Alexei Navalny’s interview with Ksenia Sobchak on TV Rain

Well, my first question is about the complicated

process of arranging this

interview. Not only I, but many other

journalists as well, have for several months now

been refused any communication with you. Your answer is always

the same: if you want to know something,

watch the blog. So what is behind this

position? Why today do you want me to

reveal all the secrets of our

arrangements? I'm in Bali, I can't. I

went to Bhutan, I can't. When you have two

days a month for interviews, they sometimes

end up overlapping with some of my events. Besides,

right now I am practically spending entire

days traveling to the regions. Right now

I'll go home, literally grab my bag, and

head to Perm, and from Perm I'll go to Izhevsk. I have

an election campaign. That means

that

I am

quite busy schedule-wise. But

for many journalists, if they are willing

to show some interest in my

campaign, they can travel to these cities

and interview me. We have opened

44 campaign offices so far. As of today,

that means I have personally attended

the opening of probably thirty-five or thirty-six

offices, and in every place, in every

city, I gave a press conference, gave

several one-on-one interviews, and in

that sense I am trying to make sure we

meet the standard of the most

transparent election campaign, and I

speak with journalists as much as

I possibly can. It's just that there is a feeling—I

am not speaking only about myself. Although if we

really reconstruct those events,

it was precisely in that week when all those

events happened, when you wrote the letter

to Vaino (Anton Vaino, head of the Russian Presidential Administration). Right in the middle of those heated events

you somehow disappeared off the radar and it was

impossible to reach you. And of course a little

later it became possible to arrange an

interview because, well, accordingly,

the situation began to change and those events

started to fade from memory. But it was strange that you

refused not only me but many journalists. During

that period, when indeed

that letter raised many questions, you

for some reason, for a while... I would like

the journalistic community to

act somehow more collectively, I suppose,

because, well, there was a difficult period when

I needed to have surgery on my

eye. I had it done, so I could not give

interviews. Then, as soon as I returned, I

started again, and once I had recovered, I traveled around

the regions. Since then, I repeat, I have given

several press conferences and given

several one-on-one interviews. If

you had come after me to Saransk or Voronezh,

that opportunity existed—I already told you off

air, I would gladly... but still, so that

despite the fact that at

the moment this is probably not the most

topical issue, still, in order to

put it to rest, I would still like to get

an explanation. I know that a huge

number of your loyal supporters were

surprised and shocked by this letter, and

this appeal to Vaino about permission to leave the country—in general, this is

the kind of topic where, let's put it this way, on the one

hand, I understand that we all live in a certain

reality in which connections with the

Presidential Administration are necessary, while on the

other hand, when a person who

embodies that motto, 'trust no one, fear nothing, ask for nothing,'

writes such a letter, even for a

respectable and understandable reason, of course

for many people it immediately triggers a new

wave of all that talk that Navalny

is working with the administration, and so on.

Now we'll explain everything to everyone. So,

the specific nature of my work

is that all day long, both I and the Anti-Corruption Foundation

spend all day writing

letters. I write them to Chaika (Yury Chaika, then Prosecutor General), I write them

to Bastrykin (Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia's Investigative Committee), I write them to Putin, because

we investigate corruption and

we send formal letters

all day long—and not with personal requests. And

I had no personal request.

These are two different things. For

many years, I was completely unlawfully denied

an international passport. I was denied it, and I sued twice

over it. My complaint is currently before the

European Court of Human Rights, and

all I did in this regard—without ever seeing

any of these people, Vaino in particular,

whom I have never once met in person—was write

a letter saying that I demanded to be issued

an international passport because I needed to travel

for surgery, and I stated that my

complaint was before the ECHR and that I was being unlawfully

denied it. Under the laws of the Russian

Federation, I should have been issued that

passport, and I was issued it. I don't know

why, or what exactly worked inside the

Presidential Administration, but this was

most definitely not a situation where I

made some personal request and

they did something for me as an exception.

What happened is that my legal rights, which

had been trampled on for years... He simply deals with

passports. We all understand that he is

a trusted associate of Putin, a person very

close to the president. We all understand that

this is a person to whom—well, in other words, it is

practically the same as writing to Putin, and it is clear

that these issues are resolved informally. I

understand perfectly well that I was not given a passport

for many years for informal, unwritten reasons, because

they simply did not want to give it to me on those informal grounds.

So when you asked for it—did you really not weigh

the risks? There are no risks at all. Let me

say again: I am a cautious politician. You know how

anything can always be used against you.

Did you really not understand that they, of course,

could, of course, use this against me

in many ways, including this

interview where I’m speaking with the well-known

liberal Ksenia Sobchak, and she—they’re all terrible like that.

I’m simply saying that you can

say anything, you can twist it however you like. And so

demanding that my rights be upheld is

not a request at all. I demanded that they

issue me a passport. The passport office wrote,

“Alexei, did you write to the passport office again?”

When I demand that Medvedev

be removed from office and that an

anti-corruption investigation be conducted, I write to Putin as well

and to the Investigative Committee

and to the Prosecutor General’s Office and anywhere else. And here I

filed an official complaint in court, to the

European Court, and took an application to—what’s it called—

the migration center, or whatever it’s called,

you get the idea. I also wrote to the human rights ombudsman,

and he had already asked me

to write, so I

sent the same message: that I had been

attacked. I demand that they

stop violating my rights and hand over

my international passport, and they gave it to me.

Maybe they’ll take it away again tomorrow, I don’t know. What

surprised me was precisely from the point

of view that, generally speaking, you are a very

cautious person, and here, well, it was such an obvious

thing. Do you regret it now? Of course

not. This has no

contradiction whatsoever with the fact that I am a

cautious person. I think the epithet I’d use is

that I’m a normal person. I’m a prudent

person. I know what I’m entitled to under

the law, and I demand it. Nothing happened

that would amount to a departure from my

principles. Have you had any

informal meetings with anyone from

the presidential administration? With Vaino? Never.

I’ve never seen any of them in my life. Well, I

have seen, you could say,

Fedotov, who is the human rights

ombudsman and also formally an employee of

the administration. I saw him there at the radio station.

I met with him, yes. But as for

those who are officials in the presidential

administration, I’ve never seen any of them. No one.

We’ll talk about that a bit later. Let’s

come back to it. We’ve talked about it now—sorry,

No, we haven’t talked about it enough yet. Let’s

No, about the passport situation,

enough. But about the question of whom you

communicate with and where, I’d still like to return

to that. If you don’t mind. But

right now I’d like to talk about, well,

your supporters, broadly speaking, and your

supporters who defend you. As it seems to me,

this strategy is still connected to

your position. Please explain to me what

you mean by “my supporters.” Well, look, there are

people who support you unconditionally,

and that is what, probably, for any politician

is called the core electorate. These are

ordinary

voters who vote for Alexei Navalny

regardless of anything. Such people are the core

of your electorate; you

can’t not know that. Then there is

the more complicated category of people who

might vote for you sometimes, and sometimes

might not. You can disappoint them,

upset them; you might say the wrong thing about

Crimea or about gay people, and suddenly their position

starts to waver a little. Then Akunin

writes something, someone else says something,

and that’s what I want to talk through regarding this core.

Look, these people are called different things; those who

don’t like them call them “navalnyata” (a derogatory term for Navalny supporters),

“Navalny’s minions,” and other insulting

names. I wouldn’t like to call them that.

I’ll call them the core. This is nonsense—let me

stop you right there.

There is no such thing as

this “core electorate,” and all these, as

you put it, political science

stories are exactly why I call for all

political scientists, of course, to be thrown into a cage with

wild animals at the zoo, because, well, you’re

just repeating a set of clichés: people

are ready to vote for you regardless of

how you change your views. Of course

not. There are people who probably

are my loyal supporters, and I,

in turn, am their reliable

political partner. But they

support me because of a set of political

demands. If tomorrow I stop

fighting corruption, then of course they

There is a certain trend that worries

not only me but many people who

at the same time are people who

support [you]: as soon as any

thinking person, whether it’s me or

some writer or creative person

or just, for example,

Akunin, or for example Bykov, or someone else,

the moment that person writes something

not even necessarily critical, but something

well, in general, some kind of reaction—Bykov or

didn’t write anything, but Akunin at one point

did, and Lev Shlosberg also wrote something

as well.

Then immediately a huge number

of accusations appear at once claiming that all

of it is paid for by the Kremlin; any criticism

of Alexei Navalny means that immediately

the “Murzilki” (a mocking term for paid propagandists) have gone into battle, and so on.

Frankly, that worries me. For example,

there’s Lev Shlosberg—he spoke out.

You’re asking for a specific example? I’ll give one: he

commented on your program. A person

whom many respect, and whom many generally

consider a decent person, said some

unflattering things about you. I can

quote them. Go ahead, quote them.

I’ll quote him to you now: “He is not a democrat, and”

He’s not a liberal; he’s just trying

to gather any protest-minded

electorate he can, from nationalists

to communists, from liberals to yesterday’s

supporters of United Russia, the LDPR, and Zyuganov

— anyone at all. No economic

program or political reforms are

needed,” said Shlosberg. In response to that

statement, made in a conversation with a journalist from Echo

of Moscow (a Russian radio station), you can immediately, on Echo of Moscow’s website,

go and see either thoughtful

comments, or specifically from your

core electorate, immediate

accusations that he’s a “Murzilka” (a puppet or stooge), that this is

a Kremlin-paid interview, and right away

some kind of—well, instead of some

constructive discussion of those words,

it turns into a very harsh kind of affair,

an attack. Why does this happen, and what can you

say in response? People have their own

opinions. I am absolutely fine with

criticism, and I engage in discussion with everyone.

As you can see, I’m here with you in this

interview and ready to answer all your

sharp, uncomfortable questions. And I’ll repeat: I

try to be one of the most accessible

politicians for the press. At every meeting, in

every city, I answer absolutely every

question. You raise your hand — I answer.

You raise your hand — I answer. There are many

questions politicians do not always

want to answer, but I answer them

anyway.

And there are people who value that; there are people

who support me. They have their

own opinion. When Shlosberg, whom I

have a fairly good opinion of, says what you

just repeated, I, along with people in the

comments, could come and write that

Shlosberg said something foolish. He simply

said something that is, objectively, foolish.

So, he is accusing you specifically of the fact that

you have no economic program. In

general, that there is no clear platform.

Let’s go through it point by point.

Right.

So, for example, spending on

healthcare should double

in your view in order to ensure the necessary

level of medical services. Why

double? Why not 20 percent, or 40? Have you

done economic research on this

topic? Ksenia, have you read my program? I

looked at it. Yes, of course. Did you

read it on our website? On our

website and in my speeches, everywhere I

state that we must increase

healthcare funding by a factor of two

and education funding also by roughly two

times. Echo: Why by two? Why not by four?

I’ll answer you: because there are countries in the

Organisation for Economic

Co-operation — that is, roughly speaking, there are

wealthy countries — and when we look at

how much these wealthy countries spend, as a

percentage of GDP, on healthcare

and education, we see that our

healthcare and education

are underfunded. Do you know how much

Russia currently spends, as a percentage of GDP,

on healthcare? I know, Ksenia. I am fully

well-versed in the numbers. But this is a question of the

consolidated budget

versus the federal budget. Right now — wait.

As a share of consolidated GDP — I, you—

Consolidated or federal budget? Well,

tell me how much. Come on, we’re talking

about specific figures. Consolidated

or federal? Consolidated.

How much of GDP, consolidated? So

once again, let’s—right now we are

talking about specific provisions of my

program, and these specific provisions

of my program grow out of the experience of

developed countries. That experience of developed countries

shows that education and

healthcare — I’ll tell you this

number now, and remember it, because

you are, I know—well, because what you’re

doing now, trying to catch me out

on some number, shows that

unfortunately, you basically do not understand

how the budget works, or the difference between

the federal and the consolidated budget. So

tell me, what is the difference? There is a

GDP figure for healthcare. That is, you

say it needs to be doubled. That’s what I’m

talking about and asking you. In that sense, I’m not a

politician, and of course I

prepared specifically for our broadcast, but it seems to me

that if you say

3 at the present moment — today

is spent on healthcare — but it seems to me

that if you are proposing to raise it,

you should know it. So what, for

you, for example,

is an indicator of success in the field of

healthcare? An indicator of success in

healthcare is, naturally,

life expectancy, detection rates

for diseases, and overall satisfaction

of people with the services provided — a whole set

of various

criteria and indicators that show

all of this. But the main thing we

say in the program is that it is impossible, in

principle, to achieve anything if

healthcare

is underfunded and we continue carrying out

internal reforms. If we are now paying

a doctor a salary of 14,000 rubles to 88,000 rubles (roughly $150 to $950) then

nothing will work; no reform

will succeed. That is why we say that we need

to reduce the military and police budget, while

spending on healthcare in particular

should be increased. Now look, many experts,

when discussing how to develop Russia’s economy

and how to structure its budget, in fact

People say that social spending in

Russia is hugely inflated. Which experts say that?

Quite a lot of experts say so. Well,

when we were preparing for this

program, we talked about it. But that’s

exactly the point — this is from the category of “Name the

percentage, name the expert.” No, there

are such experts — for example, right now I

can name Movchan, Kudrin, Oreshkin... Who was first, Movcha—

Movchan, probably. Yes, Movchan, not “ovcha,” or

Movchan, once again.

I’m saying: there is such a person, Movchan. But Kudrin,

for example, your favorite, says that

we need to increase spending on

healthcare and education. In fact,

he is simply proposing... Oreshkin says

that the social budget is bloated. He

doesn’t say that. Ours — ours is not bloated, that’s

the point. It is not bloated at all.

What is bloated is our military-and-police budget.

Russia, despite the fact

that it presents itself as a social

state, is in fact a state

built around the military and police, and in our country

military and political personnel should receive

decent salaries. On the one hand, you

are proposing to take that budget away from them.

Am I understanding you correctly? We’re talking about that now,

and at the same time... Let me explain.

I’ll explain everything. So, we do indeed have

a truly gigantic military-

and-police budget. The share spent directly

on salaries there is fairly low.

An enormous amount of money there is simply

stolen, particularly through government procurement.

Those are not my words, but the words of the Accounts Chamber (Russia’s state audit body),

which says that nearly every fourth ruble

is practically cashed out immediately. And we can,

by reducing

military-political capital...

We understand the platform of Yabloko or the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF),

whether we like it or not, but it is

at least something. Please describe yours. You don’t

understand anything — you understand neither

Yabloko’s platform nor the KPRF’s platform.

Why did I say that Shlosberg — let me

finish — why did I say that Shlosberg

said something foolish when he said that I have no

economic program? Because there are,

unfortunately, some people who

keep relying on something from, say,

the year 2000 or 1990, for example.

At one time Yabloko had the “500 Days” program,

and as a former member of the Yabloko party, I liked

that too, and so people think they have

an economic program, they have certain

economists, and we supposedly know something about the KPRF. In

fact, we know nothing about them, and

they have absolutely no program at all. What

we are proposing is precisely a program

based on concrete figures. One can

say for sure about their program that it is

left-wing. Well, that can be said about the KPRF, about

the communists — that theirs is a left-wing program. No, well,

in terms of progressivism, of course... But in that

sense, how is the program right-wing?

It is conservative: the role of the church, the role

of the state — of course that is right-

conservative. So where are you on this?

I just want to understand: where are you on this

spectrum? Because I read your

program. Many things are clear to me, many

things, unfortunately — for me as well — but

that is probably because I don’t

understand anything. They sound like

toasts. You understand — these are some kind of

slogans. I want to understand who you are. Are you right-wing,

are you left-wing? Can you somehow

identify yourself? In Russian

political science and practical politics, there are

no right and no left. When you

say right and left, you apparently mean

that Yabloko is right-wing and the communists are

left-wing. But Yabloko is of course not

a right-wing party; it is a left-liberal

party. Liberals, generally speaking, should be left-wing.

As for the communists — our domestic communists —

what is left-wing about them

I don’t even know what remains. They talk

about free education and healthcare...

That’s them. But where are you on this условно

political-science line? There is no

such political line — it does not exist

in Russia. What do you mean? It exists all over the world,

but here again we have some special case?

In the world it exists: you can distinguish

Republicans in the United States by their positions on a set of issues;

you can distinguish a Christian

Democrat from a Social Democrat in Europe.

In Russia, absolutely not. In Russia there are

parties controlled by the Kremlin, and there are

independent ones. That’s all: dependent and

independent. Let’s say, thank God, we’ve

settled that. Now tell us about yourself

so that we understand. You say that you cannot

place yourself on that scale, but on

basic questions, who are you? Do you criticize

the authorities from the right or from the left? In what way are you a left-

liberal? In what way are you a right-wing conservative? Well,

describe yourself. This is not

...all right. What should

the retirement age be? Does Russia really need

to change it, to raise the retirement

age? I believe that at present

there is no need to raise the retirement age.

That is the first point. Second, in practice it is

impossible, because by retirement age people are

already disabled at a rate of 30%.

If we raise the retirement age, even

more of them will apply for disability status.

And most importantly, they simply do not live that long.

Quite simply, in our country men do not

live to retirement age.

The problem of the pension fund... The average

age of men in

Russia, the average level, the average

life expectancy, the average

life expectancy depending on

of the regions, but in reality, in reality

male life expectancy is

less than 65 years. Of course, they simply will not

live to reach retirement, and the problem

of the pension fund is solved not by

raising the retirement age, but

by taking

money from where it exists — from the oil companies, from

the gas companies. They are underpaying taxes, they

are underpaying dividends, they say.

The communists, on this particular point,

this is absolutely a

"take and

divide" agenda. How is this "take and

divide"? Well, they say

that right now we simply need to take

this money and spend it. It's good that you

invited me to this interview, because now

we're going to get rid of all these clichés of yours that are in your

head. We are going to eliminate them now. So, this is

not "take and divide" — it is a normal

taxation system that

exists in all countries. That is, 70%

in taxes — why have you now taken 7%?

so that there is enough for pensioners, whose numbers

grow every year. Look at how much

in dividends per barrel of oil is paid by

Rosneft — you will see that these are laughably small

amounts. For example, Bashneft, before it was

absorbed by Rosneft, paid much more.

Our oil companies are not paying enough money into

the budget, and they are not paying enough in dividends.

Am I right in understanding that this money

would be enough for pensioners across the whole country, according to

Alexei Navalny, that money from proper

fair

taxation of this sector would be enough to

support the pension fund without raising

the retirement age — there is no need for that.

All right, moving on then.

As for understanding your political position, well, I

have answered your question. Where would you place me now —

on the right or on the left?

Of course on the left. And why on the left? Normal

taxation, on this issue, is not

Wait, raising taxes — let's put it this way:

from today's point of reference, people

who are in favor of raising taxes, in principle,

are always on the left flank. We

are talking about today, and I, for example,

first of all, was just talking about increasing

dividends. And people who advocate

for paying higher dividends are, in

your terminology, on the right.

Let's try to make today's interview

I would like to devote it to this, because

I really am very interested in it. I am also your

potential voter.

identification — where exactly does Alexei

Navalny stand? I studied political science, so

consider this something that matters to me personally.

Let's move on to foreign policy. Throw all that out of your head.

And you studied it for nothing. You should have... though that's

something we can talk about later. So,

look, I will gladly answer your

specific questions. I am glad you asked.

But this whole line of

political-science categories — well, I understand it.

I vote for the communists because they are always

left-wing, always in favor of higher taxes.

Is United Russia left-wing, right-wing, or centrist at

the present moment, and relative to whom?

Why does it also oppose

raising the retirement age? I am not

planning to become president just yet.

I am interested in studying you.

Really. Now, let's move on to foreign

policy. Back in 2008, you

called for recognizing the independence of Abkhazia

and Ossetia, correct? That did happen.

Transnistria, and Transnistria, and Abkhazia

and Ossetia. Well, if you want, I can

quote it.

Yes, yes, of course. In the Narod movement, I was

the movement's manifesto — I believed that

they should be recognized. Yes, you wanted to recognize

their independence. At the same time, when in

Crimea, Putin did

essentially what you had called for in Abkhazia

and Ossetia, you

were against it from the start. You even

suggested launching cruise missiles at

the General Staff. Remember, that was not about

Crimea — that was probably about Georgia.

Of course. But then, when Putin

annexed Crimea, for some reason it was a different

situation. Explain what the difference is.

That is, here you

supported these events, but here you

opposed them. You have already answered

your own question by saying, "for some reason it was

a different situation" — because it was a different

situation. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are

regions that, from the very moment

the Soviet Union collapsed, declared their

secession. There were bloody events there, both in Tskhinvali

and in Sukhumi — there was effectively a war there.

Yes, I know that. So what? And as far as I

know the history of Crimea, neither in the 1990s

nor in the 2000s was there any

real violence there. So this is not about Meshkov.

Do you know who that is? I do — the president

of Crimea, who declared that

Crimea is part of Russia.

And in the 1990s — well, how did that happen?

In the 1990s, he was elected by the people

of Crimea. I am saying that the same

processes were taking place as in — it is possible

to compare it with Abkhazia, where there was a war and which

was effectively independent from Georgia

for many, many years and is now

independent. It cannot be compared with

Transnistria, which has effectively

been independent from Moldova for many, many years.

It is impossible to compare that with Crimea and

Ukraine. Sure, there was no war in Crimea,

but there too there was the same process

when they wanted, essentially, to speak out in favor of

its independence. Process and war are two different things.

Process and real

independence are different things, so

And we can discuss all of this, and we will.

I am simply urging you to understand that

it is impossible to compare and lump together, separated by commas,

Abkhazia, Ossetia, Crimea,

and Transnistria — these are different situations.

Completely different. All right, on the one hand

you say that Crimea will never

become part of

Ukraine in the foreseeable future. And now you are saying that, in

principle, a second referendum should be held,

and in this connection I want

to ask: do you seriously think that Ukraine

would allow this second referendum?

If Crimea is annexed, how do you

imagine that? I am not saying this from

one side or the other — I am speaking entirely from

one side. I am speaking realistically. I

know that many people in

Ukraine do not like my words. Many people in

Russia do not like them either, but I am saying it as it is, realistically.

We can see that in the foreseeable future, of course,

Crimea will not be recognized by anyone, but in fact

it will remain part of the Russian

Federation. What can we do here? What

should some wonderful

president do? Should he announce another

proper one — or rather, not another, but

the first proper, honest referendum,

which Ukraine, of course, will not recognize, with

a high degree of probability — we understand that.

Because it needs to be held.

Ukraine will not recognize it anyway. Let us

at least be hones— The issue is not Ukraine or Russia.

The issue is the real

So, right now you do not trust the residents

of Crimea? I do trust the residents. The referendum

that took place was, of course,

an obvious fake. We need to hold

a proper referendum — that is the first point. And

second, I will also say quite honestly:

why, if no one recognizes it? What

is the point — simply to ease

one's own conscience, that these people really

cast their bal— that is not called

easing one's conscience. It is called

recording the genuine

expression of the people's will. They are real people.

Unlike you, I believe that we

must know their real opinion, that they

must come to a real referendum and

vote, and we will see the resu— well, clearly.

Ukraine will not recognize it afterward — fine, then

this is the same kind of discussion we have

regarding Putin. But why do we need

elections? They will not change anything; he already has

84%. You are changing the subject. What does Crimea have to do with it?

Are we returning it or not? What kind of

strange, impossible way of framing the question is that?

Once again, I have answered this question. First:

there is no simple solution.

Second, apparently there is no solution at all.

Just as there is no solution to a single

territorial conflict on

planet Earth in recent years. Well,

name one conflict for me that was resolved

successfully. There are none. Even between

civilized countries, there is practically not

a single precedent in which

a territorial conflict was settled, and

here it will not be settled either.

settled. I will tell you honestly, I can

simply — I hope you will speak to me

honestly. I just want to understand:

you are a smart politician, already very experienced. You

yourself understand that in politics, especially

when it comes to millions of voters

who have to vote, regardless

of whether they are on the right, the left, the center, or somewhere else, what wins

is always a clear position that people understand. Now,

right now, no — right now some

ordinary voter without

a university education is watching you, and just now you said

a lot of words about Crimea, but whether you are for or

against still has not become particularly clear to anyone.

Then Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, your

opponent, comes out, and with him everything is clear. He

says: I am for Crimea; this is my main victory.

And in fact I even want the election on the day of

Crimea's annexation, because this is

the main achievement of my presidency.

Then there was the late former politician Nemtsov,

who also immediately gave a very

simple answer to this question, and I remember it well. But

I can also give you many of his quotes

when he said that Crimea should be

returned to Ukraine. Many people did not like him for that either,

but he said it. Let us

have the editor bring it now. I personally read

those interviews and remember them. Do you have

some clear, so to speak,

— you said that at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), at the Faculty of

Political Science, they taught you everything wrong.

Do you think people are stupid? What

you just said — you are saying that any

person understands absolutely nothing.

There are things that cannot be said

as simply yes or simply no. There are things

that are complex. Well then, that means I am that kind of politician,

the kind of politician who says things as

they are. I am telling the plain truth: there is no

simple solution to the Crimea problem.

There is none. All right, then let us put it this way: since you

understand this better, and political science is

nonsense, let us talk about Ukraine and Donbas.

How, in what way, can we even

settle this problem if we do not

return Crimea? How do you

imagine that? These are not connected problems.

Donbas and Crimea are not connected. Right now, in

what does the problem of Donbas consist?

There is a war going on there, and in order to

settle the problem of Donbas and

eastern Ukraine, it is necessary to do what

your well-known acquaintance signed —

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin: start with

in order to implement the Minsk agreements

So, well, we’ll move closer to the rest of the world for now

until that is done. Well, that’s why we are not moving closer

to it, to a significant part

of the world. Without resolving the issue of Crimea, this is impossible without

progress on Donbas. All right

let’s also throw into the mix here

Northern Cyprus and the Falkland Islands as well, and

tie

all these problems together. No, forgive me

my editor is prompting me right now

once again: if I were president, then

Crimea would become Ukrainian, he said on air

on the Inter TV channel. Boris Nemtsov—just to

finish that conversation we were having on air

on a Ukrainian channel. On Russian channels

Boris said different things. Never mind

so, I’m not here to

discuss that, but to finish explaining

my position, as I already said

the problem

has no solution in the foreseeable future. It

will not be recognized, pa-

Russia will be ungovernable

How are you going to negotiate, how will you negotiate

with Europe without giving back Crimea? Say tomorrow you

become president—not by means of those wonderful

video addresses on TV Rain (an independent Russian TV channel)

to President Poroshenko. I’ll make a tra— we’re

talking about rights. You’re planning to become

president, not me. I’m trying to say

something that is clear and familiar to you

Then say so. If I somehow offended you

if that’s how it seemed to you, I offer my

apologies, Ksenia. And I will implement the Minsk

agreements. The world demands that we implement them

the world demands it, Ukraine demands it

to be implemented as well. Ukraine is not complying with them either

How will you

implement them? I will fulfill Russia’s part

of the Minsk agreements: I will hand over control of

the border. I will implement the Minsk agreements

Russia’s—what does it consist of? Russia’s

part is, first and foremost, the withdrawal of troops, and

the transfer of border control. Well

of course our troops are there

of course there are

armed groups that

are directly supported by Russia. This has

been acknowledged many times, including by

the leaders of these unrecognized

republics. They openly say that without

Russian support, without Russian

troops, they cannot fight. And what do you

think? Please tell me, Ksenia, and who

is paying pensions there now

who is paying salaries there? Well, of course

there are all sorts of wording issues, read it

the Minsk agreements—they were signed, the first

and the second ones. They need to be implemented, and from that

we must begin, and from that, I hope, there will begin

a normalization of relations with

Ukraine. But at the same time, we need to understand that

perhaps this is the main crime

that Putin committed against Russia’s future:

that in Ukraine we have acquired

a hostile state, simply

a hostile state with 40 million

people who view Russia

with hostility and will continue to view us that way

for many years to come. That’s the point. All right

what about those people who

have gone through great hardship, and

in fact are still going through

these hardships in Donbas? What should be done with them

They are there now, they

support what is happening there now

they do not want to return to Ukraine. So what

should be done with them? They believe in their Russian

world and want it to become reality there

There are different kinds of people. But yes, there are definitely such people there

Of course there are; there are all kinds of people there, including such ones

but we need to talk about ensuring that some of

them—the majority of them—do not

be subjected, that none of them be subjected

to any unlawful reprisals, but rather that

there be some kind of amnesty, that they have

guarantees. Will you stop

nationalists? What

nationalists who exist in Ukraine

the so-called volunteer nationalist battalions? Well

implementing the Minsk agreements is not some kind of

thing where we do it tomorrow

and they are suddenly fulfilled. Naturally, there must be

international oversight, there must be

an international peacekeeping contingent

mechanisms are needed that will make it possible

to avoid massacres and revenge from one

side or the other, and in fact this

happens quite often in

international conflicts. For this there are

blue helmets, there are European troops

various kinds of formations

that exist, and humanity has fairly extensive experience

in applying such measures

So I’m not saying that

I sign the Minsk agreements and paradise arrives

on earth. A complicated process will begin; everyone

will violate the ceasefire, everyone will blame

one another, there will be propaganda. Well

war is war, but nevertheless this

process can only be started by implementing

the Minsk

agreements. We will continue the interview after

the commercial break. Stay with us on TV Rain (an independent Russian TV channel)

Dozhd, and in open sources on the

YouTube channel we will continue our interview

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Good evening once again. Alexei Navalny is our guest tonight.

We continue our conversation

with politician Alexei Navalny. We have already discussed

foreign policy; surprisingly, that part turned out to be fairly

straightforward. Fulfilling the Minsk

agreements, on the other hand, is very—I said it is all

very, very difficult, unfortunately. Let's move

on to domestic

policy. For example, you

write that Russia needs a visa regime with

Central Asia and the countries of the South Caucasus,

and that labor migrants should come only on

work visas, not uncontrollably as

they do now. Also, from your website, at exactly 7:00 a.m.,

"churki" (a derogatory ethnic slur) — that's your quote — "are just

banging away with sledgehammers with some hellish racket

on some pieces of metal, so much so that even the tea in my mug

starts rippling." End quote, Navalny. I suppose

many of your voters would agree with the term

"churki," but for someone

aspiring to be president of Russia,

those are the kinds of words that ought to remain

somewhere in the distant past. Do you now

yourself understand that it was rather harsh

and probably too emotional? What year

was that post from? As far as I

remember, it gets quoted to me quite often in questions

of this kind. I think

it was from 2005 or 2007, and it concerned the fact that some

people were hammering outside my door and not letting

me sleep. Well, of course, yes, that has remained

in the past. But as for the phrase "visa regime,"

absolutely, 100 percent, yes,

Russia needs a visa regime with

the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This is

one of the most important points in our program. Listen,

but your position on

Chechnya is also well known. Tell me, what exactly

is it known for? You have repeatedly

spoken on this. I don't know whether your position

has changed now or not, but from what I

remember, you said that it was necessary to

stop these uncontrolled subsidies,

to stop such a huge flow of money into

the region. And in general, your critics said

that yes, people probably don't like it, and

from the standpoint of populism, of course, this

idea appeals to everyone — not giving away extra

money. But from the standpoint of real

politics, essentially this is the attitude

of any imperial center toward its

vassal borderlands, because with this money

—

Go on.

Why aren't we pouring money into Magadan or into

the Smolensk region, or

anywhere else? Fine then — shall we

also keep giving money where we are being blackmailed, and

where it's not even clear who is fighting whom,

and just hand it out without control? Well, I

must strongly disagree with you there.

There is no populism here at all. What there is

is sober, pragmatic calculation and

a demand that the law be observed. I

really do believe that money should be distributed

among the constituent entities of the Russian

Federation more evenly. Yes,

of course there are difficulties in the North Caucasus

republics — incidentally, in Dagestan

there are more of them now than in Chechnya — but when I

see photographs of Grozny and it looks like

this wonderful city behind you,

with its glowing skyscrapers, and then I go

to any city in central Russia

and see simply ruined buildings,

potholes everywhere... But what about the absence of terrorist attacks? Aren't you afraid that if tomorrow you stop

giving money tomorrow, then

—

I want to remind you that in your own hometown

there was a terrible terrorist attack not long ago; that in Chechnya

terrorist attacks happen

constantly; not long ago we saw

tanks firing at, what was it, the Press House.

Once again: right now, at this very moment,

this is no longer a relevant conversation about how

we supposedly bought peace with huge sums of money.

Wasn't it you who appealed —

forgive me for bringing up your appeals again —

to various presidents? Wasn't it you who appealed

to President Lukashenko

not to extradite a young

Chechen man because he would be killed or stabbed

or who knows what else would be done to him in Chechnya?

We are paying colossal sums of money and getting

neither peace, nor an absence of

terrorist attacks, nor normal government. So

we need to stop talking about this

tribute that is being paid —

it has been paid for several years now for reasons no one can explain.

All right, one more question about

domestic policy. Let me remind you,

we are trying to determine whether politician Alexei Navalny is

on the right or the left. He

for some reason still doesn't know himself. Well,

I know everything about myself, actually. Well then, define it:

who are you — a right-wing liberal, I don't know,

a social democrat maybe, I don't know,

you used to describe yourself as a national

democrat. I'll tell you — that would solve the problem right away.

A centrist? That's United Russia. No, of course not.

What kind of centrists are they? Again,

that's just what Putin says — that he's a centrist.

So, in your view, Putin is what exactly?

A centrist? In what sense is Putin a centrist? Putin, from the

point of view, again, of the role of the Church, from the

point of view of his reactionary nature, is a

right-wing reactionary. He is a person who

is effectively creating a monarchy in Russia.

A very real one. As for taxes—

Putin's tax policy really is

and you yourself have even said so in your interviews

you said so. Tax reform is the only

in your own case—your salary at

Dozhd (an independent Russian TV channel)—please go to

the accounting department and ask how much they

have to pay in taxes on top of your

salary. It's a colossal tax burden. And

raising taxes on truck drivers, and

the endless rise in gasoline prices, and

the endless increase in utility rates—that is

all taxes. So they are raising taxes.

What's more, am I against raising taxes? I

am, of course, against raising taxes. I

believe that taxes in Russia need to be lowered.

The tax scale.

The tax scale. I believe that right now

it is impossible to abolish it, because it would simply

create more administration overall.

It does not look fair, but

if we abolished it tomorrow, for example, we would simply

lose a large share of tax revenues. I support,

of course, reducing the tax burden

on business. I support reducing the

tax burden, above all, on the

payroll fund. One point in our program

states that small business should, in general,

be exempt from both taxes and from

Are you in favor of denationalization?

Once again: are you in favor of denationalizing the main

some of what? I understand what

denationalization is. Well, we know that in

Russia, in recent years, there has de facto

been a process of nationalization

of a huge number of enterprises that

in one way or another become

state-owned. If that's what you mean, then of course I

support reducing the share, the

percentage of the economy that is controlled

by the state. Right now it is more than

85%, and in practice even more through quasi-

state companies. Of course

nothing can develop in Russia, and nothing is

developing, as we have seen in recent years,

because the state has taken over everything.

Everywhere there are simply these

enormous Rosneft, Gazprom, and Rostec,

and there is practically no private business here.

This can be transferred into private hands, by organizing

what would essentially be a second wave of privatization

in Russia.

In fact—or rather, legally—they are already

private companies. Look at Sechin (Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft)—

No, it is a state company.

A state company, not a private company. Of course, we should

reduce the state's ownership share in

the largest companies. And certainly

the state must completely leave

competitive sectors such as the oil

industry and the banking sector.

Another important question that, in many ways, divides

your supporters. Look,

I want to understand: according to Alexei Navalny,

is Russia, broadly speaking, still a monoethnic

state with a

majority

of ethnic Russians—is that what you mean by monoethnic?

We have facts. We have facts that

show that in Russia, 85% of people

identify themselves as Russian. From the point of view

of various political science standards, including,

excuse me, this can be considered

a monoethnic country. Nevertheless, well,

Russia is, of course, a multinational

state, where there are other large

ethnic groups. You're talking about facts now, but you

personally—you, Alexei Navalny, a candidate for the post

of President of the Russian Federation—do you

want the majority of people in our

country to see themselves

or to feel themselves

as Russians in the civic sense? The majority of people in our

country objectively feel themselves to be Russian.

They are Russian. This is a made-up problem, pulled out of thin air.

Ksenia, of course we need to build

a civic nation. There is no need to force a Tatar

to declare that he is Russian, but it is also

quite pointless and foolish to demand

that Russians forget the word

'Russian' and say, 'We are Rossiyane (citizens of Russia).' Well, that is

in reality something nobody needs. Earlier, in the

USSR, broadly speaking, one can have different views

about Soviet policy, but there was one

factor that objectively united all

of us: yes, Soviet citizens. Those

citizens all knew who Pushkin was,

they all grew up on the same

literature. Now, if you go to

Tatarstan, and if you go a little

farther beyond the border, say to

Uzbekistan or somewhere else in the CIS (post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States),

that integrity, of course,

will no longer exist at all. Do we want, within

our own country, within Russia at least,

to preserve this unity of a single

cultural space? It does exist. Well, I assure you

that in any school in Tatarstan or

Chechnya, Pushkin is taught. There is a unified school

curriculum, there is a single state

language—Russian—and so on and so

forth. All of this already exists, and there is no need to

invent anything. Once again, all these strange

things—a Ministry of Nationalities Policy,

some made-up structures—these

are not needed at all. There is no need to overcomplicate things.

In reality, there were no such thing as 'Soviet citizens,'

and we saw that in full in

1991, when everyone

split apart. And now everyone has already forgotten the Russian

language, nobody speaks it, and when people now

try to tell me that Uzbekistan

It is especially close to us, so let everyone...

...come here visa-free. Well, that’s obvious, isn’t it?

And within Russia? Well, of course there is

Russian culture and the culture of Russia. It

unites all of us; we are united culturally.

Russian culture is still both ethnically Russian and Russian in the civic sense.

Do you feel yourself to be Russ... Ru... Russian?

By nationality, I feel myself to be

Russian. I feel myself to be a citizen

of Russia, and the two are in no way in conflict.

Can you answer me honestly: in your

address to Alisher Usmanov, which I

liked very much—and I even wrote that it

made a strong impression on many

people—you so pointedly

address him each time by his first name and patronymic

and surname, as if emphasizing every time

his non-Russian origin. And if

he were Ivan Ivanovich, would you have treated

him differently?

Would you have said it less often, like that?

That phrase, “Ivan

Ivanovich,” of course. Well, any person

I don’t know who is older than me

I will address by first name and patronymic.

And all the more so a person

I don’t like. Well, I

try not to be rude to him, to speak

politely, including because

politeness often irritates people even

more than rudeness. One point, though—

since we’ve started talking about

forms of address: Alisher’s remarks caused a lot of noise,

and so did your reply. Don’t now

call him Burkhanovich, because

to avoid...

To avoid that: I feel myself both Russian

and also a citizen of Russia; that matters to me, and

it is in no way connected. Look, from

the point of view of your address and

the reaction that followed, do you regret

doing such a big investigation,

a powerful one, with facts and so on—and then in the

form of this strange story about

rape, which he latched onto, and

it turned out there really was a rumor there. In

short, someone said something, and the ambassador

of the United Kingdom said something somewhere, but there were no facts or

documents in your blog. That’s the first point.

Second: as a matter of fact, without that there was

the investigation—we did not mention

Usmanov’s conviction at all; there was

not a single word about it, because we

did not want to create any additional

negative connotation for him. As for the whole

subsequent story—well, of course I

told everything I know about his, about his

biography, including this fact, and

I draw your attention to the fact that in the court

decision that Usmanov squeezed out of

the Russian judicial system, they did not touch

that point. Returning to the agenda:

now we’ll definitely find out whether you are left-wing or

right-wing. Many say that all these

anti-gay laws exist because repealing such

laws is much harder than inventing them.

We have a large core of conservative

voters—family-oriented people,

homophobic, let’s say—and any president,

even if he sincerely sympathizes with or feels neutral toward

this group of citizens, will

have trouble repealing all of this, because

that’s not so. You probably don’t remember, but

even when I was applying to law school,

there was an article in the Criminal Code

criminalizing homosexuality. Nevertheless, it was repealed,

and really without any problems—no one even

noticed. Homosex... And are you ready to allow

same-sex marriage? I think we need to go down

the path the United States followed before the

Supreme Court decision, namely by holding

referendums at the level of the federal subjects

of the Federation. Attitudes toward same-sex marriage

will of course vary greatly in

Dagestan or St. Petersburg, but

personally, if there were a vote, I

would have no problem and see no obstacle to

allowing people to marry.

What about abortion bans? I

am against banning abortion, of course.

To ban abortion now would simply

mean that thousands of women,

tens of thousands of women, maybe hundreds

of thousands of women—judging by the real

abortion statistics in Russia—would go around

getting them done illegally. They would die, they would

fall ill, and some kind of illegal

medical system would emerge. Of course, that must not be done.

Of course, we should strive

to reduce the number of abortions in Russia; there are

a horrifying number of them. But this is not about

prohibitive measures. It is also about

financial measures; it is also about making sure

a woman does not think that becoming a

single mother means nothing but problems and the collapse

of her life. These are social mechanisms. Well,

look, everything you’ve said so far is, on the whole,

indeed rather a center-left

agenda. What do you have that is right-wing?

Could you list it yourself?

What do you have? I understand that—explain to me

what “right-wing” means, because this

all—in traditional, I’m sorry, very

classical political science—visa restrictions

are probably considered a right-wing issue. I

am in favor of

allowing people

to obtain permits for

owning handguns; that

is traditionally considered a right-wing position.

Well, for example, in American political science,

that would be right-wing: visa restrictions, guns—

that is the right. A ban

on abortion is the left. Raising or lowering

taxes is again the right. And I’ll say once more:

all of this does not make much sense in Russia; it

doesn’t, because in Russia the state

is, in principle...

perverts. What I stand for is not a right-wing

agenda, and not a left-wing agenda either. It’s just, well,

a return to normalcy. All right, so

let’s imagine these

elections. There is Putin, who has

his own electorate and also a clear

concept for the country’s development. So what

if we set aside corruption, set aside

the Ozero cooperative (a dacha cooperative tied to Putin’s inner circle), set aside

I understand, but please try—just imagine

that all of this has already happened, that you have already

published these investigations. People already

know about them, they see them, and so on. But from the

standpoint of the fundamental direction of

Russia’s economic and political development, what can you

set against Putin? What exactly

is your broader difference from him, if we

remove the issue of your fight against

theft and corruption? Is there a substantive

difference? It’s impossible to separate that out, and that is

the key mistake many people make when they

say, “Well, fighting corruption, fine, that’s

secondary, but let’s talk about

something else.” No, this is extremely important work.

But do you have anything in your economic

program, in your development program,

your political program, that—of course, yes, we

oppose the fact that the state

has now swallowed the entire economy. We support

reducing the role of the state. We

support putting the emphasis on developing

human capital. Putin

has been consistently cutting spending on

education and

healthcare, while increasing

military and security spending. Well, there were a lot of

insulting words, personal attacks, comparisons to

various animals—I don’t even want to

repeat them. But I remember from that rally this

speech, that now he

Listen, everything I said earlier—I

really do believe that they are

corrupt and thieves, and Putin personally included

among them. That is what they are, and it is

pointless to deny it. But right now you are

asking me about fundamental differences.

Fundamental differences—I’m not going to

say, “He’s a thief and I’m not.” Yes, that is a basic

difference, but you asked about approaches to

the economy, so I’m saying that my approach to

the economy is that we

will reduce taxes on small businesses,

cut payroll taxes, and take more from

Putin’s sacred cow—namely,

the oil and gas companies. We will

cut military

and police spending. The people who

support you—from the very first words of this program it was

clear.

Honestly, the people who support you—

big business, medium-sized business, many of my

acquaintances I speak with—they all

say roughly the same thing:

“Look, right now we understand that Navalny is right about many things,

but we also understand that

the breakdown of the system, however awful

the current system may be, would still mean

an enormous crisis in any case, just as

there was a crisis in the 1990s, when

democrats, guided by the right ideas of freedom and

liberalism, destroyed the old system. And

no matter how rotten it was, still

the hungry years followed. And it wasn’t that they were

to blame for those hungry years; it was simply that

the system collapsed.”

That you are a hostage to precisely that process, no matter how

excellent you may be, no matter how

wonderful your program may be.

If it really turns out that

Putin leaves, or something happens, and you

win now or in the next

elections, you will find yourself in a system that

will be completely broken. A new one cannot

be created in a matter of days, and you

will end up in a profound crisis

economically. But in fact there are no real

preconditions for

any cataclysms to occur. Really, everything

now, in this figurative Ozero cooperative

(the network around Putin’s inner circle), has already been parceled out, and all the mechanisms are functioning badly.

First of all, as we can see, they

hardly work at all, or at best

they work crookedly.

To deal with the Ozero dacha cooperative

is the least of the problems; with it

it is fairly easy to deal. These people

committed criminal offenses. We

understand how to prosecute them under the law,

how to return their property back to

the national patrimony. In the 1990s

all of that happened because

the price of oil fell dramatically.

There was simply no money. And the Soviet Union,

like Russia now, was of course

a raw-material appendage of Western countries.

At today’s levels, we still, at

a price of $50 per barrel,

receive a great deal of money. And if tomorrow

Putin—well, imagine that tomorrow Putin

is abducted by aliens, and Shoigu takes his place,

absolutely nothing will change, absolutely nothing.

Then Shoigu is abducted by aliens too, and

instead of him—well, I don’t know—anyone, anyone

at all from this government, Shuvalov,

Let me continue that thought. Many people think that

if Putin is abducted by aliens, and even if

Navalny happens to be nearby as the most prominent

politician of the younger generation, still nothing

will change, because Navalny is one

of the Kremlin towers

of the Kremlin. Around him, they jailed everyone,

and Navalny is the only one who isn’t in prison,

but

somehow nothing truly

major is happening. Why is it all arranged

this way? That is the question

a huge number of people ask. Well, not to

me—nothing global is happening to me.

Besides the fact that they jailed my brother,

who spent a year and a half in solitary confinement,

cell. Besides that, our office

is constantly being subjected to

raids—raids on our office. Why is Alexei still at large?

You should ask the people you talk to.

On that comic note, I don't

know. I wasn't there that year, so I

just do what I have to do. I

do the things I believe in. Doesn't that

make you stop and think about something?

Don't you think? I think about it all the time,

but I don't try to figure out what exactly

is going on in Putin's head. I was once

jailed, and I saw with my own eyes what happened.

But you do understand that you were

released on Putin's personal orders,

don't you? You understand that

the decision about your participation in the

presidential election will be made personally by

Putin. No, I don't understand that. I know—

let me answer. What I do understand is that

I was released on Putin's personal orders,

just as I had earlier been jailed on

Putin's personal orders, for one simple

reason: because people took to the streets, and

on those twisted scales of his,

the scales on which Putin

weighs what he needs to do and

tries to present himself as some kind of

mental judo master, he decided that

for the moment he needed to let me out and pursue

some other strategy against us. So what

happens next—whether I am registered

for the presidential election or not—

will depend not on Putin, but

on whether I can unite

a sufficient number of people who

will create

enough political pressure to

force them to register me.

Of course they don't want to. Why would they need

to register me? Of course, if we do nothing and

just remain

a so-called opposition, then of course they won't

register me. What are they, stupid? They

act according to their own logic, but we

can absolutely force them to

do it. Look, we remember that story

that was also discussed, about how

Sobyanin gave you the signatures so that you could

run. It's clear that this too was

done, obviously, with some kind of

supreme authorization. And why did that supreme

authorization happen? Because I

announced that I would

run. That was

right around—well, not these exact days, but around

June 5—and we immediately began

our campaign. Two weeks later we

put up our first street campaign cubes (outdoor campaign stands), I think, and we

launched a mass canvassing campaign. And

all those top people, as you

call them—we know how people get removed from elections.

You know that. You just didn't let me finish, and

that's why you don't know how people are removed from

elections.

We began running an aggressive

campaign, and the Kremlin, city hall,

whoever it was—they saw that no one would

recognize those elections. So Putin himself

got scared? Yes, they were afraid that

those elections would not be recognized, and they decided

that yes, that same municipal

barrier they had put up in front of everyone—in

this case, they needed to lift it and let me

into the election. I don't care by what

mechanism they decided to do it. I know

—I knew that I had the right to take part

in the Moscow mayoral election, and I demanded it. I

was allowed in. And now I know that I

have every right to take part in the

presidential election, that there are many

people who support me, and I will

demand that this right be upheld. As an

experienced politician, can you answer

a question for me about some abstract Alexei

Navalny—just step back a little from

yourself and simply reason it through with me. Well,

from the point of view of your

political experience—my words will sound very cynical—

I sincerely wish you

many long years of good health and a good life, but

now I'll ask my favorite question:

why weren't you killed? And the second

favorite question: why weren't you imprisoned?

That's not exactly right, but speaking hypothetically, trying

to get inside the heads of Putin and the people who

make decisions—or Kadyrov—well, it seems to me

it's obvious that when weighing

the risks, especially after the tragedy

that happened to Nemtsov,

what are these people really risking? That

200,000 people will come out once, and after that

they will have solved a major problem for themselves,

because if you're not on their side, then you are

a major problem for them. So why then,

hypothetically, couldn't it be anything? Drove off the

road, I don't know, something happened, some

crazy Chechens showed up, or some other

story like that. Why, in your view, do they

not go down that path, which we

understand they have, broadly speaking, gone down before, right before our eyes?

All this interests you because

you're a young political scientist and that's what you studied. But

it doesn't interest me. I'm not going to

—

dig into that. It doesn't interest me.

If I started thinking about it, how do you

imagine it? That I come

home and think, why didn't they kill me?

Because that would solve a major

problem for them? It's pointless to think about it. We

don't know for certain how

they think. I can tell you why you

should think about it: because you are alone

in this field. Precisely because—not because

you are alone. You are a very talented person. But

I’m sure there are many

talented politicians in Russia who could

compete with you in the race for

this position and in the struggle against Putin, and you...

Precisely because everyone knows what

happened to Nemtsov (Boris Nemtsov, a murdered Russian opposition leader); everyone knows that this

could happen to anyone

who crosses that double solid line.

So you’re saying everyone else is afraid.

They probably think that the option

of simply being physically eliminated is highly

possible. Let’s call it by its proper

name: they don’t want to compete with me

because they’re afraid, yes.

Then why aren’t you afraid? I’m not afraid.

I’m a normal person. It doesn’t give me any

pleasure to think that something

might happen to me. It’s quite unpleasant

when I’m constantly being followed by

surveillance teams or cars trailing me, but even so

I’m not going to, instead of

working, spend all day thinking, ‘My God,

why haven’t they killed me?’ I have

no idea. I do what I believe

needs to be done, and I will keep doing what I believe

needs to be done, because it’s right. People support me for

that. I’ve had

115,000 volunteers sign up. My election

campaign is funded through small

donations. I see people’s support and

I continue my work. But all this

navel-gazing about who

killed whom or didn’t kill whom—well, it’s pointless.

It makes no sense to spend time on these

thoughts.

Are you afraid of Kovalchuk? So, a small

question, but it’s important for me to ask it.

Why did you personally take down from

your website the video about Kovalchuk?

We post many different

videos on our channel. There are investigations that

I publish, and there are just reflections or

fun videos or reviews. There was

a review about Kovalchuk, and the point of the video

was that all media in Russia

belong to Kovalchuk, and that is true, and in that

sense the video was truthful. But after

it was published, I hadn’t

watched it carefully before publication, to be honest.

There was outdated information in it.

That is, there was no substantive

error, but there was outdated information, so

I said the video should be removed and

another, more interesting one made. Mm-hmm. So

that was the only reason?

Yes, of course. I see. And I also can’t help but

ask about Sechin—there hasn’t been much lately. Well, there was

that story with the spoons, but as they say, the spoons

were found, but the aftertaste remained.

So why is it that against me, or against

Sechin, it’s about spoons? Why? No

major investigations about Sechin, it seems to me.

If we look at my channel,

I criticize even Usmanov and Medvedev

less than Sechin. I mean, about Sechin I

speak constantly. The story with Stas

Belkovsky—also a short

question. In general, we read many of his

comments and know that

you were also connected with him. Stas

Belkovsky.

He claimed, uh, and said that he gave

you money—that is, in January 2010

there was correspondence, it was recognized,

this correspondence, about a campaign against Rusal

and Oleg Deripaska—$50,000. I’m hearing this

for the first time, that Stas

Belkovsky said something and confirmed it.

When was that? No, wait, that wasn’t

Belkovsky speaking, sorry, I’m

reading this out.

From there, from Navalny’s correspondence with

political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky,

it follows that in January 2010

Belkovsky commissioned Navalny for $50,000

to run a campaign against Oleg Deripaska’s Rusal.

The company was at that very time conducting

Vedomosti wrote that. So, there were

many different correspondences,

and some things were hacked, some were not,

some things were made up. Did you receive money from

Stas for any campaigns

against Rusal? Of course not.

He could hardly finance anything on a large

scale. It’s rather

interesting.

He didn’t give me money.

So the attack on Deripaska was entirely

on its own? These attacks on

Deripaska—I’m still ready, with

pleasure, to carry them out, because

Deripaska is the same kind of commodities

oligarch as all the others. That is,

at exactly the moment when the company

was conducting its Hong Kong...

It had nothing to do with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and it

could not, it could not have affected the IPO on

the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. And, well, you know, this is from the same

category as people who think that I

attack Shuvalov because I’m being asked to do so by

Sechin, or that I attack

Sechin because I’m being asked to do so by

Miller. I see. One more quote from your

former ally—I should also bring it up—from

Udaltsov’s wife. For some reason she

very much... Udaltsov’s wife is my

ally. As for Anastasia, as I understand it, we used to

communicate; we even all met together.

And Udaltsov, in general, was someone

who was with you—Udaltsov, Sergei

Udaltsov, who is a political

prisoner and was one of the

leaders of left-wing organizations, certainly was

my ally and took part in

the Opposition Coordination Council, and

is a prominent politician, a poli-

tical prisoner. What his wife says

is of little interest to me. You were saying—I simply...

Let me explain for our viewers as well: you said

that you were busy raising money for

Leonid

Razvozzhayev. So,

accordingly, that you are involved in

fundraising. That you are collecting money

for prisoners. Your quote was that

people need support. Recently, we raised

money, and we collected 870,000 rubles

for—what I was saying about this—for

a person who was arrested at a

rally. As for raising money

for the others as well, you also said that. May I

answer, please? I supported all of

this, I called on people to help, but I was not

directly involved in collecting it. I wrote,

"Transfer it to such-and-such wallet,"

but I was not directly involved in the fundraising.

That is not my function. There are wonderful

people who collect the money, but I already

have plenty of work without that. I do not have

time to administer all of this.

All right, but Anastasia Udaltsova, in

response to this, said that Alexei

Navalny is lying, while the lawyer

for Razvozzhayev, Aganovsky, said in a video address

that he had not seen a single kopeck.

In short, a whole uproar broke out. If you

go to Zhenya Udaltsov's Twitter, you will

read such things about yourself that it will

be downright frightening. And you are right

not to go there.

And

interestingly, I am running for office, but honestly

speaking, even taking into account that I

am running, I am extremely uninterested in what

Udaltsov's wife is saying there.

Have you heard of what is called, you know, and about

culture at the end? Have you heard the ending already?

Has the end come? Do you want more? Of course I

want more, because we still have not decided

whether I am on the right or the left. Well, as you said

that you are a centrist. So you are occupying

the place that United

Russia currently holds. We will have posters, and you

will have written on them, "I am for stability." Well,

one more step and we will be

there. By the way, that is a very good

political strategy: a young Putin. By the way, you

should think about that. It was a mistake for you

to go into political science at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations); you should have gone

into something else. By the way, if you criticize Putin

not for corruption, but simply by saying, "I am

just like him, only younger," that would, in principle,

be enough as a promising line too. I am giving you

a political science tip: you

will run and say, "I am young

and a woman," and you will criticize him for that.

All right, now seriously, about culture.

Many people were deeply troubled by the case that

involved Kirill Serebrennikov.

A huge number of worthy people

came to the theater. Why did you

not support this gathering with your own presence

and, generally speaking, were not there at the theater?

As far as I remember, at that time I think

I was in Barcelona having an operation,

but I will not lie: either I was traveling to open

campaign offices, or I was—well, in any

case, it turned out I was not in Moscow. I

on the subject of

Serebrennikov did speak out, including in

my program. Yes, I remember that, and I can

explain my position now, but no, I did not go to the

theater. But your position

is that this is essentially, well,

part of a broader situation surrounding theatrical

and cultural life, as I understood it, which

among other things spills over into things like this.

I believe that the case against

Serebrennikov is unquestionably a

politically motivated case. Right now a woman has been arrested there

from whom they are quite clearly trying to beat out

testimony against him, and of course this

is part of a broader reactionary trend

when

the state, in any more or less

independent expression of anything, in

particular creative expression—even though

Serebrennikov is, well, fairly loyal

to the state—it cannot tolerate even that degree

of loyalty anymore, and

therefore it is trying to devour everything, and is trying

to devour him now. What is your favorite

play?

Serebrennikov for the State Duma—that is

somehow very

I really liked *Muller Machine*.

I liked it; well, it was not as interesting, but

I liked it a little less. I cannot

say that I am a big theater lover. Well,

I mean, I am not the kind of person you

should ask, because it will turn out that

in this sense I am a philistine. Which

three books influenced you the most?

I read a lot and continue to read a lot.

I read a great deal.

What influenced me? *The Adventures of Huckleberry

Finn* was one of my favorite books, and

more generally Mark Twain—I valued him greatly and still

do. Well, my favorite book is

*War and Peace*. I believe that *War and Peace*

is the greatest work, after which, in

a certain sense, basically

Are you serious? That is the book that

influenced you? Are you serious? Well, you are clearly not a

Tolstoyan, first of all. What does being a Tolstoyan have to do with it?

Non-resistance to evil by violence, Tolstoy's concept—you

are saying—how is that not connected? It means

Tolstoy's philosophy, what is commonly

called Tolstoyanism, well, has no

direct relation to *War and Peace*. The fact is

that I truly believe this is

the greatest work of Russian literature

and possibly of world literature. And what

did you like about it? Why does it—I, you know,

by the way, on the subject of your

sarcasm, on the subject of words—my God.

*War and Peace*—ha-ha—was a favorite work at

Yale for us. I remember there was a strategic

planning course that was very

hard to get into—a strategy seminar—and

they said there that *War and

Peace* was the main work a person

had to read in order to

even get into our course and understand

anything in it. So many people value

Tolstoy even more than people do inside Russia.

I say that without sarcasm. Now, do you

remember a character named Platon

Karataev? Of course. Well, actually, you don’t

necessarily have to identify yourself with

any characters. I don’t

need to lie somewhere on the floor and

stare at the sky of Austerlitz (a reference to *War and Peace*). Yes, I’m sa—

which favorite character? No, I don’t have a

favorite character. I like this

book. I think it’s interesting—that’s what matters to me. I like

the way it’s written. I like

the interweaving of the characters. I like

the psychological depth. Forgive me, Leo Tolstoy,

but I’m not going to think about how I

am or am not like Pierre Bezukhov.

It’s simply ridiculous.

And name a third book as well.

For me to name a third book—well, I

beg your pardon, but that seems to me a rather

meaningless question. Many times it’s mean—

you know why it’s not mean— Let’s also

turn on Posner (Vladimir Pozner, the TV host) and ask me what I

would ask God if I found myself standing

before Him. No, I hope you’ll

say that to Pozner someday, when he

invites you onto Channel One (Russia’s main state TV channel). I wish you

live to see that time. But about

books—I’m asking you. That will be difficult.

That really will be difficult. Yes, but I’m asking

for a reason. For example, I recently

finished reading the memoir of one of my

favorite

Americans, Roosevelt, and among other things he

says something very interesting: he

believes that, in principle, a politician should

not be a professional politician.

As for the president, there should be a strong

bureaucracy in America, but the president

should be someone as far removed

from politics as possible—ideally

some kind of farmer or

someone from another field, because

politics itself, generally speaking, really corrupts

a person. And we know examples in history,

such as Václav Havel, or examples like

Sakharov, who may not have become

a politician, but was essentially a major

political figure—Wałęsa, and so on.

So what do you think about that, and does it offend

you when even your supporters

call you a political animal and say,

“Navalny, of course, is impressive. He’s a real

political animal”? It doesn’t offend me. I

take all that perfectly normally. But

people—politics is a complicated thing. It’s complicated

precisely in terms of terminology.

And for many people it’s simply hard to say

correctly what they mean. Again,

again, because of the problems with this

political terminology. Well, they say it, and

they say it. But of course I believe the point

is not the president—the point is strong

institutions. Forgive me for such a

banality: there must be a bureaucracy,

there must be a system that

slows down any president, or

conversely gives him a kick so that he works.

And times have changed since Roosevelt,

and as we can see, a businessman came to the White House,

a businessman president, and things don’t

seem to be going especially well, apparently. But

of course I believe

that a person who walks into those

offices—presidential offices—he

must first and foremost be a normal

person. He must say the right things,

he must have the right

view of the world. And that is probably why

the best

presidents in recent history have been those

who did not have extensive bureaucratic

experience—Obama, Havel, whom you mentioned,

or

Wałęsa, Angela Merkel. They did not run

any Gazproms, they were not “red directors” (Soviet-era state enterprise bosses),

they were not involved in big

business, but they had the right views on

how society should be organized.

Because a president is a person who,

by and large, should

say the right words and

in daily life live in accordance

with the principles he proclaims, and

then everything below will begin

to change. One last question on this topic.

Alexei, don’t you think that, in general,

the very idea of becoming president, of wanting

to become president, is rather

strange from a psychological point of view? That

is, it’s the idea

of a maximal ego that wants

to realize itself in such an extraordinary

position, regardless of whether you want it

for the people, for the country’s future. This

desire itself—and I know that your desire

and determination, I must say, are very

great, and you do a lot in order

to achieve this goal, and I wish you

that you achieve it sooner or later. It is

the main goal of your life. So why—

why do you so badly want to make it your goal

almost maniacally, to become president? I would like

to change the country, among other reasons. Because

I live here. My children live here.

My family lives here, my friends

and relatives are here. I like living here,

I like speaking Russian, and

I categorically cannot accept what

is happening. I know with 100% certainty that we

could live much better if we

changed certain things in the country, and

they are not major things. They need to be changed, and

tomorrow. The world around us... Aren't you worried that

power will corrupt you?

Alexei, power will most likely corrupt any person

if they remain in

that position of power for too long

a period of time. So it seems to me now that

of course, me—well, of course it won't

corrupt me. But people should not simply believe

verbal guarantees. There must be a system

under which eight years is the maximum, and then goodbye.

Go into retirement or do something

else. Four years, and if re-elected, another four

years. In your situation, you understand

that it won't be a matter of people having to

take you at your word, because you will come into

a country that currently has absolutely none of

these institutions—

with no real courts, with a corrupt

system in everything and across all state

institutions—and you will come into this system, in

which people will have to believe that you will find

the will within yourself to personally limit

your own powers and build

uh—this is the wrong approach. We are not in

Somalia, we are not living in a primitive communal system,

and this is not the 15th century. The necessary institutions in

Russia

can be rebuilt—not exactly easily, but they can

be restored fairly quickly, in the foreseeable

and near future, if there is the will. And

the judicial system and law enforcement

agencies—we have the money, we have an educated

population, we have infrastructure,

some industry still remains, we have it.

So there is no need to say that

we are somehow standing in a desert, and

around us people are running about in loincloths,

and that we therefore have to choose from among them

a Chief Justice. But that is

simply not the reality.

reform both the judicial system and

law enforcement agencies. When I become

president, we will create these institutions fairly quickly

and in part because

we will introduce self-limitations concerning

shortening the presidential term, giving up

the appointment of judges, and ensuring the independence

of appointments. And most importantly—well, one

of the most important things—is the independence of the media.

The TV Rain channel will broadcast whatever

it wants. It will be able to invite the president

to come in. Presidents will sit in your chair and

answer your questions, which, I won't hide,

I did not always like. I am sitting

here answering questions, and

that is perfectly normal. Thank you. I hope that in a new

status, we will still have the opportunity to

talk with you sometime. Thank you for this

interview. Alexei, thank you for

coming to our studio. I should say, and

apologize for the not entirely accurate quote from

Lev Shlosberg. My editors are telling me

that the meaning was correct, but in terms of

the exact wording, you can

look it up, and our viewers can

look it up on Echo of Moscow—it is a little different.

Ksenia, and please forgive me for trying

to needle you with those wonderful

video messages. Please forgive me.

All right, thank you very much, Alexei.

Navalny, politician and candidate for president

of Russia, was our guest today. Good luck to you,

Alexei.

[applause]

thank you op Channel

On June 9, TV Rain will host a meeting with viewers featuring

Nobel Prize laureate and world-renowned writer

Svetlana Alexievich. People have described her

merciless works, intolerant of any

historical falsehood, in all sorts of ways.

The event will take place on Friday at 3:00 p.m.