Alexei Navalny’s interview with Mikhail Fishman on TV Rain

Alexei, hello, hello. And my first question is

of course about Oleg Navalny, about

your brother. How unexpected was

this court decision? It basically just threw out

the ruling into the trash.

There is an ECHR ruling (European Court of Human Rights), and what follows from it

in practice? For example, can it

be challenged? I mean, why is it that the same

decision that was made—if there were

some kind of international bailiff

who could show up somewhere and

force them to comply—then maybe one could

hope for that. As for appealing it, of course everything can

be appealed. We will appeal it and win that appeal,

we will prove that it was unlawful,

that the ruling was not carried out. But you cannot force

a country to do it—a sovereign state,

because the whole point of the European

Court is that countries join it

voluntarily and voluntarily

comply with its rulings, because that makes

their legal systems better.

The Russian Federation is now making things worse and

degrading its own judicial system, so

we need to give up any hopes that

some Europe will force it to do

anything. The decision was, well, rather

unexpected. We understood that they would do

something nasty, but we understood perfectly well that

it would not happen that a judge would say:

"In light of the European Court's ruling, everything has been revised,

yes, we simply made a mistake, the case was

fabricated, release him immediately,

pay compensation, and restore

justice." Of course, we did not expect that.

But they were supposed to

implement the ruling somehow. For example, in

the Kirovles case, they complied with it in a less deceptive

way: they overturned the sentence,

and then after some time they handed down

a new one. So we understood that

they would do something underhanded, but most likely

we hoped they would even release

Oleg, adopt a decision, overturn the sentence,

and they would have to let him go. But a scenario

in which they would simply come out and

say, "We are not going to comply with the ruling,"

we did not expect. Because Russia,

remember, not so long ago, while preparing

not to comply with certain rulings,

came up with an entire legal mechanism:

the Constitutional Court could issue

a decision saying that this or that judgment

of the European Court contradicted our

"traditional values" (a common Russian political slogan), and then—there was a big

scandal when that was being discussed, quite

right. But now they just came out and said they

would not comply. And besides the, of course,

rather unpleasant consequences for

Oleg, for our family as a whole, for

Russia, for all lawyers, this is a very, very

negative signal. We need to remember

that Russia ranks first in the number of applications to the ECHR

—tens of thousands of cases—and

many of them are not connected with any

politics, and most of them are not related

to this kind of political issue. The fact that now

a ruling is being ignored in this way

.

It is clear that this is a precedent, but it is interesting

what you think: why, well,

indeed, in the Kirovles case they found

a way simply to get around it—they went out one door

and in through another. What difference does it make? Why not

do the same thing here? Why did they

they

push it through in such an obviously

unlawful way? It seems to me this continues their

tactic of pushing certain people,

certain political forces altogether out of

the legal field. That is, once again they have

demonstrated that there is a category

of people—not specific individuals, but rather people

associated with

what they call the radical

"non-systemic opposition"—for whom no laws

apply. And let them not think they can

seek justice in

the European Court of Human Rights. They are

also very irritated that right now

there have been so many complaints filed—we, many

Memorial, Agora, and other

human rights organizations are sending many, many applications,

and they are winning in case after case.

This is a kind of message:

sure, you may win there in

Strasbourg, but here you will get nowhere.

I think that is the idea. In other words, they are placing

them in this category of people for whom the law

does not apply, and Oleg Navalny as well.

Absolutely. I think so, yes. I

think that, unfortunately, this category is

open-ended. It started with me and with Oleg,

and it will be replenished fairly quickly. In that sense,

this is a question about him personally,

because he has actually already been there for

what—three years and a few months?

That much time has already passed, and he

makes such an astonishing impression

by the way he is holding up there. We all follow

what he writes from there, and not

just that—there is some incredible

combination

of courage, irony, love of life, and strength of spirit.

And of course we are all waiting for him to be

free. It should happen soon, apparently.

And how is he, in ordinary

terms? Is he the same as the way we see him,

or is it still very hard for him? He is a great

guy, and he is behaving very

courageously, having found himself in this situation

quite unexpectedly. And, let's say,

he is facing prison

pressure far greater than

that faced by most political prisoners—well, not every one,

of course; there are horrific exceptions—

but greater than the average inmate. He was

held in solitary confinement and under strict conditions.

in these so-called conditions, but basically he

is an upbeat person, and he understands that

his message, if you like, from his cell should

be upbeat, but overall it is a rather

difficult situation. Even in personal communication, he is

like that.

He jokes and laughs, but there in the detention center the situation is also quite

difficult, with fairly harsh

pressure. If you so much as take off a sweatshirt the wrong way,

they come and put you away for 15

days. He washed some clothes so that

they would dry faster: he put on a dry item underneath

and a wet item on top.

They come and say, "You're dressed improperly,"

and it's 15 days in the punishment cell.

This happens constantly, and it is fairly

hard to endure, especially when you are

in solitary confinement. And what are

his plans? After all, he will be out soon,

thank God.

What are his plans, really?

The press is already writing that this

person, who has demonstrated such

strength of spirit for many years now,

has a political future.

As for pursuing any kind of political

activity, of course a great many

people are waiting for him. He is a very decent, wonderful

person. We do sometimes discuss things with him, though

we talk about plans, but I believe there is no need

to make any plans yet, other than

the fact that, first of all, he needs to get out—out of a

Russian prison. They are always, they are always

coming up with some new

things. Yes, he needs to get out, he needs some time

to rest, and only then start dealing with

any plans—and not try to guess, not

count on anything. In other words, for now it is unclear what

this politics will look like, and Oleg—

his comrades and the party all understand that Oleg will come out

having acquired some new qualities. He has

learned Spanish, earned a law degree,

and draws tattoos and things like that.

So I don't know—

maybe in our party

instead of a party card there will be

a tattoo. That would be a great idea.

You mentioned the appeal regarding

the request that Memorial (the Russian human rights organization) was sending, and

so on. So, on May 5 there is supposed to be

a protest action. As announced so far, if I understand correctly,

we'll discuss it now, it is

unauthorized in Moscow, in Moscow, yes.

If I were at home in Moscow, I would for now

proceed on that basis. Accordingly, there may be

detentions, as often happens

at unauthorized rallies.

You promised and said that you would

support those who suffered as a result of

previous unauthorized protests, and so

on. How is that process going? How much

have you been able to help these people, and

what stage is it at now?

Tell us where the work stands. Here, the work is

mainly proceeding in two directions. First,

the payment of fines. And I can say that we

have paid fines totaling several million

rubles (millions of Russian rubles). It took time, but over these

almost two years of work there were many

detentions,

and there were many fines, including

large ones that people cannot pay, but

we paid out several million rubles,

collected money, redistributed it,

and paid them.

As for legal work, there are

hundreds of complaints that have been filed by various

organizations, including us. We

hope that some of those complaints have already been

communicated.

And they will be considered. It's just that

the European Court moves very slowly, and

that is the nature of that kind of justice, so it will not be

quick. But I have no doubt about a

positive outcome and ruling.

As for the protest itself on the 5th,

what kind of negotiations are still going on about it?

That is, are they offering you

anything in response? Again, we are

talking about Moscow. These are such strange

negotiations, constantly. Look, in Moscow we

are saying one simple thing: give us Tverskaya Street.

Because in May everyone will be walking along

Tverskaya Street; we have the right to do that. They

offer us places like Maryino, Tushino,

and so on. After some time they

unofficially, without any paperwork, simply

sent a paragraph of text: "We offer you

a stage at Komsomolskaya Square (the Square of Three Stations)." We said

—and I can repeat through your program once

again, as a direct message—

to Moscow City Hall: we are ready to consider

a normal, acceptable, dignified option

in the city center, inside the Garden Ring.

Of course, we are not going to hold a rally at

the Square of Three Stations, and we are not going to hold

a rally in a format where the venue itself

would be an additional

humiliation. Because the May 5 protest

that we are holding across the country

—there are already more than 87 cities involved—

is specifically a protest against

humiliation.

So is there still a chance you will come to an agreement? What will happen?

Will it be authorized, legal? I really wouldn't

know, if only one could understand what is going on in

these people's heads. But as of

Friday, I don't know—we said:

at least give us that route. We are not

entirely satisfied with the traditional

route of the annual march that takes place every

year, but it is hard to object to it—no one

could really object. But they are silent, because

they themselves decide nothing.

It is just a whole chain of intermediaries. Most likely

there is one person making the decision. Who exactly, and with whom

the front end consists of some officials in

the Moscow city government who are responsible for this.

Formally, they respond—they basically do.

They say, well, we don’t know, we’ll ask.

They say they run off to ask some

high-ranking officials, the request goes to

Moscow, and they apparently run to the Kremlin (the Russian presidential administration), to some

person in the Kremlin who is supposed to decide.

He’s probably busy, so the process

takes a very long time. But for me, the point here is simple:

the attitude is simple.

Either, within a reasonable time frame, there should be

approval for a reasonable place in the city center,

or we go out onto Tverskaya Street and act

simply in accordance with the Constitution. When it comes

to actions like this, the kind that

is planned for the 5th, and there have already been

quite a few of them, what always matters is

well, not exactly the backdrop, but the moment itself,

the sense of the moment. Of course, we remember very well

what kind of moment it was back in 2011

and 2012, when the previous

elections took place. It really was a powerful moment,

a powerful movement. That’s not the case now, well,

it’s hard to argue with that—it’s a fact. And now

the situation is completely different.

And in this different situation, to what extent

is this tactic justified, when you

go out already knowing full well that this

will be one of

many, and who knows how many more there will be? There is no

super-tactic that would allow us

to solve every problem. If only there were

some kind of magical

button in that room that I could press and then

a protest movement would flare up,

and everything would fall into place. We understand one

very simple thing: Russia

at the present moment is an authoritarian country.

President Putin’s next term, which

will fully begin after

the inauguration on May 7, and that is why we are holding

the action on May 5, before the inauguration. It will be

much, much worse than his previous

rule, and right now opposition to Putin

has to exist, because 53 million

people did not vote for him. But this is

the routine of political struggle. Whether there is a moment

or there isn’t a moment—

I consider that secondary. What matters is that people exist,

well, you exist and I exist, and at any

moment in time I consider it

right to speak out against this.

Just look, even now in Armenia

what is happening: it would seem they have even won,

and that man has stepped down, the one who

was trying to seize power, and yet still, well,

he appointed someone as his successor, and

the Armenian opposition says that

people should not leave the streets. The question

of persistence is the most important

political mechanism. People in the streets are

the simplest and most correct way

to express our disagreement about everything, from

corruption to poverty and inequality.

We have to take to the streets, otherwise nothing will happen.

We should not be naive and say,

well, maybe we went out into the streets three, four, five times

and nothing changed. We need

to keep going out until it does change.

Please explain, after all, what our

situation looks like with the Moscow mayoral election.

You raise an interesting point, one that seems very

important to me, actually. Just now I

read in *Vedomosti* (a Russian business daily), literally today,

that Dmitry Gudkov is already proposing

reaching agreements over the Moscow City Duma elections,

dividing up the districts for the next

electoral cycle, because as for the

mayoral election, it’s already obvious it didn’t work out. How do you

see this situation? I don’t understand what

you mean by “it didn’t work out.” The Moscow mayoral election

is very important for us. It is the biggest

election before the next State Duma elections.

I have one wish regarding it:

when we talk about the Moscow mayoral election,

I’m a Muscovite, you’re a Muscovite too, and even setting aside

all the candidates, I want

the confrontation with the incumbent mayor

to lead to the growth of the protest movement. I

want there to be a fight between all

normal Muscovites and United Russia (the ruling party). I

want there to be a fight between our

candidate and Sobyanin, and for that I need

the best candidate. Gudkov thinks he is the

best candidate.

Mitrokhin thinks he is the best

candidate. Yashin thinks he is better, and under

all this there is some kind of mess.

It’s impossible to unite them

in any way except through primaries.

I think the only thing that should happen

is the only possible thing: everyone who wants to run

should come before us and say:

we are running in the election, here is our program, we

will act in this way. I can

honestly say that I will support whoever is

the most aggressive, consistent, and

hard-working in opposing this government. That’s why I

want primaries to be held. If

we choose one person, then

And the last thing I’ll say, from the point of view of

political strategy, is that in the first

round, the more candidates there are, the better.

The other issue is that through the municipal

filter, not all of them will get through—far from it.

There are a lot of them, you see, so for the Moscow mayoral

election

I want, as a politician and as a Muscovite,

as a voter, I want there to be

primaries to choose one person.

Well, that sounds fairly smooth and clear,

and logical, yes, yes. But in fact, you still

haven’t fully convinced me.

Because it still leaves

a certain aftertaste: clearly, the democrats did not

reach an agreement, the opposition did not reach an agreement.

Instead of going and making a deal,

they came forward—and in reality, very few people

will believe in their

to read the whole procedure as meaning that this will not happen

that it is manipulation in favor of one person over the others

guys, support for one or another depends

on the format and so on; all of this, in a rush,

gets bogged down in this discussion about what kind of

primaries we need, and in scandals over

how they should be organized. As I understand it,

what is actually happening is that instead of

well, Dmitry Gudkov

having declared long ago—if everyone and everything,

the opposition, including you, Yashin, and Yabloko (a Russian liberal political party),

it's more complicated.

were united—saying: here we go, we're all campaigning for our

candidate Dmitry Gudkov. After all, we still have

the municipal filter ahead of us (the requirement to collect signatures from municipal deputies in order to run).

Why not do that? The effect of

all of us being together, it seems to me,

would be cumulative and significant.

What you're saying sounds,

on the one hand, smooth, but on the other hand

it sounds absurd. What are you suggesting—

that TV Rain (Dozhd, an independent Russian TV channel)

should merge with another TV channel and

start jointly producing some

single great channel? These are different politicians.

If I work in some field

and someone tells you, guys, well, you have a hundred

thousand subscribers,

and someone else has 100,000 too—so why don't you merge and

maybe then you'll have 250,000? That's not how it

works. But politicians are always

politicians—they are different people. As for

primaries, if we cannot hold

primaries whose fairness we ourselves believe in,

then why are we doing any of this at all?

I absolutely believe that we can

hold normal, fair primaries.

That's the first point. Second, as for who

declared first—I, too, you know, declared quite

a long time ago.

And at one point, for president of Russia, but nevertheless

without disputing anything, I didn't get

No one disputed, Dmitry Gudkov, your

favorite argument when you said: let's support

Navalny—he declared first.

Yashin supported Yavlinsky

because he supported Sobchak, and so on.

That's not a complaint against him; those politicians are

closer to him than I am, and that's normal.

You have to compete in primaries. And if

right now

Yashin or Gudkov says, I'm staking my claim

and running in the 2038 presidential election

year,

well then, should you and I have to

support him in advance just because he

declared first? That can't always be how it works.

Let's forget the naive idea

that everyone will always unite.

Politicians compete, and for us as

voters, it is important that they

compete fairly, and that we choose from among them

the strongest one. Otherwise it won't work. But even look—

there is a substantive

difference: Yashin says that we

must take a radical stance, that we need

to act quite radically against

Sobyanin, while Gudkov says he is more

systemic, and that what interests him is not the post of

mayor

—as he says in an interview with Novaya Gazeta (an independent Russian newspaper)—but

the subsequent elections to the Moscow City Duma and the State Duma.

These are, in principle, two different political

approaches, and one has supporters, and

the other has supporters too. So how do we

sort that out? Through primaries, I believe.

There is no other way. But this is

very similar to what you're saying now—

the words are different, but in terms of

meaning, I immediately remember—I remember it well—

how Yavlinsky used to say

something like: how can you unite two

electorates? That's absolute madness. We have

a completely different one, and so on.

Nevertheless, we know about

Yavlinsky: we simply know that he is

a politician who never united with anyone.

He was, he was very

popular in the 1990s—an incredibly popular

politician. We basically know

his fate and career; we have that example right

before our eyes. And these complaints

sound similar when directed at you—that you do not unite with anyone.

Every time, I have

a justification—Yavlinsky had one,

and you have one now. Yes, there is this idea

that one should unite with everyone—well, I have united

with those who are there.

There are politicians now who are significant from the point of view

of

the protest movement, from the point of view

of their individual positions. Yashin—absolutely, with him

I have united. Roizman—absolutely, I have united with him.

With a huge number of people in

the regions, I have united, and together with

them I am acting. In that sense, more than

that—it's not true to say I unite with no one.

But again, we need to distinguish between two things:

real opportunities for unification, and

a utopian construct in which everyone

acts as some kind of single front. That's the first point.

Second.

Elections differ from one another. When we have

parties and party-list elections, then of course

we need to talk about a single list.

Absolutely. Yes, and that was the kind of complaint

made against Yavlinsky—that he did not want to unite

party lists. When I was a member of

the Yabloko party, I also argued that

despite any differences,

we should put forward unified party lists. But

when the election is single-member—meaning two

people are competing for one spot—that's obvious.

Whether it's a presidential race or a mayoral one, there is nothing

to split up there.

You have to choose one person. That is,

if we now have five people

who are seeking the mayor's post, we

We conduct polling and see, for example, that

Yashin is more popular than Butkov—so how can I

decide, when Kuskov's people think he is popular?

Oops—and their own polling shows that Yashin

is popular. How can I just tell them,

"Let's unite"? That's impossible. The only thing is

it just seems to me that popularity

—whatever it may be—isn't the main thing.

I don't know whom exactly, but in any case, in fact,

there is this effect

that when we go together, it is stronger than

the popularity of any one of them, and I

remember, actually—let's explain how

they could go together. Tell me, tell me

specifically, please: you come out and you

say, "Well, I'm Valentin, I'm taking part in

these elections from the very start."

Position matters, and the key point is this:

would you support Yashin now? Obviously not.

No, and no one is really

doubting that either.

"Dima, go ahead, come on, we're all with you,

we support you, we call on everyone to support you"—

but for some reason Rodivshiy doesn't want that,

and then somehow it is considered that even though they shouted

at each other, there is no tension. But that's

not how it works. How can I say, "Dima,

go ahead," if Yashin is standing right next to him?

And why not say, "I go first"? And should I just dump

Yashin for him? That's the whole issue, among other things.

Definitely, definitely—create demand,

I remember—no, wait, I hadn't finished—I

remember it was maybe a year ago,

or a year and a half, maybe two, either in Ufa

or somewhere else—some local event outside Moscow—

you gave an interview, and for the first time the conversation turned to

the Moscow elections. Back then, if I remember correctly,

it was still Klychkov, yes. And I said that I might support him.

And I have to say, that really surprised me,

because, well, yes, maybe a little,

Gudkov is a bit more systemic, a bit more

of a compromise politician than you, but

basically, for me as your

viewer, it's the same platform.

Unlike Klychkov, who is a communist.

So how can you say that I might

support Klychkov when there is a politician

whose views, from the standpoint of

my own, are so similar? And I think maybe

—or maybe the problem is actually

something else. Maybe it's not really as

Gudkov himself says—on his own, not on

TV Rain (an independent Russian TV channel)—that Navalny is ready to unite

only on terms of capitulation.

Maybe the issue is something else entirely.

The point is that you are a perfect example

of a wonderful, very good voter

who has clearly defined his

ideological

niche: you are a liberal, a liberal democrat.

You need that kind of candidate.

But when I talk about the mayoral election, I

am talking about a fight for 50 percent

of the vote, and of course in a fight for 50

percent—for 51 percent of the vote—

you need to choose a candidate of ours

who in many ways, for you as a

left-liberal voter, will be

somewhat uncomfortable. And my position,

which I want to state once again, into these three cameras,

very clearly, is this: I want to support

the strongest candidate, the candidate

who will run the most powerful

campaign, personally directed against

Sobyanin, against Putin, and against United

Russia. At that moment, when this was two

years ago or a year and a half ago,

Klychkov quite looked like that

kind of person. He defeated the prefect

of the South-Eastern District in his own district,

which is precisely why they removed him to

Oryol Oblast (a region in western Russia).

Because he was a dangerous candidate.

Do I like some of the political

views of Klychkov and other communists? Well,

absolutely not, of course I don't like them. But

to vote for him, to support him so that he could

defeat United Russia—of course I could do that.

Okay, fine. If primaries are held—or if they are not,

because I don't believe they will be—for the Moscow elections,

then what is the right

way to act? What would be the ideal, least

conflict-ridden plan of action?

The thing is, we are not drawing up a plan

of action right now, because the question of who is allowed or not allowed

will be decided by City Hall and the Kremlin.

Whether someone gets through the municipal

filter, and we will make decisions about how

to act based on which

candidates are allowed into the election. All

these candidates that you and I

are listing—Yashin, Gudkov, Mitrokhin, and then

Rusakova; Yabloko (a Russian liberal party) might probably nominate someone else

besides Mitrokhin—they are all

acceptable candidates for us, whom

we can support if only one of them

remains. If several of them are allowed,

then we will have to see.

The ideal option is to hold primaries and

for the winner of the primaries to be allowed to run. But

there will be some real-life

scenarios, and we will assess them.

Let me also ask about the fight against corruption.

So, Prokhorov is already filing a lawsuit over

it, as far as we understand. Well, it's an interesting

story—the villa in Italy.

A genuinely interesting, interesting

point. Very often we get the impression that

there is surely grounds for

an investigation: it's all extremely expensive.

Everyone probably already knows what the story is there, what exactly

the plot is.

It's very expensive, but there is always—not always,

but it does happen—that Prokhorov has already almost

exited all of his Russian assets,

almost nothing is left, and we

are already telling everyone: the fight goes on, and

Khloponin may already just be riding out his final days there.

In recent days in the government, they’ve been friends.

They’ve known each other since childhood, and he’s a shareholder in Norilsk Nickel.

And so on.

Yes, there are questions about this deal.

Perhaps there’s something more behind it, beneath the surface.

There are questions there too, and Coco agreed.

Thirty million is a lot, a lot, a lot of money.

But when I say the word corruption,

it’s not the image of Khloponin that comes to mind, and not the image

of Prokhorov either, because

first of all, what comes up are

the usual stereotypical images, naturally,

someone like Tkachev or Sechin,

or Putin himself. Medvedev too, by the way.

He wasn’t a stereotypical case either.

No one considered him such

a major corruption villain until we

showed how it all worked. It’s actually

a very simple thing. The Khloponin and

Prokhorov case came up not because we were conducting

an investigation specifically against Khloponin and Prokhorov,

but because Khloponin reported in

his financial disclosure 2 billion rubles

that had appeared from nowhere, and we started looking into it.

We worked on it despite the fact

that Prokhorov may seem

somewhat closer to us because he

went on to

take part in the presidential election. It’s

still corruption. Khloponin was

a deputy prime minister in charge of

subsoil use—that is, a person with

enormous powers in the country’s most important

sector. And the fact that they were friends or whatever else

doesn’t change the matter.

You and I may be longtime friends—maybe not since

childhood—but if you became deputy prime minister and

I became an oligarch in the Beautiful Russia

of the Future (a slogan meaning an ideal future Russia), that doesn’t

mean I’d be able to buy you. This

iPad for $40 million—that would be

corruption. That’s why we have to treat any manifestation

of corruption the same way. And

for me, what was very important in this case

was to show that it was happening almost

in public—it was all there in the documents.

They didn’t even come up with some super-

mega scheme. They just said: instead of

me handing you 30 million so that

you can legalize it, let’s just

sell a dacha (country house), and everyone will see that it’s

ten times the market price,

but we don’t care about anyone.

That’s what those two were effectively saying, and that’s why this case got to me so much.

In this situation, should the FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation)

focus more attention on those with

whom

whom the very notion of corruption is generally

associated

in Russia? When we talk about Putin’s inner circle,

it’s not like some

single spotlight shining out of

the darkness.

It’s more like several spotlights

shining in different

directions. But you understand—we’re not

the security services. We investigate

everyone, across the board.

There’s no blacklist or anything like that.

If, for example,

Khloponin reported those 2 billion, then we

understand that we need to figure out where they

came from—and if we find it, we investigate it.

Naturally, we also focus on those people

whose corruption or lifestyle is, first and foremost,

especially glaring and

provocative—like Shuvalov. When someone

openly uses

billions and trillions and buys

apartments, we understand that there is definitely

corruption there, and we pursue those investigations. We

investigate everyone.

If I had the powers

of the security services, I assure you we would already have

exposed everyone—your people too, yes, yes.

It’s just that there’s a feeling that these

guys are easier to get at

than those whose names are

more politically sensitive.

No, this is the important point:

in this sense, they’re all the same.

In fact, all officials, the entire elite in

the broad sense, become a kind of

conglomerate that,

naturally, from your point of view, is a

corrupt

environment—a single team, really.

It’s just that now this whole

Telegram story is unfolding, and

as I understand it, that’s what

Dvorkovich was talking about when he said,

‘It works for me. It works for me.’

Telegram works. And you compared it to

how Sobyanin, for example, drives through Moscow

with no traffic jams. It’s witty, but it seems to me

that he probably meant something else:

maybe it can be read differently,

as more of a

nod in Roskomnadzor’s direction,

more of a wink to us, more of

an attempt to show:

look at this absurdity that can’t even

get the job done. It seems to me there may be something to that.

You’re trying to attribute to these people

human qualities, but I’m sure they

don’t have them—I’m sure they don’t, in 2018.

If these people still had their human

qualities, then in a private conversation

someone like Dvorkovich would be sitting here.

He’d be sitting here.

Well, not Sechin, of course—I don’t know.

Yes, with Dvorkovich it would probably be

much more pleasant to talk. We could ask him

what book he read most recently

or what film he watched. With Sechin, we wouldn’t be talking about that;

we’d only be talking about what yacht he bought most recently.

But when, in 2018—not in

2013, not in 2012, not on the eve of it—

the wars, and in 2018 these people

are sitting in the government; to me, they are all

more or less the same. I definitely

am not someone who believes that there are

some kind of liberals in the government. This

camp—these are more sinister, those are less so—

I don’t buy that; they are all the same, and that’s it. And there cannot be

a high-ranking official

in a tactical alliance—absolutely not. It’s just

impossible in the current Putin government.

In that system, he is allied only with himself and

Putin, and with no one else. Thank you very much.

Thank you.