Alexei Navalny’s interview with Idel.Realii

Alexei, first I want to talk a little bit

about conspiracy theories, which I really love, and you do too,

but still, you have already been asked

a question at the press conference about

Tatfondbank, whether this is essentially

a possible

attack on Tatarstan, because we

have effectively lost the second-largest

bank in Tatarstan, and whether this could essentially

be part of a long

chain of takeover, figuratively speaking,

a Russian takeover of Tatarstan — meaning that

the same figurative Sechin (Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft) could come and

take away Ak Bars through Tatneft, for

example. So how do you

feel about that opinion? I understand that

we cannot know for sure, but still

I would like to know how you view

such an opinion. I like conspiracy theories too,

but this time it seems to me that

you do not really need any conspiracy theory

to see that across Russia as a whole

the federal center is encroaching on the rights

of the regions, especially the wealthier ones. Well, you

we recently saw how your

neighbor, Bashkortostan, had Bashneft taken away, and

it was done in a completely foolish way, because

in terms of management, Bashneft, with all

its problems, was better than Rosneft. The

same goes for Tatneft. I am one of its shareholders, by the way,

a small shareholder, and certainly not some big

Tatneft fan from the standpoint of

corporate procedures, but I can see that

it is managed better than Rosneft,

and it pays more taxes than Rosneft.

Therefore, we can see overall

a trend of the Kremlin pressuring wealthy regions

and taking money from them — that is simply a fact,

a plain fact. It seems to me, of course, I do not

know, and I have not seen any video of Medvedev

and Putin telling someone, "Let's

deal with Minnikhanov (Rustam Minnikhanov, head of Tatarstan) now

for saying such

unpleasant things in front of television cameras,"

but what is happening certainly

looks very much like the republic — and

paradoxically, all the citizens

of the republic as well — are being punished for the fact

that your governor said words that

basically all the other

governors think: he objected to the unfair

distribution of money between the federal

center and the

regions. It looks very much like that.

Besides that, there is a completely obvious

fact: quite recently, the Central Bank

stated that it would carry out a bailout and

everyone would keep their money, but now suddenly

it has suddenly said there will be no bailout and

everyone has been left without money, and then the

question arises: why did the Central Bank

save much more troubled banks and

allocate much more money to them, but now

suddenly decide not to do that? Especially since

there was already a specific

institution designated for the bailout. Yes, absolutely.

Exactly. That is why I investigate

corruption in banks, in particular in

VTB Bank. Well, I can see that VTB is simply, well,

forgive me, a feeding trough for thieves,

and yet even it was given $10 billion

in order to save those

thieves and help them a little. But here

for some reason they do not want to give anything, although

here there are real, in fact,

defrauded depositors who, among other things,

will come here to meet with me. These are

ordinary individuals, not oligarchs,

but for some reason they have nevertheless decided to

leave them high and dry. In December, Rustam Minnikhanov

criticized

financial relations with Moscow over

the corporate profit tax. I do not know whether you know this or not,

but as I understand it, Minnikhanov

naturally understood what he was saying. It

was on video, it got online, and the leading media outlets

of Tatarstan, which by the way are here today,

were present, and then that video was deleted. So

there must probably have been

some surprise. So what was it — a misunderstanding,

not realizing what you were saying, or

not expecting such a reaction, one that even

reached the federal media? Of course he

did it deliberately. I think he

did it deliberately, simply for

objective reasons, because

Tatarstan does not have the money to develop,

because Kazan does not have the money to

develop. But look at Kazan's budget:

20 billion rubles (about $340 million at the time). That is a ridiculous figure,

a ridiculous figure. In Moscow, they spend

12 billion rubles on beautifying one section of the Garden Ring

while here an enormous

city has to live on 20 billion for the entire year.

That is how it is funded. So, as I already said,

Minnikhanov said what other

governors think. I am not a fan of Minnikhanov, not

a supporter of his; he is a member of United Russia,

and for me that says it all. But he

said the right thing. What should the residents

of the republic say? You know that the power-sharing treaty

between Tatarstan

and Moscow is currently the only such treaty

in Russia, and in the near

future its term expires. You

have spoken in favor of not extending

the treaty, since what you have already said today

means that you already support

as a presidential candidate, as a possible future

president, the idea that money and

powers should be devolved more, including

to the regions.

Do you think that such an opinion of yours

could somehow affect the voters

of Tatarstan, since a huge share of them

for example at the very least strongly support

keeping the office of the President of Tatarstan

under exactly that title, for example.

The president, by the way, is also the only one

left in Russia. I believe that my

position will have an exclusively

positive impact, because my position

is not that we need to abolish

the bilateral treaty between Russia and

Tatarstan. My position is that

under a president,

these treaties will not be needed at all

because I am already proposing to give

more money and more powers to

the regions—not because I support

separatism or want to curry favor with

the republics, and Tatarstan in particular,

but simply because I can see that the current

system has gone bankrupt. There it is—Putin and

for 17 years, step by step, have been taking away money and

powers. So the question is: what has improved?

The answer is no—it has become much worse. When you

take away from the mayor

the ability to govern his city, well,

he does not become any less

corrupt and governs the city—well, no

one has anything. Local government, local authorities,

have lost even the slightest incentive, for example,

to develop business or do anything at all,

because it does not matter how

the population feels about you, it does not matter whether you have

businesses or not—your businesses will still

your money

be taken away, all your efforts will be wasted. Therefore,

the only task of mayors and governors

in modern Russia has become simply

to please Putin, to engage in this kind of

bootlicking. And this system is absolutely

rotten. Therefore, I believe that the greatest

powers should be transferred not even to

governors and republics, but lower down—to city mayors

of cities like Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny, and so

on. Because city mayors are

the level of government where

the greatest number of problems that

people face are resolved. And the republics should

receive more money and more tax revenue

so that they have an incentive: if you work well,

you collect more money, and you will be able to

spend more on your republic. That is exactly

how relations with the regions should be built. That

is, of course I have read and heard all this already, but

still, I would like to understand: when in

Ufa yesterday you were asked a question about how

some regions are subsidized

and some regions are net contributors, specifically

in the case of Tatarstan—do you

have an understanding of how, as

president, you would resolve these issues,

including what Minnikhanov was talking about,

or is it simply a matter of giving more money and

that is it? Naturally, government is a complex

thing, and relations between the federal

government and regional authorities are not just

a matter of saying, 'Here is more money,' and that is all. Of course, for

me, the main thing is the introduction of

democratic procedures everywhere. Well,

for example, your authorities—Minnikhanov's, presumably—

probably like my idea that they should

receive more money. But they probably do not

like my idea that there should be

proper elections, that there is no need to

falsify results at polling

stations, and that the judicial system should

be separate from the state and be

independent. Because right now—go ahead,

try to win a court case against Minnikhanov or United

Russia—there is not a single case. Even when

they are 100% in the wrong, you will never

win in court against them. Therefore, my idea

for relations between everyone

is simply democracy. There is

a procedure. These are not just general words. No, this is

not general rhetoric—this is precisely absolute

specificity. My idea is that

yes, they receive more powers and

more money, but they also bear greater

responsibility to their

voters. The judicial system—well, of course,

of course, yes, I mean

the law enforcement system should mainly, first and foremost,

be federal. The federal

police—the federal police, which

deals with major cases of

corruption. There should be independent

prosecutors who can, in any

republic or any federal subject (constituent region of Russia),

act without, well, without being subordinate

to governors, and without being afraid to investigate

their corruption as well. But this is

a complex matter. Still, overall, of course, it

must be based on democratic

procedures and on freedom of the mass

media. You yourself gave an example

when your Minnikhanov said something noteworthy,

and then Tatarstan's media outlets

cut it out. That shows that the media

are controlled and are not fulfilling their

public function. I will put in place

a system across the country as a whole that will

be based on the independence of the media, on

democratic procedures, on the

independence of the judiciary, and that is

the best way for everyone to interact, because

after all, nobody needs

President Navalny simply to be friends with

the president of Tatarstan, because

today they are friends, and tomorrow they

fall out and things get worse. No, what is needed

is not friendship; there must be some kind of

normal framework for relations.

You want to transfer more powers

specifically not even to the governor, but to the mayors

of particular cities. Well, in this case,

let it be Kazan. And how exactly is that

different, really? That is, we have,

for example,

the same team. So what difference does it make

whether it is the president or the mayor? I am not only proposing

to give more money to the regions. I propose—I

insist on the main thing in the regions:

Bring back elections for you? Well, there’s no doubt about it.

Everyone in the republic knows it.

They know you have two clans: the Mekhanov clan

and the Shaimiev clan. They’ve divided up the entire

business sphere between themselves, and everyone understands who

answers to whom at the regional level,

and at the city level. But if there are

normal, free elections without

fraud, this system will change, and we won’t have

this situation where the same

team stays in power all the time. Whoever wins,

wins. That’s how it should be.

There should be competition, including from previously

unrepresented political forces.

Tatar nationalists, who are being pushed out everywhere,

or Russian nationalists—

they should have their own political

representation everywhere, of course. Because

right now there is only United Russia,

and no one else. It has squeezed everything tight

and lets no one else in, even though in reality

it does not represent the majority of the

population. For these languages

to actually continue being spoken,

there needs to be an infusion of resources into the media,

into films, into the arts, and so on and so forth.

But do you really think the whole

issue is only about money? In other words,

take Tatarstan as an example. We have

a parliament called the State Council,

and Tatar nationalists, for example, the same people

who say: listen,

not a single session is held in Tatar anymore,

and in the Kazan City Duma there is no translation

into Tatar. That no longer depends

on money, but specifically on whether the authorities want

to do it or not. Although, for example, Tatar

is taught a great deal in schools here,

even more than Russian should be taught, or

the question of translating legislative assembly sessions

into Tatar is a question of making sure

people continue to learn it, that someone

actually wants to speak Tatar.

If you wanted to go to the theater

and see a play, a production in

Tatar, you could. You could watch

a decent film in the Tatar

language. That’s the issue. And for that,

money needs to be allocated—money that is actually

quite modest compared with the insane

spending we see everywhere. And again,

there’s no need to overcomplicate things or invent

something artificial. We can clearly see a positive

example

of preserving languages that are not

dominant overall, but are dominant in

a particular region in European countries,

and so on. And we should also take into account the negative

experience of different countries, where we see how

easy it is to lose some

national culture, while restoring it

afterward is practically impossible. So there are

all sorts of complex political questions.

It’s clear that everyone plays the national

card, always has and always will. But

there has to be a foundation, and that foundation is

that we need to fund the things where

the language lives naturally:

books, culture. Right now they’re playing

the Tatar nationalist card, as I already—

if you watched my

press conference yesterday in Ufa,

three groups of nationalists came there:

Bashkir, Tatar, and Russian, and all of them

said, “We support you.” They

hate each other, they fight with one another,

but they all support me for

a very simple reason: because I am not

trying to force them to do anything. I am not

trying to lead them. I guarantee them

one thing: that in a normal system, they will all

be able to take part in elections. That is one

example. In my view, one could also cite

Catalonia. And yet, for

the Catalan language and Catalan culture not

to disappear, the local authorities

passed laws—in essence, they

were autonomous and adopted

laws that did not exactly contradict, but

were different from those of,

so to speak, the federation—well,

the leadership, the leadership of Spain.

That’s not the point.

But in our case, how do we achieve that?

Yes, we have our own constitution, but the same

school curricula, for example—

that requires

political rights as well. And who is going to

grant that at all? Why would they?

And note this: despite the fact that in

Catalonia they passed certain laws

that contradicted the central government,

no one died because of it. In the

United States, states pass laws that

very often contradict federal

laws, and states differ greatly

from one another, and no tragedy

has resulted from that. I propose we acknowledge

the obvious: many republics in

Russia differ substantially from

one another. The differences between Kazan and Moscow

are not as great as people often say,

but they do exist. And in

particular, here the issue of language

keeps coming up. All these questions

can be resolved, as I said, by two

things. First, we need to give people what

is rightfully theirs. Look, taxes—

if we are not talking about mineral extraction taxes,

mainly—well, they

in fairness should largely

remain where people pay them,

where they earn their money. That’s fair, isn’t it?

It is.

And so we need to resolve the issue

of distributing money and powers, and we

must fund all these cultural

initiatives. There is no confrontation here. That’s it.

It's an invented concept that if we now

give more power to Tatarstan, then

Tatarstan will somehow break away from

Russia and join New Zealand.

But that's nonsense—just nonsense that was simply

made up. Yes, it would be a region that

has its own particular features. And what, does it not have

those features now? We simply have to admit

the obvious: Tatar nationalists

do not support you fundamentally, because

not only do they want it

to be extended, they also want

to get more out of it. You

say that the treaty is not necessary

because you are already prepared to do that anyway. But that

you know, that's how you explain it to us, but

others don't understand it. Still, if

by the 2008 election, if you are

allowed to run and you talk about this, then

the same Tatar nationalists

I think that—well, in Bashkiria (Bashkortostan) there is no longer

such a treaty—they will fight to the end

to defend these rights; for them this is

a matter of principle: the treaty, the office of

president. I understand. Good question, only

will Tatar nationalists strongly back

United Russia, or will they strongly back

Putin, who is taking everything away? They

consider Navalny

not radical enough for them, but at the same time are they

supposed to support a government that has simply

robbed them, taken away taxes, that

is grabbing everything in sight, that does not

even let the local governor utter a word about

the fact that some of the taxes should stay there?

I take a realistic view of this; I understand

perfectly well that I will not be able to satisfy

the political interests of all political

groups. No, they do not hold the dominant

position. Maybe they would hold it in fair

elections, but for now

United Russia prevails, and it carries out

the role of the party of government, and right now

the task of the party of government is to

take everything away—not give it to the regions. We see

this happening every year, and again and again

the share is reduced—for example, the share of the profit tax

that remains there.

Therefore, broadly speaking,

what matters to you: the frills or

actually getting somewhere? The treaty or the money? I'm asking

you, as represented by the Tatar nationalists.

So I will say this absolutely clearly: I

believe that money and powers should

be transferred to the regions, because that is

the right thing to do. Otherwise, regions

cannot develop, and we

have seen that over the past 17 years. That's

all. As for the title of president, I

don't care what the head here is called.

What

difference does it make? No, Putin is the one cutting this back. As I understand it,

in Bashkiria (Bashkortostan) they were forced

to rename the office. I don't care.

If people want it to be called that, then let it be called that.

Suppose I am president—I have not the slightest

jealousy about not being

the only president in the country. After all,

there is always the president of

the chess association or something like

that—what difference does it make? What is the purpose of

the country, and what is the purpose of the Republic of

Tatarstan? So that people can live well there,

earn decent wages, and

call their leader whatever they

see fit—anything at all. Let them

call him tomorrow the Great Leader or

whatever they want—put it to a referendum.

This is a local issue. If they called it that, they called it that. I

fully support any expression of the will

of the citizens—that is, decide

this question by referendum. Why not? More powers and money

should go more to mayors than to governors. You

said that then there would be no problems for

the president of Tatarstan. What did you

mean? What

problems? That there would be no problems with

the president of Tatarstan if

Naberezhnye Chelny and

Kazan compete with each other? The main idea, including in the Kremlin and among

those people who advocate super-

decentralization, is that

the regions need to be arranged so that

there is no separatism—that, supposedly, when

the president of Tatarstan has a lot of

money, he will immediately break away from

Russia. As I already said, and well, we quite

often see—and have in fact seen—

situations where regional heads have a

tendency to turn into little tsars

when they have a great deal of money. They

pull the judicial system under their control and

so on. I believe that the main way

to combat this is to pass powers further down,

that is, so that the competition is not between

them at the top, but so that most of the power is lower down,

so that it is not

Naberezhnye Chelny and Ufa competing, among others, but rather

the level of competition is reduced; it

shifts from the republic level to

within the republic itself. So I was right

to put it this way: say there is an investor, and he

wants to set up production in Tatarstan.

Kazan offers him one set of terms,

and Naberezhnye Chelny offers another set of terms,

and he chooses. And here,

because we are shifting this, well,

competition from the regional level to

the city level, we thereby, it seems to me,

eliminate the particular danger

—even if only hypothetical—that

regional leaders will begin turning

into little princes. How many percent in

Tatarstan, if you are allowed to run in the election? Well,

perhaps you have already conducted some polling.

Besides that, how many people here

in terms of numbers...

I am counting on a majority of the votes, and...

I say this without any irony. I fully realize

that right now my main

problem is that people simply do not

know that I exist. But we will make sure they do,

including through the work

of our campaign headquarters.

We will get the message across that I am the only

candidate who speaks about real

problems, and the only candidate

who poses a genuine challenge

to the Kremlin's corrupt policies. These

policies are liked by no one, and so I

hope to win a majority in your

republic. Thank you very much.