I really liked it at Maika Neki's.
I liked it — they really have a solid
program. And their stream format there is
Of course, they have an advantage simply because
they can afford it. They have no ads,
you can talk for an hour and a half, as much as you want,
we'll stop whenever we want — and we're on air.
Right now? No, not yet. Calm down, really,
we're not on air yet. Well yes, I know that.
I don't know him personally at all. But we're on
the air — the studio light came on too,
this thing lit up, so I did too. We're live. Good
evening. This is the 2019 program — until I start,
they'll keep laughing, you know. And today, of course,
is a historic event — two
historic events. We're all in Moscow, on
Svoboda... in Moscow, not in St. Petersburg, and I am too
here in Moscow. So yes, we have
historic
events. Good evening, good evening everyone.
Good evening. So, that's it, now
everything is clear, but we should remind everyone that +7 985 970
4545 is for SMS, the Twitter account is active, and something
is happening on our YouTube. I remember that
you have to leave likes — well, and you can also
write questions there. I'll also take
this opportunity to say that on my Facebook
I've also opened a thread for questions to Alexei
since a huge number of them started
coming in over the course of the day today.
We'll definitely ask some of those questions.
We haven't spoken in a while, but the first question I'll ask
is from Dmitry.
Guberniev. Dmitry Guberniev was a guest
on our program,
just this Thursday. Was that
yesterday, then? Yes, yesterday. And everyone
knows that Dmitry Guberniev is a
sports commentator. I'm quoting from the
transcript: a question for Alexei Navalny.
What will happen when you come to power?
What will happen to Guberniev, who was
an authorized representative? What will happen to us?
Alexei, Dmitry asks.
Guber... The answer to that question depends
on whose authorized representative he
was. Authorized representatives can do whatever
they want within the law, and in that
sense, we have no complaints against people who love
Putin — whether they truly love him or are lying that
they do, that doesn't interest us. If Dmitry
Guberniev was not involved in corruption, in
jailing people, or in any
other unlawful acts that even under the current
Criminal Code are
punishable, then Dmitry Guberniev, please,
will be able to do whatever he wants in the Beautiful Russia of the Future
(Navalny's phrase for a future democratic Russia). He will have a shameful
page in his biography — that he was an authorized representative
for Putin. And basically, that's
all. That will be his punishment. He will
have to explain to his grandchildren why he was
Putin's authorized representative.
So then what awaits
Popov? Well, Denis Popov can expect
something entirely different. Denis Popov is the
Moscow prosecutor, in whose case
real estate was discovered in Montenegro
and in Spain. Naturally, none of it was
declared.
Most importantly, the source of the
funds is completely unclear. In other words, the man invested
millions of euros abroad in secret, and I have no
doubt that we still haven't found a significant
part of his real estate. That is, what
he has in Astrakhan, on Rublyovka (an elite area outside Moscow), in
Montenegro, and in Spain is worth several
million euros. How did a man acquire that
when he spent his whole life working as a
prosecutor? Well, I would say that our
quite well-founded assumption is that it was
corruption and bribes, and
therefore Denis Popov's actions
should be
— if he cannot explain the origin
of his money, and obviously he cannot
explain it if he declared
nothing — then that is grounds for
opening a criminal case. Alexei, I have
this question: all these
investigations of yours — well, for example,
the latest one on Popov — have they ever
had any consequences, so to speak,
official ones? Well, Metelsky wasn't
elected, for instance — not re-elected, rather. Well, well,
that was not through official channels, voters...
Unfortunately, our state is structured in such a way
that at one time, in the beginning, the authorities
really were afraid of things like this.
Remember there was that deputy, Pekhtin, and we
found an apartment in Miami, and within a couple of
weeks he stopped being a deputy. He wasn't even removed —
he left on his own. It was simply a
period when the authorities still felt a little
embarrassed about such things. Now, unfortunately,
it works differently. And despite the fact that
for example, Denis Popov, the Moscow
prosecutor — we have completely
exposed him — they cannot remove him, because if they
remove Popov from office now, then what will
everyone in Moscow be saying? That Navalny
was right, that Navalny beat them, that Navalny
proved that the prosecutor's office is
corrupt. Nonsense — there are no
checks, no FSB (Russian security service) investigations; one mafioso appoints
another mafioso. They cannot allow themselves
to do that. So yes, this really
is this kind of
— this is a thief and a corrupt official; we
tell people that he is a thief and a
corrupt official. And in a situation like the one with
Metelsky, who held an elected office,
we proved to the people in the district where they
were voting that he was a thief and corrupt, and he
stopped being a deputy. And now, today,
there was a hearing at the Simonovsky
Court, where he came running and demanded that
the court ban us from using the phrase
The leader of United Russia is a crook.
Well, good luck to him with that.
That is, this is his only complaint, his
complaint about this thesis, about the words saying that
Metelsky himself, essentially, the leader
of Moscow's United Russia, let me remind you, and
a former Moscow City Duma deputy, is
a corrupt official. Well, and some other things—he
simply pulled phrases out of context. What's interesting is that he
does not, in fact, dispute the fact
that he owns real estate,
hotels in Austria, and when our
representative in court says
to Metelsky's representative, well, here—
explain it, let's talk about
the hotels, where he got the money for them, and
so on—he says, we don't want to
discuss that, it's not interesting to us. You must
refute the phrase that Metelsky
is a thief. After all, you do not have a court ruling in hand
that says, you know, Metelsky
is a thief. Since there is no such ruling, you must
retract your video. You must
delete it. And all the other things—some
millions, some Spanish hotels,
the origin of the funds—we are not going to
discuss that, it doesn't interest us. And the judge
agrees with him and says: no, we won't
discuss that. But tell me this:
do your investigations and these publications
have any effect at all on public opinion,
since we understand that they attract
a huge number of views,
are replicated, spread around, and clearly
this information reaches a large
number of people who, at the very
least, use the internet. But does this
somehow affect their attitude
toward these specific people, toward events, toward
politics in general? Does
a cause-and-effect relationship work here, such that when we
talk about Popov and Metelsky, we
are still talking about a system headed
by a very specific
person? It definitely does have an effect, and there are many
facts proving that it does. Well,
as for Metelsky, he simply was not
elected, and in fact far
fewer United Russia candidates were elected in this
election cycle in Moscow and in other
cities, including thanks to our
investigations. There was a well-known
sociological study that
showed that after the release of our film
*He Is Not Dimon to You* (a reference to Alexei Navalny's anti-corruption documentary about Dmitry Medvedev), well, essentially, we
destroyed Medvedev's approval rating once and
for all. Since then, it has never
recovered. That is, Medvedev is now
the most unpopular of the well-known
politicians in the country, and that is, of course, the result
of our investigation. Head down, on your knees—
before him, the old woman laughs—hot water...
That old woman would have fallen to her knees before
Chikatilo (a notorious Soviet serial killer), unfortunately, before Sokolov in
Napoleon's bicorne hat, because that is
some kind of authority figure. The old woman understands:
if I run over now and fall to my knees in the mud,
then maybe they'll give me hot water,
which I haven't had for two years. But she
ran—she was fighting for her hot water.
It would be strange to condemn her.
The one who should be condemned is Putin, who keeps at the
head of the government that very
He needs approval ratings, though in fact he is not running anywhere
for office for now—we still don't know. He is not
running, but Putin, in turn, is
interested in ensuring that the person
who is his close associate
and head of government, the second
most powerful person in the country, depends only on
Putin. He understands that the public does not
like him and that if he goes nowhere—
the authorities will persecute him for
his corruption, and therefore he must do
everything possible to keep Putin in
power, because he has a vital interest in that. The same
applies to
Metelsky; it applies to
all of them: they are corrupt, because personally
their freedom and future depend on his
power. There are rumors coming from there that, in general,
everything Navalny does—really all of it—is useful, and we
take it
on board;
it will come in handy. The file folder will be lying there
for later. A long time ago, they even said this publicly.
Medvedev himself, for example, until
it came out and touched him personally, liked to throw around
vague phrases like
well, people are publishing information
on the internet, and well,
my name, of course, hasn't been mentioned there for many years now.
Well, they are doing
useful work, and at some stage of our
activity
that was, well, considered to be how the authorities
should respond to questions of that
kind. But later we turned into
complete enemies, because
we conducted investigations
about them themselves. And after that
Medvedev began saying that our
investigations were not useful.
And someone, if I remember correctly, almost publicly said
that Navalny should actually be made
head of the Accounts Chamber (Russia's state audit body).
Many people say many strange things publicly,
so, well,
listen, everyone is free to talk.
They said a lot of things; it's just that now, in
recent times, even things like that—whether
mild or funny—are no longer allowed
to be said, because, well, because in general
it is forbidden to mention it in any context.
Notice that even about me, rather rarely now,
there appear some completely
commissioned negative pieces on TV channels,
because mentioning the name at all is basically forbidden.
This year. All right, then a little bit
a few words about relations with
potential
those friends about
unification... everyone loves
they love. How do you know? Wow.
Wow, I was sure they did. What
is going on? You’ve really
doused me with ice-cold water. Who? Let’s understand
who doesn’t like me
Who dislikes me? Who has turned away from me? I think
that’s what he means. This last
specific statement about Garry (Kasparov) not...
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky don’t love you either
It seems to me everyone likes me. Well, at least
at least... Look, the thing is
what does “like” mean?
I actively supported Yabloko (a Russian liberal political party), and I
think all of us, myself included, made
a major effort to ensure that
Yabloko formed, historically, the largest
largest faction in the Moscow City Duma in all
time. Is that connected with affection? If not
with affection, then it is connected with affection, it
is connected. I may have some
differences over strategy and tactics with
Yavlinsky, but that does not mean I won’t
support their
candidates on principle. I hope that they, these
wonderful people who have
some tactical disagreements with me,
maybe don’t like me very much
or are jealous of something, or whatever, but
overall, there will come a moment
when they need my support, and they will get it
If I need their support, I
think I’ll be able to count on it too
Well, by the way, in many ways they
quite openly support this
mantra that is being actively promoted in
the liberal wing regarding Alexei
Navalny: that he is an authoritarian
leader, some kind of absolute Führer
who cannot tolerate other people’s
opinions, and that his work is only possible under
his personal direction, and so on and so forth
So first of all, my first question is: who
is the author of this concept? What do you think, if
it even has an author? Why is it that
in general, where did this come from? Surely you
have thought about it yourselves—where did this
this narrative come from? Excellent question. This narrative
really does exist; it is being actively
promoted, and, remarkably,
it is being promoted by people
who themselves have stood at the head of
their organizations for many years, irreplaceably. Well,
let’s say there is a set of certain complaints
invented or real. For example, I
argue that sometimes elections should
be boycotted, and sometimes one should participate in them
That is unacceptable to Garry Kasparov, for example
and that is a normal position. He
consistently advocates a boycott
so he always argues with me on
this issue. And I have nothing against that
Let him argue. We have a discussion. There are
some made-up complaints, and also this
clear set of claims: that I’m an FSB agent
that I work for the Kremlin. I do not work for the Kremlin
That I’m authoritarian; on the contrary, I’m too
weak. I took part in the Russian March (a nationalist demonstration in Russia)
therefore I’m too conservative
I’m too liberal. There is this whole set of
these things, and one of them is that I am very
authoritarian. What can I say to that?
It seems to me that in a minute I can
answer that in a minute, because due to
Navalny’s authoritarianism, we missed
the commercial break. There you go, everyone, what a mess
Everyone talks about someone else’s authoritarianism, you see
But someone started it. I still remember
there was some old lady, a hundred years ago, as it were
an old lady who, her whole life, well
she was an extraordinary old lady, there appeared
some old lady who
who was supposedly one of the
very active and prominent members
of Yabloko, although in Yabloko hardly anyone really
knew her. I saw this
old lady twice in my life, and she wrote her memoirs about
me—completely made up. And it was
an astonishing thing. Well, what can you do?
Well, really, what could I do about this old lady?
She was just some kind of, like Yunna
Morits (a Russian poet), she was
obsessed
with Navalny. Well, she was the same kind
of obsessed person. She wrote some
monstrous things. She first
wrote about me, wrote about Yashin, and I with
Yashin discussed it and laughed, because, well, we
remembered there was such an old lady. She came by a couple
of times into our room, but certainly not as
let’s say—not, well, not a cleaner, just
some nice old lady would come in
“Hello, hello, I’m a member
of the party from the Central District somewhere.” Well
all right, nice to meet you, nice to meet you, and
then she just writes memoirs about us
Yes, yes, yes, that’s how it started, and
off it went
Yes. Well, we’ll continue our program
2019, and Navalny continues
to answer: people compete. People need
to say something negative, including
about other people. To those who say that I am
some kind of authoritarian leader, I answer
very simply: look at the history of my
activity. I have consistently and always
stood for primaries; I organized
elections to the Opposition Coordination Council
when everyone was shouting that there was no need for any
elections, just lead everything. In all
elections I support representatives
of other parties and set no
conditions. Just now there were elections to the
Moscow City Duma and in other regions. Did I
went around demanding, "Sign some kind of"
declaration saying that you love me very much and won’t
criticize me, the way the Yabloko party often does
(a Russian liberal political party). I didn’t set a single condition
for anyone. I supported them simply
because they are the opposition. That’s why I
try, through practical actions,
to prove it every day. Look at
our organization. It’s very democratic.
Look at what we do — it’s, it’s
always support for competition. So that’s
basically the whole answer. Mm-hmm. I
have a question, Alexei, about
the protests. There’s a feeling, a feeling
that all civic activity
has kind of stopped, right? That everyone has gone silent.
The rallies happened, then everyone went home.
The trials continue, the prison terms continue,
they continue. If, if we don’t, don’t, don’t
repeat the protest, then they’ll simply lock everyone up.
People need to be saved. Do you think they should be
saved only through new protests? That’s
the question. By the way, how? Save them by any
means. We saw that some of those who were saved
were saved simply because there was
a certain intensity of public opinion.
At that point there were no
super-massive demonstrations anymore. There were,
in particular, actors who spoke out, yes, and
there was simply such a public resonance that everyone
started talking about it, and some people
were released. Then, when things went quiet, they
started again, in silence,
putting people in prison. Well, absolutely. In fact, just now
I came here from Avtozavodskaya metro station
to your station, Echo of Moscow radio (a Russian radio station),
on Novy Arbat, and in front of the metro
at Avtozavodskaya there were picketers. There’s a whole
campaign called Metro Pickets, and
they stand everywhere. And of course we would like
the protests to keep growing all the time, the way
it’s happening in Colombia, or as it
recently happened in Bolivia. Unfortunately, it’s
a wave-like process. Remember, there was
2011 and 2012,
there was enthusiasm, then a year later
it flared up several times in a row, and everyone was celebrating again.
And everyone writes, "At last, young people have taken to
the streets," and then it all dies down again. It’s this kind of
wave-like protest, and we probably, unfortunately,
— I wish it were
constant, that there were always great demonstrations
every Sat— Well, why don’t we
try? Because you can’t initiate things irresponsibly.
I can announce a rally
every Saturday. But if no one
comes, that will have such a
demoralizing effect
on the protest movement. So if I knew how
to press a button that would instantly
stir up 300,000 people and send them running
to protest, I would press that button.
Unfortunately, there is no such button. And so I, like
all of you, like all of us, try
to bring people in. I always go to all
the actions. Though lately I rarely make it to them
because usually I get
arrested somewhere — now, these days, simply for
a couple of weeks before any action. But even so,
I still go to them. I’m not shy about it and
I’m not afraid to call on people to attend. As for
how to get people out, there is no
other answer, no other solution, except
routine work in every sense.
Spreading information. Those very
Metro Pickets — they release people because
they fear public opinion. Putin
is afraid that these arrested
and imprisoned people are dragging down his ratings, and he
released Pavel Ustinov because, well,
all the actors were shouting, "Either release him
or, effectively, we’ll destroy you
on our Instagram." Margarita has a different
opinion. She thinks that all your appearances,
our appearances, all these Metro Picket actions,
the protests — all of it is nonsense, because
in the end one Kremlin tower calls another and
the issue gets decided. Margarita Simonyan, first
let her return 100 million rubles (about 1 million USD), together with
her husband, which she spent on
her talentless film, first of all. And
second, let all of them, all of them with their
Russia Today team, give back to us
the 20 billion rubles (about 200 million USD) we spend every year on
this pointless, utterly stupid television channel
that nobody watches — neither on YouTube nor
well, basically, on television either.
It costs 20 billion rubles a year, so somehow she is
really not an authority for
me at all. Nevertheless, I
mentioned that example simply to, so to speak, sharpen the point.
I brought up that example, that quote. But in
fact, a great many people, including
again what you might call people
who could be considered our
allies in many ways, believe
that protests still do not
affect political decisions, and that
civic activity, mass participation, do not
affect political decisions at all, that
these
decisions — all our, all our
sorry for interrupting — all our
empirical experience shows that this is not
the case. Well, listen, we weren’t born
yesterday either. We’ve seen actions and
the consequences of those actions. After all,
I’m sitting in this studio, and although I’ve been
convicted several times, I still wasn’t
sent to prison for five years in 2013
because people came out onto Manezhnaya Square
(a central square in Moscow). The Golunov case is an example, the same
with Ustinov is an example, and there are other
examples too. We know for certain, absolutely,
that this is the only thing that works. As for
Golunov, that’s exactly what I wanted to ask about
— about Golunov. It seems
that if back then this
A campaign over Golunov’s arrest wouldn’t have hurt.
There was no one there to do PR for Putin or anything like that.
who at that time was in
St. Petersburg, at the forum, and back then people were talking about
No one was talking about the forum. Everyone was talking
only about Golunov, saying it was a mistake
by the security services in relation to Putin, not
in relation to Golunov. Probably, yes. But in
fact, why was it a mistake? I mean, he was
arrested, people started getting outraged, and
so the security services realized it was a mistake.
But if people hadn’t gotten outraged, still
what comes first is the question.
If it were up to Putin, Putin would jail
half the country tomorrow, leave just one pipeline
— a Gazprom pipeline — and let it bring him money.
He doesn’t need anyone — not pensioners,
no one. He’d lock them all up, and
let them work, building a new
pipeline. He wouldn’t even raise an eyebrow. But
when he sees that simply thousands of
people are posting on Facebook, and it’s obvious that
they’re about to pour into the streets, then he
lets those people go. Of course, afterward they
dress it up as, “Yes, we ourselves
released them. You were getting upset there on Facebook, but
we reconsidered it. Well, we understand,”
perfectly well that they only start thinking about something
when they’re afraid of one thing only:
that if they squeeze a little harder now,
people will take to the streets. Then they let them out. Someone
recently published this figure, and it struck me:
apparently, over the last 10 years
how many people have been imprisoned?
30,000 poli-
ti-
cal prisoners, around
No, specifically under these protest-related articles.
Over the last, what, 10 years? I think that’s
an exaggerated
figure, if I’m not mistaken.
We’ll check Mediazona (an independent Russian media outlet) and the news so we don’t
mislead anyone.
We’ll definitely check. I think that’s
unlikely. Still, we do see a clear
trend: the number of absurd cases from the category of
things like this—
it was just being discussed yesterday—
someone took a photo, posted it on Facebook, uh, people
formed the number 55 with their bodies, but from
Facebook it was photographed in a way that made it look like a swastika,
and a criminal case was opened. And if there hadn’t been
a scandal on Facebook, they would have convicted
that person. How many times has that happened?
The system can no longer work any other way, and
they earn positions, ranks,
apartments by jailing people, because Putin told them:
I’ll give you positions,
ranks, apartments, if you keep locking up,
in particular, those who write, uh, there on
Facebook, VKontakte, and so on. And what
you said at the beginning of the program, that
if we stay silent, they’ll jail everyone — they
really do have a plan to jail everyone. Did you find it?
Well, also, on the subject of imprisonments and
releases, there’s a very important
topic here that I’d maybe like
to go into in more detail in the second part.
But I’ll ask the question: all these actors who
came out in support of Pavel Ustinov, whom we
were all so happy about — that happened while you weren’t there.
Alexei, at that time you were sitting there, watching
through the bars, yes, at what was happening.
But when they came to the rally where,
I think, you also spoke that day,
already, yes — when there was the rally, yes, there was.
There was a wonderful report by TV Rain (an independent Russian TV channel) precisely from
that actors’ crowd — wonderful guys,
all great. But they were all completely
at a loss under the pressure of this
political subject. They
had entered a completely unfamiliar space and
immediately started saying, “Oh, this is all not
our thing. We only want people to be freed, and
politics — no, no, no, we
are against politics, we’re not against the authorities,
we’re not rebelling, we’re only defending one specific
person who is innocent.” That’s why I’m bringing up again
what I already said before:
cause and effect. How do we make
that connection click into place in their minds?
Listen, it has clicked into place for them.
Let’s be honest: they understand everything perfectly well.
It’s just that the bravest among them
— Yana Troyanova, one of the most famous
actresses in Russia, who definitely has something
to lose — stands at these pickets every
Saturday because it all clicked for her, and
she isn’t afraid, and she speaks honestly. As for
all the others, they’re at the first, at the
first stage of this evolution. They understand everything,
but they’re afraid. They depend very much on
some minister like Medinsky (former Russian culture minister),
pathetic and miserable as he is, who can with a single
snap of his fingers destroy their careers. They
will never be cast again. So for
them, this is already an act
of fantastic courage. We’d like
them to keep being this brave going forward,
but unfortunately not all of them can.
Well, thank you that they did at least something.
Compared with where things were a year ago, this
is already major progress.
Did you find the news?
And where did you get
30,000 political
[music]
prisoners
Anya
[music]
It is 8:30 p.m. in the capital. Good evening, this is
Konstantin Miroshnikov in the studio on Ekho
with a brief news update. At the Élysée Palace
the dates of the summit were officially confirmed
for the Normandy Four in Paris. The leaders
of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine
will gather together on December 9, TASS reported, citing
the press attaché of the French administration.
the presidents' summit will take place against the backdrop of
the agreements reached in the summer of this year
agreements which, in particular,
made it possible to separate forces in a number of
zones along the line of contact in Donbas
the last meeting of the Normandy Four
let me remind you, took place in Berlin back in
October
2016. Former Donald Trump adviser
has been found guilty of lying to Congress, as
Fox News reports. Such a
verdict against Roger Stone
was delivered by the jury. They concluded
that the former adviser tried to conceal the truth about
his contacts with the WikiLeaks website
prosecutors believe that Stone
intended to obtain compromising
information on the Democrat in order to help
Trump in the election campaign. In addition,
he is accused of attempting
to block the testimony of other
witnesses in Congress and conceal from
lawmakers documents. Stone's defense
insisted that he had not broken
the law because he had not received any
compromising material. During the trial, the former
Trump associate clashed with the court; he
was banned from speaking to the press and
on social media. Bolivia has withdrawn from
the socialist alliance of Latin American countries
in Latin America, this was announced on air
by the republic's foreign minister
Karen Longaric. In addition,
the Foreign Ministry is recalling almost all ambassadors who
were appointed by the government of the resigned
president Evo Morales. Earlier,
the head of the ministry also announced the recall of
the diplomat in Cuba and the republic's representatives
to the UN, who refused
to leave their posts after Bolivia's withdrawal
from the regional bloc. Its
remaining members include Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Cuba, and a number of other island states
Earlier, Honduras and
Ecuador also left the bloc. Now for the weather in Moscow:
cloudy, 4°C above zero, pressure 757 mm
of mercury (about 1009 hPa). Tomorrow, around 4°C, with a chance of
light brief rain
Konstantin Miroshnikov, news service
Ah
of Moscow. OVD-Info, yes, then we can believe it. Yes,
yes, look, over the past 15 years
I'll read it now. All right, so that we
can talk about it properly. Otherwise people
really
mile
...and one of the most deeply moving human
voices...
you know, the investigator told Kirill
Serebrennikov. He's testifying today
again, that society must be protected
from people like you
in general. Of course, the investigator
Lavrov. Was that in court or somewhere else,
just off to the side? Kirill quoted his
words
Yes, that's Lavrov, your guy now, right?
handling your case
Well, listen, we have
112 investigators in our
[music]
group. The lead one should be, what's his name,
Gubaidulin, maybe? Or the one
who handled the
Bolotnaya case (the case related to the 2012 Bolotnaya Square protests in Moscow)
Once again, good evening, the program
on Echo of Moscow... our
let's go
thank you very much to our listener
my Facebook friend Garry Vorontsov, he
sent me a link. So, according to OVD-Info, under
the article on violating the rules for rallies,
demonstrations, marches, or pickets, over
the past 15 years more than 30,000 people have been convicted
Well yes, actually
Absolutely, I'm just roughly
estimating now. Look, in 2017
the 'He Is Not Dimon to You' protests had 2,000 people
over the last
period, and recently there were also another
around 5,000 across all the rallies, so
I guess that comes to about that per year
So from the moment they
adopted these laws under which there are arrests
and fines for participating in rallies
that's probably how it added up
to 30,000. We can say that this is mass
repression. Of course, they'll tell us, let's
also be honest: not all of these people were
jailed; they were fined, after all
or some of them were briefly
detained for 30 days, 15 days, but even so
nevertheless, of course, this is still
the work of a repressive apparatus. Especially since
we still don't really have
political articles as such, except for
extremism, yes. And everything else that
in Soviet times counted as dissident activity
doesn't exist now. There isn't even an article now
what was it called, for anti-Soviet
propaganda, yes. But nevertheless, now
look, we already have thousands of cases
for insulting representatives of the authorities, and in 8% of
cases—I saw the statistics just today—
it's about insulting Putin, writing something
about Putin. 'Butterfingers' also
counts as an insult; they've already taken people away a couple of times
someone wrote the right thing. But if you write
'send the judge to the soap factory'
'hen'
they say that's also a call to murder a judge
'Butterfingers'—he judged me himself
several times. I don't feel the slightest
warm feelings...
Back to the question, Dmitry
Guber, and to ask after all, seriously, about
lustration—about what is, of course,
your trademark topic
Libertarian. This tool, in terms of...
freeing ourselves from the cursed past and in
taking steps toward Russia, moving closer to Russia.
the future. I’ll talk about that later. I believe this
tool is effective, and the history of our
neighbors—above all the Czech Republic and Germany—
has shown that this is a
highly effective tool. Moreover, those countries that
to one degree or another did, after all,
carry out lustration clearly began
to develop better.
They are wealthier and more
successful countries. There are mixed views
on this issue, but I
definitely belong to that
part of the opposition spectrum that
believes that lustration in Russia is, of course,
necessary. This was the biggest
problem with Yeltsin: he did not do it, and
that was because he was part of that system. Well,
fine, he was part of that system, but even
early in his term there were people
—forget the slander about him—there were people
who had imprisoned dissidents as late as
the final years. When Anatoly
Marchenko died after a hunger strike in eighty-
nine—or yes, in 1990 he
died—well, the point is that even then
executioners were still serving, people who had committed
crimes even under Soviet law. I’m
not saying that Yeltsin should have
purged all CPSU members, but judges who handed down
-
unjust sentences, and security service officers
who dealt with dissidents—them
of course should have been subjected to lustration, not
sent off to work for oligarchs, like what was his name,
Filipp Bobkov or Popkov—he worked for
Gusinsky. That was a monstrous
mistake, and that is why nothing worked out
for us. I absolutely believe that if
we do not carry out some form of lustration,
our chances of
success
and of normal development are much lower. All right.
That was a very detailed answer, yes. I think
Dovzhenko, if I remember correctly, passed away
in my view.
Bobkov—I remember that people who knew him
and he himself said that on the one
hand, yes, but on the other hand he
almost saved Solzhenitsyn, for example,
by securing his expulsion from the country.
There you go—these investigators
who are fabricating cases now, they are all
such nice, pleasant people. I constantly have
this recurring situation where
at the same time a person is writing up
some completely made-up
report on you, and then looks up and
says, “Honestly, Alexei, I
support you. Of course, what you’re doing is good
work.” The people who come to my home
to conduct a search—well, I don’t know, my
wife and daughter will be sitting there, and they walk around
them. By the way, my wife asked me to send greetings
to your program—she’s a big
fan of it.” “We send our very, very best
regards too.” Yes, and they walk around the apartment,
rummaging through children’s things, and at the same time
the operatives, even the investigators,
will обязательно come up and say, “Well, actually,
of course, Alexei, nothing personal—we have nothing against you.
You’re doing good work. We ourselves
would have, you know, shot all those corrupt officials
ourselves. But right now, of course, we
have to tear through all your belongings here
and dig around and look for something, although
we understand there’s nothing here and
nothing to look for, and all of this is pulled out of
thin air. But somehow—it’s not us, it’s life
that’s like this.” That doesn’t make it any easier for us. And also—
you’re supposed to make sense of all that.
That’s all. I think even Alexei himself
is already confused about how many
lawsuits there are now. In fact, it really is
quite hard to keep track of them; these lawsuits
keep appearing again and again. So,
several such suits have been upheld.
The biggest are
Mosgortrans, some Restaurant Armenia, but
new ones keep appearing. Last week
we learned that some noodle shop is suing us,
which really sounds like a joke.
They want rubles because, they say, they didn’t sell
what they consider a sufficient amount of
noodles, and apparently Alburov, Sobol, and I
got in the way of that. And today we
were in court with Metelsky. In our office
there’s a big wall with
the court schedule written on it, and there are literally several
every day. The biggest is 88 million
rubles, which Prigozhin won from me, from Sobol,
and from the FBK—Prigozhin, Putin’s chef, that very one.
Well, in total, as far as I remember, we’ve
been hit with lawsuits totaling 40 million
rubles. Already upheld, including
Prigozhin’s, meaning upheld—well,
are you already paying those 88 million?
That was all—it was simple.
Are we paying? Of course we won’t be able
to pay any 88 million rubles, but that’s
ridiculous, and it’s obvious that the amount is
absurd. You see, it was almost
on the very same day that we proved in
court that Prigozhin had poisoned Moscow
children, the court ruled that each family
with a poisoned child should be paid
15,000 rubles, and at the same time we are supposed
to pay Prigozhin 88 million rubles. That is
an absurd amount, simply in order to
paralyze the FBK. That means now they will
now, entirely on legal grounds, be able to
keep seizing everything from us because we
will still owe them until—I don’t know—until
the end of time, basically for a very long time.
They are seizing equipment, that is—and for now
they are just seizing it; they simply come in and...
After some time, they’ll start seizing her—what exactly?
The FSB guys, the courts, and then the bailiffs—they
will be confiscating equipment from the FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) and from my
apartment, and from Sobol’s apartment as well—they
will be taking, I don’t know, a television
or sofas, because that all has to be
sold and the money given to Prigozhin, because he
is, poor thing, the injured party. But listen, there are
people giving sensible advice. Many say: let
Alexei announce a fundraiser for the fines.
We’ll raise those billions
or millions in three days for a good cause. Maybe that
is one possible path. It’s entirely possible that this is the way
to go. It’s just that right now these proceedings are ongoing
and new ones are being added every day, so I
can’t even say how much needs
to be raised. Will we need to raise
100 million rubles, or I don’t know, or
maybe some of those amounts will be reduced.
So for now, we’re proceeding on the basis that we
are raising money for our work—that is, we
are still fundraising and still need
that support. But we’re raising money for investigations, for
the work of the headquarters, for the work of the FBK. When all
these court cases are over and the bailiffs start
running around us shouting that they’re confiscating everything,
then we’ll make a decision, and I don’t
know yet what that decision will be. For now, it’s unclear.
I’d like to bring up one more topic, if
you don’t mind. My co-host also thinks it’s a very
delicate matter—a topic Alexei
carefully avoids and doesn’t like to
talk about. So what, the host is going to ask me?
Ask me. It’s the topic of Crimea, because yes, there are many
people who demand a direct answer to
a very complicated question—they want a very
simple answer. I’ve heard it at least 15 times already:
“Navalny
still dodges the question.” But I’m not
dodging it. It’s just that very complicated
questions do not have very simple answers.
So, broadly speaking, my answer is this:
all of us are thoroughly sick and tired of
questions about Crimea and questions about Ukraine, and I
really do avoid them, because I do not
want to follow Putin’s agenda. Putin
would like everyone in the country—and especially the opposition—to
spend every day, every hour,
every second running around discussing Crimea,
arguing with Ukrainians and so on.
I’m not going to do that, and
I won’t do it. Of course, what
happened in 2014 was illegal.
But we’ve already entered that part of
politics where there are no simple solutions.
There are 2 million people there with Russian
passports. In other words, it’s already some kind of
messy mince—you can’t turn that mince back
into its original form. So there is no
simple solution to the Crimea problem.
Apparently, there is no simple solution at all,
just as there isn’t one for the Japanese islands dispute.
That may not sound like a neat, simple answer, but
I’m
a person from real life, a person
who is fighting for leadership positions,
a person who thinks about what he
will actually be able to do if he takes a leading
position. So I’m saying that if I take
such a position, I will begin by
holding another absolutely
fair referendum in Crimea. Or rather, not another one, but
the first one, because that referendum cannot
be considered a real referendum. But I understand that this kind
of answer will not
please a certain number of
Facebook users. Well, if they don’t like it,
they don’t like it. That’s not the point—not
Facebook. The issue here is that this is a kind of
dead end, because
yes, fine, a referendum—but a referendum
is held either in an independent
territory or on the territory of some
state. If it is the territory of the
Russian Federation, then the fate of Crimea
should be decided by all citizens of the Russian
Federation, not just the residents of Crimea. That’s not
how it works. The same
goes for holding a referendum on the territory of
Ukraine. So we should not
approach this simply from some
casuistic legalistic point of view: in one
constitution one thing is written, in another
constitution something else is written, and there are people
now sitting in the Kremlin who simply
don’t care about any constitutions or any
laws. We have to proceed simply from
reality. Point number one, the starting point
in this roadmap, is to clearly determine
what the people who live in that
territory actually
think. That is the starting
point. But I still live in Russia, I am
a Russian politician, and I represent
the interests of all the people who come to
polling stations holding
Russian passports. I have to think about
all those people. I wonder—there is no headquarters in Crimea,
by the way. First of all, in
Crimea it is monstrously difficult to work. We
literally had our people arrested just yesterday
from the Belgorod headquarters, who, as I understand it,
had come to Crimea with a quadcopter (drone)
to film some property belonging to a Belgorod
crook that he had bought somewhere in Yevpatoria (a resort city in Crimea).
They were detained completely illegally, everything was
confiscated, and they were jailed for several days
under administrative arrest. We don’t even know any
details. In that sense, Crimea is
of course an absolute lawless zone.
It is impossible to conduct any
political activity there. Right now, the main
activity of the FBK is investigations.
The activity of the FBK is investigations.
The activity of our headquarters is also
investigations and political work
directly in the regions, on the ground. But
elections—right now, that is the main thing we
were dealing with quite recently
quite recently. The next elections—when are the elections?
Everyone is asking about the State Duma. Every year we have
a single voting day. Yes, exactly.
That’s right—the next single voting day
will be this coming September, including in
major regions, including Novosibirsk
and Chelyabinsk. Those will be local elections,
but they are important too. Let me take
a question. We’ve collected some good ones—people have been writing in.
I’d like to ask one question
that we were asked to raise.
No, Valery Solovey asked us to ask it.
And our listeners here are also asking us,
our listeners. Solovey said this on air
and off air as well, and asked us to find out from
Navalny what his attitude is. Right now, a certain
group of civic activists outside
the party system has announced across all regions
a kind of civic action,
an action of civic solidarity.
Against what, exactly? What do they want? Well, that’s not quite—
you’re oversimplifying it.
That’s not the point. If you’re in,
I don’t know, Tsaryovo-Kokshaysk,
and you have your own local problem there, then you
protest. The question is: am I against it?
Against people, as you said, in Tsar—what was it—
holding an action when they want to? I’m
in favor of them doing so.
Please.
I support it.
Let them fight for their rights. I’m not just
saying we support it—our headquarters
that exist—I don’t know what kind of
wonderful group of people has come together.
Maybe it really is wonderful, and
I think it probably is wonderful,
but we have real headquarters in 45
regions that, every single day,
are constantly monitoring most
of these actions. Our headquarters
organize them. From Alexander:
Astakhova: can the FBK and Alexei
win at the ECHR if they do not pay
the insane fines that were imposed on them?
Winning or losing at the ECHR is not connected
to paying specific fines. We go to the ECHR
if our rights have been violated. The ECHR is the
European Court of Human Rights. If our
rights—such as the right to a fair
trial—
or if we are being politically persecuted—
are violated, we go to the European Court.
If we prove our case, we win. This
has nothing to do with what Russia does there.
Have there already been victories? Of course. I think
this may sound a little boastful,
but among individual Russian citizens,
hardly anyone has won more cases at the ECHR
than I have. Lyosh, as for forms
of protest in general—besides, let’s say,
political actions, rallies, pickets, and
so on—what about a form like a mass
strike, something that
the real trade union movement is known for
in all European countries and in
America as well? Is it possible here to build
some kind of powerful political
movement on that basis? One thing I’m proud of
is that we are the only
political movement that actually
works with militant
trade unions, of which there are very few in
particular. We support, for example,
strikes—the doctors’ strike in
the Novgorod region. We were its main
information backers, in that sense—
how should I put it—its media sponsors.
Yes, everyone learned about that strike because
we actively supported it from the very
beginning. And we follow similar actions
very closely,
and help where we can. About nine months ago I
announced in a video that we have an entire
major project: we help all
trade unions. Again, we want nothing from them.
To return to the question of my so-called authoritarianism,
I don’t need trade unions to do anything
for us or even to support the FBK.
They are fighting for their own rights. We said
that we are ready to spend time, money,
and legal resources in order to help
these trade unions. And you asked a great
question, because
without the active participation of trade unions,
a political movement is always
weak. In Russia, trade unions traditionally
barely exist. We are trying very hard to
bring them in and help them somehow.
People really are terribly afraid,
first of all. And second, they come and
say, “We’re on strike, and nobody knows about it.”
But that is a problem we can
solve. Because when they—when we—
get involved, millions of people hear about it.
That is what is called professional solidarity,
essentially. Again, when actors
came out in support of an actor, that was
basically the beginning of a trade union
movement. Historians—
historians, priests—yes, exactly. We are very,
very engaged in this. And by the way, doctors and
teachers also issued a statement then, and this
Doctors’ Alliance, which we supported,
also called on people
to take part in rallies and actions. So
we devote a lot of time to this.
Some of our colleagues in the opposition
kind of laugh at this and say that I’m
drifting to the left, but I do not think that
helping trade unions means moving left or right.
Normal trade unions are, in any country,
a huge sector of political life.
And they are not necessarily left-wing; there are right-wing ones too.
It’s simply a real opportunity.
Since you mentioned the church, have there never
been any attempts, either from their side or from yours?
any kind of cooperation and
any kind of action, so to speak
there is no solidarity in action, though there is plenty of talk
quite a lot. I’ve met with various
people too. There was even, at one point, some time ago,
a minor scandal a few years ago. I
met with Chaplin, and some
photos were published, and then a lot of people
turned on me — how could I possibly
have done that? But let’s put it this way: this contact
has always existed. Inside the Church there are also
a huge number of people unhappy with the fact
that it has, de facto, simply turned
into an instrument of the state. And, well, let’s
be honest, there is opposition there, but
right now this nomenklatura there, uh,
the episcopate, however you want to put it, in the Russian Orthodox Church. Unfortunately,
to a large extent these are people who
simply do not believe in God, and of course within
the Russian Orthodox Church there are many, let’s put it mildly, who are dissatisfied
with this situation, but it has never
led to any practical
uh, practical steps, practical work
still, you have to understand that priests
there are already like soldiers — they are completely
dependent on their superiors, and
only a handful of them can say anything
remember when recently, in support of
political prisoners, some clergy spoke out
— the vast majority of them
were not from the Russian Orthodox Church, and those who were
from the Russian Orthodox Church were later somehow
punished by their superiors. And as for an investigation,
we have never conducted one
Well, we are following this closely, but
for now I never comment on our plans
regarding
investigations
If you have a Russian passport but
live abroad permanently and do not
have an account with a Russian bank,
you can support the FBK morally. If you
had an account with a Russian bank, then you could
support us financially as well, but right now
well, you know, they slapped us with this
“foreign agent” label because
they staged a provocation and transferred money to us
from Spain into a blocked account. We could not
return it. So, if you are
a Russian citizen, you can
help us. You can give us money too,
but if you send it to us from
a foreign account, then right now we would simply
have to return it, unfortunately
— that’s how the law is set up. But as for
whether anything has been unblocked, it’s endless: we
get things unblocked, they block them again, and you
eventually don’t even know whom to trust. Well, we do know, but I
again, I’m not going to comment on this in too much detail
all of this, simply so as not to
explain
uh, to the people from the Investigative Committee
who are listening very carefully
to our interview how exactly
to fight us effectively. It is very hard for us
right now. We’re having to survive because
it’s hard for us to raise money. And most
importantly, even if we do have money
in an account, we can’t send it
to a person because their account
is blocked. They’re also
blocking child benefits, survivor benefits,
and so on. They have simply, for a whole
bunch of people — some of whom have absolutely nothing
to do with us — just blocked
their personal accounts, and people simply cannot
make loan payments, they can’t go to the store
using that card — it’s blocked, and
that’s it. Some woman is suffering,
a huge number of people are suffering
because they have never in their lives
worked for us or received anything from us
— their tiny pension gets paid there, and then
they simply block that card, and that’s it
and the person runs around in their region trying to prove
that, basically, they have absolutely nothing
to do with Navalny, have never seen him in their life. There was simply
a case, I think in Omsk Region,
where they literally searched the neighbors of our
coordinator — the neighbors — and carried out searches
and seized their electronics. Just the neighbors.
Alexei, 2021 is coming — you
know, elections, elections, elections. For you, will they be
the main event? Of course, yes. But in 2021
for me — and I hope for you, for
everyone — they will be a major event, because in 2021
United Russia will once again want
to secure and strengthen its majority in
the State Duma, just as they wanted to in
the Moscow City Duma. What’s more, in
2021 everything will be more difficult — well,
probably more interesting for us
because they have already seen our strategy of
Smart Voting. They will come up with something
on that front, they will invent something
cunning, and our shared task is
to use every element of political
struggle. I’m not saying that elections are
the most important thing, no, but we absolutely
must participate in them somehow, and
we must give United Russia a fight
We’ll see. I always say that every
election should be considered separately. In some
cases, well, we need to and are obliged to boycott; in
others, we must take part
But from where we stand now, at this point in time
and place, it all looks like
in the 2021 elections we must crush United
Russia, and I personally, along with my
associates, will do everything in our power
to rough them up there politically
A brilliant question. Alexei, let’s suppose
the day comes when you defeat all
the crooks and thieves and they resign
— what will the FBK do then? They will not resign.
The FBK will be engaged in what we
will be doing: supporting prosecutions in court and
there will be long, very long, but honest trials, and we will
to put them on trial, and
after that, there will be far too much of everything there.
When that brighter time comes, we will
hand out some medals to everyone and disband
everyone to go home. You know, any
army, sooner or later, must
go back to their apartments. Listen, but in
fact, is there still hope that, by peaceful
means, it is possible to change, uh, the government in Russia?
The USSR changed peacefully, after all. It was from above
all of it. Well, from above—but remember
the demonstrations against Article 6
of the Constitution. Some things came from above, some
came from below. From above there was glasnost, from above
there was glasnost—that is, the
society proclaimed by Gorbachev was
prepared for this, prepared for this way out. But
now it is exactly the opposite. Yes, well,
there are completely different scenarios
for a transfer of power: some are peaceful, some are not.
What Putin is doing is leading everything
of course toward the country's collapse. He is leading
first toward an economic crash, which
first toward economic stagnation, and it is already
inevitable—it has already arrived. We see that none of
us has the slightest illusion that
tomorrow we will live better than
today. Stagnation has set in, and after it
an economic crash will inevitably come, and
after that there may be various scenarios. We
all hope for a peaceful scenario. We are
normal people, after all, but unfortunately this
government is doing everything to make the likelihood
of a peaceful scenario lower. Well, I think that
the scenario also depends on how
the elections of 2021 go, among
other things. Many, many factors affect this.
We are preparing for the 2021 elections.
They are two years away—very soo...
The technology is exc... We are preparing, and we are
right here and now doing everything
necessary in order to weaken these
positions of this government. Thank you, thank you.
Thank you, that's all. All the best.
Take care. Well, well, great—thank you very much.
Thank you very much.
