Broadcast of Full Albats from May 25, 2015

Good evening. It’s 20:10, and you’re listening to Echo of Moscow radio. I’m Yevgenia Albats, and I’m beginning our program devoted to the key events of the week — the events that will shape politics in the coming weeks and months. Today in the Echo of Moscow studio is the leader of the Progress Party, one of the leaders of the united opposition, and the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), Alexei Navalny. Hello.

Good evening.

And economist Andrei Movchan, head of economic programs at the Moscow Carnegie Center, formerly co-chairman of the investment company Third Rome.

Good evening.

But before we begin, a short epigraph for our broadcast.

The blind wander at night. At night it is much easier For them to cross the square. The blind live by touch, Feeling the world with their hands, Knowing neither light nor shadow And sensing only stones. Walls are made of stone. Behind them live men. Women. Children. Money. Therefore, the unbreakable Would do better to go around the walls.

That was an excerpt from Brodsky’s poem “Blind Musicians,” written in the early 1960s. Of course, I chose this poem because these days mark the 75th anniversary of Brodsky’s birth. And because it seems to me that this poem very accurately reflects the state of our society. And naturally we’ll be talking about politics. What politics is today, what politics ought to be today — that is the subject of our program. My first question is for both of you. What should politics be in a society of the blind — or rather, of those who prefer to be blind and deaf? Alexei Navalny.

You know, I fully agree with the foreign agents law. When we ask what politics is — this law and the way it is enforced in Russia tell us that politics is now everything. Any independent opinion, anyone or anything with an opinion that is independent of the state and receives money not from the state — all of that is politics. Any independent activity, any civic activity, is in fact political. And the debates we see on absolutely any subject — take the discussion of polygamy, for example. A year or two ago there was no such discussion; it was a completely marginal topic, of no interest to anyone. Now, just look, it’s part of the political mainstream. Charity and debates around charity are completely politicized. Any more or less striking work of art is already politics. Today I read that the Golden Mask theater award is writing a letter to the Ministry of Culture, and that letter too is absolutely political in content. Could we have imagined such a degree of politicization even quite recently? So everything independent of those people who think they should run Russia one hundred percent is political activity, and everything we can and must do to defend our independent opinion is politics, and we need to keep moving in that same direction. That is, express what you think needs to be expressed. Simply say what you think needs to be said. Yes, it will immediately be treated as politics; yes, they will immediately come running to label you a foreign agent. We saw today that the Dynasty Foundation was, I think, declared a foreign agent. And what did Dynasty do? It essentially funded Russian scientists where the state would not fund them. That activity was declared political, and the activity of foreign agents was effectively declared harmful. Well, fine then — let the Dynasty Foundation, I hope, not shut down and continue carrying out its independent politics.

Thank you. Andrei Movchan.

Academically, the word “politics” comes from two Greek words: “πολιτικός” — a multiplicity of interests. In other words, politics is everything that describes conflicts of interest in society. In that sense, politics is always the same in any society. Incidentally, the Greeks called people engaged in politics — that is, expressing interests — “πολιτικός,” while those who did not were called “ἰδιώτης.” In other words, people without interests; not for nothing has that word acquired a different connotation today. Though in essence nothing has changed. I don’t really agree with the notion of a “society of the blind” when applied, apparently, to today’s Russia as well. People are never really blind; the question is what and how they see. Where they see their interests, how they perceive them. If we’re talking about this blindness, Solzhenitsyn had a wonderful work with the epic title “Live Not by Lies.” You probably remember it. In its opening paragraphs he actually described Russian society in 2015 in remarkable detail — right down to the absence of fear of a third world nuclear war. In other words, it was the same in 1973. Society has not changed at all. People changed, structures changed, logic changed, the world changed, some countries moved far ahead — but Russian society remained where it was in 1973. In the same place where Václav Havel once found it when he wrote about the power of the powerless. He has a wonderful essay in which he said that society does not really trust the authorities — you could say it does not trust them at all — but at the same time prefers not to show that outwardly, because in return it receives very concrete immediate benefits from the authorities. A society of tacticians, pragmatists, that has completely lost any sense of strategy. And yes, Solzhenitsyn gave the answer back in 1973 as to what it means to do politics in such a society. To live not by lies means to express your opinion. It means simply not applauding what you dislike, and applauding what you do like — regardless of whether the state funds it.

That’s very elegant, Andrei, I’ll grant you. But first of all, I think there’s a huge difference between society in 1973 and now. Back then there was mass cynicism about slogans like “we’ll catch up with and overtake America,” about “we’ll build communism tomorrow,” and so on — it was everywhere. At home people listened to the “Voices” (Western radio broadcasts such as Voice of America and Radio Liberty) and read banned literature, and then they went to Party meetings and said how brilliantly Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev had spoken. That’s one thing. And second, when you say people should say what they think, could you tell me where, apart from Echo of Moscow, maybe two or three print publications, and the internet? So I don’t really understand. It sounds nice, but it seems to me to have nothing to do with real politics.

You know, a quick answer. First of all, a nation that bought nearly $100 billion worth of goods at the moment of its greatest national pride and near-total victory over America can be called cynical…

You mean in December.

A. NAVALNY: Any independent activity, any civic activity, is in fact political

Of course, last year. It hasn’t changed at all since 1973. They all stockpile buckwheat in response to an article about a bumper harvest. In that sense we are no different from those who marched in the November 7 demonstrations, lived under portraits of Lenin, and so on. It’s all the same. On the other hand, as for where to speak — where could Solzhenitsyn speak in those days? In four typed copies, as Galich wrote. Now we can speak online; in fact, now you can speak anywhere. I write on Facebook, in my blog, and on the Carnegie website, and I come to Echo of Moscow; tomorrow I’ll be speaking at the New Economic School, the day after tomorrow in The New Times, then at the Chicago Club, and on Friday on TV Rain. And that’s despite the fact that I’m not a professional politician and, generally speaking, this is my fifth occupation in life — and yet I speak in all sorts of places. Today Nezavisimaya Gazeta interviewed me. There is an enormous amount of space in which to speak, and in fact it’s very bad that we aren’t making even more of it. Ideally, we ought to unite somehow, find ways, create something that would reach ordinary people instead of remaining as semi-elite as it is today in these spaces. Unfortunately, we’re not doing that yet. But still, the opportunities to speak today are certainly an order of magnitude greater than they were then.

Alexei Navalny.

First of all, I don’t agree with those parallels to 1973, because after all we are now speaking on the country’s largest radio station. And apparently hundreds of thousands of people are listening to us. And despite the intensifying political repression — specifically political repression — it cannot be called mass repression, and there is still a great deal we can do. But it’s important not to stop your activity at simply speaking out. Speaking out is the foundation of everything, first and foremost, but there is still room for organizational activity. We are even taking part in elections now. Many people disagree with that, by the way. But we are participating in elections, despite how difficult that is. The Anti-Corruption Foundation, which carries out extensive work, writes draft laws. And so on. So if there is the will, then right now anyone who wants to do something has many opportunities. It can be a little frightening, sometimes you have to pay a price for it, but anyone who is active can still achieve a certain degree of success even now.

Still, you say there are many opportunities. Name five. Or three.

I already said: you can express your opinion, at a minimum, in various forms — articles, speeches, and so on. You can participate in elections. We, the Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Progress Party, write draft laws. Right now we are building around our organization… people who will develop various visions of Russia’s future. We are going into these elections with a program that would substantially change the tax system and Russia’s federal structure in general. We are talking about restructuring taxation. There are many things one can do. Zhenya, I absolutely agree that of course everyone has been squeezed. I absolutely agree that electoral struggle does not look very convincing. And it is hard for us to prove to anyone that you can simply go to the polls and vote out United Russia and Putin. Several years ago, in an interview with your magazine, I said that power would under no circumstances change hands as a result of elections. That is certainly true. But the main thing is that the desire must remain. Because a great many people simply say: look, good Lord, all the media have been shut down, so let’s stop doing anything at all. But you still publish your magazine. You publish it despite heavy pressure, despite enormous financial difficulties, because you believe it is the right thing to do. And I urge everyone to do what can be done now. If you don’t want to go to rallies yourself, send 300 rubles to the people organizing them. If you are afraid to do something yourself that could make you a political prisoner, help the families of political prisoners. If you don’t want to run in elections yourself, then at least go as a voter and campaign. The opportunities exist. They are shrinking, certainly. Activity is becoming more dangerous, certainly. But it still needs to be done, and it still can be done now. And we are doing it. And we will keep doing it.

All right. Andrei Movchan, my next question is for you. Recently, in several of your columns, you have spoken very sharply about the opposition. I specifically printed out your column on Snob, “The Madness of Indignation,” and the discussion we had in our magazine. You say that the opposition attacks the authorities even where the authorities are, generally speaking, quite reasonable or say quite reasonable things. And that where Putin and his team demonstrate an ability to talk to ordinary people, the opposition demonstrates a complete unwillingness and inability to hear those people and speak with them. And honestly, as I was reading it, I kept thinking: is this the position of a political “novel” — someone who never dealt with politics before and suddenly started, and learned what the Greeks called things? Or, as some accuse you, is it a call for collaborationism? Explain what this is. Why is it that you recently emerged from an investment bank and suddenly made the opposition the object of your criticism, as if too few people were already beating up on it?

Well, first of all, I’ve written a bit more than two articles. And in the others, the object of criticism is not the opposition — where there is criticism. In some articles there is no criticism at all. Second, I think it is very important to understand that we are not dealing with a binary world in which there is some chosen force of evil and everything else is a force of good. So it is enough to ask: are you not a force of evil? If not, then you are already good. The world is much more complicated. Moreover, if you look at what is happening, in my view — and I may be mistaken, as this political “novel” who has read too much Greek; unlike the opposition, I have the right to be mistaken — real evil has not yet arrived. The threat of real evil lies ahead in Russia. For now, this is still just a process leading up to 1917.

I read that. You are frightened by, and frightening your readers with, a communo-fascist threat — something economists who support authoritarian modernization, like Anatoly Chubais, have been endlessly using to scare all of us. For as long as I can remember, in 20 years of Russian journalism, everyone has always been scaring us with a communo-fascist threat.

But maybe they are right to scare you.

Nope.

Look, in this case it’s my word against yours. I may be a political “novel,” but still, part of our opposition — let’s be precise…

But the logic of what you’re saying is this: if something truly terrible lies ahead, and Putin is at least some sort of centrist, then let’s support Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

No, that is not the logic at all. If I may, let me explain the logic.

Please.

Because I’m best at explaining my own logic — just as you are yours. So, in my view, the logic is as follows. In reality, fighting the regime currently in power in Russia is, on the one hand, practically useless in the immediate term — let’s argue about it, but I think it is practically useless — and on the other hand, strategically completely useless. Because it doesn’t have long left. Because it is actually devouring itself. It is a regime consuming its own internal resources. A very poorly structured regime, incapable of either governing the country or developing it. Three or four more jolts, and it will slowly start to come apart on its own. And when it does, of course, just as the regime credits itself with the rise in oil prices, there will likewise be people who say the regime fell apart because of their activity. But in fact, in my view, it will fall apart because of its own nature. No wonder it is now so convulsively trying, like someone falling into a well, to cling to everything and tear it out by the roots along the way. Now it has torn out the Dynasty Foundation. But the main question is what will happen when it finally does come apart. What force will be next to take on, as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said, responsibility for Russia? And if the forces that some use “liberal” as a slur for, and others as praise, continue to discredit themselves and, instead of winning over by one means or another a platform of at least 50% of the population, continue to shrink it — and they are shrinking it. Not because they are bad, but they are shrinking it, let’s admit that fact — then who will remain on the political palette? And what will happen when the fabric of this present soft tsarism comes apart in our hands and tears?

Alexei Navalny.

In Andrei’s very interesting line of reasoning, one thing jars on my ear a little when he says: “I and the opposition, I look at the opposition.” But who is this opposition? To me, Andrei is opposition through and through.

A. NAVALNY: 86% is the figure of Putin’s loneliness

Absolutely.

He is one of the leading political publicists, speaking quite sharply and convincingly on various subjects. He works at the Carnegie Center, which is unquestionably a political organization, however much you may deny it — and in the U.S. it is one of the leading political organizations. So it seems to me this is a pointless and futile didactic conversation: “I and the opposition.” We are the opposition. You write articles and talk about how things are arranged wrongly, and how they ought to be arranged properly in order to change something. And a very wrong and harmful part of your reasoning, it seems to me, is the argument that we should not think about how to make the regime change, because it will eat itself and destroy itself, but instead think about what comes after. Of course we need to think about that.

That’s an incorrect paraphrase. I’m not saying we shouldn’t think about how it changes. On the contrary, maybe that’s exactly what we should be working on. I’m saying we should not think about destroying it.

Let me finish the thought…

Changing it — of course we should.

Take Fidel Castro’s regime: Americans and Cubans sitting in Miami have been waiting and waiting, and now they have grown old and their children have grown old, all waiting for Fidel Castro’s regime to eat itself. And indeed, it seemed to have reached that point 20 years ago — that was it, it had to destroy itself. But it is still alive. So it seems to me — forgive me, you may call this vulgar primitivism — that what to do afterward is clear: hold elections…

No one will hold elections afterward. What elections? We have 86% of the population, conditionally speaking, consolidated by a totalitarian ideology. What elections?

That is absolutely wrong.

The first thing they’ll do is abolish elections.

Listen, in 1983 it also seemed that one hundred percent of the population had rallied together. It seemed that Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko — remember him? — also had a 99% approval rating. Then two years passed, and all of it was destroyed. There is no 86%. That 86% is the figure of Putin’s loneliness. Because the last more or less free federal elections we had were in 1999. Since 2003 there have been no elections at all. That is where the 86% comes from. If there are free elections, that 86% will split into different columns, and whoever wins the election, whoever forms a coalition government, should lead Russia forward. But it seems to me that our task now is to force this regime to hold free elections.

We’re going to break now for the news, and then we’ll return to the Echo of Moscow studio.

20:35. Those watching us online are definitely at an advantage, because while the ads were running on Echo of Moscow, a wonderful and interesting conversation was going on here. I hope Echo of Moscow listeners will hear it now as well. Alexei, questions are coming in for you. I’ve noticed, by the way, that people have started pointedly addressing you as “Alexei Anatolyevich.” Alexei Anatolyevich, why do you keep…

I’m not sure it’s a good thing that people have started addressing me that way.

Well, of course — you’re getting older. Alyosha. What can you do. “Why do you keep trying to play by the rules in a game with no rules? You understand that the authorities will not allow coalition candidates to win elections by any means, so why, instead of a policy of educating people, do you choose a policy of elections in a country without elections?” I can’t make out the username, but never mind.

That is the wrong way to frame the question. At least it is definitely wrong in relation to me. The Anti-Corruption Foundation and the structures I create with my colleagues cannot be accused of having only one strategy. We do a little electoral work, but much more of what we do is education, specific cases of exposing corruption, and explaining it to the public. As I already said, I do not believe — and I do not want to deceive anyone by saying — that the strategy of electoral struggle is the one and only correct strategy that will bring us victory right now. I think it is important, and when elections can be used — for example, the 2015 elections in certain regions — to create stress for this government, to force it into competition and dialogue with us, then of course those elections should be used. Because that is one line of activity. In addition, we must use these elections because the main idea of the 2015 elections is essentially to recreate the opposition. We are creating a new opposition; we are trying to introduce the mechanism of primaries, that is, competition as the main way of solving кадровый вопрос — deciding who will be first on the list, who will be second, and who will be third. Because remember every one of our elections: it always starts again — let this person head the list, let that person do it. In the end, a backroom deal is struck, and people are not interested in voting or campaigning for such a list. We want to impose this on the entire opposition and prove to society that primaries are extremely important. That is why in these elections we are building a mechanism under which, in three regions — Kaluga Region, Novosibirsk Region, and Kostroma Region — the lists will be formed in exactly this way: through genuinely fair primaries. And that is a crucial task. Then we will recreate, reinvent the opposition. And then all these articles and all this pathos of addressing “the opposition” — it will be clear whom we are addressing. We will be addressing the people themselves and saying: let’s not vote for these politicians in the primaries, let’s vote for those ones. That is very important. Since in these elections we are effectively forging a weapon against United Russia, then let’s forge that weapon together. Navalny should not be the one designing that weapon — all of us should. We should decide whether it should be more left-wing, more right-wing, more liberal, more conservative. That is exactly how we will form the lists, and that is a crucial task. It’s just that during an election period, more emphasis has to be placed on it. Right now, for example, I spend less time on anti-corruption investigations and more on elections. But it is not the only strategy.

Andrei Movchan, during the break you objected and asked Alexei some questions. I’d like you to repeat them.

It’s a long story — I asked a lot of questions. To begin with, a remark about what Alexei said. It seems to me that this is precisely what I, from my own somewhat different publicistic angle, have been writing about. This is the opposition we actually need. An opposition that struggles with itself in order to be worthy — worthy of being an opposition — and does so together with people, rather than taking the position of radical orthodox zealots. The position that “86% of the population are sheep, and we know what to do.” Unfortunately, that does exist on certain flanks of the opposition. When we manage to eliminate that, when we manage to remove those people who are fighting for power rather than to change the country, those people in the opposition who refuse criticism…

Once again: remove whom?

Those people who are fighting for power rather than for changing the country.

And what does a political party fight for?

It seemed to me that a political party — though I’m a political “novel,” as a famous heroine once said, merely a humble girl — usually fights to change the country. To make the country live better.

And where is the contradiction? First you have to gain power in order to change the country. Isn’t that so?

Not always. It seems to me that an opposition that is not in power can sometimes do more than the ruling party. There are many examples of that.

For example?

For example, in any free society it is precisely the balance between opposition and government that moves the country forward. Leave one good party in power by itself, and very quickly it will turn into United Russia.

You mean in a free society.

Then we need to define what power is. An opposition that has access to power is an opposition represented in parliament. And it is precisely the balance involved in forming a coalition government that moves the country forward, because the government and the opposition have to come to agreements.

The opposition absolutely must be represented.

Power is the ability to make decisions that affect people’s behavior — and that people obey. That is the classic definition of power.

Or power is the ability to influence the behavior of people who change the decisions made by the government. That is also power. So, about the question. I was asking: if the goal is to force or persuade the current authorities to hold honest — I’ll simplify, if I may — elections within some foreseeable period, then two questions arise. The first is: what gives us confidence that this is possible? Let’s say, possible without casualties. We are talking only about peaceful and lawful methods, I hope. And the second question is: why are we confident that in today’s society — which we have been debating so much, why it is the way it is, why it welcomes and accepts things that we do not welcome and do not accept — why are we sure that in honest and free elections this society would choose something more progressive and more beneficial for the country?

The first part of your question — why do you think this is possible at all? Well, forgive me, this may sound a bit lofty. But simply because I believe in Russia, I believe in people. I believe that people progress, I believe society develops, and that it is more developed now than it was in 1973 or in 1905. And that confidence of mine is based, among other things, on empirical experience that I gained as a politician — for example, in the Moscow mayoral election. I spoke with all sorts of people, and it was not some marginal number of people who supported me, but effectively a third of the electorate. And I know for certain that when I explain my vision for Russia’s development, I get a normal response and one degree or another of support from all kinds of people — from police officers conducting a search of my home or office to listeners of Echo of Moscow. I believe these people strive to progress, strive for something good. They still believe in science and development. They do not want to introduce polygamy in Russia. I simply know that.

That answers the second question — why elections would happen and positive forces would win…

That answers the first question.

…positive forces.

What do you mean by positive forces? I believe that in honest, free elections, the forces that win — if everyone has competition and access to the media — will by definition be legitimate, normal, progressive. In Poland, conservatives won. Are they good forces or bad? Apparently good, at the moment, because the Poles elected them. Russia too will apparently develop in cycles of some kind. If Zyuganov had won in 1996 rather than Yeltsin, would those have been good forces or bad? At the time, many probably thought bad. But looking back now at 1996, I think it would have been better if Yeltsin had not falsified the election and Zyuganov had won; then he would have lost the next election, and the pendulum would have begun to swing. All the Eastern European countries went through that evolution, and nothing terrible happened. I think the good forces are those that win in honest elections, even if that person is not me, or people with views similar to mine. Even if we lose, but some other people win — well, they won, which means we’ll win in the next cycle.

I completely support that position. But still, the answer to the second question: fine, but why do you think it will be possible to achieve a situation in which, in a few years, the authorities agree to such elections?

I’m not saying it will be possible to achieve it. I’m saying we must do everything possible to achieve it. There are different mechanisms. Look, this Sunday elections were held in the city of Baltiysk. Do you know that United Russia got zero seats there, even in single-mandate districts, not just on party lists? So one mechanism is to make sure that in every city, in every election, United Russia gets zero mandates. Zero votes. That is one of the goals of our opposition in the broad sense of the word — yours, mine, Zhenya’s, all the radio listeners’. We must strive for that. Mass events — we must take part in them. Propaganda work, writing articles — that is also part of the work. It’s simply a multi-vector thing. I’m not saying there is a magic button or some magical action, some algorithm: let’s do this from 9 to 6 and the government will fall. No. But any positive activity and any pressure on the regime — direct pressure on the regime — is right. We just shouldn’t disguise, as it seems to me you do, our obvious positive political activity as detachment and say: well, all this is good, but I’m not opposition, so let the opposition come up with something better and then I’ll join it. We need to join now and openly declare that all of us are normal people who want normal development for Russia; let’s go to elections and make sure United Russia loses everywhere, among other things.

But as for me, you know, there’s no point hiding my sex or age. I was officially listed as a national traitor long ago. I’m not hiding and not concealing anything.

I mean in a generalized sense…

I’m a bit paranoid when it comes to facts. I understand the desire — I very much want it, you very much want it — and to be precise, what we want is not for the government to collapse. We very much do not want any government in Russia to collapse. We want elections to take place. Because the collapse of the government would lead to catastrophe anyway. The government must not collapse. We want this government to transfer power calmly and peacefully to whoever wins the next election. And still I do not see the facts suggesting that society is moving toward convincing the authorities, or that the authorities are moving toward accepting this conviction of the need for such elections. So far I see movement in the opposite direction.

It will not persuade them, it will force them. These people cannot be persuaded. How can you persuade Putin to give up the billions of dollars that he and his circle are looting, in favor of other people coming in and an honest government launching criminal investigations into their dirty dealings? It is impossible to persuade them. They can only be forced. To do that, we need to consolidate and move forward within this multi-vector struggle.

That is the dangerous point for me.

But there is such a thing as the history of human progress. We began this program by discussing 1973. It is not 1973 now; let’s be frank, things are easier now. Because we are speaking on a radio station, not discussing all this somewhere in a pretrial detention center. And if we believe in progress, we understand that sooner or later thinking people will win. You yourself said that this government is devouring itself. Well then, let it devour itself. We simply have to help that along. We must openly declare that we are working to force these people to share power in the broad sense of the word: to announce mayoral elections, to announce gubernatorial elections, to decentralize governance, to return taxes to the regions, and so on.

A. NAVALNY: People strive to progress; they believe in science and development, not in introducing polygamy in Russia

Not force them to share power, but force them to bring it into a democratic condition.

Andrei, so what are you proposing — sit and wait until it devours itself? Or what? What should be done? Say, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, we love you dearly, please do us a favor and retire”? What should be done?

First of all, I’m certainly not proposing that we sit and wait, and as you can see, I myself am not sitting idle but trying to do something. I believe that tectonic processes — and such a change would obviously be tectonic, a new process for Russia — are involved here. Because democracy has never existed here for a single day.

That’s not true.

That is my personal opinion.

But we do have some statistics, after all. Russia was at least partially free after the Communist Party’s monopoly was abolished; it was a relatively free country.

Once again, as a political “novel,” I have a right to a private opinion.

All right. So what would you do, then?

I think we need to work with society. Because only society carries out…

What does “work with society” mean?

Above all, with society we need to find those platforms on which we can stand together with the majority of the population and, together with it, rock the authorities. De-Stalinization is one such platform, in particular. In my view, it is very important. For today. Today it is the place where the authorities are weak, because they are trying to consolidate both Stalin’s supporters and his opponents at the same time. They make gestures to both sides. But this is a very serious, dangerous, polarizing issue. And here, in particular, one can talk with society. Because unlike other issues — corruption, for instance, by the way, since our society has unfortunately been built on corruption for many years — society reacts only weakly and without much aggression to accusations of corruption, because everyone is used to living that way. But the issue of Stalin could, for example, be the point that would unite a large number of people right now. I can see that even from my latest article — how huge numbers of people, sharply and forcefully, become involved in this unifying process against totalitarianism, against Stalin-style repressions, against the return of Stalin’s memory and his role as an effective manager — that nonsense which people sometimes try to spread today. And it seems to me very important to find, with broad layers of society, a common democratic agenda that it already shares today. I think that could move people forward very strongly and very quickly.

I just can’t understand it. I completely agree with you that de-Stalinization is very important, but I absolutely do not understand, first, how you are going to do that in conditions where television shows films in which Stalin is, one way or another, not exactly ideal, but still a pretty decent fellow. Second, a great many people read your column, but mostly they were listeners and readers of the Echo of Moscow blog and Facebook — what is called preaching to the converted. And third, I do not understand at all how that can influence the authorities and politics.

May I suggest an option? We did something similar, for example — this is just one case — the Progress Party and the Anti-Corruption Foundation proposed it with regard to the concept of illicit enrichment. We wrote a draft law, and essentially proposed creating a black-and-white world. There are politicians who support the fight against illicit enrichment, whatever camp they belong to — maybe even Communists or A Just Russia; they may do unpleasant things, but we allow, for example, supporting them. But everyone else, even if they declare themselves liberal 300 times over, we will never support under any circumstances. It seems to me that could be the practical implementation of this idea. We formulate a set of theses, key demands — a friend-or-foe system. And if you share them, you get our support. If you do not share them, then under no circumstances — even if you save children, or are a wonderful doctor, or a marvelous artist or director — you will not get support and will always receive condemnation. That probably somewhat contradicts your idea, Andrei, that the world is not black and white but more complex. But perhaps in order to apply these theoretical concepts in practice, the practical application must be this way. We must sharpen the divide. We must say: here is where the line between friend and foe lies. And if Comrade Stalin seems to you — if you say, yes, he was bad, but you know, he still did a lot of useful things — that is already unacceptable under any circumstances.

Alexei, you know, it is incredibly pleasant for me to hear what you are saying. Because that is exactly the logic I support.

The opposition unites instantly.

That is precisely what a non-black-and-white world is. You unite very different people while cutting off what is truly black. You remove only the black color. And there really are not many things on which no agreement is possible. That is why I have a very poor attitude toward irreconcilable opponents, toward those who dislike criticism and cannot tolerate discussion. Because you can never build anything with them, no matter how right they may be. Yes, that is exactly the idea: choose a set of things with which no compromise is possible, and with which the majority in society, generally speaking, also does not compromise. Ours is a normal society in that sense. People may be frightened or confused, but they are not pathological. It is a normal people, like any other, as Woland said. And if we choose such a set of theses and offer them to society as a way of determining who remains with us and who is ready to discuss, struggle, build socialism, capitalism, whatever — but who truly thinks about the good of the country and who does not — then I think the support of the majority will be guaranteed.

A. NAVALNY: These people cannot be persuaded. It is impossible. They can only be forced

I would even say that a great deal of work is already being done in this direction. Do you remember there was a plan for a “Spring” march, which did not take place because of the tragic killing of Boris Nemtsov? Well, Nemtsov and I, together with the organizing committee, formulated the set of demands for that march. And we specifically tested each of those demands through polling. Each one was supported by 70% of the population or more. They were divided into socioeconomic demands — the key one was cutting military spending and reallocating that money to science and education — and political demands, the key one being access for everyone to elections and free elections for mayors and governors. So in principle we do have this set of theses that we can nail to the door and unite around. But after that we must quite firmly cut off all those who disagree on certain points, because they are no longer even fellow travelers.

Yes, but then again the question is where those theses stop, because unfortunately the issue of direct elections is not one close to the masses. It is clear that some percentage of the population thinks about it, but the main mass of people…

That is why we divided them into political and socioeconomic ones, fully understanding that the socioeconomic agenda is what interests everyone. I repeat, this was major political work and organizational work as well. We conducted polls, and we know for certain that in this sense these are theses on which we are in complete contradiction with the authorities. The authorities do the opposite. But paradoxical as it may seem, each thesis has 70% public support.

By the way, a separate point that may be important is that on certain especially painful issues of this kind — for example, the issue of Stalin — one could simply enter into dialogue with the authorities, for whom the cult of Stalin is no less dangerous, and perhaps more dangerous…

And yet we see that they are promoting it one way or another. They do it in camouflaged forms, but they do it. So in general, dialogue with the authorities is of course good, but trying to outsmart them in this regard seems fairly hopeless to me. Because they are not fools either.

Explain to me what you mean by dialogue with the authorities.

You know, there was a time when for a Harvard professor to enter Russia, he had to go through the same procedures as a Tajik laborer. I remember a direct dialogue with Shuvalov. At a conference at Troika, Shuvalov spent half an hour talking about how well we were doing in attracting qualified specialists, after which I stood up and said: let me tell you a couple of stories — to you personally and to the audience. And after that no one here will talk about how well things are going. You know, three months later the law was changed.

Have you heard that the law on undesirable organizations has been signed?

Yes, I even know that the Carnegie Center is already number one on the list…

I don’t think so.

Obviously it will not be declared an undesirable organization, but the denunciation has already been prepared, as is customary here, and it has already been published. Yes, of course I’ve heard.

But that law was passed by the same authorities, signed by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, with whom you intend to interact. Tell me — how? You come to him, and he says: “Movchan, where are you from? Carnegie? You’re an undesirable element here.”

Well, what I’m telling you is that, first of all, any attempt is better than none. It might work. Second, it worked with corruption. When there was discussion of it, when a campaign was ready — and ready in a much more serious form, that is, involving the discovery of a large number of scapegoats…

You mean when Medvedev was president.

Yes.

But after that the situation changed fundamentally. And don’t you think, Andrei — and this is a question for you too, Alexei — that after the murder of Boris Nemtsov, no dialogue with the authorities is possible? After we know that investigators cannot question people suspected of involvement in that murder, there can be no talk of dialogue with this government.

I thought just the opposite. First of all, murder is always a tragedy and a terrible crime. But Martin Luther King was murdered in America.

Yes, and Black people are lynched there too. We know.

No, and dialogue with the authorities did not die because of that. Nor did dialogue with the authorities in America die as the basic culture of politics. That is true.

A. NAVALNY: Right now I spend less time on anti-corruption investigations and more on elections

But Martin Luther King was not killed by the governor of one of the states.

No one knows for sure who ordered Kennedy’s killing either. And there were political murders in Israel, and in France, and in Italy, and in Germany. And it may be that the fact that the authorities are unable to deal even with the governor of a fully subsidized region means that right now they will in fact engage in dialogue — if they feel they need it.

It’s just that “dialogue with the authorities” sounds vague. What is dialogue with the authorities? For example, to write… the authorities have huge problems. They have negative selection, and their personnel are, forgive me for the rude language on air, but 90% idiots. They are incapable of writing anything.

I don’t think one should speak that way about anyone, especially on air. I apologize, of course.

They really are stupid, incompetent people. So in principle, writing some amendment to a bill that they themselves are simply incapable of thinking through but need — that is perfectly normal.

That is dialogue.

That is dialogue. But some sort of dialogue with Ramzan Kadyrov about how to investigate Nemtsov’s murder — that kind of dialogue is impossible. So dialogue is still a broad concept. The main thing is that any conversation with the authorities must not involve betraying yourself. Because lately this approach has become fashionable: you know, we are some kind of moderate opposition. We criticize, but only a little. So one simply needs to engage in any dialogue, be absolutely open to any dialogue, but not for a second betray oneself — concealing nothing, distorting nothing.

Andrei, 20 seconds — we have to leave the air.

Only this: today we contradicted each other a lot while agreeing on all the main things. Yes, dialogue is needed. Yes, opposition is needed. Yes, it must not be insane. Yes, it must be constructive. And yes, there are chances.

Thank you very much, everyone. In the Echo of Moscow studio today were Alexei Navalny and Andrei Movchan. I hope that such good-natured dialogues among those who disagree will continue on this air. At least for as long as I am able to keep working here. Thank you. Goodbye. We’ll hear each other again someday.