Blogger Navalny Tries to Prove That Fighting Regime is Fun

Alexey Navalny is a Russian lawyer, former member of the board of “Yabloko” political party, and a blogger who became popular due to his online anti-corruption investigations. Time Magazine called Navalny “Russia's Erin Brockovich” [ENG]; Russian newspaper Vedomosti named him Man of the Year in 2009 [RUS]. Currently, Navalny is a World Fellow at Yale University [ENG]. On Oct. 19, 2010, he participated in the presentation of a Russian blogosphere report published by Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society and Morningside Analytics: “Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization” [ENG]. GV's RuNet Echo talked to Navalny after the presentation, which took place at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C.

Alexey, you participated in the presentation of the “Mapping the Russian Blogosphere” report. Did you find anything interesting for you in this research? Can it be helpful for Russian bloggers?

First of all, the Harvard report is useful simply because it is a Harvard report. Before this, we had several different reports describing the Russian blogosphere. But those reports were produced by organizations that were themselves market players—that is, they owned blogging platforms or something similar. Those reports were interesting, but people did not trust them. Now we have something created by an institution with a solid reputation. So I think this is the first report that can genuinely be trusted, and that alone is a major step forward for the Russian blogosphere. Second, it is important that technical methods have confirmed that the Russian blogosphere is, to a large extent, socio-political, and that bloggers who write about politics and are directly involved in politics and civic activism are the mainstream of the blogosphere, not its fringe. And interestingly, the real fringe is more likely made up of the people who go around calling everyone else fringe. The data also showed that all these petty crooks—groups like Nashi and Young Guard (pro-Kremlin youth movements)—mostly occupy the instrumental segment, among the so-called paid bloggers. On top of that, they failed to create any serious constellation on the blogosphere’s star map. It is obvious that this was a purely technological Kremlin project, and it did not succeed. That is very important for future work. It is clear that simply investing money and buying a few people to promote some idea does not work in the Russian blogosphere. It resists that kind of manipulation quite effectively.

But beyond that, there is a real question. We now have a huge amount of technical descriptive data, and it needs to be interpreted and studied seriously. It is not yet clear how exactly to do that. But at least now we have a starting point.

At one time, when you were part of the democratic movement, your colleagues accused you of nationalism. One of the report’s conclusions says there is no strong polarization between nationalist and democratic groups of bloggers. What does that finding mean to you?

For me, this is technical confirmation of some of my own ideological ideas. I have said that the division between democrats and nationalists is, in a certain sense, conditional—it is a product of the broader political nonsense we inherited from the early 1990s, when notional democrats were fighting notional communist-nationalists. That simplified political model no longer works. And today the blogosphere reflects the real political situation. There is the systemic opposition that exists in the State Duma, but in reality it represents only a tiny share of the political views that actually exist in society. And then there is the informal part, which is ten times larger. The broader opposition—all of it together—stands against the state and against specific manifestations of censorship, violence, corrupt police, and so on. So what we have is a kind of cloud that is oppositional, critical in its outlook. Within that cloud, I see that notional nationalists and notional democrats actually coexist quite comfortably, despite criticizing one another. They coordinate their actions and move in the same direction.

But in terms of how you identify yourself in the blogosphere, which cluster are you closer to—the nationalists or the democrats?

I see myself as part of the cloud. We saw these clouds. Again, Harvard, based on its own understanding of Russian political science, colored that cloud in different shades. But to me it became clear that those green dots and yellow dots are all together in the same cloud. So all this political labeling—calling some people nationalists and others democrats—is completely conditional. I see that there is a cloud. I am somewhere near the center of it. And I see that both the little green dots and the little yellow dots are working together with me. So if we stop obsessing over sticking labels on everyone—nationalists, democrats, liberals, “liberasts” (a Russian slur for liberals), fascists, and so on—then overall this cloud is playing a positive, important, necessary role.

It so happens that the most prominent political bloggers today—you and Marina Litvinovich, for example—are bloggers who became outcasts from the democratic movement, people who were once part of its offline structures and were forced to leave. How do you explain that common denominator?

That is exactly the most remarkable thing this map showed us! I will not speak for Litvinovich, but the map showed that I am not an outcast from the democratic movement. Rather, the democratic movement, in the form in which it currently exists, is itself the outcast, because the greater part of the real democratic movement exists entirely outside the framework of the three clowns who have somehow acquired a license to call themselves the democratic movement. In fact, they are the outcasts.

Alexei, at the presentation of the Harvard map, you said that you do not want to use a virtual platform for political action offline. Is that really your position? Does that mean those who argue that the Runet does not affect real political life are right?

Not exactly. I simply believe that a pure online-offline divide no longer exists. In other words, the actions I organize online have very tangible offline consequences. We organize a campaign—and a specific official gets fired. We organize a campaign—and a criminal case is either opened or not opened. In fact, there is no real division. There are not two parallel universes. I just do not think the blogosphere should now be used to directly create offline structures. There is no point wasting energy trying to organize and assemble activist cells through the internet that will then meet somewhere in Saratov and drink tea together... That is pointless right now. There is no need to use the 21st century to organize something out of the 19th. There is no need to use blogs to build Leninist-style parties with cells, branches, votes, resolutions, and so on. At this point, there is no antagonism between online and offline.

So in your view, the claim that the internet discusses but does not influence is simply wrong?

It has been wrong for the past ten years. Obviously, the internet has influence.

Not long ago, as a result of a virtual election, you became mayor of Moscow. First of all, congratulations! But beyond the congratulations, what does that victory mean to you?

I am pleased by it. Many thanks to everyone who voted for me. But I take it with irony and self-irony, because obviously the key word here is “virtual” mayor. Still, these elections show two important things. First, more than 60,000 people took part in the vote. That shows that people are deeply dissatisfied with the fact that they have no real opportunity to vote anywhere in a meaningful way. That is precisely why many bloggers took what was essentially an entertaining internet voting project quite seriously, and why they are discussing it so seriously. Second, I was, of course, surprised that I won by such a large margin, and that the places behind me were also taken by politicians and public figures from the opposition camp, while officials and actual contenders got 2–3 percent, at most 6 percent. This suggests that the authorities, despite all their power, have completely lost a certain moral and intellectual competition on the internet, which is already quite large—37 million people. There is no platform on which the authorities look convincing or are trusted. There are the websites of *Kommersant*, *Vedomosti*, *Echo of Moscow*, but even if we take non-liberal sites—conservative, entertainment, neutral, whatever—any vote on any of these internet platforms leads to the victory and moral dominance of what we call the opposition. And the authorities, despite investing enormous amounts of money, time, and personnel into their internet efforts, have failed at that work. And as internet penetration expands, as its reach grows, and as more people become daily internet users, that gap will only widen. Right now, this is the main threat to the stability of the Russian authorities.

When will the critical point come, when virtual voting will have a concrete impact in the real world? Could the virtual audience already play some significant, decisive role in the 2012 presidential election, so that the result is not only virtual?

I expect that within the next two years, when the number of people getting their news from the internet every day rises to 50 million, we will see a qualitative shift. In other words, the internet will become much more powerful, and the role of public opinion generated online in decision-making will grow many times over. However, I do not think this will have a serious impact on the direct outcome of the 2012 election. It will have a serious impact on the course of the campaign, on its messaging, on the discussion around it. In fact, the authorities will shape their messaging and everything else by looking at what is happening on the internet. For them, the internet is like a giant focus group. The Russian authorities are characterized by being highly populist. They simply do what people want from them—so long as it does not fundamentally contradict their own ambitions or interests. But in any case, the entire election agenda will be tested and trial-run on the internet. In that sense, the internet will have significant influence, but it will not directly affect the result. Putin will safely become president again.

What about a situation where one leader plays to the internet and another ignores it... Could that have any effect?

Well, in fact, although Medvedev is seen as someone who pays close attention to the internet, the people who actually live on the internet view that quite ironically. It comes across as a funny guy playing with an iPhone, an iPad, and a Tamagotchi. So I would not say that Medvedev’s attempts to flirt with the internet and look like some kind of geek in a positive sense help him very much.

Moving from politics to a broader question: what is a blog for you? Is it a political platform, an information platform, a tool for fighting something?

A blog is everything to us. In today’s Russia, a blog is a means of gathering information, spreading information, organizing civic campaigns, and creating media-driven political pressure. Blogs work, in principle. A blog is your own personal mass medium, only interactive. If I write, “Guys, I need to find a specialist in building design to analyze some corrupt scheme in construction,” I find those specialists through the blog. If necessary, I call on everyone through the blog to file complaints with the antimonopoly service, and thousands of people do it. A blog is a universal tool that is not purely online. Online and offline are connected through the blog. In this way, real people in real places—for example, sitting in their apartments—are coordinated to write complaints that are then reviewed by a real police officer, some officer named Petya sitting in the Cheryomushki district police department.

How do you explain the success of your blog and its transformation into an effective mobilization platform that draws a large audience around it?

I think my blog stands out and enjoys a certain level of support—and I am very grateful to everyone who supports it—because I offer practical steps for applying pressure. My concept is not simply to say, “Look, official Ivan Petrov is a crook.” My concept is to say, “Look—official Ivan Petrov is a crook because he did this, this, and this, so now let’s all do steps one, two, and three together to get crook Ivan Petrov sent to prison.” That is my basic concept. I offer solutions. They may be more or less effective. We may win. We may lose. But in any case, I do not want to just shout. I involve people in direct confrontation. In other words, we put pressure on the authorities. But I try to do it in a somewhat entertaining format. I am trying to prove to everyone that fighting the regime can be fun.

At the same time, your blog gained prominence in part through specific investigative stories, including corruption at VTB and the death of Magnitsky. How possible would such investigations have been without a blog, and how effective was the blog in this context as a tool for investigation and anti-corruption work?

Without a blog, this could have been done in America, for example, because an investigation into corruption at a major bank would have attracted the attention of traditional media. In Russia, it could only be done through a blog. Through the blog, I announced that these facts existed and that I was conducting an investigation. Through the blog, I gathered other VTB shareholders who filed complaints together with me. Through the blog, I found leasing specialists, experts on drilling rigs, and so on. Through the blog, I found other insiders who told me what was happening with those rigs now. In other words, I coordinated the entire campaign through the blog. The blog gives me information, and then I serve as the direct link between the online investigation and specific individuals. I formalize all the information I find in the form of complaints and court cases.

How successful do you consider the outcome of that investigation?

Well, it depends on how you measure success. If you ask me whether I managed to put Kostin, the head of VTB, in prison, the answer is no, and apparently that will be extremely difficult in the near future simply because of the political situation, since Kostin is, in effect, the state. And at the very least, he has no desire to imprison himself. However, this became the most discussed issue at the VTB shareholders’ meeting; it is one of the most painful issues VTB is dealing with right now. In other words, VTB is genuinely afraid of this situation. We forced them, at a minimum, to do something about those drilling rigs, and they started moving. I am convinced that this investigation at least made corruption at VTB more sophisticated and more cautious. Where they may once have stolen 70 percent, now perhaps they steal 40 percent. They are still stealing, but at least they are afraid to do it so openly.

And in the Magnitsky case, how much has actually been possible to achieve?

In the Magnitsky case, I am certainly not playing the leading role by any means. In a sense, I simply use the blog to inform people about what is happening there. This situation is, of course, the most outrageous of all. We remember that Medvedev also said he demanded an investigation, and so on, yet nothing has changed. And in this case, the interests of the FSB, the police, senior officials, and judges are all entangled; they are directly responsible for the fact that a man was tortured and killed. For them, this is not just some anti-corruption investigation—it is a concrete criminal case after which they should all be in prison. And here we are facing colossal resistance from the state and law enforcement agencies. But my blog, and other blogs covering the case, help keep the Magnitsky case on a knife-edge, in the spotlight.

Speaking about the future of the fight against corruption, what directions do you see for the use of the internet and blogs? How can this be made more effective?

Right now, you can do almost anything through a blog. The latest successful example is the fight against fake tenders in the IT sector. That can be replicated... What is needed here is not more blogs or internet solutions as such, but people who are ready to do this work. If there is a person who wants to do it, it is now fairly easy for them to find supporters and experts. In other words, blogs and the internet are currently a very convenient environment that can be used for a real fight against corruption in any field, against injustice, against anything illegal.

People often say there is no censorship on the Runet, but that the main form of control is through threats against bloggers. Organizations like VTB are powerful structures, and your investigations struck at their commercial interests. Were there concerns about your safety or direct threats?

I have never received threats connected with the cases I work on. From time to time there are strange phone calls or strange cars following me... It does happen, though not very often, but I have never received any direct threats personally. I think this is exaggerated to some extent. Of course, they can easily take out a specific person in three seconds—me included—but some people will resist longer, some less, some will break earlier, some later. Still, there is no need to exaggerate their ability to pressure everyone. When they see that a fairly large, organized group is standing against them, they are more likely to back down.

Do you not see a scenario in which the screws are tightened on the internet?

I can see that they are exploring that possibility, and there are probably technical solutions—for example, the Chinese model. However, I think that moving in that direction would provoke very strong resistance, and the consequences for the authorities would be far more dangerous than a free internet.

Alexei, what are your future plans on the internet? Do you intend to modify your blog in some way or use other platforms? Can we speak of creative plans in the fight against corruption?

My colleagues and I are looking for new technical solutions, which in fact already exist in large numbers in the West. The same goes for Ushahidi, which I linked to the “Ushahidi for Potholes” project, as well as a couple of other anti-corruption projects. We are experimenting and carefully studying what has been done in other countries in order to bring ready-made technological solutions to Russia. In principle, we could invent all of this ourselves. But why waste time if it has already been invented for us and people are ready to share it with us? Corruption is not something unique to Russia. In many countries around the world, corruption exists on a scale no smaller than ours. In some places it is fought successfully; in others, less successfully. In any case, there are many successful projects. We need to study them, bring them to Russia, and replicate them.

And what is the idea behind the “Ushahidi for Potholes” project?

Russia’s Code of Administrative Offenses states that if there is a pothole in the road deeper than 50 centimeters and longer than 80 centimeters, that means: a) the pothole must be repaired immediately, and b) the specific official responsible for that road—and every road has an official responsible for it—must be fined for failing to act. So we are going to try to use this simple Article 12.34 of the administrative code to organize activists around a very simple goal: get the potholes outside your home repaired and punish the official responsible for them. Under the law, they have no option but to penalize that official. And we will try to build a project that really gets under the authorities’ skin. Through this project, we will also identify activists who are interested in this, people who are genuinely active, and perhaps try to involve them in future projects.

And one final, more personal question. How much time does running a blog like this take? How do you have any time left for work after that?

I like my blog, and I find it very interesting to read comments and communicate with people there, but you have to understand that while the blog helps you, in a certain sense you become a slave to it. First of all, people are constantly demanding things from you: that you write, that you not write... If you post something from your personal life, I constantly see comments like: “You have no right to use your blog to write this kind of nonsense about your personal life—write about corruption and the struggle instead.” In that sense, the blog stops being your personal property and becomes something bigger. Morally speaking, you are no longer the master of your own blog. Second, right now about 50,000 people read me every day. If I write nothing, by the third day that drops to 20,000; after a week, 2,000; and after two weeks, only your mother will still be checking to see whether you have posted anything. So if you want to run a popular blog, you have to write something from time to time and keep saying something. That is what is so good about the internet: the audience is very fluid, and nobody is going to fuss over Navalny if Navalny does nothing for a month. Those are the rules of the genre.

Thank you, Alexei!