holding new elections.

Political reform as well—fairly clear and

straightforward demands. They were addressed to

the authorities, and the authorities are ignoring them. On the one

hand, we can see that they are very afraid.

They are making various chaotic

moves now, setting up their own

counter-initiatives, various support groups.

They are trying at times to curry favor with

the protesters, and at other times accuse them of

being hirelings of foreign intelligence services, and so

on. In other words, the authorities are deeply

concerned about this, but they are not

going to fulfill a single

demand. And the authorities are not some

abstract thing; we understand that

the organizer of the falsification was

a specific person. His name is Vladimir

Putin. He is doing this in order to

preserve autocratic rule in the country.

And this autocratic power in the country he

uses for one simple thing:

corruption. That is, he is simply looting

Russia's wealth. That is precisely why the rhetoric

of the moment is becoming the slogan: down with

autocracy, as in 1917.

Exactly right: the slogan of the moment is

the slogan 'Down with autocracy.' We want

a president, a lawfully elected president,

not an autocrat, not a tsar, or some

person who wants to be a lifelong

national leader, and so on. We

want a government that we may not

love, but do respect and recognize. Vladimir

Putin is not a person who can be

recognized as the president of the Russian

Federation simply because he makes himself

president by means of

falsification. All right, nevertheless he

is running in this election, and judging by

everything, he will not withdraw his candidacy. On March 4

he will be on the ballot

alongside four other

candidates: Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky,

Mironov, and billionaire Mikhail

Prokhorov. There were major arguments before

the parliamentary elections on December 4 about how

opposition supporters should vote. You

remember, yes? Some proposed spoiling

the ballots, since there was no 'against

all' option; some proposed boycotting

the election; some proposed listening to

your point of view and voting for

any candidate

against the United Russia party. Sorry,

for any party, but not for the United

Russia party. What now, what

advice are you now giving your supporters?

How should they conduct themselves on March 4?

Indeed, our official

slogan and the main strategy that

prevailed, it seems to me, in the end,

was: vote for any party against

the party of crooks and thieves, United

Russia. I think that this time the concept

will be similar. Of course, the slogan 'I vote for

anyone against Putin' sounds a little

less energetic than

'I vote for anyone against United Russia,'

because here, after all, we are talking about

four specific people rather than entire

parties, which are still some kind of

conglomerates and communities. Nevertheless,

we must understand a very simple

thing—indeed, several very simple things. First, that

what is taking place

is not an election; it is a procedure,

an event as a result of which Putin will re-

appoint himself president and Russian

autocrat. Second, we must

use this event to

put maximum pressure on the authorities and

create maximum stress, because in the end we

must create such a level of pressure

that the authorities will finally announce

honest, free elections. And third,

the most effective strategy

pressure on the authorities during the elections, the main point

for a candidate running against Vladimir Putin, because

this would be a vote specifically

against Vladimir Putin, and not for

Zhirinovsky, not for Zyuganov, and not for

Prokhorov. But as for the idea of putting check marks

in all four

boxes at once and thereby making the ballot

invalid, a great many people are suggesting

doing that.

I categorically do not like that approach

because there is no

unifying idea in it.

You see, the call to vote for anyone

against Putin quite obviously

unites the supporters and activists of

Zyuganov, Prokhorov, Mironov, and

Zhirinovsky. A call to vote

to effectively spoil the ballot is

divisive. Spending a lot of time in

debates with Zyuganov’s supporters—I do not

see the point. Right now I have no

disagreements with Zyuganov. Zyuganov is a man

who is running against Putin. He

should receive as many votes as

people cast for him. I have no problem with Zyuganov

and no dispute with him. Our dispute is with Putin

over the fact that we want fair

elections. That means we need to vote against

Putin in order to achieve fair elections.

Alexei Anatolyevich is here in the studio of our

program Big Politics. Present here are

my colleagues, well-known Ukrainian

journalists. I would like to give them

the opportunity to ask you the questions

that interest them. Please, the first question

from the political commentator of the popular

Ukrainian weekly Kommersant

Irina

Solomko. Correspondent—I just wanted

to clarify: weekly magazine Correspondent. But I actually have

two questions for you. And

the first one is, let’s say, tactical.

Right now, you were saying that

elections are coming, and we all know perfectly well that

it has already become known that Mr. Yavlinsky

was indeed not registered. What interests me is

why you are not protesting against this

now, because essentially, well, I

heard what you said—that you

hope that through pressure you can somehow

force Putin to do something,

but I personally do not believe that. Putin

is definitely not such a simple man that

some rallies or something else could

make him do anything, yes, at all.

So why is it that at this stage you are somehow

losing this tactical struggle,

in my opinion? And the second question, after all:

Yevgeny Alexeyevich has already asked you

about your ambitions and plans. But

certainly, I think, especially after

the cover of Time—well, the article in Time, you

have certainly seen it—where you are

called Russia’s hope, that is, a great deal

of expectation is being placed on you, in

particular by the international community.

Everyone understands that your ambitions are

presidential, at the very least, and

at least in the wider world you are seen

as someone who could lead

Russia, probably, in some other

direction now, set it on a different course.

In that connection, I would still like

you to state your broader plans clearly

—your long-term plans—and in that context,

I understand, I value very much, and I think that you

have done a great deal as a blogger, yes,

who fights corruption, but that is

not enough to go on to lead a country.

You need, at a minimum, a team; you need

to have a program. In that context, are you

doing any groundwork, because

as the Orange Revolution showed,

the main problem of the Orange camp was that

they came to power unprepared for that

power. Are you now preparing

to take that power and do something

for the country? Thank you.

Thank you very much. So, first,

regarding Yavlinsky, you are completely wrong,

because the organizing committee for the

rallies adopted a special resolution

in which we demanded that

Yavlinsky be reinstated in the election. When the decision was made

that all

presidential candidates would be invited to speak at

the rally that took place

quite recently, on February 4,

we considered Yavlinsky a candidate and

invited him, even though by that point he had already

been removed. More than that, there was a special

separate resolution and a vote at

the rally regarding Yavlinsky, and everyone

gathered there unanimously stated

that they categorically protested against

his removal and demanded his

reinstatement. So in that sense,

our task, our position, is absolutely

consistent.

Second, as for plans, ambitions, and so

on—well, you understand, it is not articles in

Time magazine that make a person a more

or less significant politician;

that is a matter of PR and publicity.

Today someone gets 15 minutes of fame, yes.

I’m probably going through that right now, including in the sense that

way. So when you ask me these

questions, the situation is such that I have

become relatively popular among other

Russian opposition politicians. This

should be taken philosophically. So,

I’m being completely sincere, and when you

ask me about our strategic

plans, and specifically my strategic

plans, I say quite plainly that our

main strategic plan is

to achieve free elections, because we can

talk about this endlessly here

and discuss how we need to create

a program, a team, and so on. As you rightly

noted, Putin is not a simple man, and we

are still very far from

even being able to take part

in elections. Right now, perhaps some magazine is writing something about me,

but the opportunity

to appear on television exists for me

only on Ukrainian television. On

Russian television, I am still

completely banned

as a person.

SBO

the Orange Revolution, and opposition

politicians, at least foreign ones, can you

show them? You know, we can show

Ukrainian opposition politicians.

I’m sorry, we’ll now

take a break and continue our conversation in

the next part of our program. In it, we

will also touch on one more

topic: the ban on imports of Ukrainian cheese into

Russia. After talks by the minister of

agricultural policy, Mykola Prysyazhnyuk, in Moscow,

the fate of one of the important items of

Ukrainian exports still remains to be

fought for. We’ll discuss this with the

minister himself in the final hour of our

[music]

program. This is an edition of the program Big

Politics on the Inter TV channel. Let me remind you

that today our guest is the well-known

Russian opposition politician Alexei

Navalny. Alexei Anatolyevich is currently

in a television studio in

the Russian capital, live on air with

us, let me remind you.

At the moment, my colleagues, Ukrainian journalists

present in our studio, are asking him

their questions. Next question, please.

Dmytro Lytvyn, columnist for the website

Revisor. I would like to clarify something regarding

the level of pressure on the authorities and the Orange

Revolution, which was mentioned here in

different parts of this conversation with Mr.

Navalny. Will there be, in Moscow, as in

proper revolutionary cities,

any tent camps or

anything similar, which I think would more effectively

convince Vladimir Putin that he is

wrong, rather than just Muscovites coming out

to the square on a day off with slogans?

Well, I can’t speak about any

specific plans, because first of all,

they are, after all,

worked out by a group of people, not

just by me. Second, as I already said,

the protest is organizing itself; it is a wave.

And the people who are part of the organizing committee are, in

a certain sense, simply riding the crest

of that wave. But indeed, we are seeing

a situation in which

the protest is growing and

the confrontation is intensifying. Fortunately, it

is not turning into any violent forms,

but we do see that the number of people

is increasing, the rhetoric is becoming ever more

aggressive, and the actions are changing shape,

becoming more and more inventive,

taking on various sophisticated forms. I

do not rule out that a moment may come

when those gathered will go out into the streets and

refuse to disperse. At the same time, I should immediately

add that the model

of the Orange Revolution and Maidan (the protest movement centered on Kyiv’s Independence Square) in the

sense in which it existed in Kyiv is not very

applicable in Russia now for a number of entirely objective

reasons. Nevertheless,

some such incidents, when

people gathered refuse to disperse,

are possible. And what are those reasons, Alexei

Anatolyevich? Because when I was

recently in Moscow, just this past

Wednesday, I was invited to speak

in a discussion on the possibility of an

Orange Revolution in Russia on

the popular radio station Echo of Moscow, and

there one of my opponents, a deputy of the

State Duma, the new

State Duma elected as a result of

those very elections against

whose conduct, with so many violations,

the opposition is protesting—Sergei Zheleznyak—

said: we know everything, we know that

tents are already being purchased in large

quantities in order to stage in

Moscow a Maidan similar to Kyiv’s. Why

do you think a Maidan is impossible? What

kind of

reasons are these? Well, there are some

obvious political differences here. Maidan

happened—correct me if I’m wrong, I’m

not the greatest expert and I can’t

say that I know Ukrainian

politics and how all of this was organized

but some differences are obvious

first of all, the Maidan and the Orange

Revolution took place after the presidential

election, when there was, after all, a leader, there was

an opposition leader, and this opposition leader, in

the eyes of the protesters, had won the elec-

tion. The victory was stolen, and it was clear that

they were protesting in order to reclaim

their victory—namely, so that their leader would become

president of Ukraine. Right now, in

Russia, the protesters have no obvious leader

No, there was no presidential election; all

the opposition leaders were simply not allowed

to take part in the election, so there is neither

a unifying force nor

[applause]

a presidential candidate; they are fighting for fair

elections. That is a fundamental difference. There are

fundamental differences, and there, in

Ukraine’s political system at the time,

there was at least one independent

TV studio, and there was a substantial number of

opposition deputies who stood shoulder to shoulder

around the Maidan (Kyiv’s central protest square); there was

as I understand it, a fairly

loyal attitude from the Kyiv city administration

which, let’s say, issued

permits and, so to speak, made it easier to build

all of that infrastructure. In Moscow, we

have a completely different situation.

Permission for even the simplest rally has to be

literally clawed out, and

obtained only through pressure and threats; we get

permission to hold marches

and rallies only because everyone knows that

people will come out anyway, even without any permission,

and then it really could very

quickly turn violent. So that is

the only reason why we

get these permits. So it seems to me

that the situation is very

different, and no direct analogies,

especially no tactical analogies, between

Moscow and Kyiv, can be drawn.

Alexei Anatolyevich, here is my question. I

have one here. All right, first of all,

you said

that it may happen that one day

people will come out into the square and will not want

to disperse. In that case, is it possible

that force would be used? If events follow

that scenario, then against people who

do not want to leave, would

force be used? That cannot be ruled out entirely,

but nevertheless I think the likelihood of

that is not very high, primarily

because, as I said at the beginning of our

conversation, the main purpose of these

people being in power is that

they are simply enriching themselves. They have

bank accounts in Switzerland, they live

luxurious lives, and they understand that

an escalation of the political situation in

Moscow and in Russia, and the use of violence

against protesters, would simply

drastically devalue their assets in the West.

And when our crooks, our Russian

homegrown ones, are lounging somewhere in

Belgravia in London and living there

a life of luxury, riding on yachts and moving

in high society, that is one

situation. But when those same people have

blood on their hands, and everyone knows that they

were involved in suppressing the opposition and in

violence, I think it is unlikely that they will be

guaranteed such a chic, luxurious, and

carefree life in Britain or on the

southern coast

of France. And tell me,

please, let us imagine that your

slogan, “vote for any candidate except

Putin,” is heard, and one of these

candidates receives a very serious

percentage of the vote. For example, the very same

Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, and

a runoff situation arises, and it is entirely

possible that in the second round Gennady

Zyuganov could count on victory

because he could consolidate the entire

protest electorate. What

then? There is no problem with that. He will become

president. The person who should become president is the one whom

the people choose. Nothing terrible would

happen. You saw this in your own

country: Yushchenko was elected, and after

some time the voters became disappointed,

and brought Yanukovych back. Nothing

so terrible happens. Yes, there are

certain political excesses, but

this is a normal process: they choose one person,

become disappointed in him, and choose another.

I believe it is Russia’s tragedy that in

1996

Yeltsin was elected through obvious falsifications.

We should have gone through

what all

Eastern European countries went through, when

after the romantic

revolutions of the late 1980s and early

1990s, there was a reaction, and

socialists and communists came to power; then they

were voted out again after some time, and

that political

pendulum began to swing. There is nothing страшного in

the fact that Zyuganov, for example, or anyone else

someone else will become president, president

No. If this person is actually

elected, he will form a coalition

government, because obviously he

will not have enough support

to control the entire Duma (the lower house of Russia’s parliament); he will

work under conditions of significant

pressure from the mass media,

from liberal

democratic forces, and so on.

That is normal: there will be a president who

fends off the opposition and carries out

some of his duties. Uh-huh, good.

Please, I would like once again to give the floor

to my Ukrainian colleagues. Vadim Denysenko,

editor-in-chief of the weekly

Komentarii, your

question. Alexei Anatolyevich, you know,

both here in Ukraine and there in Russia, there is one

and the same question, really, before

the elections: uh, no matter what we say, no matter what

we do, nothing will change — that is what

many people say. I think that here

about 70 percent, and in your country about 70 percent

say that in reality, whether you speak or not,

nothing will come of it. Well, I would like

to ask you to explain why

it is necessary to do something different from what

people say. I do not accept that position, and

the whole history of humanity shows that

when people do something, when even 1%

of active people believe in what they say

and do what they believe in, those people

achieve astonishing success. I am

absolutely certain that in the next

year and a half there will be substantial

changes in the political situation for the

better. And you understand, six months ago we had

just as many skeptics

who said that nothing would happen

and that it was impossible for the streets of Moscow to see

hundreds of thousands of people until

the economy collapsed. We saw that

the economy did not collapse, and there was no

any significant deterioration in

the economic situation. Nevertheless,

suddenly we saw on the streets of Moscow

as many people as we had not seen since

the beginning of the 1990s

It was impossible to imagine six months

ago that the changes in

the political situation, in the political

system, that have already

been declared. Some time ago, President Medvedev

said that for another hundred years in Russia

governors would be appointed. Nevertheless,

amendments have now been introduced, and

governors will once again be elected.

Of course, we understand that the proposed

political reform is, for the most part,

deceptive and aimed simply at

relieving political tension, but this is already

a significant success: with one rally

it was possible to achieve what the opposition in

the State Duma had been trying to achieve

for eight years. Therefore, simply our practice, our experience,

both ours and that of neighboring countries, and simply

human stories, tell us that

everything will work out and evil will be

defeated. Please, a question from the editor-in-chief

of Expert Ukraine magazine, Andrei

Blinov.

Uh, good evening, Alexei. Uh, you know, it is very

pleasant that in Russia, as in Ukraine,

young politicians are appearing. I have always

tried to compare young politicians with

certain characters from literature,

classical literature, so that, well, in

general, the comparison is understandable. Probably

it is worth taking Russian literature, which we love very much.

And you know, I have been listening to you

carefully, and still one has to

admit that for now, the main

character with whom I associate you is

still Bazarov — yes, remember his theory

of nihilism. That is, the main thing, really,

is still... well, not Ivan the Fool, no, by no means.

Not at all. And therefore, in fact,

I simply — as we understand things here

from Ukraine, looking at the political situation —

it is perfectly clear that there is, of course,

a national leader. He has major

problems, quite clearly, with corruption.

I can say that despite the Orange

Revolution, there is indeed a broader scope of

democracy in Ukraine, but here too there are the things

you are talking about — believe me, the same

yachts, perhaps. Well, there is not as much oil,

so of course it is poorer, but I want to tell you

that still, let us

speak honestly. If we compare it with

the Orange Revolution, the number two candidate

in our country, in the third round, after, well, a major

political defeat, got 44

Today Gennady Zyuganov in Russia has

as the second-highest-rated candidate in Russia

a rating of 15, at most

20 percent, and that is all.

So in this connection I have one question for you

on domestic policy, and a second one, after all,

on foreign policy, because let us, after all,

speak about

constructiveness. In reality, we can

destroy the world, but why do that?

The first question, by and large: if not

Putin, then who? I think this question is asked

A great many thoughtful Russians and thoughtful

Ukrainians, we are undoubtedly in

the Russian information space and

we follow events very closely, and

the second ques- how will it then be necessary

to build relations with

Ukraine? Thank you very much for your question.

Well, first of all, when we talk about protest,

it is absolutely not destruction, it is

a positive agenda.

Protest happens because we demand

free elections—what could be

more positive and more right than

honest, free elections? As for

the slogan “If not Putin, then who?”, which

is now effectively the slogan of Putin’s

election campaign—that is, they

go around saying, “If not Putin, then who? Look,”

“the whole country will collapse, Russia will be thrown

to America, and, I don’t know, there will be

cars burning in the streets and

zoos destroyed and elephants running through the streets of Moscow.”

Well, that is absolute nonsense, deception, and

besides, it is even insulting to

a gigantic country where

140 million people live. I want to remind you that we

have somehow suddenly forgotten the name of President

Medvedev, who was perfectly well

president and who assumed that he

would remain president, and everyone was talking about it

quite, quite recently. In our Putin-era

government, even if we are

talking about the current groups

of the establishment within Putin’s

government, there are some relatively

decent people, each of whom could

run the country certainly no worse than

Putin. So, the first point is this:

even among pro-Putin or

people in power, there are plenty of people who

could do exactly the same things that

Putin does—that is, at a minimum, mostly not

do anything, but simply drift along

on the waves of history. A lot of people can do

that.

And

there is an invention of humanity called

representative democracy. And I believe

that representative democracy,

and political competition in general,

bring the best people to the surface;

the worst gradually sink down,

the better ones rise. Therefore, as a result of

free elections, the person will come to power

whom the people support, and even without Putin

remarkable politicians will emerge. It

may well be quite likely that in fair

elections, if he takes part in them,

Vladimir Putin—if Vladimir Putin is

the person who wins them. But

that would already be, excuse me, a different Vladimir

Putin—one who wins with difficulty in the second

round, who would again be forced

to form a coalition government,

who would be forced to fight

corruption because he would be pressured by

deputies and the mass

media, who would be forced not

just to talk, but to actually do something.

So, for some reason, we always have

this kind of situation. Back in 1996,

it was “If not Yeltsin, then who?” If

not Yeltsin, everything would collapse. Back then, Putin

was completely unknown. Putin appeared like

a jack-in-the-box and was appointed

by Abramovich in 1999. And

now we are practically being told that Putin is

something the Lord God sent us.

If not Brezhnev, then who? If not

Stalin, then who? If not Lenin, then who?

Every dictator creates a myth about himself—that

he is irreplaceable. But in reality, that is

absolute nonsense. If tomorrow

a grand piano fell on Putin, nothing in the country would

change for the worse—absolutely nothing.

Water would still run from the taps, and

commuter trains would still run. We would elect a new president

who would certainly be no worse than Putin.

As for your

second—as for your second

question, about relations with

Ukraine—

I am deeply and absolutely convinced that

Ukraine and Belarus are Russia’s main

geopolitical—indeed, in every sense—

allies, and our foreign

policy should be directed as much as possible

toward integration with Ukraine and

Belarus. This is because it happens

in an organic way; these are

the main foreign-policy tasks. And I

understand, of course, all the difficulties that

exist now in Ukraine. There are huge

numbers of people who play

some kind of anti-Russian card; a large

number of people in Russia, uh, play

some kind of anti-Ukrainian card, and so on.

But historically, it simply turned out this way:

in essence, we are one and the same people, and we

must strengthen this integration. We

must resolve all these issues with

Gazprom and gas cutoffs and so

on. But all of that is absolutely just

dust on the enormous pedestal of

Russian-Ukrainian unity. Well, you

know, Alexei Anatolyevich, I think that

Right now, many of our viewers who were listening to you

sympathetically

immediately tensed up when you said

that Russia and Ukraine are practically, and Russians and

Ukrainians are practically one people.

And that is because many people think that

this is not actually the case. Yevgeny Alievich, I,

for example—what people do I belong to?

I am half Ukrainian, half Russian. I

have

most of my relatives living in

Ukraine. Until the Chernobyl nuclear power plant

exploded, literally all my

relatives lived there. I spent every summer

there. I honestly don’t know—absolutely

maybe I’m more Ukrainian in terms of some of my

roots and genetics. I am absolutely not

trying to venture now into areas

where I am not very competent. And I am not

going to argue that there is no such thing as

a Ukrainian nation. By all means,

let it exist, that is perfectly fine, and

Ukrainian culture exists, and

there are a great many people

who want to say: we are not

Russians, we are Ukrainians, we are our own people.

Wonderful, excellent—but that

does not in the least contradict

processes of integration, nor does it

contradict the idea that we can live in

some very, very

uh, very, very close arrangement. And

it is completely obvious to me that there is no country

more closely related to Russia than

Ukraine. Mm-hmm, but at the same time

many people perceive today’s Russian foreign

policy not simply as a policy

aimed at

integrating Russia and Ukraine in one

sphere or another, but as an effort to make that

integration proceed in such a way that

Ukraine would end up dependent

economically and

politically on the Russian Federation, and

perhaps even, in the future,

would delegate part of its state

sovereignty to supranational bodies.

And a great many people absolutely do not

like that. Well, listen, this is

a natural political process. We see the same

thing in the European Union

and in any space where

integration processes are underway: there is a larger

country, there is a smaller country; somewhere there is a larger

population, somewhere a smaller one. And

naturally, the elites and establishments of the two

countries—one tries to dominate the other,

the other tries to push back and keep

a whole lot of powers for itself. Naturally, the same

thing happens at the everyday level.

Every time I come to Ukraine

to visit my relatives, we argue

about what matters more: Russian gas

or Ukrainian salo (cured pork fat). It is an endless

process, and it is an objective process. Well,

everything can be calculated, and one can come up with

an acceptable arrangement which, of course,

will be criticized every time, but

that is political life—everything flows, everything changes.

Ukraine is becoming an ever more developed

country. Ukraine is not experiencing some of the

problems that perhaps

Russia is experiencing—objective ones,

migration, and so on. Therefore every

country tries every day, every second,

every hour, to bargain for better

terms for itself. But that applies not only to

countries, but also to regions, capitals, and cities. This is

a normal process. The main thing is that we

understand that it must keep moving

forward all the same. And still, I must note that

according to all sociological surveys, a larger

number of Ukrainian citizens support not

integration with Russia in politics

and economics, but integration with the European Union,

although the prospects for that integration are quite

distant and vague—that must also be acknowledged.

Well, you understand, it would be strange if it were

the other way around. It is perfectly obvious that

citizens of Ukraine who have

the opportunity to visit Europe and

the opportunity to visit Russia proceed

from a very simple consideration: that the standard of living

in the European Union is better, and integration into the

European Union would give them more

benefits, privileges, and so on. But it seems to me

that these things do not, on the whole, contradict each other.

Russia—I believe that Russia is part

of Europe, and in Russia as well there are processes

of integration into the European Union, naturally

at incomparably, much slower

rates than is happening in Ukraine, in

Ukraine.

And that is absolutely normal—there is

Euroscepticism.

[applause]

I think my colleague will now say that

in fact it is clear that your

voters are in Russia, and this rhetoric

resonates with them. But from a geopolitical point of view,

I mean, in Ukraine, certainly, right now

because of what Yevgeny Alexeyevich said, half of

your sympathizers there have definitely

turned away from you after hearing this,

because in reality, probably,

a modern Russian politician should

understand that he must be a democrat.

not only in its own state, but also in a broader

geopolitical sense. And that Ukraine there

It, just like Belarus, also has, well,

the right to be a sovereign state, and without

that understanding, it seems to me that we

won’t get very far — or rather, you won’t get very far.

get very far. Thank you.

Thank you very much. This is a kind of inherited

trauma of Ukrainian democracy: you always

seem to think that somewhere, someone is

plotting to seize Ukraine

and annex it to Russia. No one is

challenging Ukraine’s sovereignty

and

or the need for the Ukrainian

people to determine their own future themselves — whom they

want to align with and whom they do not want

to align with. I don’t think there is any need

to look for grand geopolitical

meanings in this, because

“geopolitical meanings” suggests that

there are always four people sitting in the Kremlin

thinking about how to annex Ukraine. No one

thinks that way; nobody needs that. And in

fact, it’s not as if — it may seem to you that

this is of utmost importance, of course, but I can

assure you that on the Russian political

agenda, the issue of integration with

Ukraine, unfortunately, ranks

about twenty-fifth, and no

Russian democrats, or whoever else,

imperialists, communists — they are not constantly discussing

how to seize Ukraine

or anything like that. This is not a question of geopolitics

but a question for people like me, who

go to Ukraine every May holiday

and want there to be

completely, uh, unhindered travel.

A huge number of people travel to Russia.

We want to live in some kind of

shared state-like space. What you

have now is that you can absolutely

calmly come to Ukraine. You are, as it were,

here there — every year I spend

6 hours at the Russian-Ukrainian border

sitting in a car just to cross this

border, whereas to Belarus I simply

drive through without even stopping.

You must admit, that is a substantial difference. We are

simply a state, yes, a sovereign

state that has its own border

that must be protected. That is absolutely

normal. When you travel to Europe,

how long do you stand there? Explain that to me, please.

When I say that I

want integration processes

to take place, I want to travel to Ukraine and

for Ukrainian citizens, my relatives,

to come to me in Moscow without spending

many hours at the border — does that mean

that I’m now going to climb onto your Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament)

and start tearing down the flag or ripping off

the state coat of arms? No.

No one wants to encroach on

Ukraine’s sovereignty; there is no

point in that. We do not actually want to solve

your problems either, including the ones you

have in enormous numbers, and we have no

slightest desire to interfere there with you

and do some kind of work in your place. So,

if I understood you correctly,

Alexei Anatolyevich, you simply want

to cross the border between Russia and

Ukraine by car in roughly the same way

as citizens of sovereign Germany

today cross the border with sovereign

France, for example, without even slowing

down at the place where there once

really were border posts,

barriers, customs, and so

on. Exactly right. And in Spain,

for example, there are a great many

people who are Eurosceptic

and say, “stop feeding Greece” — a normal

process. But nevertheless, from Spain one can

easily get to Greece, passing through all sorts of

other countries without

stopping at all. That is normal.

The existence of politicians who

strive for greater political,

ethnic, or any other kind of national

identity does not mean that we must

shut ourselves off with barriers and wage trade

wars, and so on. Alexei Anatolyevich, our

satellite time is running out, as they say. I

will still try to ask — to manage to ask —

you one final question after all: what will happen

after the elections take place on March 4?

Your scenario, your

forecast? To a large extent, this political

picture will be determined by Vladimir Putin himself

by the degree of falsification. If they

stage something more decent and

Putin goes ahead with his self-appointment

through the kind of falsification he carried out quite

recently, then I think street protest will

grow substantially.

His presidency will be definitively

illegitimate, and within a few

months we will see, well, a kind of substantial

political confrontation which I

hope nevertheless will not take the form of any

violent scenarios. Thank you, Alexei

Anatolyevich, for your answers. Let me remind viewers

that today on our program, from the television studio

in Moscow, one of the most prominent figures took part.

of opposition politicians in today’s

Russia, Alexei Navalny. And we will continue

our

program. Well, I will probably refrain from

a lengthy analysis of this interview. In a brief

comment by way of an afterword, I will say only

one thing: watch once again the report that

preceded the conversation with Alexei Navalny.

Think about what Russia has turned into

over the past 12 years, what has happened—not

only to Navalny, but also to many

other figures in this report. Think about it:

back then, no one could have believed that in

2024, it would already be two years

into Russia’s bloody full-scale aggression

against Ukraine; that

many Ukrainian cities would be reduced to rubble;

that thousands upon thousands of peaceful

Ukrainian civilians would die; that Navalny would be

killed in prison; that Nemtsov would long since be

lying in his grave; and that almost all the other

leaders and activists of the opposition would be either

in exile or behind bars.

Some would pass away. And then think: Putin

intends to remain in power for another 12 years

and is not especially trying to hide it. Can you

imagine what else might happen to Russia,

how much further it might change?

It seems to me that this is what, first and foremost,

the West needs to think about, because there

are still many people there

who

even after what has happened in Ukraine still remain in

blissful ignorance of the fact that

Putin’s Russia in fact

poses an extremely serious threat to their

security, their

very existence, and they need to do something

about it. Appeasing an aggressor, as we

know from history, leads to nothing good.

That is all from me. Please,

once again I ask you: like this

video, ask questions, leave

comments, and subscribe to my

channel. All the best to you, until

next

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