"The stability of poverty can be guaranteed by anyone." Alexei Navalny — on a decent wage for a UVZ machinist, the eternal Crimean sanctions, Putin's "mafia code of conduct," and the likelihood of a Russian Maidan

— Alexei, you often mention Uralvagonzavod in your speeches — the plant that since 2012 has become known as the backbone enterprise of the current government. As a representative of a Tagil media outlet, I cannot help but ask: what can you offer an ordinary UVZ worker? — First of all, I am very glad that a Nizhny Tagil media outlet is interviewing me. I really want to come to Nizhny Tagil. We have long had the idea of speaking before the workers. I don't know how many people will come and want to listen to me, but I have things to say to them. Taking this opportunity, I want to convey something important through you. Putin used Uralvagonzavod to scare the entire country and the Muscovites who took to the streets. Five years have passed, and during that time we have been convinced that he has been unable to offer anything to those UVZ workers. The average wage of a moulder at UVZ is 30,000 rubles. It is impossible to live on that money. But when I see how much money the state spends on defence contracts, I understand that this money is simply being embezzled and never reaches the enterprises. That is why I want to offer an ordinary machinist this: he will work normally, and the state will pay him more. Wages at Uralvagonzavod should be twice as high, and there is enough money for that. I will force state companies like Rosneft to pay proper dividends; I intend to fight corruption in the state defence order, where a trillion rubles is embezzled every year. A trillion! I intend to fight corruption in the procurement of state corporations like Rosoboronzakaz, where 25 trillion rubles is spent annually and no less than five trillion is stolen. You see, we are operating with figures that show that simply fighting corruption alone would double this machinist's salary. And right now we see that, despite some financial injections, UVZ's debt in 2014 was 4.5 billion rubles. I have read in arbitration courts — and it made me furious — that Alfa-Bank filed for UVZ's bankruptcy. This is perhaps the perfect illustration of the absurdity happening here. The largest enterprise that they politically parade around, which is supremely important — the foundation of the country's defence capability — and its workers are getting nothing, the enterprise itself is on the verge of bankruptcy, and the third piece of news is that CEO Sienko is celebrating his birthday for 10 million rubles. — But Uralvagonzavod, as you know, is not only tanks. There is, for example, a railcar production line, and nobody is buying those railcars. Specialists have long been discussing the fact that within the framework of a market economy, Uralvagonzavod should perhaps be declared bankrupt, 15,000 people let go, and only the tank shop kept. And there are many such inefficient enterprises that the state is propping up primarily because of the people — AvtoVAZ is the same. As a free-marketeer, would you begin this "shock therapy" as president? — This is an important matter, an excellent question. There is no need for any "shock therapy." These are not the 1990s; oil is not at 12 dollars a barrel — there is a sea of money in the country right now! There is no need to lay anyone off. These are the basic laws of market economics: by laying off 15,000 people in Nizhny Tagil, we will not reduce state expenditure. Because there is nowhere for them to get a job there — the labour market is practically monopolised. Someone might say: let's lay them off and they'll cleverly find other work or move elsewhere. That won't happen. Population mobility in Russia is minimal. They will take to the streets, and they will have to be paid their wages anyway. The dire situation at Uralvagonzavod, as with many enterprises, as with AvtoVAZ, is in some sense connected to the monopolisation of everything in the country. Who can buy railcars right now? There's the RZhD monopoly, which also devours tens of billions of rubles every year and cannot function properly. We need de-monopolisation of industry as a whole. The state currently controls 84 percent of the economy one way or another, and every day we get news that they've bought something again. Rostelecom buys some Tele2, Rostec, which owns the defence plants, spends its days buying things. Buying, buying, buying... Where to? Why are you buying all of this? We need to create a market structure in the economy, and within that structure, enterprises like Uralvagonzavod will be in demand. Sooner or later. There will be a period of some difficulties, but forgive me — is what we have right now a period of prosperity? — People are afraid of that period of difficulty. It comes back to the question of that notorious stability that Kholmansky and UVZ stood for. They are afraid that under Putin they have 30,000 rubles, and when Navalny comes there won't even be that. — Let me say this through you with complete certainty: this stability of poverty that Putin has given them can be guaranteed by anyone. I will make it so that they earn more. No "shock therapy" is needed, because according to modern economic thinking (not what Gaidar envisioned), we understand that mass layoffs and lockouts under non-competitive labour market conditions will lead nowhere. We now have enough money to implement a long-term programme of proper enterprise restructuring, so that people receive their wages, a transitional period passes, and at the end of it they would be earning more. — Your programme covers a lot of economics and domestic policy, but little foreign policy. Nevertheless, if you become president, you will receive the nuclear briefcase and be able to pick up the phone and call Trump. You will have to face that side of the challenges of being Russia's president. Have you not thought that those patriotic activists now standing outside your headquarters might be right, and that Russia is not really loved — that Putin is right with his military rhetoric, that when he came in 2000 he also wanted to be friends with the whole world but was offered the role of a raw materials appendage... — And he agreed, unfortunately, to that role, because the share of budget revenues from raw material exports is greater for us than it was in the Soviet Union. It's not that Russia is unloved — it's just that everyone else loves themselves. It would be strange if France, the United States, or Great Britain were to put Russia's interests above or on par with their own. This is the natural competition that takes place in the world, the competition for wealth for one's own citizens. We must be part of this competition — that is important. What is Putin doing right now? He says: let's restore Palmyra, let's invest in Aleppo, let's rebuild south-eastern Ukraine, and so on. And I say to him: let's restore Nizhny Tagil and Yekaterinburg. There is simply not enough money here to fix the roads — the road maintenance budget is cut every year. And at the same time, the voyage of the Admiral Kuznetsov to the shores of Syria — a joyride, a bit of showing off — cost 7.5 billion rubles. Those 7.5 billion rubles are probably needed more inside the country. So of course I have no illusions. Every country fights for its citizens to be wealthier. And Russia should enter that competition with exactly the same goal. First we become rich, then we spend somewhere else. As it stands, we recently paid Bosnia and Herzegovina a Soviet-era debt of 190 million dollars. At the same time we have forgiven billions of dollars to everyone: Cubas, Mozambiques, Vietnams. — But those are our friends, aren't they? — OK, but are we supposed to feed them now? They're our friends, we love them — but let's first spend the money on ourselves. When the moment comes that the average wage in Nizhny Tagil is 100,000 rubles, at that very moment let's raise the question: maybe we should give some money to Cuba? — Will President Navalny not uphold the thesis that "Russia is a great power"? — Russia is unquestionably a great power; Russia should be the leading state of Europe. But for me, the greatness of a country derives from the wealth of its citizens. When we have a GDP per capita equal to that of the United States, then we will surpass them in greatness. It cannot be done any other way, because we don't have the money to maintain an army. Our navy is outdated; the defence enterprise Uralvagonzavod is on the verge of bankruptcy. If we look at the world, we see that Russia is 1.5% of the global economy. With that kind of role, there is nobody we can compete with. That means the sequence must be reversed — first we grow the economy, from that citizens become wealthier, they live better, pay more taxes, our budget grows, and we can spend more on the military-industrial complex. And that includes protecting what we need to protect — that is natural. — And yet, if you become president and the head of the FSB or the Foreign Intelligence Service brings you secret folders, might you agree that Putin is right in how Russia currently positions itself on the world stage? — That is complete nonsense. A secret folder exists to say that there are certain agents. Secret folders about how the world works do not exist, because that is already well known to all of us. There are rich countries and poor countries, there are selfish countries, there are governments that look after themselves — naturally — there is international competition. Because the USA, for example, holds oil reserves far greater than ours. Canada holds oil reserves far greater than Russia's. But they banned oil exports from their territory until the very last moment, because it was profitable for them to use us as a raw materials appendage. And if we run to them and say that we are ready to be a raw materials appendage, they reply: fine, be one. This competition will always exist; everyone will be squeezing wealth from each other, there will be trade wars, there will be conflicts around arms trading. And as president I will actively work to ensure that Russia has as much space as possible to pursue military interests tied to economic ones. But I repeat: this is very much a derivative of the economy. If your country is poor, you will never have a strong army and no one in the world will fear you. In reality, no one fears Russia — inside the country the propaganda will tell stories about how everyone was terrified. Who is going to be scared when the average wage in Tagil is 30,000 rubles? That's 500 dollars! If you told a worker at a US defence enterprise what they earn at Uralvagonzavod, he would laugh. Or cry. Because that is what the greatness of a country means, and that is what I will work on first and foremost. — Good, Russia has no external enemies — at least they won't be able to destroy Russia if you are elected. But what will happen to the entire Putin vertical when you become president? It is a massive system: the security services, Medvedev, Sechin, Sobyanin, Timchenko, the Rotenbergs, Kovalchuk, and so on. And all of them have their governors, mayors, controlled enterprises, spheres of influence. Isn't it more likely that they will stage a Maidan if Navalny becomes president? How will you be able to stand up to them? — First of all, it is not right to call this system Putin's. Putin simply made this system more corrupt. How does this system differ from Yeltsin's or the Soviet one? It is a state apparatus that exists and will continue to exist under any president. In that sense there are no worries that tomorrow they elect me and something immediately falls apart. Nothing will fall apart. And the second, most important thing: some of these people will of course want a Maidan, because I will deprive them of billions of dollars. Of course, when Sechin from Rosneft buys himself a yacht for 180 million dollars and names it 'Princess Olga' after his wife, when he pays himself a salary of 3.5 million rubles a day, I will tell him that, first, you will no longer be receiving that salary, and second, I will put you in prison. Of course he won't like that! But I have no doubt that I will receive far more support than Putin in Nizhny Tagil itself, when we send that entire oligarchic and bureaucratic gang to prison through an honest and fair trial. The state apparatus will restructure itself — we have seen this in many countries, from Singapore to Georgia. Look at the Baltic states — the same Soviet people... — Ukraine? — In Ukraine the situation is different — a revolution did happen there after all. And Ukraine is now practically in a state of war. But at the same time, despite Ukraine's terrible situation — war, uncertain authority, various Maidans — look at the economic growth rates: even in that terrible hell they are higher than in Russia right now. It is hard to believe, but it is actually the case. In most cases we simply see that this is the story of humanity. When a decent authority comes along, begins to generate decent signals, is not corrupt, leaves after four or eight years without trying to stay for 24, does not strangle newspapers — everything starts to work. The system of checks and balances does not allow the president to be corrupt. And it will work in Russia. I fundamentally believe that the well-known government thesis — that Russians will never have democracy, that they are not mature enough — is a typical manifestation of Russophobia. We are mature enough for everything. And I do not believe that Russians are more stupid, or more miserable, or lazier than Canadians or Finns. Definitely not, and we can live the same way. — You have previously said on multiple occasions that if you became president you would not return Crimea to Ukraine. At the same time, Trump recently stated that the sanctions — which hit not just individuals but the entire Russian economy — would be lifted if Russia returned Crimea. You promise a minimum wage of 25,000 rubles, economic growth, but doing this under sanctions will be difficult. If there is no option of a repeated referendum for Crimeans or some other arrangement, and you find yourself faced with a choice — either sanctions for another 30 years, or returning Crimea — what would you choose? — That is a false alternative. There are three types of sanctions on Russia, and the so-called Crimean sanctions are a minimal part of them. In order to lift the sectoral sanctions that damage the economy, we need to fulfil the Minsk agreements, give up on the whole Ukraine business and say: live on your own. And then the majority of sanctions will be lifted. The Crimean sanctions will remain forever — for the foreseeable future. They cannot be lifted; Crimea cannot be returned — no such mechanism exists. But these sanctions are not a major problem for the economy. Russia must stop participating in the war in Donbas. And all the money it spends on the war in Donbas, it should spend inside the country. And in Crimea we will hold a referendum, and whichever way that referendum goes, that is the direction we will move in. But, as I have said many times, there is no quick solution to the Crimea problem, just as there is no solution to the problem of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, Northern Cyprus, the northern Kuril Islands, the Falkland Islands, and so on. Crimea will be listed alongside all these territorial conflicts, of which there are many in the world. It is unresolved, but the main complaint of European countries towards Russia is that they do not want to see war on European territory. When tanks stop firing on European territory, most sanctions will be lifted from us, and they couldn't care less about Crimea. — Since 2011 you have participated in various blocs and coalitions and created your own Progress Party. But now you are a presidential candidate without a party. — The answer is very simple. Because they are afraid. The Progress Party does not participate anywhere because it was liquidated. We demanded its registration four times, went through the entire registration procedure, and only on the fourth attempt, after three years, was it registered — and then liquidated three months later. I would have had a party, and I assure you it would have been represented in the State Duma at the last elections. That is exactly why they will not let me run now — never mind the party. The Kremlin is currently saying that Navalny cannot participate in elections, even though constitutionally I can. Of course I would like to rely on a party structure; of course I would like to participate in all regional elections. I have no doubt that at least in the key centres of the country, this party would have significant political representation. But they liquidated it. As I have already said, the nationalists have been crushed — not allowed to run; democrats are not allowed to run except in the form of Yabloko or Parnas. So we are forced to do this (build a network of regional offices — editor's note). In an ideal world I would rely on the support of a party that was actively participating in parallel everywhere. — Before the presidential elections in September there will be another Unified Voting Day. Do you not think it might be possible to gain extra points as part of the presidential campaign by putting forward your candidacy in some regional elections — for example, for the post of Sverdlovsk governor? That campaign would certainly receive federal coverage and would bring you additional name recognition and ratings. — I want to participate in a campaign honestly and not for political technology purposes. That is why I state clearly which campaign I am participating in and which post I am fighting for. Here in Sverdlovsk Oblast — and this exists in few places in Russia — there are quite a few popular politicians. There is Roizman himself, and if they let him run tomorrow, he will win. There are other politicians who would win these elections against Governor Kuivashev, who is a very, very unpopular governor, effectively an appointee from Moscow, and it is unclear what he is doing. So I would gladly support independent politicians who would run in any elections here; however, I am somewhat sceptical about whether they will be allowed to run. Because for Kuivashev that would mean defeat. And I myself do not want to play games — I want to act directly. — This past week social media has been actively discussing an unexpected liberalisation of the agenda in connection with the Prosecutor General's statements on Dadin and Chudnovets, and the Kremlin's intervention in the dispute over the transfer of St. Isaac's Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church. Many have started talking about a new thaw. What do you think this represents, and how will the agenda change as March 2018 approaches? — This is not a thaw, it is sociology. The authorities have been doing an enormous number of completely stupid things. A new presidential administration came in and saw what absolute stupidities the previous Volodin administration had committed. Have you seen a single person who agreed that Chudnovets was rightly imprisoned? No. They saw that the Chudnovets case — she has no connection to politics whatsoever — turns anyone who finds out about it into a human rights activist. They saw the same with Dadin. They first passed their idiotic law on solo pickets, and then monitored public opinion — the FSO handles that for them — and saw that even Putin's core support base, the pensioners, was saying: 'What, are you stupid? You let Serdyukov go free and you're locking someone up for standing with a placard.' They realised that the Dadin case is very easy to use for criticising the regime. Because you can show any person the footage: here are Vasilyeva and Serdyukov, and here is a young man who stood with a picket sign. And any person, whether for or against Crimea, for or against Putin, will say that this is absurd. And the same with St. Isaac's. First they decided to do it because they're in charge, and then they monitored public opinion and clutched their heads. This government relies on sociology and always fears public opinion. Whenever they realise that, even despite lies, propaganda, and television, they cannot turn the tide on certain cases — even small ones — they act in the opposite direction. — As the presidential elections draw closer, will they change the agenda? — Their agenda consists of holding onto power, because for them power is money and opportunities. In that sense it will not change. But discontent with this government will objectively grow. Can they do something to increase support among the population in Nizhny Tagil? They cannot defeat corruption; they cannot raise wages either; they cannot do anything. And in each specific case they will act situationally, guided by opinion polls. — Do you have your own sociological data? — Yes, we set up our own polling service back in 2013 and wiped the floor with VTsIOM and the Levada Center — and everyone acknowledged that we were best at forecasting. We conducted sociological research when we were testing our programme... — What are the current ratings for Putin and for Navalny, according to your data? — We have not done such quantitative polls with ratings recently, because up to 50% of the population still doesn't even know who I am. How could they, if nothing is said about me on television? That is why we need to run part of the campaign before measuring any effectiveness of our work. But the most important thing we are recording is this political vacuum. People all want something different. All that approval rating they talk about is the rating of an absence of anything else. And people say in polls: yes, I suppose we'll vote for Putin — who else are we going to vote for, Zyuganov or Zhirinovsky? And when someone new appears there, everything changes very quickly. We saw this in Moscow, we saw this here in Yekaterinburg when Roizman was elected, in Novosibirsk where communist Lokot was elected, in Irkutsk Oblast. The government suffers defeats when someone new appears. That is precisely why their main focus right now is simply not letting people run in elections. The agenda will change. They had a super-mobilisation around Ukraine and the war. But how long can you ride that wave? — Will Putin make a bold move and dismiss the government before the elections? — He has never done anything like that. It is not his style. As a representative of a mafia system, he values connections, the reliability of people, their personal loyalty. The ability to, well, have a word: 'Dima, go to Gazprom, squeeze it out and send 2 billion rubles to Roldugin.' There are few people you can say that to. Even if you are Putin, tsar and emperor. He has few people with whom you can openly, as they say, sort things out. A billion here, a billion there, a Cyprus offshore account here... — Then again, he might persuade Medvedev to become the sacrificial lamb, making him, say, rector of Moscow State University or the UN representative. — Such rumours have been circulating for quite a while. But I understand that, despite everything, Medvedev is the main trusted person — Putin personally trusts him enormously. Putin has never changed his personnel; loyalty is very important to him. How does he rule? Loyalty in exchange for corruption — you are loyal to me politically, I allow you to steal whatever you want. Take Serdyukov. The Kremlin suffered enormous political damage by not imprisoning Serdyukov. Despite the fact that every little old lady in the country demanded Serdyukov's imprisonment, he did not imprison him, because Serdyukov was a reliable person — code-of-honour wise, by those mafia norms of conduct, he was his own normal guy. Why is Chubais, one of the most unpopular people in the country, still sitting in the government? Those people from NOD keep presenting me with the Chubais question, even though he works for Putin. Because from the time of their St. Petersburg mafia days, he is a reliable person. Putin is that type — the leader of a corporate state. — The patriotic activist well-known in Yekaterinburg, Ilya Belous, who set up a picket outside your headquarters, was saying before cameras today that Navalny will lose the election and then stage a Maidan, refusing to accept defeat. After the failure of the white-ribbon movement and the tightening of laws on rallies in Russia, will people take to mass protests, in your view? How possible is a revolutionary way of changing power today in general? — If the government fears revolutions, it is easiest for it to avoid this scenario. Just let everyone run in the elections! The people will not take to the streets if they see that I lost in a fair fight. There were debates, Putin won. Who is going to take to the streets? Nobody will take to the streets for a person — for me in particular. People take to the streets because of injustice. Therefore the revolutionary scenario is currently being created by the government that suppresses everything, that crushes everything. In Ukraine, the main core of the Maidan was the nationalists. And here the Kremlin regime is crushing our nationalists — some of whom were among the fighters in Donbas, like Strelkov. And former pro-Putin people will be among the most aggressive of those who take to the streets. So it is precisely the Kremlin that is creating this scenario. — Will you lead people out into the streets, or will you be preparing for the 2024 campaign? — It is bad, but it is true: only public actions throughout Russia's modern history since 2000 have produced any result. From Kondopoga to Moscow, any injustice in the country is unfortunately resolved only by taking to the streets. Because there are no other methods. There are no parties, no trade unions, no major federal media outlets. And when there is such an injustice that I am unable to resolve, I will take to the streets — and I am sure many people will be there with me.